JUDGMENT 1. - Duo writ petitions (2182/97 & 2157/99) have been preferred by M/s West Patent Press Company Pvt. Ltd. (for brevity "Company") against the Municipal Council, Beawar. Since these petitions involve identical factual disputes arising out of a common lease in respect of self same land in question, they are being decided at the joint request of the parties by this common order.In WP 2182/97 the relief sought for inter alia is to- (1) declare the Company as holding the land validity in two parts (i) leased out and the other part (ii) free hold; thereby to direct the respondents not to demolish construction over such lands; (2) direct the respondents to pay damages in the tune of Rs. twenty lacs having caused as a result of illegal action on the part of respondents or its officers; (3) direct the respondents to reconstruct the demolitions made by raising construction in its original shape as it existed prior to demolition on 3/4/1997. Whereas in WP 2157/99, an order is sought against the respondents to immediately decide the Company's application for renewal of the lease in its favour considering earlier agreements which provided that it is a lease in perpetuity.Albeit a chequered history and dates of events leading to the execution of agreement in question are stated resulting into complexed facts, but only the circumstances leading to duo petitions are being concisely stated herein below.As per an agreement (Annexure 2 which is photostat of true copy duly attested by Commissioner, Nagar Parishad, Beawar), entered into between Captain Donald Robertson who was then President Municipal Committee Beawar along with two members, and Alfred Baker Esquire, duly qualified Agent of Mr. DK West (Agent in India of West's Patent Press Company Ltd.), a lease was executed on 17th April, 1880 for a plot of land adjoining in Chang Gate of Beawar admeasuring 3 acres for ten years from April, 1880, at annual rent of Rs. 25/- per acre. By another agreement, municipal land measuring 1 acre 2 rods 5 poles in Shahpura Mohalla Close to West Patent Press Company's factory was also taken on rent of Rs. 75/- per annum for 10 years from July 1886. By another agreement, municipal land measuring 2 acres adjoining Chang Gate of Beawar was also taken on lease at the annual rent of Rs. 75/- per annum for 10 years from July 1886. By another agreement, municipal land measuring 2 acres adjoining Chang Gate of Beawar was also taken on lease at the annual rent of Rs. 50/- per acre for 10 years from 26th April, 1890.By lease agreement executed on 11th July, 1896, municipal land in Shahpura Mohalla, Beawar measuring 1 acre 2 rods & 5 poles was put at enhanced annual rent of Rs. 100/- per acre for ten years from July, 1896. 2. Then Comes execution of an Indenture made on 30th June 1916 (Annexure 3-Photostat copy of true copy duly certified by Sub Registrar Beawar on 18/7/1916), whereby plot of land situated in Shahpura Mohalla near Chang Gate in the Municipality of Beawar measuring 4 acres 2 rods and 5 poles, was leased out by the Municipal Committee in favour of the lessee Company for 30 years from 26th April 1909 at a yearly rent of Rs. 500/-. This lease was renewed by an Indenture made on 1st April, 1941 (Annexure 4 xerox copy of true copy certified by Sub Registrar Beawar) whereby leased plot of land situated in Shahpura Mohalla in the Beawar town of Ajmer Marwar Block No. 7 & Nazul List No. 30, 31, measuring 4 acres 2 rods and 5 poles, was put on rent of Rs. 750/- per annum for 30 years from 25th April, 1939.Curiously enough, despite the fact that the lease term under agreement dated 1/4/1941 (Ann. 4) had expired on 25th April, 1969, and that the lessee Company continued in possession over the land in dispute even after 25/4/69, it was only on 18/6/1975 when the State Government admittedly accorded sanction for lease of the land measuring 21,200 sq. yards (out of total leased land of 21931.22 sq. yards) and land measuring 731.22 sq. yards was not leased out on account of having been reserved for purposes of road construction) by letter (Ann. 5) for 30 years from 26th April, 1969 to 25th April, 1999 with the condition that annual lease rent was fixed at Rs. 55,120/- and that no further renewal would be accorded after expiry of 30 years on 25th April, 1999 thereby the leased land would surrender back to Nagar Parishad, Beawar; and that agreement would be got executed and registered at the cost of the lessee.Pursuant to the sanction of State Government (Ann. 55,120/- and that no further renewal would be accorded after expiry of 30 years on 25th April, 1999 thereby the leased land would surrender back to Nagar Parishad, Beawar; and that agreement would be got executed and registered at the cost of the lessee.Pursuant to the sanction of State Government (Ann. 5) the Municipal Council, Beawar (respondent No. 2) sent a demand notice (Ann. 6) on 11/7/75 asking the lessee Company to deposit to the tune of Rs. 3,47,256/- outstanding from 26/4/69 to 25/4/75 with a specific stipulation to pay such outstanding lease rent and to further execute lease deed, failing which the land would be got vacated treating encroachment thereon. 3. It is the case of the petitioner Company that M/s West's Patent Co. Ltd. (Joint Stock Company having its HQ. Panipat Haryana) under sale deed dated 1.1.72 (Ann 1) sold the Cotton Ginning & Pressing Factory at Beawar commonly known as Factory of Wests' Patent Press Co. along with 13,336 sq. yards of free hold open land and 21,931 sq. yards perpetual lease hold land, besides superstructures for housing the godowns & residential quarters for the staff built on lease hold land so also machinery fitted & lying therein, in favour of M/s West's Patent Press Company (P) Ltd. having its registered office at 32 Regal Building, Parliament Street, New Delhi for a consideration of Rs. two lacs. 4. The Indenture (Ann 13) has been produced to show that Mr. C.F. Letch, duly authorised and appointed Attorney of West Patent Press Co. Ltd. (UK Company) has signed this indenture on 4th April, 1977 in furtherance to agreement dated 17/1/69, as modified by subsequent agreements dated 5/10/1970, 29/4/71, 1/1/72 & 23/3/77, in favour of West's Patent Press Co. (P) Ltd. (Indian Company) (petitioner herein), according to which the Indian Company had paid a sum of Rs. 3,07,500/- to the UK Company as total consideration and thereby nothing remained to be paid as it was full & final settlement. 5. It is also the case of the petitioner Company that a detailed representation (Ann 7) was sent on 21/9/75 against letter No. 2618 dated 28/7/75 demanding lease rent outstanding to the tune of Rs. 3,07,500/- to the UK Company as total consideration and thereby nothing remained to be paid as it was full & final settlement. 5. It is also the case of the petitioner Company that a detailed representation (Ann 7) was sent on 21/9/75 against letter No. 2618 dated 28/7/75 demanding lease rent outstanding to the tune of Rs. 3,47,256/- in respect of renewal of the lease, inter-alia asserting that the land had already been demised in their favour in perpetuity as is evident from the indenture of lease deed dated 1/4/1941 ; where under the Municipality had been given an option to revise the rent which in no case would exceed 33% of existing annual letting value of the site; therefore, method of capitalising, the value of the land demised by valuing the land @ Rs. 40/- per sq. yard and then finding the annual letting value thereof @ 6.5% is entirely without any jurisdiction.Again surprisingly enough, indisputably, the petitioner Company obviously by virtue of its protest under representation dated 21/9/75 (Ann 7), not only continued in possession over the land in dispute but also admittedly neither executed the lease deed nor paid lease rent determined pursuant to State Government's sanction for renewal under letter dated 18/6/75 (Ann 5) and demanded by the respondent No. 2 vide letter dated 11/7/75 (Ann 6) even till further expiry of renewed term of lease of 30 years from 26/4/69 till 25/4/99, inasmuch as even earlier lease rent was @ Rs. 750/- under agreement dated 1/4/41 was not accepted by the respondent No. 2.Be that as it may, neither any decision was taken on the representation dated 21/9/75 (Ann 7) nor communicated it to the petitioner Company, nor the petitioner Company could have been evicted from possession and thus admittedly, the possession over the land in dispute continued with the petitioner Company not only after expiry of renewed term on 25/4/99 but also till date.However, again on 7/1/99 three months-Prior to the expiry of renewed period of lease of 30 years on 25/4/99, the petitioner Company reiterating its case as to the lease being in perpetuity moved an application (Ann 9) to the respondent No. 2 seeking further renewal of the lease pursuant to earlier agreement of lease dated 1/4/1991 duly followed by reminder dated 17/3/99. But no decision has been conveyed to the petitioner company. Hence this writ petition No. 2157/99.Re. But no decision has been conveyed to the petitioner company. Hence this writ petition No. 2157/99.Re. Writ Petition No. 2182/97By letter dated 20/4/1972 (Ann. 1) of the West's Patent Press Company (P) Ltd. Post Box No. 28 GT Road Panipat addressed to the Chairman Municipal Committee Beawar, the lessee Company agreed to surrender the land required by the respondent Municipality for providing road across to the godown sought to be opened from northern corner connecting the same to Nehru Nagar Colony without charging any compensation, and the lessee Company proposed to fix at Rs. 3,000/- per annum as lease rent and subject to this, they waived all their objections regarding enhancement of rent at old rates. But despite the consent of surrender as to the land for road construction having been given by letter dated 20/4/72, it appears from letter dated 29/2/96 (Ann. 2) that such a land was not surrendered, therefore, the petitioner Company was directed to remove their construction over the surrendered land otherwise the Municipality would do it at their costs. Even by letter of consent dated 24/2/96 (An. R2) the petitioner company agreed to the SDO Beawar & Commissioner Nagar Parishad Beawar for surrender of land in vicinity of Geeta Bhawan Road by removing Godown &, superstructures latest by 29/2/96 for road alignment construction by vacating it for public purposes.Admittedly the Municipal Council, Beawar filed a Case No. 1/79 before the Estate Officer, Beawar (SDO Beawar) for summary eviction from the land in dispute under the provisions of Rajasthan Premises (Unauthorised Occupants) Act, which are yet pending decision inasmuch as the predecessor of the petitioner Company had also filed a revision petition U/s 300 of the Rajasthan Municipal Act, before the competent authority for determination of the rent, which too has been pending consideration. 6. In WP No. 2182/97, claim of the petitioner Company is based on a sale deed in respect of land of free hold having been sold by Bihani Lal & others to West's Patent Press Company (P) Ltd. on 5/5/1925 as to total land measuring 8 bighas & 19 biswas in Khasra Nos. 960 & 961, which was subsequently alleged to have been sold by the West's Patent Press Company in favour of the petitioner Company by sale deed executed on 1/1/1972 for the land of free hold measuring 15,536 sq. yards. 960 & 961, which was subsequently alleged to have been sold by the West's Patent Press Company in favour of the petitioner Company by sale deed executed on 1/1/1972 for the land of free hold measuring 15,536 sq. yards. It is the case of the petitioner Company that it was having its possession over leased holder land measuring 21,931.22 sq. yards and free hold land measuring 21,931.22 sq. yards and free hold land measuring 15,536 sq. yards, which are situated nearby and their boundaries are adjoining with each others. Further it is the case of the petitioner Company that no notice whatsoever was given for removal of any construction or material except the notice for 731.22 sq. yards of land out of total leased out land measuring 21,931.22 sq. yards, so also for free hold land. Hence, a civil suit was admittedly instituted by the petitioner Company on 29/2/96 for perpetual injunction, and so also for temporary injunction. However, temporary injunction was ultimately declined though initially the trial Court ordered to maintain status quo but after reply and written statement of the defendants, the order of status quo was vacated and II application was.dismissed, against which revision petition was filed but it was dismissed as withdrawn. 7. Therefore, on 3rd April, 1997 the Enforcement Officers of the Municipal Council Beawar along with other officers of the District Administration in the form a Team are alleged to have reached the spot for demolition of the complete building, godowns and residential quarters of the petitioner Company but also took away the iron gates fitted on the boundary wall & tin sheets of the godowns, besides the raw & finished material lying therein. Hence this writ petition No. 2182/97. 8. The main thrust of arguments canvassed on behalf of the petitioner Company is as to interpret the lease dated 1/4/1941 of the period from 26/4/39 to 25/4/69 in perpetuity and to further hold that after expiry of lease period of 30 years commencing on 26/4/69, second renewal was also permissible, because the use of words, 'every' & 'each' in the covenant, itself is conclusive proof to show that more than one renewal of lease was permissible. According to Shri R.D. Rastogi on behalf of the petitioner Company, original lease period as per lease dated 1/4/1941 was for 30 years from 26/4/39 to 25/4/69, but after expiry of this first lease period, two renewals were permissible for the period of 30 years in each renewal. Shri Rastogi further contended that despite having applied for second renewal of the lease by a registered letter dated 7/1/99, nothing was done while its reminder was also sent by registered post dated 17/3/1999. 9. Shri R.D. Rastogi further contended that on the basis of the sale deed dated 1/1/1972 registered with the Registrar Delhi on 24/3/1972 (Ann 1) the petitioner is entitled to be declared holding the land validity in two parts (1) leased out and (2) free hold ; and that since the respondents did not follow due process of law for demolition of the construction over the leased out as well as free hold land in dispute, therefore, it is entitled to the damages caused as a result of illegal demolition by the respondents, besides direction to them to reconstruct the demolished portion of construction of factory. It was also argued that as a result of high handedness on the part of the respondents, major part of the factory building constructed on leased out part was demolished by the respondents, inasmuch as under the grab of demolition, they even demolished boundary wall and other construction done by the petitioner Company in its own private free hold land which was purchased under a registered sale deed for which permission of construction was obtained as is evident in the map (Ann 3). 10. Lastly Shri R.D. Rastogi on behalf of the petitioner urged that no notice whatsoever had been given by the respondents before demolition made at the site on 3/4/1997 inasmuch as no opportunity of hearing was afforded and thus the respondents demolished the construction over the factory building of the petitioner on the leased out land as well as free hold plot and that apart, the respondents failed to show in their reply that before making such demolition on 3/4/1997, any notice or any opportunity of hearing was given to the petitioner Company. 11. To support the contention viz. 11. To support the contention viz. that no action can be taken without serving proper notice ; that due course of law should be adopted before taking any action of dispossession ; that writ petition is maintainable against forceful possession ; that even after expiry of the lease period, if lessee continues to be in possession then such lessee becomes statutory tenant and cannot be thrown from such land by force ; that the Government must act fairly even in its contractual matters, Shri R.D. Rastogi learned counsel for the petitioner Company placed reliance upon various decisions. Here let me have a resume of the decisions cited by Shri R.D. Rastogi.Re. Citations relied by Shri R.D. Rastogi on behalf of the CompanyIn Anamalli Club v. Govt, of TN ( 1997(3) SCC 169 ) , the Apex Court held thus "Law makes a distinction between persons in juridical possession and rank trespassers. Law respects possession even if there is no valid title to support it. Law does not permit any person to take law into his hands and to dispossess a person In actual possession without having recourse to a court. The object thereby is to encourage compliance of the rule of law and to deprive the person who wanted a person in lawful possession removed from possession according to proper form and to prevent him from going with a high band and eject such person. Undoubtedly, the true owner is entitled to retain possession even though he had obtained it by force or by other unlawful means but that would not be a ground to permit the owner to take law into his own hands and eject the person in judicial possession or settled possession without recourse of law." But curiously enough a careful decision in Annamallai Club v. TN Government (supra) makes it crystal that the Apex Court categorically held that after determination of the grant, though they have no right to remain in possession, the State cannot take unilateral possession without taking recourse to the procedure provided under the Act and therefore, the respondents should have adopted the procedure prescribed under Section 4 & 5 of the Eviction Act after determination of the license granted under the Government Grants Act. In this context, the Apex Court made it clear that it would not have been open to the respondent to have a notice issued to the appellant and give time to vacate the premises within 10 days or 15 days and, therefore, could have resumed possession with minimal use of police force. The Apex Court further held as under:- "It is not possible to accept the contention that the appellant is entitled to notice before the order of termination of grant made and so the action is bad in law and so the appellant is entitled to restitution of the property. The recourse to Article 226 of the Constitution, to establish title would not be a proper remedy. But in this case it is not necessary to go into the question since the High Court had held that the writ petition was not maintainable." A categorical conclusion arrived at by the Apex Court is that there is no need for the State to file a suit for eviction. But notice in compliance of principles of natural justice should have been given affording reasonable time of 10 or 15 days to vacate the premises and to deliver vacant and peaceful possession ; thereafter, the Government would be free to resume possession, and that since possession was already taken, notice need not be given afresh to the appellant. 12. In East India Hotels Ltd. v. Syndicate Bank (1992 (Supp)(2) SCC 29) , suit premises were given on lease and license basis to Bank for 12 years with provision for renewal of the license for a further period of 12 years, but license was terminated after expiry of initial period of 12 years rejecting request of licenseee plaintiff for extension of period of license. It was a case of a suit for recovery of possession by person dispossessed of immovable property without his consent otherwise than in due course of law and that suit was decreed U/s 6 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963. But there was conflicting views expressed by the Division Bench of the Apex Court (Per N.M. Kasliwal & K. Ramaswamy, JJ.), therefore, the matter was placed before Chief Justice for constituting a larger bench for resolving the conflict. 13. But there was conflicting views expressed by the Division Bench of the Apex Court (Per N.M. Kasliwal & K. Ramaswamy, JJ.), therefore, the matter was placed before Chief Justice for constituting a larger bench for resolving the conflict. 13. In RV Bhupal Prasad v. State of AP ( 1995 (5) SCC 698 ) , though the Apex Court held that it was a case where possession of the appellant was as tenant at sufferance and was liable to ejectment in due course of law, but his possession was held not legal nor lawful because his possession of thereafter was unlawful or litigious possession as the landlady declined renewal after expiry of the lease. Thus while holding that the appellant may remain in possession until his ejectment in due course in execution of the decree in the suit filed by the respondent, but it was held that his possession cannot be considered to be settled possession and therefore he was akin to a trespasser, though initially he had lawful entry. 14. In Chandra & Co. v. State of Rajasthan (1981 RLW 19) it has been held that there is a distinction between a case where the Government is seeking to evict a person in unauthorised occupation of Government property and the unauthorised occupant approaches the Court for relief against such eviction and a case where State Government or its officers have forcibly evicted an unauthorised occupant from Government property without the authority of law. 15. In Bishandas v. State of Punjab ( AIR 1961 SC 1570 ) the Apex Court held that the petitioners could not be held to be trespassers in respect of the dharamsala, temple and shops ; not could it be held that the dharamsala, temple and shops belonged to the State, irrespective of the question whether the trust created was of a public or private nature. However, it was also held that a trustee even of a public trust can be removed only by procedure known to law, but he cannot be removed by an executive fiat. 16. However, it was also held that a trustee even of a public trust can be removed only by procedure known to law, but he cannot be removed by an executive fiat. 16. It was a case where though it was held that a person who bona fide puts up constructions on land belonging to others with their permission would not be a trespasser, nor would the buildings so constructed vest in the owner of the land by the application of the maxim quicquid plantatur solo, solo credit, but on the other had it was made it clear that if the State thought that the constructions should be removed or that the condition as to resumption of the land should be invoked, it was open to the State to take appropriate local action for the purpose ; and even if the State proceeded on the footing that the trust was a public trust it should be taken appropriate legal action for the removal of the trustee. 17. In Raptakos Brett & Co. Ltd. v. Ganesh Property ( 1998 (7) SCC 184 ) , on the expiry of the lease period, the erstwhile lessee continued in possession by virtue of the law of the land, i.e. that the original landlord cannot physically throw out such an erstwhile tenant by force, therefore, the Apex Court held that he must get his claim for possession adjudicated by a competent court according to relevant provisions of law because the status of an erstwhile tenant has to be treated as a tenant at sufferance akin to a trespasser having no independent right to continue in possession. It was a case where by instituting a suit for a decree of possession and damages @ Rs. 200/- per day, the plaintiff (respondent) had sought to enforce its right to get restoration of possession under the covenant of the lease and the law of the land and his suit was decree by the trial Court & confirmed by the High Court. The Apex Court dismissed the appeal rejecting the plea of the appellant lessee that the eviction suit was not maintainable as then the plaintiff was an unregistered firm. The Apex Court dismissed the appeal rejecting the plea of the appellant lessee that the eviction suit was not maintainable as then the plaintiff was an unregistered firm. However, in that case, the Apex Court observed that the statutory obligation of the erstwhile tenant recognised by Section 108(q) read with Section 111(a) of the Transfer of Property Act does not get obliterated and repealed merely because such implied obligation or term in the contract cannot in any way reduce the legal efficacy of the statutory obligation foisted upon such a lessee by expression provisions of Section 108(q) read with Section 111 (a) of the TP Act. 18. In LIC of India v. Consumer Education Centre ( 1995 (5) SCC 482 ) , it was held that in the sphere of contractual relations the State, its instrumentality, public authorities or those whose acts bear insignia of public element, action to public duty or obligation are enjoined in a manner that is fair, just and equitable, after taking objectively all the relevant options into consideration and in a manner that is reasonable, relevant and germane to effectuate the purpose for public good and in general public interest and it must not take any irrelevant or irrational factors into consideration or appear arbitrary in its decision. 19. It was a case where the term "insurance policy introduced" was intended to cover not only the elite and the persons employed in Government, semi-Govt. and reputed commercial establishments but also need to cover wider public, self-employed or those working in unorganised sectors. The policy under Table 58 was beneficial to all sections but was restricted to lives in specified areas alone and, therefore, it was held that confining the policy to already covered salaried sections would, therefore, be unreasonable and arbitrary and would deprive large segments in the rural areas or unorganised or self employed, which would be unjust, irrational and unfair. 20. In M/s Dwarkadas Marfatia & sons v. Bombay Port Trust ( 1989 (3) SCC 293 ) it was held that all actions including contractual dealings of statutory authority are subject to judicial review and the Court can see if such body has followed the statutory purpose and acted in public interest and not in mala fide or arbitrary or for a collateral purpose, because its action must be reasonable and taken upon lawful and relevant grounds of public interest. It was a case where eviction proceedings by Port Trust-An exempted landlord under Rent Act, were challenged and eviction of appellant under policy for leasing to major portion holder was upheld. However, the Apex Court held that in course of above judicial review of the actions of a constituted authority, the Court cannot really substitute a decision reached by a fair procedure keeping the respondent's policy in mind by a different decision only on the ground that the decision which appeals to the court, is a better one, otherwise the court would under the guise of preventing the abuse of power, be itself guilty of usurping power which does not belong to it. 21. According to the Apex Court, judicial review is not concerned with the decision, but with the decision making process, for which it is necessary to bear in mind the way and means by which the Court can control or supervise the judicial action of any authority which is subject to judicial control. In para 32 the Apex Court held that the Court may also refuse to interfere if there is laches, because in that case while the decision to allot to the major holder was arrived much earlier in 1973 the appellant failed to take any action till 1977 and substantial construction work to the knowledge of the appellant had been done in that time and thus on facts, it cannot be said that the Port Trust has acted improperly. 22. In Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd. v. Dolly Das (JT 1999 (3) SC 61) the Apex Court held that a writ under Article 226 does not lie to enforce contractual obligations, but if facts pleaded do not involve complexed question of fact for investigation writ could lie. The Apex Court made it clear that in the absence of constitutional or statutory rights being involved a writ proceeding would not lie to be enforce contractual obligations even if it is sought to be enforced against the State or to avoid contractual liability arising thereto, and thus in the absence of any statutory right Article 226 cannot be availed to claim any money In respect of breach of contract or tort or otherwise. Further the Apex Court held that where interpretation of a contract arises in relation to immovable property and in working such contract or relief thereof or any other fall out thereto may have the effect of giving rise to an action in tort or of damages, the appropriate remedy would be a civil suit.Re. Contentions of the respondentsShri J.S. Rastogi learned counsel for the respondent No. 1 has raised manifold objections as to the maintainability of the writ petition, itself. In this regard, Shri Rastogi inter-alia contended that the petitioner has not produced any document of title as to purchase of lease hold rights of London based Company, inasmuch a though it is the case of the petitioner that it has entered into some agreement to sale dated 17/01/1969 but the same has been held to be forged one by Karnataka Court and further in writ petition No. 2157/99, the agreement claimed to be dated 05/10/1970 has not been submitted and therefore, not only the title of the petitioner is disputed but also the petitioner having only agreement to sale and having no registered sale deed in its favour nor having been submitted, its writ petition is not at all maintainable.Next contention urged was that two parallel proceedings of suit and writ petition for the self-same relief filed wherein stay order was got issued ex parte but no vacation of ex parte stay order, the present writ petition was filed, though suit has subsequently been withdrawn. It has also been contended that no injunction can be granted in favour of trespasser against true owner.Lastly Shri J.S. Rastogi on behalf of the Municipality vociferously contended that bearing in mind conduct of the petitioner, a discretionary jurisdiction U/Art. 226 of the Constitution should not be exercised in its favour, especially when (i) the petition has no title deed and only agreement of sale in its favour-Copy of which has also not been submitted ; (ii) the petitioner has not executed lease deed after 1975 nor it has paid single pie as lease money ; (iii) once the petitioner agreed to vacate the part of lease area of 731.22 sq. yards for opening of road but did not surrender it and filed suit for injunction and got stay order, which too was withdrawn after preferring the writ petition at hand ; (iv) the period of lease also expired on 25/4/1999 where after it was not entitled to any renewal of lease in view of document (ExR1) or (Ann 10) so also Schedule A-Order dated 18/6/75 ; (v) no relief for damages can be granted when title of the petitioner, itself, stands disputed and (vi) moreover the proceeding for eviction as trespasser are already pending under the Rajasthan Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1964. 23. Shri J.S. Rastogi on behalf of the respondents also urged that even otherwise, the transfer (claimed by the petitioner Company) of lease rights under the alleged sale deed having taken place on 24/3/1972, i.e. after the lease itself having expired on 25/4/1969, being not sustainable in the eye of law, is not only disputed but also did not legally vest any rights of acquiring lease title or interest inasmuch as on the one hand, the petitioner Company claimed to have acquired rights of lease under the sale deed but on the other hand, the petitioner Company failed to execute the lease deed despite the sanction having been granted by the respondent State Government vide order dated 18/6/75 (Ann. 5) but also failed to either deposit or pay the lease rent fixed at Rs. 55,120/- per annum for reduced area measuring 21931.22 sq. yards despite repeated demands firstly made on 11/7/75 (Ann. 6) till date while lease term of 30 years granted under sanction dated 18/6/75 (Ann. 5) but also failed to either deposit or pay the lease rent fixed at Rs. 55,120/- per annum for reduced area measuring 21931.22 sq. yards despite repeated demands firstly made on 11/7/75 (Ann. 6) till date while lease term of 30 years granted under sanction dated 18/6/75 (Ann. 5) from 26/4/69 to 25/4/1999 has already expired but not a single penny has been paid towards lease rent outstanding for more than 30 years and therefore, even according to lease term & conditions stipulated in original lease deed dated 1/4/1941, the petitioner Company has committed breach of the lease contract having no legal case in its favour and that being so, the petitioner Company as per its own case, no doubt, has been akin to a trespasser, which resulted in initiating proceedings for eviction against it which are yet pending consideration besides its own dispute raised for determination of lease rent, itself, has yet been pending decision under the garb of which, it has not cared to pay a single penny towards lease rent since 26/4/1969 till date. 24. Re. Citations relied by Shri J.S. Rastogi on behalf of the respondentsIn support of the contention raised by Shri J.S. Rastogi that no writ petition is maintainable by a person having only agreement of sale and no registered sale deed has been submitted, following decisions have been cited : (1) Topkhanadesh Grah Nirman Sahkari Samiti v. State of Rajasthan (1996 (2) WLC 364) (2) Krishna Co-operative Housing Society Ltd v. Rajasthan Housing Board, Jaipur (1993 (3) WLC (Rajasthan) 583) (3) Sushil Kumar Jain v. Kishan ( AIR 1995 SC 1891 ) ; (4) State of UP v. District Judge and others ( AIR 1997 SC 53 ) ; (5) Naraindas Karsondas v. SA Kamtam ( AIR 1977 SC 774 ) ; 24. As regards objection as to two parallel proceedings of suit & writ petition being not maintainable, Shri J.S. Rastogi cited decision in Jai Singh v. Union of India ( AIR 1977 SC 898 ) as relied upon in the decision of this Court in Magharam v. State of Rajasthan ( 1987 (2) RLR 610 ) . 25. As regards alternative remedy, Shri J.S. Rastogi placed reliance upon the decisions in Jairam v. State of Rajasthan ( 2000 (3) WLN 129 ) and Sumer Mai v. State of Rajasthan (AIR 2001 Rajasthan 1). 26. 25. As regards alternative remedy, Shri J.S. Rastogi placed reliance upon the decisions in Jairam v. State of Rajasthan ( 2000 (3) WLN 129 ) and Sumer Mai v. State of Rajasthan (AIR 2001 Rajasthan 1). 26. In Krishna Co-operative Housing Society v. Rajasthan Housing Board (1993 (3) WLC (Raj) 583) , the Housing Society having not purchased land under any registered sale deed, by entering into an agreement with Khatedars to sell and agreement being against provisions of Tenancy Act and Land Revenue Act, but made allotment of plots to various allottees under particular Housing Scheme, this Court held that neither Housing Society nor allottees can have locus standi to challenge acquisition proceedings because person entitled to claim interest in compensation can alone be person interested competent to challenge. It was a case where it has been held that mere agreement to sell land does not create any interest in or change on property. 27. In Topkhana Desh Grah Nirmal Sahkari Samiti v. State of Rajasthan (1996 (2) WLC (Raj.) 364) the petitioner Housing Society advanced to claim land on the basis of an agreement to sale and possession of land having taken in 1975, but since no record was produced in respect of Khasra Girdwari, Jamabandi or mutation, even copy of alleged agreement was withheld, inasmuch as agreement itself was unregistered, thus the Court held that existence of agreement, payment and other matters were disputed and in this view of the matter, the writ petition was dismissed or preliminary objection as to locus standi. 28. In Jairam v. State of Rajasthan ( 2000 (3) WLN 129 ) , the petitioner first approached civil court and filed suit for injunction against the order impugned in writ petition and in the suit, temporary injunction was declined against which appeal was*filed but dismissed but thereafter suit was withdrawn so as to file writ petition. This Court held that such a writ petition is not maintainable as there was also delay of 17 months in challenging the impugned order. 29. In Sunil Kumar v. Kishan ( AIR 1995 SC 1891 ) the petitioner laid claim for a higher amount of compensation under the Land Acquisition Act, resulting into reference U/s 18 but the Civil Court disbelieved agreement of sale put forth by the petitioner thereby resulting in the order of reference in favour of the respondents. 29. In Sunil Kumar v. Kishan ( AIR 1995 SC 1891 ) the petitioner laid claim for a higher amount of compensation under the Land Acquisition Act, resulting into reference U/s 18 but the Civil Court disbelieved agreement of sale put forth by the petitioner thereby resulting in the order of reference in favour of the respondents. It was a case of reference where dispute was to the title to receive the compensation and where the agreement was subsequent to the notification U/s 4(1) therefore the Apex Court held that the Government is not bound by such an agreement because the inter se dispute was only with respect to the title as on the date of notification U/s 4(1). Hence the Apex Court held that it is settled law that the agreement of sale does not confer title and the holder of an agreement even assuming the agreement being valid, does not acquire any title to the property. 30. In State of UP v. District Judge ( AIR 1997 SC 53 ) , as the agreement to sell does not create any interest in favour of the transferee and such land can be treated to be a part and parcel of the holding of the transferrer, the Apex Court held, the result is inevitable that the appellant State is entitled to succeed and that despite the agreements to sell in favour of the transferees concerned that had taken place in 1970, the said lands which continued to remain in the ownership of respondent No. 3 could be legally included as part of his holding. It was a case of land includible in tenure holder's holding for the purpose of ceiling area despite the fact that tenure holder entered into agreement to sell some of his lands before appointed day and transferred possession to proposed vendees and therefore, Section 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act was held not attracted. 31. In State of Rajasthan v. Bhawani Singh ( AIR 1992 SC 118 ) , title of the writ petitioner was very much in dispute in view of the facts stated therein, therefore the Apex Court held that disputed question relating to title cannot be satisfactorily gone into or adjudicated in a writ petition which was held as misconceived insofar as it asked for, in effect, a declaration of writ petitioner's title to the plot in question. 32. 32. In Bareily Development Authority v. Ajay Pal Singh ( AIR 1989 SC 1076 ) , when the contract entered into by the State was non-statutory and purely contractual, it was held, the relations are no longer governed by the constitutional provisions but by the legally valid contract which determines the rights and obligations of the parties inter-se and in this sphere, the parties can only claim rights conferred upon them by the contract in the absence of any statutory obligations on the part of the authority in the said contractual field and further that no writ on order can be issued under Article 226 of the Constitution of India to compel and authorities to remedy a breach of contract pure and simple. 33. In Bihar Eastern Gangetic Fishermen Cooperative Society Ltd v. Sipahi Singh ( AIR 1977 SC 2149 ) , it was held that provisions of Article 299 of the Constitution are mandatory in character and it required that a contract made in the exercise of the executive power of the Union or of a State must satisfy three conditions contemplated thereunder, and failure to do so nullifies the contract and renders it void and unenforceable, and therefore there is no question of estoppel or ratification in a case where there is contravention of the provisions of Article 299(1) of the Constitution. 34. In Magharam v. State of Rajasthan ( 1987 (2) RLR 610 ) the petitioner availed of alternative remedy of suit and his temporary injunction application in suit was rejected, therefore, this Court held that two parallel remedies in respect of same subject matter at the same time cannot be allowed and as such writ petition was not entertained. 35. In Mahadeo Savlaram Shelke v. Pune Municipal Corpn ( 1995 (3) SCC 33 ) , the orders of eviction were passed by due process of law and had become final.' Hence it was held that no right was created in favour of the appellants to remain in possession as their possession was unlawful and thereby they cannot seek any injunction against the rightful owner for evicting them. It was also held that no injunction could be granted against the true owner at the instance of persons in unlawful possession. 36. It was also held that no injunction could be granted against the true owner at the instance of persons in unlawful possession. 36. In Premji Ratansey Shah v. Union of India ( 1994 (5) SCC 547 ) , it was held that injunction may be given to protect the possession of the owner or person in lawful possession ; that it is not mandatory that for mere asking such relief should be given ; that injunction is a personal right U/s 41 (j) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 ; the plaintiff must have personal interest in the matter and the interest of right not shown to be in existence, cannot be protected by injunction. It was also held that even assuming that they had any possession, their possession was wholly unlawful possession of a trespasser and an injunction cannot be issued in favour of a trespasser or a person who gained unlawful possession, as against the owner. In this situation, the Apex Court held that injunction would not be issued against the true owner. 37. In State of Bihar v. Jain Plastics & Chemicals Ltd ( 2002 (1) SCC 216 ) , it was categorically held that existence of alternative remedy does not affect the jurisdiction of the writ court, but it would be a good ground for not entertaining the petition but in a case of alleged breach of Government contracts, the writ is not the remedy. It was further held that seriously disputed questions or rival claims arising out of breach of contract are required to be investigated and determined on the basis of evidence led in a civil suit rather than by a court exercising prerogative of issuing writs. 38. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties at length, considered their rival contentions as well as the entire material on record, at the very outset I must make it crystal that the petitioner Company has claimed its rights of lease having acquired by virtue of registered sale deed duly executed by an English Company which was original lessee of the leased land in dispute measuring 21,931 sq. yards on 24/3/1972 followed by subsequent memo of understanding entered into between English Company and the petitioner Company stipulating therein that final payment was made in furtherance to agreement dated 17/1/1969 as modified by subsequent agreements dated 5/10/70, 29/4/71, 1/1/72 & 23/3/77, as is evident from Annexure 13 to WP No. 2157/99, and on the basis of these agreement to sale, sale deed and memo of understanding (supra) the petitioner Company claimed its possession since 17th day of January, 1969. Though the possession of the Company has not been disputed but it is the respondents' case that such a possession of the petitioner Company is not only illegal but also of a trespasser and that being so, the Municipal Council Beawar filed an eviction petition against the petitioner Company before the Estate Officer, Beawar under the provisions of the Rajasthan Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, and these eviction proceedings are pending decision. Contrarily the respondents pleaded that merely because a sale deed dated 1/1/1972 was executed between Panipat Company & Delhi Company, no title could be created in favour of the petitioner Company ; and it was emphatically denied that any lease in perpetuity was ever granted in favour of the petitioner Company or in favour of the English Company. 39. Contrarily the respondents pleaded that merely because a sale deed dated 1/1/1972 was executed between Panipat Company & Delhi Company, no title could be created in favour of the petitioner Company ; and it was emphatically denied that any lease in perpetuity was ever granted in favour of the petitioner Company or in favour of the English Company. 39. Be that it may, keeping in view pleading of the parties brought on record, no doubt title or interest or rights of the petitioner Company as to the lease of the land in dispute is disputed, inasmuch as facts pleaded involved complicated questions of fact for investigation not only as to the title but also as to the claims of any money in respect of breach of contract or otherwise, inasmuch as interpretation of a contract arises in relation to the immovable property and in working such lease or relief thereof besides any other fall out thereto for damages, therefore, in my considered view, the appropriate remedy is a civil suit as expounded by the Apex Court in a decision (cited by Shri R.D. Rastogi on behalf of the petitioner Company) in Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd v. Dolly Das (supra) in respect of the relief sought for in writ petition No. 2182/97 as to the (1) declaration of the Company holding the land validly in two parts either leased out or the other part free hold ; (2) the damages caused as a result of demolition done by the respondents or its officers and (3) the direction for reconstruction of the demolished building in its original shape as it existed prior to demolition on 3/4/1997. 40. As regards the issue as to the lease in perpetuity as per deed dated 1/4/1941 (Ann. 4), though Shri R.D. Rastogi drew my attention to pages 3 & 4 of deed (Ann. 4) so as to show that second renewal was also permissible, but contrarily Shri J.S. Rastogi on behalf of the respondent also brought to the notice of the Court that a similar provision like in the deed dated 1/4/1941 (Ann. 4) ("provided always that on second renewal this present covenant shall cease to have any further effect") has also been contemplated in previous deed dated 30/6/1996 (Ann. 4) ("provided always that on second renewal this present covenant shall cease to have any further effect") has also been contemplated in previous deed dated 30/6/1996 (Ann. 3) which, in fact, is original lease followed by first renewal by deed dated 1/4/1941 and second renewal by sanction of the Government accorded on 18/6/75 effective from 26/4/1969 to 25/4/1999 under order dated 18/o/1975 (Ann. 5) under which second renewal was subject to the condition that no further renewal would be accorded after expiry of 30 years on 25th April, 1999 and that apart, according to Shri J.S. Rastogi, though the petitioner Company has sought renewal w.e.f. 26th April, 1999 for 30 years, but once admittedly after expiry of renewed lease on 25/4/1969, the petitioner Company or its predessor company did not execute lease deed, it has no legal right rather it has ceased to have any further effect, what to talk of renewal after expiry of lease on 25/4/1999. 41. A careful reading of the Indenture made on 30th June, 1916 shows that it was executed between the Municipal Committee and the West's patent Press Co. Ltd. Beawer (the lessee) which had applied for the lease of and the Committee had agreed to demise to the lessee, for the term of 30 years from the 26th day of April, 1909. But according to the Indenture made on 1/4/1941 (Ann 4), the lessee had applied for renewal of the lease & the Committee had agreed to renew the lease to him of a plot of Nazul land to hold the demised premises for the term of 30 years from 25th day of April, 1939. 42. As per both the Indentures (Ann. 3 & 4), as was agreed and declared therein, the terms shall be read and construed as if all the liabilities to which a lessor and a lessee are respectively declared to be subject to section 108 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 with the exception of clause (8) of that section (namely the prohibition to erect a permanent structure). As regards revision of lease rent, in an Indenture dated 1/4/1941 (Ann 4), it has been contemplated that notwithstanding this lease is in perpetuity, if this lease is renewed under the covenant, Rs. As regards revision of lease rent, in an Indenture dated 1/4/1941 (Ann 4), it has been contemplated that notwithstanding this lease is in perpetuity, if this lease is renewed under the covenant, Rs. 750/- yearly sum payable as rent shall at the discretion of the Committee be subject to revision on the expiry of 30 years on the occasion of each such renewal, provided that the yearly sum so assessed on revision shall not exceed 33% of the annual letting value of the site. On this basis, it has been contended on behalf of the petitioner Company that the lease has been in perpetuity. No doubt, the lease has been in perpetuity but it cannot be forgotten that the lease deed dated 1/4/1941 has been in perpetuity to original lease of 30 years under deed dated 30/6/1916 effective from 26/4/1909. Albeit clauses of default in payment of yearly rent and/or revision of lease rent have been common in both the Indentures dated 30/6/1916 (Ann 3) and dated 1/4/1941 (Ann 4), but the determination of yearly rent fixed by the respondent State Government while according the sanction for renewal of the lease in perpetuity to preceding lease renewal effective from 26/4/1969 to 25/4/1999, has not been accepted by the predecessor Company (lessee) rather assailed in revision petition u/s 300 of the Rajasthan Municipalities Act before the respondent State Government against the demand of enhanced rent by letter dated 11/7/75 (Ann. 6) and this revision petition has yet been pending consideration, this Court feels reluctant to go into' the merits of revision of yearly rent by way of interpreting the lease in question in this writ petition and I am not prone to adjudicate the controversy by way of interpretation of the lease, itself, on merits as to whether the petitioner Company is entitled to renewal of the lease in its favour or not, because the only prayer in its writ petition No. 2157/99 of the petitioner Company is to direct the respondents to immediately decide the Company's application for renewal of the lease. Hence the question as to whether further renewal after 25th April, 1999 is permissible or not, as per covenant of lease deeds dated 30/6/1916 (Ann 3) and 1/4/1941 (Ann 4), so also the issue as to the determination of enhanced or revised rent as per covenants of aforesaid lease deeds, both are left open for being adjudicated upon by the appropriate authorities or forums where the matter has been pending since long albeit the lease period itself has expired on 25/4/1999. 43. Similarly, the petitioner Company by virtue of its protest by representation dated 21/9/75 (Ann. 7) not only continued in possession over the land in dispute but also neither executed the lease deed nor paid lease rent determined pursuant to State Government's sanction for renewal by letter dated 18/6/75 (Ann 5) as amended by respondent No. 2 by letter dated 11/7/75 (Ann 6) even till further expiry of renewed term of lease of 30 years from 26/4/69 till 25/4/99. Be that as it may, neither any decision was taken on the representation dated 21/9/75 (Ann 70 nor communicated it to the petitioner Company, nor the petitioner Company had been evicted from possession nor the eviction proceedings alleged to have been initiated against the petitioner Company or its predecessor Company (lessee) have been concluded by the competent forum where such proceedings have been pending since 1979, for the reasons to the best of knowledge of the respondent authorities, inasmuch as admittedly the possession over the land in dispute continued with the petitioner Company or its predecessor company not only even after expiry or renewed term on 25/4/99 but also till date. 44. Rather manifold objections have been raised by the respondents in their reply to these duo writ petitions alleging the conduct of the lessee company for committing breach of lease terms not only in executing the lease deed pursuant to Govt, sanction (Ann. 5) but also in not making regular payment of annual lease rent under the one pretext or the other. 45. 5) but also in not making regular payment of annual lease rent under the one pretext or the other. 45. Moreover, once the eviction proceedings were admittedly initiated at the instance of the Municipal Council, Beawar before the Estate Officer Beawar for summary eviction of either the petitioner company or its predecessor Company under the Rajasthan Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, in the year 1979 which are pending since then, it is surprisingly enough, what necessitated the respondents to remove the possession of the petitioner Company on 24.2.96 and for demolition of the factory premises that too without taking course of law, especially when law respects possession even if there is no valid title to support it. 46. It is not the case of the respondents that the lease sanctioned by the Government under order dated 18.7.75 (Ann. 5) for 30 years from 26.4.69 to 25.4.99 was terminated by issuing prior notice to the lessee Company or by affording opportunity of hearing before removal of possession of the petitioner Company or demolition of factory premises. It is also not the case before this Court on behalf of the respondent that any notice was issued to the petitioner Company or its predecessor lessee company as to the alleged breach of lease term or for having not executed the lease pursuant to the renewal sanctioned by letter dated 11.7.75 (Ann. 5), or for having not paid any single penny towards revised/enhanced annual lease rent determined under renewal order dated 11.7.75. 47. Merely because the petitioner Company or lessee company had no title or right to remain in possession after expiry of lease term if they failed to execute lease deed pursuant to the renewal sanction (Ann. 5) or failed to pay any single penny, the State cannot take unilateral possession without taking recourse to the procedure provided under the relevant law viz. Eviction Act or the Transfer of Property Act or by following the principle of natural justice. 48. Since the eviction proceedings are yet pending decision against the petitioner Company or lessee Company, this Court feels loath to go into the controversy as to the status of the lessee under lease deed dated 1.4.1941 or dated 11.7.75 or of the petitioner Company as a tenant at sufferance akin to a trespasser having no independent right to continue in possession after expiry of renewal term on 25.4.1999. 49. 49. Better recourse of law would have been for the State, its instrumentality and the Municipality in the sphere of contractual relations, to have adjudicated upon all the disputes raised either at the instance of the lessee or the petitioner Company or even at its own by resorting to eviction proceedings before removal of possession or demolition of the factory premises over the land in dispute, including the issue of entitlement of renewal of the lease at the instance of the petitioner Company after expiry of lease term on 25.4.1999, to which no lease deed has ever been executed either by the petitioner Company or its predecessor company or original lessee. 50. In our jurisprudence governed by rule of law even an unauthorised occupant can be ejected only in the manner provided by law. A course of legal proceedings according to the rules and principles which have been established in our system of jurisprudence for the enforcement and protection of private rights. It is trite that due course of law implies the right of the person affected thereby to be present before the forum, authority or tribunal or court of law which pronounces judgment upon the question of life, liberty or property in its most comprehensive sence; to be heard, by testimony or otherwise, and to have the right of determination of the controversy by proof, every material fact which bears on the question of fact or liability, be conclusively proved or presumed against him. That being so, the Courts have viewed with askance any process other than strict compliance of law as valid in dispossessing a person in occupation of immovable property against his consent. 51. I must also reiterate the dictum of law that a tenant at sufferance is one who comes into possession of land by lawful title, but who holds it by wrong after termination of the term or expiry of the lease by efflux of time. The tenant at sufferance is one who wrongfully continues in possession after the extinction of a lawful title. A tenancy at sufferance does not create relationship of landlord and tenant. The lessee holding over with the consent of the lessor is in a better position than a mere tenant at will, but the relationship of the landlord & tenant is not established until the rent was paid and accepted. A tenancy at sufferance does not create relationship of landlord and tenant. The lessee holding over with the consent of the lessor is in a better position than a mere tenant at will, but the relationship of the landlord & tenant is not established until the rent was paid and accepted. Even the possession of a tenant who is ceased to be tenant is protected by law, although he may not have a right to continue in possession after termination of the tenancy or lease, his possession is juridical. Under law, the possession of a lessee, even after expiry of its earlier termination is juridical possession and forcible possession is prohibited; a lessee cannot be dispossessed otherwise than in due course of law. Obviously because a lessor, with the best of title, has no right to resume possession extra judicially by use of force, from a lessee, even after the expiry of earlier termination of the lease by forfeiture or otherwise. On the contrary, it is under an additional inhibition stemming from the requirement that all actions of Government and governmental authorities should have a legal pedigree. In the present case there is no question of the Government thinking of appropriating to itself an extra judicial right of reentry. Possession can be resumed by Government only in manner known to or recognised by law. It cannot resume possession otherwise than in accordance with law, in respect of land in dispute. Government and its instrumentality (respondents herein) are accordingly prohibited from taking possession otherwise than in the course of law.Before parting with this matter, I feel it my duty to say that the executive action taken in this case by the State and its officers is destructive of the basic principle of the rule of law, as is obvious from the facts on record viz. admittedly (1) eviction proceedings initiated against the petitioner company or lessee company or its predecessor company long ago in the year 1979 have not been got decided by the Government or its officers; whereas what necessitated the respondents to dislodge the possession of the lessee company or the petitioner company on 24.2.96 when the respondents' officers reached the spot; (2) what prevented the respondents from getting decided the matter pending before the competent authority under law in respect of the controversy raised by the lessee as to the determination of lease rent by way of demand of enhanced rent under letter dated 11.7.75 (Ann. 6) against which revision petition is admittedly said to have been pending consideration U/s. 300 of the Municipalities Act; and (3) why the respondents failed to recover the lease rent for the entire lease period from 26.4.69 to 25.4.1999 or to adopt recourse of law for breach of any lease term for non-payment of lease rent or otherwise: (4) why the respondents failed to decide the application of the petitioner company or lessee company for further renewal after expiry of earlier term on 25.4.1999, which too stands pending adjudication before the respondents; are the crucial questions which need determination by proper forums appropriately. 52. Unless the aforesaid disputes raised not only by the petitioner-Company or its predecessor company or lessee company in respect of the possession or the lease covenants, but also by the respondents in these writ petitions, which are pending adjudication in appropriate forums, are decided finally, in my considered view, giving primacy, legitimacy or legality to the conduct or acts of the lessor (respondents) to take possession of the leased property in derogation of the due course of law would be deleterious to rule of law and tantamounts to high handedness. The impugned possession over the leased property in dispute is litigious and after expiry of the lease on 25.4.1999, it is juridical. 53. Resultantly, these two writ petitions are allowed subject to the observations, referred to above and to the extent only that the respondents are directed to decide the petitioner Company's application (1) for renewal of the lease and for determination of lease rent due from 26.4.69 enhanced by Govt, under its sanction of renewal dated 11.7.75 (Ann. 53. Resultantly, these two writ petitions are allowed subject to the observations, referred to above and to the extent only that the respondents are directed to decide the petitioner Company's application (1) for renewal of the lease and for determination of lease rent due from 26.4.69 enhanced by Govt, under its sanction of renewal dated 11.7.75 (Ann. 5) considering earlier agreements' covenants and its construction in accordance with law so also observations made herein above; and (2) the respondents are further directed to decide eviction proceedings initiated by them in the year 1979 and pending since then before the competent forum, including the interest on the arrears of lease rent outstanding against the lessee till date. All this exercise be completed within a period of three months from the receipt of certified copy of this order and it is expected that the parties to the applications shall co-operate in the course of early hearing and decision of all the disputes pending adjudication since last two decades. In the meanwhile, the respondents are prohibited from taking the impugned possession otherwise than in due course of law. However, the relief sought for in WP No. 2182/97 is left open to be adjudicated by the appropriate forum for which a liberty is given to the parties to avail of any remedy available in law as to the declaration or damages or reconstruction of the alleged demolitions in accordance with law keeping in view the observations referred to above. No order as to costs.Writ Petition Allowed to Extent that Respondents should decide Petitioner Company's Application for renewal of lease and for Determination of Rent as also to decide Eviction Petition Pending since 1979 Within 3 Months. *******