JUDGMENT 1. 1. This writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India has been filed by the petitioner on 2-9-2002 against the respondents with the prayer that by an appropriate writ, order or direction, the impugned order dated 26-8- 2002 (Annex.1) passed by the respondent no. 2 Dy. Legal Remembrancer, Department of Panchayati Raj, Government of Rajasthan, Jaipur by which the petitioner was put under suspension, be quashed and set aside. 2. The case of the petitioner as put forward by him in this writ petition is as follows:- The petitioner was elected as Pradhan of Panchayat Samiti, Reodar in the month of February, 2000. The case of the petitioner is that he was working on the post of Pradhan with honesty and dedication, but due to some enmity, FIR No. 247/2002 was registered against him at Police Station C.P.S., Anti Corruption Bureau, Jaipur on 12-8-2002 under the provisions of Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (hereinafter referred to as "the Act or 1988") pertaining to a trap which was laid on 8-8-2002 and Rs. 11,000/- were recovered from the drawer. The further case of the petitioners is that before the challan was filed, the impugned order Annex.1 dated 26-8-2002 placing the petitioner under suspension was passed by the respondent No. 2 under sub-section (4) of Section 38 of the Rajasthan Panchayati Raj Act, 1994 (hereinafter referred to as "the act 1994") and the same was passed without giving any notice to the petitioner. In this writ petition, the impugned suspension order Annex. 1 has been challenged by the petitioner on various grounds and the main grounds are as follows:- (i) That Section 38 (1) of the Act of 1994 which deals with the removal and suspension, says that the State Government may pass an order of suspension after giving an opportunity of hearing to the person concerned and since in the present case, no opportunity of hearing was given to the petitioner before passing the impugned order of suspension Annex.1 dated 26- 8-2002, therefore, the said order Annex.1 becomes bad in law and liable to be set aside. (ii) That no challan has been filed against the petitioner and, therefore, in absence of that, he could not be suspended. (iii) That in the impugned suspension order Annex. (ii) That no challan has been filed against the petitioner and, therefore, in absence of that, he could not be suspended. (iii) That in the impugned suspension order Annex. 1, it has been mentioned that an enquiry under Section 38(1) of the Act of 1994 is under contemplation against the petitioner, but no such enquiry was initiated on that day and thus, as per the provisions of Section 38(4) of the Act of 1994 before passing the order of suspension enquiry should have been initiated under subsection (1) of Section 38 and in absence of that, mere contemplation of enquiry would not be sufficient and from this point of view also, the impugned suspension order Annex. 1 is bad in law and liable to be set aside. 3. Hence, this writ petition with the prayer as stated above. 4. A reply to the writ petition was filed by the respondents and it was averred by them that since a criminal case under the provisions of the Act of 1988 was registered against the petitioner, therefore, he was suspended vide order Annex. 1 dated 26-8-2002. It was further averred by the respondents that on 23-8-2002, record was scanned and it was proposed to initiate enquiry against the petitioner on 23-8-2002, which was approved by the Director, Local Bodies and Secretary to Government of Rajasthan and Minister of Panchayati Raj Department on 26-8-2002 and, thereafter, a charge-sheet was also served upon the petitioner and the petitioner was afforded an opportunity of hearing to file reply by 16-9-2002. In these circumstances, the impugned order of suspension Annex. 1 cannot be said to be bad in law. Furthermore, the petitioner is not entitled to invoke the extraordinary writ jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, as the impugned suspension order Annex. 1 was passed in accordance with law. Hence, the writ petition filed by the petitioner be dismissed. 5. I have heard the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner and the learned counsel appearing for the respondents and gone through the materials available on record.Point No. 1 6. 1 was passed in accordance with law. Hence, the writ petition filed by the petitioner be dismissed. 5. I have heard the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner and the learned counsel appearing for the respondents and gone through the materials available on record.Point No. 1 6. So far as the point No. 1 that no opportunity of hearing was given to the petitioner before passing the impugned suspension order Annex.1 is concerned, it may be stated here that in the case of suspension, principles of natural justice are not applicable and therefore, giving of opportunity of hearing to the petitioner before passing the impugned suspension order Annex. 1 was not necessary. Hence, the argument No. 1 stands rejected.Points No. 2 and 3 7. To appreciate the contentions of the petitioner as well as the respondents, the relevant provisions of Section 38 of the Act of 1994 is reproduced hereinbelow:- "Sec.38. Removal and suspension.- (1) The State Government may, by order in writing and after giving him an opportunity of being heard and making such enquiry as may be deemed necessary, remove from office any member including a chairperson or a deputy chairperson of a Panchayati Raj Institution, who (a) refuses to act or becomes incapable of acting as such; or (b) is guilty of misconduct in the discharge of duties or any disgraceful conduct; Provided that any enquiry under this sub-section may, even after the expiry of the term of the Panchayati Raj Institution concerned be initiated or, if already initiated before such expiry, be continued thereafter and 'in any such case, the State Government shall, by order in writing, record its findings on the charges levelled. (2) ................... (3) ................... (4) The State Government may suspend any member including a chairperson or a deputy chairperson of a Panchayati Raj Institution against whom an enquiry has been initiated under sub-section (1) or against whom any criminal proceedings in regard to an offence involving moral turpitude is pending trial in a Court of law and such person shall stand debarred from taking part in any act or proceeding of the Panchayati Raj Institution concerned while being under such suspension. Provided .............. Provided further ............ (5) ....................... 8. Provided .............. Provided further ............ (5) ....................... 8. So far as the suspension is concerned, the relevant provision is sub-section (4) of Section 38 and it contemplates suspension on two grounds:- (i) when an enquiry has been initiated under sub-section (1) of Section 38; or (ii) against whom any criminal proceedings in regard to an offence involving moral turpitude is pending trial in a Court of law. 9. In the present case, in the impugned suspension order Annex. 1 dated 26-8-2002, it is mentioned that since an enquiry under section 38(1) of the Act of 1994 is under contemplation against the petitioner, therefore, by virtue of Section 38(4) of the Act of 1994, the petitioner was put under suspension. Meaning thereby so far as the second ground of suspension as contained in sub-section (4) of Section 38 is concerned, that was not taken into consideration while passing the impugned suspension order Annex. 1 against the petitioner. 10. Apart from this Court in Smt. Geeta Devi v. State of Raj. (S. B. Civil Writ Petition No. 1779/ 2001 decided on 17-5-2001) while interpreting Section 38 of the Act of 1994 has taken the view that since in sub-section (4) of Section 38, the word is "pending trial in a Court of law", therefore, mere registration of case would not be sufficient to pass an order of suspension under Section 38(4) of the Act of 1994 and in that case, suspension order was set aside by this Court. This is another matter. 11. However, if the charge-sheet has been filed, then it can be said that criminal proceedings are pending in a Court of law, but that challan was also filed after passing the impugned suspension order Annex. 1. 12. Now the question for consideration is whether on contemplation of enquiry, an order of suspension, as passed in this case, can be passed under section 38(4) of the Act of 1994 or not. 13. From perusing the impugned suspension order dated 26-8-2002 (Annex.1), it is very much clear that an enquiry on that day against the petitioner was under contemplation, but the wordings embodied in Section 38(4) of the Act of 1994 reveal that an order of suspension could be passed against whom an enquiry has been initiated under sub-section (1) of Section 38. 14. Since in the present case from perusing the impugned suspension order Annex. 14. Since in the present case from perusing the impugned suspension order Annex. 1, it cannot be inferred that an enquiry was already initiated against the petitioner, but was under contemplation and, therefore, in these circumstances, the compliance of wordings of Section 38(4) of the Act of 1994 was not made by the respondents while passing the impugned suspension order Annex. 1 against the petitioner and, therefore, from this point of view, the impugned suspension order Annex. 1 is bad in law and cannot be sustained. 15. The learned counsel for the respondents has submitted that contemplation of enquiry and initiation of enquiry should be taken in the same manner and for that she has placed reliance on the decisions of this Court in Mohanlal v. The State of Rajasthan, 1963 ILR Rajasthan 259 and Ugam See Modi v. State of Rajasthan, ILR 1961 Rajasthan 892 . 16. So far as the decision in the case of Mohanlal (supra) is concerned, it may be stated here that case was under the provisions of Section 63(4) of the Rajasthan Municipalities Act, 1959 and, therefore, since in Section 38(4) of the Act of 1994, there are clear words that an enquiry should have been initiated before passing an order of suspension and thus, that authority would not be helpful to the respondents. Similarly, the authority in the case of Ugam See Modi (supra) would not be helpful to the respondents. 17. For the reasons stated above, the impugned suspension order Annex. 1 dated 26-8- 2002 cannot be sustained as it was issued in violation of the provisions of Sub-section (4) of Section 38 of the Act of 1994 and thus, liable to be set aside and this writ petition deserves to be allowed.Accordingly, this writ petition filed by the petitioner is allowed and the impugned suspension order dated 26-8-2002 (Annex. 1) passed by the respondent No. 2 Dy. Legal Remembrancer, Department of Panchayati Raj, Government of Rajasthan, Jaipur is set aside.However, it is made clear that if the concerned authorities pass a fresh order of suspension against the petitioner taking in view the provisions of sub-section (4) of Section 38 of the Act of 1994, then this order would not come in their way, in other words, they are at liberty to pass a fresh suspension order at any time against the petitioner in accordance with law.No order as to costs.Petition allowed. *******