JUDGMENT 1. - This second appeal has been preferred against the judgment and decree of the First Appellate Court dated 20.2.2001 by which it has affirmed the judgment and decree of the trial Court dated 12.11.1997 evicting the appellant-defendant from the suit premises under the provisions of the Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent & Eviction) Act, 1950 (for short. "the Act"). 2. The facts and circumstances giving rise to this case are that the respondent-plaintiff filed a suit for eviction of the appellant-defendant from the suit premises on the ground of default. The said suit was registered as Civil i Original Case No. 128/1983 and the same stood dismissed, vide judgment and decree dated 9.8.1988, by giving the benefit of first default. Again, the plaintiff-respondent filed Civil Original Suit No. 310/1988 in respect of the same suit property on the grounds of second default as well as the reasonable and bonafide need of the plaintiff-respondents and his sons for i opening a grocery shop. The appellant-defendant submitted the written statement stating that the plaintiff-respondent refused to accept the rent and the same was deposited in the trial court under the provisions of Section 19-A of the Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent & Eviction) Act. His further stand taken in the written statement was that the suit property was not required for personal and bona fide need of the plaintiff-respondent, rather he wanted to increase the rent. After trial, the trial court decree the suit. The defendant-appellant went in appeal and the same stood dismissed vide impugned judgment and decree. Hence this second appeal. 3. Mr. S.N. Trivedi, learned counsel for the appellant, has raised a large number of issues, including that the findings of facts recorded by the Courts below are contrary to the evidence on record, thus, being perverse, this Court may re-appreciate the evidence: the issue of partial eviction has not been considered properly which requires reconsideration: and the finding of fact recorded by the courts below on the issue of bonafide need of the landlord is also perverse and that issue also requires reconsideration. While deciding the case, the Court should lean towards the tenant as the Act has been enacted to protect the interest of the tenant. 4. On the other hand, Mr. Dinesh Maheshwarl, learned cousnel for the respondents, has submitted that the concurrent findings of facts do not warrant any interference by this Court. While deciding the case, the Court should lean towards the tenant as the Act has been enacted to protect the interest of the tenant. 4. On the other hand, Mr. Dinesh Maheshwarl, learned cousnel for the respondents, has submitted that the concurrent findings of facts do not warrant any interference by this Court. No substantial questing of law is involved in the case and, thus, the appeal is liable to be rejected at the initial stage itself. 5. I have considered the rival submissions made by the learned counsel for the parties and perused the judgments cited at the Bar. 6. Undoubtedly, the second appeal can be entertained only on a substantial question of law. The Hon'ble Apex Court has been taking a very serious view of the matter emphasising the High Courts should not entertain a second appeal under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (for short, "the Code") unless it raises a substantial question of law. In Panchu Copal Barua v. Umesh Chandra Goswami & ors., AIR 1997 SC 1041 , the Court observed that while entertaining the second appeal. the Court should not over-look the change brought about by the Amendment Act of 1976 restricting the scope of second appeal drastically and now it applies only to appeals involving substantial question of law, specifically set-out in the memorandum of appeals and formulated by the High Court. The Court, for the reasons to be recorded, may also entertain a second appeal even on any other substantial question of law, not formulated by it, if the Court is satisfied that the case involves such a question. Therefore, the existence of a substantial question of law is a sine-qua-non for the exercise of jurisdiction under the amended provisions of Section 100 of the Code. It is the obligation on the Court of Law to further the clear intendment of the Legislature and not to frustrate it by ignoring the same. 7. In Kashibai v. Parwatibai, (1995) 6 SCC 273 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that the High Court cannot ignore the statutory provisions of Section 100 of the Code and re-appreciate the evidence and interfere with the findings of facts unless the substantial question of law or a question of law duly formulated is to be decided. 7. In Kashibai v. Parwatibai, (1995) 6 SCC 273 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that the High Court cannot ignore the statutory provisions of Section 100 of the Code and re-appreciate the evidence and interfere with the findings of facts unless the substantial question of law or a question of law duly formulated is to be decided. The second appeal does not lie on the ground of erroneous findings of facts based on appreciation of the relevant evidence. 8. In Kshitish Chandra Purkait v. Santosh Kumar Purkait & ors., AIR 1997 SC 2517 , the Supreme Court observed that while deciding the second appeals, mandatory statutory requirements are seldom borne in mind and second appeals are being entertained without conforming to the above discipline. It further placed reliance upon its earlier judgments in Mahendra & Mahendra Ltd. v. Union of India, AIR 1979 SC 798 , wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed as under : ".... It is not every question of law that cold be permitted to be raised in the second appeal. The parameters within which a new legal plea could be permitted to be raised, are specifically stated in Sub-section (5) of Section 100. Under the proviso, the Court should be 'satisfied' that the case involves a substantial question of law and not a mere questin of law. The reason for permitting the substantial question of law to be raised, should be recorded by the Court. It is implicit therefrom that on compliance of the above, the opposite party should be afforded a fair or proper opportunity to meet the same. It is not any legal plead that would be alleged at a stage of second appeal. It should be a substantial question of law. The reasons for permitting the plea to be raised should also be recorded." 9. In Ram Prasad Rajak v. Nand Kumar & Bros. & Anr., AIR 1998 SC 2730 , the Supreme Court held that existence of substantial question of law is a sine-qua-non for the exercise of jurisdiction under Section 100 of the Code and entering into the question as to whether need of the landlord was bonafide or not, was beyond the jurisdiction of the High Court as the issue can be decided only by appreciating the evidence on record. 10. 10. Similar view has been reiterated in Tirumala Tirupati Devasthanams v. K.M. Krishnaiah, (1998) 3 SCC 331 ; State of Rajasthan v. Harphool Singh, (2000) 5 SCC 652 ; Rajapps Hanamantha Ranoji v. Mahadev Channabasappa & ors., AIR 2000 SC 2108 ; Santakumari & ors. v. Lakshmi Amma Janaki Amma, (2000) 7 SCC 60 ; Satyamma v. Basamma (Dead) by LRs., (2000) 8 SCC 567 ; Santosh Hazari v. Purushottam Tiwari, AIR 2001 SC 965 ; Kulwant Kaur & Ors. v. Gurdial Singh Mann, AIR 2001 SC 1273 ; M.S.V. Raja v. Seeni Thevar, (2001) 6 SCC 652 ; Hafazat Hussain v. Abdul Majeed & ors., (2001) 7 SCC 189 ; V. Pechimuthu v. Gowrammal, AIR 2001 SC 2446 ; and Neelkantan & ors. v. Mallika Begum, (2002) 2 SCC 440 . 11. There may be a question, which may be a "question of fact", "question of law", "mixed question of fact and law" and "substantial question of law." Question means anything inquired; an issue to be decided. The "question of fact" is whether a particular factual situation exists or not. A question of fact, In the Realm of Jurisprudence, has been explained as under : "A question of fact is one capable of being answered by way of demonstration. A question of opinion is one that cannot be so answered. An answer to it is a matter of speculation which cannot be proved by any available evidence to be right or wrong." (Vide Salmond, on Jurisprudence, 12th Edn. page 69, cited in Gadakh Yashwantrao Kankarrao v. E.V. alias Balasaheb Vikhe Patil & ors., AIR 1994 SC 678 ). 12. In Sm. Bibhabati Devi v. Ramendra Narayan Roy & ors., AIR 1947 PC 19 , the Privy Council has provided the guidelines as in what cases the second appeal can be entertained, explaining the provisions existing prior to the amendment of 1976, observing as under : .......that miscarriage of justice means such a departure from the rules which permeat all judicial procedure as to take that which happen not in the proper sense of the word 'judicial procedure' at all. That the violation of some principles of law or procedure must be such erroneous proposition of law that if that proposition to be corrected, the finding cannot stand, or it may be the neglect of some principle of law or procedure, whose application will have the same effect. That the violation of some principles of law or procedure must be such erroneous proposition of law that if that proposition to be corrected, the finding cannot stand, or it may be the neglect of some principle of law or procedure, whose application will have the same effect. The question whether there is evidence on which the Courts could arrive at their finding, is such a question of law. "That the question of admissibility of evidence is a proposition of law but it must be such as to affect materially the finding. The question of the value of evidence is not sufficient reason for departure from the practice......... 13. In Suwalal Chhogalal v. Commissioner of Income Tax, (1949) 17 ITR 269 , the Apex Court held as under : "A fact is a fact irrespective of evidence, by which it is provided. The only time a question of law can arise in such a case is when it is alleged that there is no material on which the conclusion can be based or no sufficient evidence." 14. In Oriental Investment Company Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income Tax, Bombay, AIR 1957 SC 852 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court considered large number of its earlier judgments, including Sree Meenakshi Mills Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income Tax, AIR 1957 SC 49 , and held that where the question of decision is whether certain profit is made and shown in the name of certain intermediaries were, in fact, profit actually earned by the assessee or the intermediaries, is a mixed question of fact and law. The Court further held that interfere from facts would be a question of fact or of law according as the point for determination is one of pure fact or a "mixed questin of law and fact" and that a finding on fact without evidence to support it or if based on relevant or irrelevant matters, is not unassailable. 15. In Sir Chunnilal V. Mehta & Sons v. Century Spinning and Manufacturing Co. 15. In Sir Chunnilal V. Mehta & Sons v. Century Spinning and Manufacturing Co. Ltd., AIR 1962 SC 1314 , while considering as what may be the substantial question of law for interference by the Supreme Court, held as under : "The proper test for determining whether *a question of law raises in the case is substantial, would, in our opinion, be whether it is of general public importance or worthier it directly and substantially affects the rights of the parties and if so, whether it is either an open question in the sense that it is not finally settled by this Court or by Privy Council or by the Federal Court or is not free from difficulty or calls for discussion of alternative views. If the question is settled by the highest court or the general principles to be applied in determining the question are well settled and there is a mere question of applying those principles or that the plea raised is palpably absurd the question would not be a substantial question of law." 16. A Constitution Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, in State of J & K v. Thakur Gange Singh, AIR 1960 SC 356 , considered as what may be the substantial question and held that authentic interpretation of the Constitutional provisions amounts to substantial question of law. However, where the the substantial question of law had already been decided by the Authority which is binding on the other Courts like the judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court under Article 141 of the Constitution is binding on all other Courts etc., it does not remain a substantial question of law because there remains no scope to interpret further the said provision. While deciding the said case, the Hon'ble Apex Court placed reliance upon its earlier judgments in Charanjit Lal Chowdhary v. Union of India & ors., AIR 1951 SC 41 ; Ram Kishan Dalmia v. Justice Tandolkar, AIR 1958 SC 538 ; and Mohammed Haneef Quareshi v. State of Bihar, AIR 1958 SC 731 . The same view has been reiterated by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Bhagwan Swaroop v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1965 SC 682 . 17. The same view has been reiterated by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Bhagwan Swaroop v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1965 SC 682 . 17. In Reserve Bank of India v. Ramakrishna Govind Morey, AIR 1976 SC 830 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that whether trial Court should not have exercised its jurisdiction differently, is not a question of law or a substantial question of law and, therefore, second appeal cannot be entertained by the High Court on this ground. 18. There is no prohibition to entertain a second appeal even on question of fact provided the Court is satisfied that the findings of the courts below were vitiated by non-consideration of relevant evidence or by showing erroneous approach to the matter. (Vide Jagdish Singh v. Nathu Singh, AIR 1992 SC 1604 ; Smt. Prativa Devi v. T.V. Krishnan, (1996) 5 SCC 353 ; Satya Gupta v. Brijesh Kumar, (1998) 6 SCC 423 , Raghuvendra Kumar v. Firm Piem Machinery & Co., AIR 2000 SC 534 ; and Molar Mal v. M/.s Kay Iron Works Pvt. Ltd., AIR 2000 SC 1261 . 19. Thus, in view of the above, unless the case involves substantial question of law, the second appeal cannot be entertained. 20. I find no force in the submission made by Mr. Trivedi that the Act is beneficial only to the tenant and thus the Court should lean towards him, for the reason that the Act provides for maintaining the equilibrium of interest of both the parties. 21. In J. Chatterjee v. Mohinder Kaur Uppal & Anr., (2000) 7 SCC 510 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that a balance has to be maintained between the general object of the statute which is to provide protection to the tenant against arbitrary actin of the land lord of their eviction and the assistance to be referred to the land lords to recover the possession of the premises let out by them for his occupation if they fulfil the requirements of the statute. 22. In Malpe Vishwanath Acharya v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1998 SC 602 , the Hon'ble Apex Court emphasised the need of stricking a balance between rival interests so as to be just law, in every social legislation like Rent Control Act. "The law ought not to be unjust to one and give disproportionate benefit or protection to another section of the society." 23. "The law ought not to be unjust to one and give disproportionate benefit or protection to another section of the society." 23. Leaning towards the tenants, while interpreting the provisions of the Rent Control Act, would render the provisions beneficial to the landlord as nugatory and hence such an interpretation is not permissible in law. (Vide Arjun Khaiarwal Makhijani v. Jamnadas C. Tuliani, AIR 1989 SC 1599 ). 24. Even otherwise, legislation only for protecting the interest of one party is not permissible as it may tend to be arbitrary and discriminatory and be violative of the mandate of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. In Joginder Pal v. Naval Kishore Behal, (2002) 5 SCC 397 , the Supreme-Court, while dealing with this issue, observed as under : "Socially progressive legislation must have holistic perception and not a short-sighted parochial approach. Power to legislate socially progressive legislations is coupled with a responsibility to avoid arbitrariness and unreasonability and unreasonability. A legislation impregnated with tendency to give undue preference to one section, at the cost of constructions by placing shockers on the other section, nor only entails miscarriage of justice but may also result in Constitutional invalidity." 25. Therefore, it cannot be said that the Rent Control Act is only to protect a tenant and it does not look after the interest of the landlord. The submissions in this regard, made on behalf of the appellant, are preposterous and hence rejected. 26. The provisions of Section 13(1)(h) of the Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent & Eviction) Act, 1950, contain expressions like "reasonable" and "bonafide need". 27. The expression "reasonable" means; rational, i.e. based on reasons; not excessive or immoderate; something conformable or agreeable to reasons; having regard to the facts of a particular case; something not per se preposterous or absurd; something within the limits or reasons. (Vide Raghuvir Singh v. Commissioner, Income Tax, AIR 1958 Pb. 250 ; and M/s. Kelvin Cinema v. State of Assam, AIR 1996 Gau. 103 ). 28. In R.K. Garg v. Union of India, AIR 1981 SC 2138 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court, while dealing with the same expression, observed as under : "The action is called `reasonable' which an informed, intelligent, just minded civilised man would rationally favours. The concept of `reasonableness' does not exclude notions of morality and ethics.", 29. 103 ). 28. In R.K. Garg v. Union of India, AIR 1981 SC 2138 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court, while dealing with the same expression, observed as under : "The action is called `reasonable' which an informed, intelligent, just minded civilised man would rationally favours. The concept of `reasonableness' does not exclude notions of morality and ethics.", 29. The word "reasonable" implies intelligence, care and deliberation with, as a course, which reason dictates. (Vide Chintamanrao & Anr. v. State of M.P., AIR 1951 SC 118 ; P.P. Enterprises v. Union of India & ors., AIR 1982 SC 1016 ; and M/s. Bishamber Dayai Chandra Mohan v. State of U.P., AIR 1982 SC 33 ). 30. In Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. M/s. Jaggannath Ashok Kumar & Anr., AIR 1987 SC 2316 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that the word "reasonable" has, in law, the prima facie meaning of reasonable in regard to those circumstances, of which' the actor called on to act reasonably, knows or ought to know. 31. In Gujarat Water Supply & Sewerage Board v. Unique Erectors (Gujarat) Pvt. Ltd., AIR 1989 SC 977 , the Supreme Court observed as under : "It is difficult to give an exact definition of the word 'reasonable'; the reason varies in its conclusion according to idiosyncrasy of the individual and the. times and circumstances in which the thinks......." Thus, it is evident that the expression "reasonable" means rational, based on reason and should not be arbitrary, whimsical and unreasonable. BONA FIDE NEED: "Bonafide" means : something more than a desire or wish; in good faith or genuinely; in other words, it conveys absence of intent to deceive; something done with care - and attention. The phrase relates with things and actions which have relation to mind or motive of an individual. It connotes good faith, which is suggestive of honesty of purpose. (Vide Subnadran Devi v. Sunder Devi Tekchand, AIR 1965 Pb. 188 ; Sohan Lal v. Poonam hand, AIR 1961 Raj. 32 ; Kumari Leena Gupta v. Institute of Medical Science, Banaras Hindu University, AIR 1989 All. L.J. 676 ; and Girja Debi v. The Rent Control & Eviction Officer, AIR 1965 All 366 ). Bonafide need is not merely a ruse to get rid of the tenant from the suit premises. (Vide Joginder Pal (supra)). 32. 32 ; Kumari Leena Gupta v. Institute of Medical Science, Banaras Hindu University, AIR 1989 All. L.J. 676 ; and Girja Debi v. The Rent Control & Eviction Officer, AIR 1965 All 366 ). Bonafide need is not merely a ruse to get rid of the tenant from the suit premises. (Vide Joginder Pal (supra)). 32. In Ram Chandra v. Ishwar Chandra & ors., (1988) 3 SCC 131 , the Supreme Court considered as what constitutes the "bonafide need" of the landlord for the purpose of rent control matters, observing as under : "it is, no doubt, true that the question whether the requirement of a landlord is bonafide or not, is essentially one of fact, notwithstanding the circumstances that a finding of fact in that behalf is a secondary and infrantial fact drawn from other primary and perceptive one. All the conclusion drawn from primary facts are not necessarily questions of law. They can be, and quite often, are pure questions of fact.... But the essential idea basic to all such cases is that the need of the landlord should be genuine and honest, conceived in good faith; and that further, the Court must also consider it reasonably to gratify that need. Landlord's desire for possession, how honest it might otherwise be, has inevitably a subjective element in it and that desire, to become a 'requirement' in law, must have the objective element of a 'need.' It must also be such that the Court considers it as reasonable and, therefore, eligible to be gratified. In doing so, the Court must take all relevant circumstances into consideration so that the protection afforded by law, tenant is not rendered merely illusory and writtled down. It is something out from absolute necessity but more than mere desire or a mere requirement." 33. In M/s. Bega Begum & Anr. v. Abdul Ahad Khan, AIR 1979 SC 272 , the words 'reasonable requirement', as contained in J & K Houses and Shopping Land Control Act, 1966, is concerned, were interpreted and explained as under : "....Reasonable requirement, which, undoubtedly, postulates that there must be an element of need as opposed to a mere desire or wish; the distinction between a desire and need should doubtlessly be kept in mind but not so as to make even the tenant's need as nothing but a desire... .The connotation of the term.... .The connotation of the term.... should not be artificially extended nor its language so unduly stretched or stained so as to make it impossible or extremely difficult for the landlord to get a decree of eviction. Such a course would deviate the very purpose of the act which afforded the facility of eviction of the tenant to the landlord on certain specified grounds." 34. While deciding the said case, the Court placed reliance upon its earlier judgment in Phiroze Bemanji Desai v. Chandra Kant Patel, AIR 1974 SC 1059 . 35. In Bapubhai Mohanbhai v. Mahila Sahkari Udyog Mandir, AIR 1975 SC 2128 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that whether the requirement of the landlord is reasonable or not, is to be judged from all the facts and circumstances and highly relevant circumstance bearing on the reasonableness of the landlord's requirement is that the purpose for which the possession is sought, is a purpose for which the premises cannot be used save on pale of the penal consequences. The Court must be vigilant that the provisions of the law should not be interpreted in such a way that it may encourage the breach of the statutory provisions itself. 36. In Sarla Ahuja v. United India Insurance Co. Ltd., AIR 1999 SC 100 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that the landlord is the best judge of his need and when a landlord asserts that he requires the building for his own occupation, the Court or the Tribunal should not proceed on the presumption that the requirement is not bonafide. If he fulfils the conditions stipulated in the statute and landlord shows his prima facie case, the Court/Tribunal has to draw a presumption that the requirement of the landlord is bonafide. The Court observed as under: "When, other conditions of the clause are satisfied and when the landlord shows a prima facie case, it is open to the Rent Controller to draw a presumption that the requirement of the landlord is bonafide. It is often said by the Courts that it is not for the tenant to dictate the terms to the landlord as to how else he can adjust himself without getting possession of the tenanted premises. While deciding the question of bonafide of the requirement of the landlord, it is quite unnecessary to make an endeavour as to how else the landlord could have adjusted himself." 37. While deciding the question of bonafide of the requirement of the landlord, it is quite unnecessary to make an endeavour as to how else the landlord could have adjusted himself." 37. In Shiv Sarup Gupta v. Dr. Mukesh Chand Gupta, (1999) 6 SCC 222 , the Hon'ble Apex Court held as under : "Chambers 20th Century Dictionary defines bona fide to mean "in good faith : genuine". The word "genuine" means "natural : not spurious : real : pure : sincere". In Law Dictionary, Mozley and Whitley define bona fide to mean "good faith, without fraud or deceit;;. Thus the term bona fide or genuinely refers to a state of mind. Requirement is not a mere desire. The degree of intensity contemplated by "requires" is much more higher than in mere desire. The phrase "required bona fide" is suggestive of legislative intent that a mere desire which is the outcome of whim or fancy is not taken note of by the rent control legislation. A requirement in the sense of felt need which is the outcome of a sincere, honest desire, in contradistinction with a mere pretence or pretext to evict a tenant. ........The Judge of facts should place himself in the armchair of the landlord and then ask the question to himself whether in the given facts substantiated by the landlord the need to occupy the premises can be said to the natural, real, sincere, honest. If the answer be in the positive, the need is bona fide. ....The court would permit the landlord to satisfy the proven need by choosing the accommodation which the landlord feels would be most situated for the purpose; the court would not in such a case thrust its own wisdom upon the choice of the landlord by holding that not one but the other accommodation must be accepted by the landlord to satisfy his such need...... An Approach either too liberal or too conservative or pendantic must be guarded against." 38. In Deenanath v. Puranmal, (2001) 5 SCC 705 , the Hon'ble Apex Court held that findings of fact recorded by the Court below can also be reversed in second appeal if they are shown to have been taken without considering the statutory mandate for the reason that every finding must be in consonance with the statutory mandate. In Deenanath v. Puranmal, (2001) 5 SCC 705 , the Hon'ble Apex Court held that findings of fact recorded by the Court below can also be reversed in second appeal if they are shown to have been taken without considering the statutory mandate for the reason that every finding must be in consonance with the statutory mandate. The Court further held that bonafide requirement of land lord means that there must be actually pressing need not a whim or fancy desire. It must be present need and also the land lord must be in possession of reasonably suitable accommodation of his own in the town or city concerned. 39. In Johan Mathai Abbraham v. British Physical Laboratory (India) Ltd., (2001) 9 SCC 691 , the Supreme Court held that being in occupation in a portion of the building having a fraction, undoubtedly share in it cannot be held a buyer to seek eviction of the tenant on the ground of bonafide requirement for the reason that he may require the other portion for professional activity in the premises where he was living. 40. In Shashi Kapila v. R.P. Ashwin, (2002) 1 SCC 583 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that bonafide requirement of the landlord cannot be questioned on the ground that sometimes in the past, he wanted to dispose of the tenanted premises. Even if there is an agreement to sell in respect of the said premises, the landlord cannot be said to be un-suited on that ground. 41. In Kannimmal v. Chellaram, (2002) 4 SCC 627 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that while dealing with a case of eviction on the ground of bonafide need, the Court or Tribunal must be careful as for what purpose the eviction is sought and whether the tenanted premises can be used for that purpose or suitable for that purpose. While deciding the said case, the Court placed reliance upon its earlier judgment in Shri Bala Gnesan Metals v. M.N. Shanmughan Chetty, (1987) 2 SCC 707 , wherein it was held that if a person wants the eviction of a tenanted premises for commercial purpose, there may be surplus accommodation meant for residential purpose with the landlord but not being suitable for commercial purpose, the said factor would not tilt the balance in favour of the tenant. 42. 42. In Siddalingamma & anr v. Mamtha Shenoy, (2001) 8 SCC 561 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed as under : "The concept of bonafide need or bonafide requirement needs a practical approach instructed by the realities of life and approach either too liberal or too conservative or pendantic must be guarded against. If the land lord wishes to live with comfort in a house of hiw own, the law does not command or compell him to squeeze himself and dwell in lesser premises so as to protect the tenant's continued occupation in tenanted premises." 43. Similar view has been reiterated in Kempaiah v. Lingaiah & Ors., (2001) 8 SCC 718 holding that there must be a requirement in realities. The real distinction between 'desire' and 'requirement' lies in circumstances of the need. There is an element of 'must have" in the case of 'requirement' which is not present in the case of mere 'desire'. The term reasonable and bonafide requirement are complementary and supplementary to each other in the context. 44. In Dattatraya Laxman Kamble v. Abdul Rasul Moulali Kotkunde & anr., (1999) 4 SCC 1 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court had held that when the legislature employ the two terms i.e. reasonable and bonafide requirement together, the message took part is that requirement must be really genuine from any reasonable standard. 45. Thus, in view of the above, it is clear that the landlord is the best judge of his need and he cannot be asked to accommodate himself in a lesser accommodation so that the tenant may not be evicted. A person has a right to maintain his living-standard according to his status and financial condition. The Court is bound to take note of the requirements of the statutory provisions and once the Court is satisfied regarding the reasonableness and genuineness of the claim of the landlord, it is bound to up-hold it. 46. The instant case is required to be examined in view of the aforesaid settled legal proposition. Both the courts below, after appreciating the entire evidence on record, reached the conclusion that the suit property was required for reasonable and bonafide use by the landlord for establishing the business of his sons. The said findings cannot be held to be perverse even by stretch of imagination not being based contrary to the evidence on record or being based on no evidence. The said findings cannot be held to be perverse even by stretch of imagination not being based contrary to the evidence on record or being based on no evidence. Being pure question of facts involved herein, no substantial question of law is involved. Even on the ground of partial eviction, no interference can be made as there is a specific finding by both the courts below that the partial eviction will .not serve the purpose of either of the parties, therefore, such a course was not warranted. 47. The second appeal is dismissed. In view of the fact that the appellant is in possession of the suit premises for a long time and require an appropriate premises for shifting, he is given time upto 30.6.2003 provided he pays the monthly rent by 15th of each month and file an undertaking that he shall no induct any other person in the suit premises, will not make any addition or alteration and shall hand-over the vacant and peaceful possession by the aforesaid date to the plaintiff-respondent. The undertaking to this eff shall be filed before the trial court within three weeks from today.Second Appeal Dismissed. *******