RAVI R. TRIPATHI, J. ( 1 ) THE Chief Executive of the Surat Electricity Company filed the present petition being aggrieved of the judgement and award passed by the Labour Court in T. Application No. 62 of 1988, which was confirmed by the industrial Court in Appeal (IC) No. 4 of 1996. ( 2 ) THE facts of the present case are that the respondent-employee was working as a Technical Assistant in the petitioner-company and he was served with a chargesheet dated 13/05/1987, a copy whereof is produced at Annexure-A to the petition. The charges levelled against the respondent-workman reads as under :" (I) Unauthorised removal of 3 phase Meter from one consumer and installation of the same at the premises of another consumer without permission of the Officer of the Company; (II)TAKING illegal gratification. "a departmental inquiry was conducted complying with the principles of natural justice and in the departmental inquiry, the charge was held to be proved and, therefore, second show cause notice was issued on 28/09/1987. The respondent-workman, after having asked for time to tender his explanation to the said show cause notice on number of occasions, did not avail that opportunity and tender any explanation. The respondent-workman was then discharged from service by an order dated 15/12/1987. The said discharge order was challenged in the Labour Court at Surat in application (T) No. 62 of 1988 and by an order dated 28/02/1992 (Annexure-G ). The petitioner-company filed its written statement and the Labour Court after taking into consideration the case of both the parties was pleased to pass an order of reinstatement with full back wages by its judgement and award dated 2 6/02/1996, a copy of which is produced at Annexure-I to the petition. THE petitioner, being aggrieved of that judgement and award of the Labour Court, filed an Appeal (IC) No. 4 of 1996 before the Industrial Court. The said appeal was decided by the Industrial Court on 6/02/1999. The award of the Labour Court, ordering reinstatement, was upheld, but grant of 100% back wages was reduced to 75% back wages, a copy of which is produced at Annexure-J to the petition. ( 3 ) BEING aggrieved of both the aforesaid orders, the petitioner-company filed the present petition wherein on 14/10/1999, this Court issued Rule and Notice as to interim relief, returnable on 25/11/1999 and granted ad interim relief in terms of paragraph 17[b]. ( 3 ) BEING aggrieved of both the aforesaid orders, the petitioner-company filed the present petition wherein on 14/10/1999, this Court issued Rule and Notice as to interim relief, returnable on 25/11/1999 and granted ad interim relief in terms of paragraph 17[b]. THE matter was, thereafter, adjourned on number of occasions and it reached final hearing on 29th january, 2002. The learned Advocate for the petitioner-company concluded his arguments and learned advocate appearing for the respondent-workman sought time to file an additional affidavit. ( 4 ) THE learned Advocate for the respondent-workman filed an additional affidavit today, which is taken on record. ( 5 ) THE case of the petitioner-company in short is that the respondent-workman was found guilty of the charges levelled against him in the chargesheet. The departmental inquiry initiated against the respondent workman was though held to be legal and proper, the labour Court held that the order of `discharge of the respondent-workman was illegal, as the punishment was disproportionate to the offence. The Labour Court, after framing the issues, answered the same in the affirmative and ordered reinstatement of the respondent-workman with 100% back wages. ( 6 ) MR. P. S. Chari, learned Advocate for the petitioner-company, submitted that the Labour Court has committed an error in coming to the aforesaid conclusion after having held that the departmental inquiry was legal and proper. Mr. Chari submitted that in view of the judgement of the Apex Court in the matter between Janatha bazar (South Kanara Central Cooperative Wholesale Stores limited) and Ors. vs. Secretary, Sahakari Noukarara sangha and Ors. , reported in (2000) 7 SC 517, the amount of misappropriation, whether it is small or large, and even to an extent, past record of an employee, which may be unblemished, is an irrelevant factor. Mr. Chari relied upon the observations made by the Apex Court in paragraph 6 wherein the observations of the Apex Court in the matter of Punjab Dairy Development Corporation Limited vs. Kala Singh, reported at (1997) 6 SC 159, were reproduced, reads as under :"in view of the proof of misconduct, a necessary consequence will be that the management had lost confidence that the workman would truthfully and faithfully carry on his duties and consequently the Labour Court rightly declined to exercise the power under section 11a of the INDUSTRIAL DISPUTES ACT, 1947 to grant relief with minor penalty. "mr. "mr. Chari also relied upon the observations made by the Supreme Court in the aforesaid judgement in paragraph 8, which reads as under :"in case of proved misappropriation, in our view, there is no question of considering past record. It is the discretion of the employer to consider the same in appropriate cases, but, the Labour Court cannot substitute the penalty imposed by the employer in such cases. " ( 7 ) MR. Chari submitted that in the present case once the departmental inquiry is held to be legal and proper wherein the charges levelled against the delinquent are proved, there is no question of the Labour court interfering with the order of punishment and ordering reinstatement, that too, with 100% back wages. Mr. Chari clarified that when he says, "that too with 100% back wages", it does not mean that reinstatement without back wages would have been an acceptable order. ( 8 ) MR. Chari, learned Advocate appearing for the petitioner-company, relied upon a judgement of the High court of Madras in the matter between Prasad Film laboratories, Madras vs. Presiding Officer, Principal labour Court, Madras and Anr. , reported in 2001 (II) LLJ 48 , wherein the High Court of Madras was pleased to hold that in case of misconduct of theft, dismissal is not required to be interfered with and no reinstatement is required to be ordered since quantum of property, which is stolen, is small. Mr. Chari submitted that the Court was pleased to hold that quantum of stolen property being small, cannot be a criterion to condone dishonest act of theft, which amounts to grave misconduct. ( 9 ) MR. Chari, learned Advocate for the petitioner, submitted that in the present case, both the Courts below have committed an error inasmuch as the departmental inquiry is held to be legal and proper and still the `order of discharge is quashed and reinstatement is ordered. Mr. ( 9 ) MR. Chari, learned Advocate for the petitioner, submitted that in the present case, both the Courts below have committed an error inasmuch as the departmental inquiry is held to be legal and proper and still the `order of discharge is quashed and reinstatement is ordered. Mr. Chari, while emphasising his contention, relied upon a judgement of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in the matter between State Bank of India and Central government Industrial Tribunal, reported in 1998 (80) FLR 849, wherein the Court was pleased to hold that - `it is firmly settled in the decisions of the Supreme court (supra) that where a proper inquiry has been held by employer and the finding of misconduct is supported from the evidence adduced in the enquiry, the Tribunal has no jurisdiction to sit in appeal on the decision of the employer. ( 10 ) MR. Upadhyay, learned Advocate appearing for the respondent-workman, took all pains to submit that the respondent-workman is not guilty of the charge levelled against him. Mr. Upadhyay invited the attention of the court to the deposition of Shri Anilkumar D. Mehta, who was Witness No. 1 in the departmental inquiry examined by the management. Mr. Upadhyay submitted that in the cross examination of Mr. Anilkumar D. Mehta, he has stated that when he visited the premises of Shri manjibhai (the complainant), he found more than one unauthorised and un-tested meters. He submitted that in the present case, the petitioner-company has not taken any steps against said Shri Manjibhai, who was in possession of such unauthorised meters. With all vehemence at his command, the learned Advocate submitted that the company has neither disconnected the electricity supply of Shri Manjibhai nor has seized those unauthorised meters. He is allowed to go by charging for the consumption shown in those meters. Mr. Upadhyay submitted that other witness examined on behalf of Shri manjibhai, being Witness No. 8, Shri Anilkumar Ramanlal raja, who is stated to have a shop in the name and style of `maruti Electricals and who is doing the work of `electrical fittings. Mr. Upadhyay submitted that the said witness has deposed that as there was no wireman, he had carried out the fitting and had started the supply. MR. Mr. Upadhyay submitted that the said witness has deposed that as there was no wireman, he had carried out the fitting and had started the supply. MR. Upadhyay, learned Advocate for the respondent, wanted this Court to appreciate the deposition of Shri Anilkumar Ramanlal Raja in light of the fact that he had installed the meter in question and had started the supply of electricity. Mr. Upadhyay wanted this Court to read stray sentences from the deposition of that witness, which is neither permissible under the law nor in the interest of justice. Mr. Upadhyay submitted that once there is no witness to depose that it was the respondent-workman, who installed the meter in question at the place of the complainant, the respondent-workman cannot be held to be guilty of the charge and the present petition must fail in view of the concurrent findings recorded by the Courts below. ( 11 ) MR. Upadhyay, learned Advocate for the respondent-workman, relied upon a judgement of the Apex court in the matter between H. B. Gandhi, Excise and taxation Officer-cum-Assessing Authority, Karnal and ors. vs. M/s. Gopinath and Sons and ors. , reported at 1992 (Suppl.) (2) SCC 312. Mr. Upadhyay submitted that the scope of judicial review in such case is very limited. He submitted that only the `decision making process can be examined and not the `decision itself. Mr. Upadhyay submitted that the Apex Court has held that, `high Court cannot re-appreciate the facts recorded by the fact finding authority under the statute. Mr. Upadhyay relied upon paragraphs 4 and 8 of the said judgement. Mr. Upadhyay could not show as to whether in the facts of the case before the Apex Court, a finding was recorded about the legality of the departmental inquiry. On perusal of the facts of the case before the Apex Court, the decision has no application to the facts of the present case. ( 12 ) MR. Upadhyay, learned Advocate, then placed reliance on the judgement of the Apex Court in the matter between Union Bank of India vs. Chandrakant Gordhandas shah, reported at (1994) 6 SCC 271 , to contend that interference by the High Court in concurrent findings of fact is not justified. Mr. ( 12 ) MR. Upadhyay, learned Advocate, then placed reliance on the judgement of the Apex Court in the matter between Union Bank of India vs. Chandrakant Gordhandas shah, reported at (1994) 6 SCC 271 , to contend that interference by the High Court in concurrent findings of fact is not justified. Mr. Upadhyay relied upon the observations made by the Apex Court in paragraph 11 of the said judgement, which reads as under :"it is trite that if the trial court and the appellate court, who are entrusted with the duty of investigating into questions of fact, record concurrent findings thereon on a proper discussion and appreciation of the materials placed before them, the High Court should not interfere with or disturb those findings while sitting in judgement over the same in its writ jurisdiction. Having carefully gone through the impugned judgement in the light of the materials on record, we feel tempted to quote the following observations made by Venkatachaliah (as His Lordship then was) in Rajbir Kaur v. S. Chokesiri and Co. as they are also pertinent here: (SCC p. 41, para 52)"with respect to the High Court, we think, that, what the High Court did was what perhaps even an appellate court, with full fledged appellate jurisdiction would, in the circumstances of the present case, have felt compelled to abstain from and reluctant to do. "mr. Upadhyay missed to give required emphasise to the words underlined hereinbelow :"it is trite that if the trial court and the appellate court, who are entrusted with the duty of investigating into questions of fact record concurrent findings thereon on a proper discussion and appreciation of the materials placed before them. . . "even at the cost of repetition, it is reiterated that in the present case, the Labour Court has held the departmental inquiry to be `legal and proper by a detailed order dated 28/02/1992, a copy of which is produced at Annexure-G. In the judgement and award passed by the Labour Court and in the judgement and award passed by the Industrial Court, it is no where discussed as to why the findings recorded in the departmental inquiry are warranted to be disturbed. ( 13 ) MR. Upadhyay, learned Advocate for the respondent-workman, relied upon another decision of the apex Court in the matter between Khanna Improvement Trust vs. Land Acquisition Tribunal and Ors. ( 13 ) MR. Upadhyay, learned Advocate for the respondent-workman, relied upon another decision of the apex Court in the matter between Khanna Improvement Trust vs. Land Acquisition Tribunal and Ors. , reported in (1995) 2 SCC 557 . Mr. Upadhyay submitted that the Apex Court has held that the jurisdiction of High Court under article 226 of the Constitution of India is limited and the High Court must confine itself to correcting of an error of jurisdiction committed by the Tribunal and it cannot assume suo motu jurisdiction of appellate court and correct every mistake assumed to have been committed by the Tribunal. IN that case, the Apex Court has observed in paragraph 2 that, "we find force in the contention of the learned counsel appearing for the Improvement Trust that the learned Single Judge of the High Court committed grievous error of law in interfering with the belting made by the Arbitrator and wrongly increased it to 50 ft. depth. It is seen that the Arbitrator on the basis of the evidence adduced before the Court in two sale deeds upto a depth of 43 ft. fixed at Rs. 307. Therefore, the arbitrator determined the compensation @ Rs. 307 per sq. yd. The High Court found that the respondents did not raise a point in the writ petition of the correctness of the belting by the Tribunal. But, held that it was the duty of the High Court under Article 226 of the constitution of India to have it corrected, as, according to learned Judge, it is a palpable error committed by the tribunal. We do not appreciate the view taken by the high Court. The High Court has not exercised the appellate jurisdiction under Section 54 of the Land acquisition Act. Admittedly, under the Punjab Town improvement Act, 1922 no right of appeal is provided. Therefore, in exercise of the power under Article 226, the High Court has to confine itself to correcting any error of jurisdiction committed by the authorities namely, the Arbitrator appointed under the Act and it cannot assume suo motu jurisdiction of the appellate court and attempt to correct every mistake assumed to have been committed by the Tribunal. The High Court had not rested its conclusion on any factual foundation for increasing the belting upto a depth of 50 ft. while the tribunal had evidence before it. The High Court had not rested its conclusion on any factual foundation for increasing the belting upto a depth of 50 ft. while the tribunal had evidence before it. Considered from this perspective, we are of the view that the High Court was not justified in increasing the belting from 43 ft. to 50 ft. to enhance the compensation @ Rs. 307 per sq. yd. "as discussed hereinabove, the precondition is that the High Court must not interfere with the finding recorded by the Courts below if the same is recorded on a proper discussion and appreciation of materials placed before them. IN view of the aforesaid discussion, none of these decisions of the Apex Court helps the respondent-workman. ( 14 ) MR. CHARI, learned Advocate for the petitioner-company, submitted that the submissions of Mr. Upadhyay are devoid of any merits. There is an attempt on the part of Mr. Upadhyay to quote stray sentences from the depositions of various witnesses examined by the management to confuse the real issue before the Court. Mr. Chari relied upon a judgement of the High Court of judicature, Andhra Pradesh in the matter between singareni Collieries Company Limited vs. Industrial tribunal (I), Hyderabad and Anr. , reported in 1997 (3) l. L. N. 815 to submit that in case of disciplinary inquiry, evidence cannot be understood as it is understood in the context of a civil or criminal proceeding in the Court of law. He submitted that in a departmental inquiry, term `evidence is to be taken as equivalent to `material exhibiting the conduct of the delinquent officer and the standard of proof applicable to the departmental enquiries is that of `preponderances of probability and not that of proof beyond reasonable doubt. ( 15 ) IN fact, Mr. Upadhyay is not able to point out anything, much less a convincing thing for which the complainant, Shri Manjibhai, deposed against the present respondent-workman. Mr. Upadhyay could not give any reason for disbelieving the evidence of the complainant, who has deposed that, "i know Shri Khatiwala; his name is nandkishore; I have met Khatiwala in Surat Electricity company and also at his residence, and; I have paid him rs. 500 and he had obtained my signature on a form. " He has also deposed that Mr. Khatiwala had told him that for the present you pay Rs. 500 and he had obtained my signature on a form. " He has also deposed that Mr. Khatiwala had told him that for the present you pay Rs. 500 towards the expenses and remaining amount which may be required to be deposited in the company will be calculated later. He has also deposed that on 28/04/1987, Mr. Khatiwala had installed the new meter at his residence. He also deposed that when the new meter was installed by Mr. Khatiwala, he was not present at the residence. ( 16 ) DURING the extensive cross examination of the said witness on behalf of Mr. Khatiwala, (present respondent workman), no material contradiction could be obtained. Not only that one Muljibhai Jiyaram Patel, who is examined as Witness No. 5 by the management in the department inquiry, has also deposed that Mr. Khatiwala had kept the meter at his place as Manjibhai was not present at his residence and thereafter, when Khatiwala came in the evening along with some other person, that meter was installed in the premises of Manjibhai. There is no reason for which these two persons shall depose against the present respondent-workman. The submission of Mr. Upadhyay that the evidence in the departmental inquiry be weighed in golden scale is not acceptable and hence, it is rejected. ( 17 ) IN view of the aforesaid discussion, it is clear that the Labour Court as well as the Industrial Court have erred in passing the impugned judgement and awards. The same are required to be quashed and set aside on a simple ground that the Courts below have erred in interfering with the order of discharge though the Courts below had held the departmental inquiry to be legal. In light of the latest judgement of the Apex Court in the matter of Janatha Bazaar (supra), showing sympathy in the case of misappropriation is nothing but a case of `misplaced sympathy. ( 18 ) IN the result, the present petition is allowed. The judgement and award passed by the Industrial Court in Appeal (IC) No. 4 of 1996 confirming the judgement and award of the Labour Court in T. Application No. 62 of 1988, is hereby quashed and set aside. Rule is made absolute. No order as to costs. .