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2002 DIGILAW 1718 (ALL)

Jagannath v. State of Uttar Pradesh

2002-11-19

KAMAL KISHORE

body2002
( 1 ) THIS is a criminal appeal against the judgment and order dated 25-7-1989 passed by Sri Dharam Paul, the then IV Additional Sessions Judge, Unnao in S. T. No. 88 of 1985 convicting the accused-appellants under Section 307 IPC and sentencing them to undergo 5 years R. I. ( 2 ) DURING pendency of the appeal, the appellant No. 1 Jagannath has died, hence the appeal against Jagannath stands abated. ( 3 ) I have heard the arguments of the parties counsel and have gone through the record. ( 4 ) IT has been argued by the learned counsel for the appellant that since the occurrence took place on 11-8-1978 at 6. 00 p. m. , while the FIR was lodged on 12-8-1978 at 9. 55 a. m. No reliance can be placed on such an FIR in view of the ruling reported in 1972 Cri App R 280 : AIR 1973 SC 501 , Thulia Kali v. State of Tamil Nadu. No doubt the said law laid down by the Honble Supreme Court is good law, however, the same is not applicable to the facts of the present case. In the instant case, the occurrence is alleged to have taken place on 11-8-1978 at about 6. 00 p. m. , while the FIR regarding he occurrence has been lodged on the very next morning at 9. 55 a. m. In a case of like nature where a person was murdered while the witnesses have sustained injuries in the same occurrence, which took place during sun-set, while the first information report regarding the occurrence was lodged during the next morning, it has been held by this Court in the ruling of the Division Bench as reported in 1983 All LJ 652, Jhalloo v. State of U. P. That the mere delay in lodging the FIR under such circumstances, is not sufficient to discard the prosecution story. Under these circumstances, I find that the delay of few hours in lodging the FIR has been sufficiently explained and the delay, if any, in lodging the FIR of the present case is not sufficient to discard the prosecution story in view of the aforesaid ruling of this Court. ( 5 ) THE surviving accused-appellant Ram Naresh has been assigned to main role of inflicting fire-arm injuries on the right eye-brow of injured Shiv Bilas. ( 5 ) THE surviving accused-appellant Ram Naresh has been assigned to main role of inflicting fire-arm injuries on the right eye-brow of injured Shiv Bilas. Admittedly, the injured Shiv Bilas has been murdered in another crime before recording of his evidence in session trial. The prosecution has examined the informant Ram Vilas (P. W. 1), Surya Pal (P. W. 2) and Lala (P. W. 3) as eye-witnesses of the occurrence. ( 6 ) THE learned counsel representing the appellant has strongly contended that the witnesses examined by the prosecution to substantiate its case are neither independent nor corroborative. Moreover, they are partisan and interested one, hence no reliance can be placed over their statements. To substantiate this submission, it is strongly contended that Ram Vilas (P. W. 1) is the brother of another injured Shiv Bilas, while Lala (P. W. 3) is a close relation of this witness Ram Vilas (P. W. 1) as Lala has admitted that Ram Vilas is his real nephew. Merely because out of three witnesses examined by the prosecution, two witnesses are near relation, it cannot be said that their testimony is interested and to be discarded outrightly. It has, therefore, been argued by the learned counsel for the appellant that since out of three eye-witnesses examined by the prosecution, two are the relation witnesses. No reliance can be placed on the testimony of both relation witnesses. This argument of the learned defence counsel is not tenable. It has been held by the Honble Supreme Court in the ruling reported in 1973 Cri LJ 850 : AIR 1973 SC 1073 , State of U. P. v. Paras Nath Singh that there is no rule that even straight forward evidence of relations of the deceased needs corroboration for sustaining conviction. That such witnesses happen to be naturally able to identify the assailants (coupled with the recovery of the bloodstained earth from the place of occurrence) leaves no reasonable doubt about proof of guilt. In absence of circumstances showing witnesses as inclined to falsely involve the accused, their being related to the deceased in innocuous. The same view was followed in the ruling reported in 1976 Cri LJ 605 (Orissa), State of Orissa v. Domons Majhi, where it was held that there is no rule either of law or of prudence that family members of the deceased in a murder case are incompetent witnesses. The same view was followed in the ruling reported in 1976 Cri LJ 605 (Orissa), State of Orissa v. Domons Majhi, where it was held that there is no rule either of law or of prudence that family members of the deceased in a murder case are incompetent witnesses. There may be cases where only the family members will be the witnesses to the occurrence and their evidence is not to be rejected merely on the ground of interestedness. In a case where the witness was the father of the deceased and was also inimical to the accused, it has been held by the Honble Supreme Court in the ruling reported in AIR 1978 SC 191 : 1978 All LJ 466, State of U. P. v. Sughar Singh that he being a partisan witness, his testimony has to be viewed with great caution to what by itself cannot be sufficient ground to reject it unless the same is found to be untruthful by reason of other infirmities. It has been held by this Court in the ruling reported in 1978 Cri LJ (NOC) 289 (All), Natthoo v. State of U. P. That mere relationship or interestedness of a witness is not sufficient to discard him if his presence on the spot i. e. place of occurrence cannot be seriously doubted. Close relations would be the last persons to screen the real culprits and falsely implicate innocent persons and hence the mere fact of relationship far from being the foundation of criticism of the evidence, is often a sure guarantee of truth; when witness gives evidence on oath the presumptions should be that he has spoken the truth that is the oath he takes and the burden must lie on him that challenges the veracity of that statement to show that it is not true, and if that burden is not discharged by any of the recognized legal methods, then a Court can have no legal justification for not relying on the evidence of that witness. It has been held in the ruling reported in 1979 Cri LJ 603, Gauri Basvaish (Kant) v. State of Karnataka that the evidence of close relatives need not be rejected as interested because normally close relations have no motive to shield the real offender. It has been held in the ruling reported in 1979 Cri LJ 603, Gauri Basvaish (Kant) v. State of Karnataka that the evidence of close relatives need not be rejected as interested because normally close relations have no motive to shield the real offender. The Honble Supreme Court has held in the ruling reported in 1980 Cri LJ 1330 : AIR 1981 SC 82 , Hari Obula Reddi v. State of Andhra Pradesh that the interested evidence is not necessarily unreliable evidence. Even partnership by itself is not a valid ground for discrediting or rejecting sworn testimony nor is it an invariable rule that interested evidence can never form the basis of conviction unless corroborated to a material extent in material particulars by independent evidence. All that is necessary, is that the evidence of interested witness should be subjected to careful scrutiny and accepted with caution. If on such scrutiny, the interested testimony is found to be intrinsically reliable or inherently probable, it may by itself be sufficient, in the circumstances of the particular case to base a conviction thereon. In a similar case, where the witnesses were family members and the closest relations of the deceased persons and it was quite natural for them to rush to the scene of the occurrence after listening the alarm raised by the deceased and others, it has been held by the Honble Supreme Court in the ruling reported in AIR 1976 SC 2499 , Molu v. State of Haryana that this by itself did not detract from the testimony of these witnesses. In a case of like nature where the deceased was in his hut along with his wife and the accused had given axe blow on the person of the deceased resulting the death of the deceased in presence of the wife of the deceased, it has been held by Honble Supreme Court in ruling reported in 1981 All WC 455 : , State of Rajasthan v. Smt. Kalki that she is the most natural witness and is not interested witness. ( 7 ) ALL the three eye-witnesses examined by the prosecution have corroborated one and another and have supported the case of the prosecution in material particulars. The case of the prosecution finds further corroboration from medical evidence also. The prosecution has examined Dr. J. N. Bajpai As P. W. 5 who has proved the injury report (Ext. Ka-5 ). ( 7 ) ALL the three eye-witnesses examined by the prosecution have corroborated one and another and have supported the case of the prosecution in material particulars. The case of the prosecution finds further corroboration from medical evidence also. The prosecution has examined Dr. J. N. Bajpai As P. W. 5 who has proved the injury report (Ext. Ka-5 ). Dr. J. N. Bajpai (P. W. 5) has deposed that the injuries on the person of Shiv Bilas as given in the injury report (Ext. Ka-5) could have been inflicted by fire arm. The case of prosecution and the testimony of P. W. 1 Ram Vilas thus find support from the medical evidence also. Hence, the same should be relied upon, as has been held by the Honble Supreme Court in the ruling reported in 1976 Cri App R 49 : , Shyam Balu Chaugle v. State of Maharashtra. In a recent ruling also as reported in Judgment Today (2002) 5 JT (SC) 404 : , Gajula Venkateswara Rao v. State of Andhra Pradesh that the testimony supported by the medical evidence should be relied on. Since the testimony of the eye-witnesses examined by the prosecution have been corroborated by the medical evidence also, I find that the Court below was justified in convicting the accused-appellant Ram Naresh for the offence punishable under Section 307, IPC. ( 8 ) THE appeal is devoid of merit and is hereby dismissed. Appeal dismissed. . .