JUDGMENT Arun Kumar Goel, J.—All the petitioners have challenged the order dated 14.7.1999 passed by learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Chamba, whereby they have been ordered to be summoned, as accused. I have heard the learned Counsel for the parties and with their assistance record of the trial Court has been examined. 2. In this behalf, it may be worthwhile to notice that two First Information Reports were lodged with Police Station, Sadar, Chamba. One was F.I.R. No. 278/94. This F.I.R. was registered at the instance of respondent No. 2 under Sections 356/506/34 I.P.C. The other F.I.R. No. 277/94 was registered under Sections 336/506/34 I.P.C. Since both the F.I.Rs. pertained to the incident alleged to have taken place at the same time and same place, in all fairness, as well as, with a view to avoid conflicting decisions, should have been investigated by the same officer and thereafter should have further been sent for trial simultaneously. 3. Fact remains that the case arising out of F.I.R. No. 277/94, was sent for trial before the Court below. After recording evidence and after considering respective submissions in this case, the accused, namely Jasbeer Singh, Rohit Parkash Chaudhary, Dharam Chand, Dr. Pradeep Saini and Ramesh Chand, all were acquitted. 4. State has preferred Criminal Appeal No. 53 of 2000, whereas after completion of investigations in the case, arising out of FIR No. 278/94, it was observed by the police that the complaint is false. So, on one hand cancellation report was submitted, and on the other proceedings under Section 182 I.P.C. were ordered to be initiated against the complainant, (Jasbeer Singh in this case). On receipt of this report from the police, trial Court ordered issuance of notice to the said complainant. He preferred a protest petition before the trial Court. Matter came for consideration before the Court below. 5. Instead of ordering further investigation or accepting the cancellation report etc., trial Court recorded the statements of four witnesses and has thereafter passed the impugned order summoning the petitioners. In this case arguments were heard and judgment was reserved on 10.5.2002. While going through the records, it was felt that Criminal Appeal No. 53 of 2000 also needs to be heard. As such it was ordered accordingly on 25.5.2000. In these circumstances, this matter alongwith Cr. Appeal No. 53 of 2000, was heard on 31.5.2002. In this case arguments were heard and judgment was reserved on 10.5.2002. While going through the records, it was felt that Criminal Appeal No. 53 of 2000 also needs to be heard. As such it was ordered accordingly on 25.5.2000. In these circumstances, this matter alongwith Cr. Appeal No. 53 of 2000, was heard on 31.5.2002. Thereby both these cases are being disposed of simultaneously, but by separate judgments. 6. Shri Chandel, learned Counsel appearing for the petitioners, submitted that accepting everything to be correct (for the sake of argument and without conceding), with special emphasis on the statements of PWs 1 to 4, no offence is made out on the basis whereof his clients-petitioners could be ordered to be summoned. While advancing his this line of argument he pointed out that at this stage, scope of examination, as well as, interference is very limited. According to him, despite all these limitations summoning order have been passed in a mechanical and perfunctory manner. Therefore, this Court, at this stage, can look into the material available on the file and then deal with the case. Another submission, in this behalf, was that while considering the case, the learned Court below ought to have taken into account the evidence recorded by the police, as well as, its recommendations. 7. So far the parameters of interference by this Court at the summoning stage is concerned, the matter is well settled by the Honble Apex Court. Reference to some of the decisions would be made in this behalf. In Rajendra Nath Mahato v. T. Gangooly, Deputy Superintendent of Police, Purulia and others, AIR 1972 Supreme Court 470, it was held as under:— "10. In the present case there was no order of transfer of the case by Shri Ganguly to Shri Sarkar. The issue of process is a matter for judicial determination. Before issuing a process the Magistrate has to examine the complainant. That is why the issue of process is by the Magistrate who was taken cognizance or the Magistrate to whom the case has been transferred. The High Court, therefore correctly quashed the issue of process. 11. It was contended on behalf of the appellant that the High Court should not have gone to the question as to whether a prima facie case was established or not. The High Court, therefore correctly quashed the issue of process. 11. It was contended on behalf of the appellant that the High Court should not have gone to the question as to whether a prima facie case was established or not. The High Court under Sections 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure can go into the question as to whether there is any legal evidence. When the High Court said that the evidence in the present case came from tainted sources and was not reliable the High Court meant what can be described as no case to go to the jury." In Dr. Sharda Prasad Sinha v. State of Bihar, AIR 1977 Supreme Court 1754, a three Judges Bench observed as under:— "It is now settled law that where the allegations set out in the complaint or the charge-sheet do not constitute any offence, it is competent to the High Court exercising its inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure to quash the order passed by the Magistrate taking cognizance of the offence." To similar effect, are the decisions reported in State of Haryana v. Chaudhary Bhajan Lal and others, AIR 1992 S.C. 604 and in S.N. Palanitkar and others I v. State of Bihar and another, AIR 2001 S.C. 2960. In Ashok Chaturvedi and others v. Shitul H. Chanchani and another, (1998) 7 Supreme Court Cases 698, while dealing with the powers of the Court, it was observed as under:— "5. But the question that yet remains for consideration is whether the allegations made in the petition of complaint together with statements made by the complainant and the witnesses before the Magistrate taken on their face value, do make the offence for which the Magistrate has taken cognizance of? The learned Counsel for the respondent in this connection had urged that the accused had a right to put this argument at the time of framing charges, and therefore, this Court should not interfere with the order of the Magistrate taking cognizance, at this stage. The learned Counsel for the respondent in this connection had urged that the accused had a right to put this argument at the time of framing charges, and therefore, this Court should not interfere with the order of the Magistrate taking cognizance, at this stage. This argument, however, does not appeal to us inasmuch as merely because an accused has a fight to plead at the time of framing of charges that there is no sufficient material for such framing of charges as provided in Section 245 of the Criminal Procedure Code, he is debarred from approaching the court even at an earliest (sic earlier) point of time when the Magistrate takes cognizance of the offence and summons the accused to appear to contend that the very issuance of the order of taking cognizance is invalid on the ground that no offence can be said to have been made out on the allegations made in the complaint petition. It has been held in a number of cases that power under Section 482 has to be exercised sparingly and in the interest of justice. But allowing the criminal proceeding to continue even where the allegations in the complaint petition do not make out any offence would be tantamount to an abuse of the process of court, and therefore, there cannot be any dispute that in such case power under Section 482 of the Code can be exercised. Bearing in mind the parameters laid down by this Court in several decisions for exercise of power under Section 482 of the Code, we have examined the allegations made in the complaint petition and the statement of the complainant and the two other witnesses made on oath before the Magistrate. We are clearly of the opinion that the necessary ingredients of any of the offences have not been made out so far as the appellants are concerned. We are clearly of the opinion that the necessary ingredients of any of the offences have not been made out so far as the appellants are concerned. The petition of complaint is a vague one and excepting the bald allegation that the shares of the complainant have been transferred on forged signatures, nothing further has been stated and there is not an iota of material to indicate how all or any of these appellants are involved in the so-called allegation of forgery The statement of the complainant on oath as well as his witnesses do not improve the position in any manner, and therefore, in our considered opinion, even if the allegations made in the complaint petition and the statement of the complainant and his witnesses are taken on their face value, the offence under Sections 406, 420, 467, 468 and 120-B of the Indian Penal Code cannot be said to have been made out. This being the position, the impugned order of the Magistrate taking cognizance of the offence dated 5.2.1996 so far as it relates to the appellants cannot be sustained and the High Court also committed error in not invoking its power under Section 482 of the Code. In the aforesaid premises, the impugned order of the High Court as well as the order of the Magistrate dated 5.2.1996 taking cognizance of the offence as against the appellants stand quashed." In Punjab National Bank and others v. Surendra Prasad Sinha, 1992 Cri. LJ. 2916 (Supreme Court) held as under:— "It is also salutary to note that judicial process should not be an instrument of oppression or needless harassment. The complaint was laid impleading the Chairman, the Managing Director of the Bank by name and a host of officers. There lies responsibility and duty on the Magistracy to find whether the concerned accused should be legally responsible for the offence charged for. Only on satisfying that the law casts liability or creates offence against the juristic person or the persons impleaded then only process would be issued. At that stage the Court would be circumspect and judicious in exercising discretion and should take all the relevant facts and circumstances into consideration before issuing process lest it would be an instrument in the hands of the private complaint as vendetta to harass the persons needlessly. At that stage the Court would be circumspect and judicious in exercising discretion and should take all the relevant facts and circumstances into consideration before issuing process lest it would be an instrument in the hands of the private complaint as vendetta to harass the persons needlessly. Vindication of majesty of justice and maintenance of law and order in the society are the prime objects of criminal justice but it would not be the means to wreak personal vengeance. Considered from any angle we find that the respondent had abused the process and laid complaint against all the appellants without any prima facie case to harass them for vendetta." 8. In the present case, when statements of all the PWs (to which reference will be made hereinafter), are read together, no case for having issued process is made out. PW-1 is Jasbeer Singh complainant himself. Per him, he has a Kothi at Khajjiar, which was given to him by Gurbachan Singh, who was issueless. On the upper side of this kothi, there is another Kothi of Sukhjit Singh son of Paramjit Singh, Sukhjeet Singh had entered into an agreement to sell this house (kothi) in March 1988 for a sum of Rs.1,90,000/- with Ramesh Saini and who is in possession. Whereas this witness was caretaker of this Kothi. He had engaged a Chowkidar. In this Kothi, his chhoti mami (aunt) Elizabeths belongings were lying. Twenty days prior to 26.9.1994 (date of incident), Rashid Mohammad petitioner had broken the lock of the Kothi after extending threats. He was accompanied by Sh. Tej Pratap and Inder Partap. Regarding this, an oral complaint was made to the S.H.O. Per him, on 26.9.1994, he went to his kothi at Khajjiar with his wife. Ramesh Chand, Rohit Chaudhary and Pardeep Saini stayed with him. Ramesh Chand has his kothi at Dalhousie, who had come from there. Electricity went off, as such Electrician was called to repair it. Electricity supply was erratic. During this period at 9.00 p.m. Samarjeet etc. started firing. This continued upto 25-30 minutes. While firing, they were using filthy abuses. Rasheed Mohammad was saying that a tank of diesel should be brought and kothi be set on fire. This incident was witnessed by him from the rear window of his kothi. Inder Partap, Tej Partap, Rasheed Mohammad, Kulwant Singh and Ravinder Singh were also there. started firing. This continued upto 25-30 minutes. While firing, they were using filthy abuses. Rasheed Mohammad was saying that a tank of diesel should be brought and kothi be set on fire. This incident was witnessed by him from the rear window of his kothi. Inder Partap, Tej Partap, Rasheed Mohammad, Kulwant Singh and Ravinder Singh were also there. There were 10-15 persons behind, in whose hands 5-6 guns were there. According to this witness, he rang up to Sh. Tehal Singh, XEM. about this incident who sent the police to the spot. Police lodged a complaint, but they did not record statement of any of his witnesses. 9. PW-2 is Smt. Kailaso Devi. According to her, she works as a Chowkidar on the Kothis of Jasbeer Singh for the last 40-45 years. About 4-5 years ago, when she was cooking food in the upper wall kothi at arount 8.00 p.m., Inder Pratap Singh, Tej Pratap and Rasheed Mohammad and 10-15 more persons asked her to get out of the kothi, as it belongs to them. She told them that she may be permitted to cook the food, but she was forcibly turned out and thus people came into possession. Then she went to the kothi on the lower side. 10. PW-3 is Satya Prakash, Electrician. Per him, on 26.9.1994, he went to the Kothi of Jasbeer Singh at Khajjiar at about 8.00 p.m. to remove the electricity fault. It took about half to 3/4 of an hour. During this period, from the kothi on upper side, there was lot of noise and abuses were being heard. When the witness was about to leave for his residence, he heard sound of gun shots. This continued for about one hour intermittently. These were being fired from the kothi on the upper side. 11. PW-4 is Ramesh Saini. According to this witness, on 26.9.1994, he was staying with Jasbeer Singh (illegible) at khajjiar. It was at about 8.00 p.m. when the light went out of order. It took about half to 3/4th of an hour for removing the fault. When the fault was removed. Inder Pratap Singh, Tej Pratap Singh and 10-15 persons were using filthy abuses in the names of mother and sister to Jasbeer Singh. They were armed with guns in their hands. It took about half to 3/4th of an hour for removing the fault. When the fault was removed. Inder Pratap Singh, Tej Pratap Singh and 10-15 persons were using filthy abuses in the names of mother and sister to Jasbeer Singh. They were armed with guns in their hands. Rasheed Mohammad was saying that a tank of diesel may be brought and kothi may be put at fire. During this period, they fired atleast 20-25 gun shots. According to him, this instance was witnessed by them from the rear window of the kothi of Jasbeer Singh after it was opened. Jakhir Singh telephonically informed Sh. Tehal Singh, XEN. regarding this incident and police then came on the spot. This is the entire prosecution evidence. 12. As already observed, file of the case arising out of F.I.R. No.277/ 1994 was also heard simultaneously. Therefore, a reference is also made to the said file for limited purpose. What emerges from this file is that Inder Pratap Singh, Rasheed Mohd., Dr. Vishal Mahajan, are the prosecution witnesses in that case. Whereas accused in this case have been named in the preceding paras. In the instant case, Inder Pratap Singh, his father Tej Pratap Singh, Rasheed Mohammad, Kulwant Singh another person have been ordered to be summoned for having committed offences under Sections 504/506 IPC as well as under the Arms Act. Trial Court ought to have kept in view the decision of the Supreme Court in Nathi Lal and others v. State of U.P. and another, 1990 (Supp) SCC 145. This decision of the Apex Court has been followed more in its breach than compliance by the Court which position is writ large. Leaving the matter here only in the circumstances of this case, the pleas on behalf of the parties are being examined hereinafter. 13. With a view to controvert what was urged on behalf of petitioners, Mr. Anand Sharma, learned counsel for respondent No.2 forcefully urged that the petition is premature and this Court should not on the basis of the evidence, referred to herein above, interfere with the summoning order. According to him, it is based on proper consideration and calls for no interference. Per him, it will pre-empt the decision of the case without its trial, which will not only be against, but shall also be contrary to the spirit of law. 14. Alternatively, it was urged by Mr. According to him, it is based on proper consideration and calls for no interference. Per him, it will pre-empt the decision of the case without its trial, which will not only be against, but shall also be contrary to the spirit of law. 14. Alternatively, it was urged by Mr. Sharma, that the petitioners will get ample opportunity to question the legality as well as validity of the impugned summoning order by challenging the same before the trial Court. Therefore, he prayed that the petition be dismissed. Shri Sharma, with a view to advance his case, referred to a number precedents, to which a reference will be made hereinafter. 15. First decision relied was in the case of M/s. India Carat Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Karnataka and another, AIR 1989 Supreme Court 885. So far as legal proposition laid down in this decision is concerned, there is no quarrel. The question is after having not accepted the report of the police, the trial Court chose to take cognizance and then record evidence. Still the core question is, whether any case is made out on the basis of the evidence recorded as well as the materials which were before the Court or not? In this view of the matter, this decision does not advance the case of respondent No. 2. 16. Next decision referred to was in K. Sham Rao v. A.R. Diwakar, 1980 Cri. L.J. 347, is also to similar effect. In this case amongst other things, it was held, that after the matter was referred to the police for investigation and on report to the Magistrate under Section 156(3); and on its basis refusal by the Magistrate to take cognizance of the complaint was held to be illegal. It was further held in this decision that Magistrate should have taken cognizance under Section 200 and an opportunity should have been given to the complainant to prove his case. When a reference is made to this decision in context of the present case, trial Court had correctly proceeded in the matter. As such, no benefit can be derived from this decision also. 17. He also referred to the decision in Anil Saran v. State of Bihar and another, 1996 Cri. When a reference is made to this decision in context of the present case, trial Court had correctly proceeded in the matter. As such, no benefit can be derived from this decision also. 17. He also referred to the decision in Anil Saran v. State of Bihar and another, 1996 Cri. LJ 408 (Supreme Court) and pointed out that once process was issued by the trial Court after being satisfied that a prima facie case is made out, then whether the accused is liable or what defences are open to him were not to be considered at that stage. This decision is not relevant in the context of present case, because the statements of PWs 1 to 4 in no circumstances, spell out any case, much enabling the trial to have passed the impugned summoning order Annexure P-l with this petition. 18. Regarding the opinion having been formulated by the learned Magistrate below after recording evidence of the witnesses examined by the complainant that reasonable ground exists to summon the accused; High Court of Allahabad held that no illegality is done by the trial Court and High Court should not substantiate its findings recorded by the Magistrate. Reference to this decision will be made during the course of discussion hereinafter. 19. When evidence referred to hereinabove, is examined on the touch stone of the decisions of the Supreme Court referred to hereinabove, prima facie no case either under Sections 504 or 506 IPC much less of Arms Act is made out. When statements of all the PWs examined before passing the impugned summoning order by the learned trial Magistrate are seen, those are general in nature without attributing any particular act to any of the petitioners. Firing had taken for half an hour and 3/4th of an hour. There are two versions given by the PWs. Number of people were armed with guns. In these circumstances and on the basis of these general statements, none of the petitioners could have been summoned. Summoning order is not to be passed in a mechanical manner. Reason being, that it visits the persons summoned with the serious consequences. He has to face a trial and arrange for bail. This does not mean that where a case is prima facie made out, persons, like the petitioners cannot be summoned. 20. Summoning order is not to be passed in a mechanical manner. Reason being, that it visits the persons summoned with the serious consequences. He has to face a trial and arrange for bail. This does not mean that where a case is prima facie made out, persons, like the petitioners cannot be summoned. 20. With a view to make out a case under Section 504 IPC, mere using of filthy abuses without intention to cause annoyance or breach of peace, no offence is made out under this Section. 21. Similarly, before an offence of criminal intimidation can be made out, it must be established prima facie, that the accused persons (like petitioners in the present case), intended to cause an alarm to the complainant party i.e. Jasbeer Singh. Mere threats, as alleged by him, extended by the petitioners, with a view to deter the complainant from interfering with what the petitioner is believed to be his exclusive property would not constitute offence of criminal intimidation. 22. Trial Magistrate while passing an order like the one impugned in this petition, is supposed to examine the whole record before it and then proceed further in accordance with law. He is neither a mere post office nor an order is to be passed in a mechanical manner. It is a judicial act and must be, prima facie, supported on the basis of evidence adduced before the Court. This observation assumes significance keeping in view the cancellation report, as well as, action under Section 182 I.P.C. recommended by the police. While not accepting the same, degree of duty was higher upon the trial Court, who should have ensured and there is legal and enough evidence which atleast pointed to one and irresistible conclusion leading to the guilt of the accused persons, like the petitioners, if the present case, if such statements are accepted on their face value. This is not the case made out from the statements of PWs 1 to 4. Merely having discussed the evidence without weighing its evidentiary value in law, process has been ordered to be issued, therefore, the impugned order cannot be upheld. This legal position does not call for citing any precedent. 23. No other point is urged. This is not the case made out from the statements of PWs 1 to 4. Merely having discussed the evidence without weighing its evidentiary value in law, process has been ordered to be issued, therefore, the impugned order cannot be upheld. This legal position does not call for citing any precedent. 23. No other point is urged. In view of the aforesaid discussion, this petition is allowed and as a consequence of it, order dated 14.7.1999, passed by learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Chamba, in protest petition (private complaint) No. 534-1/99 /96-11/2001 titled as State of H.P. v. Inder Pratap Singh and others, FIR No. 278/94, alongwith all other proceedings in this case, is hereby quashed and set aside. Bonds, if any, furnished by the petitioners before the trial Court are ordered to be discharged. Petition allowed.