JUDGMENT V. Gopala Gowda, J.--The Appellant was Defendant and the deceased Respondent was the Plaintiff in the trial Court. For the sake of convenience, the parties are referred to as per their rank in the trial Court. 2. (a) The Plaintiff filed the suit in O.S. No. 317 of 1988 for possession of suit 'A' schedule property, mesne profits and damages at Rs.10/- per day. The case of the Plaintiff is that Defendant was a tenant of the property in question and the tenancy is month-to-month. The further case of the Plaintiff is that she terminated the lease by issuing legal notice dated 20.6.1988 but the Defendant failed to quit and hand-over possession of the premises. The Defendant resisted by filing written statement denying the case pleaded by the Plaintiff and contending that the lease is a permanent lease and the lease was not determined. It is claimed that the lease was for a period of 5 years with an option to continuation. It is asserted that the Defendant has opted to continue the lease. The Defendants prayed for dismissal of the suit. (b) During the pendency of the suit, the Plaintiff died and her legal representatives came on record and prosecuted the suit. (c) On the basis of the pleadings, the trial Court framed issues. Both the parties led evidence by examining witnesses and producing documents. On appreciation of the material evidence on record, the trial Court by its judgment dated 17.7.1996 dismissed the suit holding that the lease was permanent and termination of the same was not valid and proper. Aggrieved by the dismissal of the suit, the legal representatives of deceased Plaintiff filed appeal in Regular Appeal No. 164 of 1996. The first appellate Court re-appreciated the documentary and oral evidence available on record, by its judgment dated 24.9.1998 allowed the appeal, set aside the judgment and decree of the trial Court and decreed the suit with costs directing the Defendant to hand-over possession of the property to the Plaintiff within two months. Aggrieved by the same, this second appeal is filed by the Defendant. 3. Aggrieved by the same, this second appeal is filed by the Defendant. 3. This appeal was admitted to consider the following substantial question of law: Whether the lower Court having held that Ex.D-2 as having been proved, whether it was right in further holding that no materials have been placed to show that renewal of lease from time to time when the continuation of possession under the lease had not been disputed by the Plaintiff? 4. Heard the learned Counsel for the parties and perused the judgments and decrees of the Courts below. 5. The crux of the case is whether the lease of the property in favour of the Defendant was permanent or temporary. The trial Court dealt with Issues 1 and 5 together since those issues pertain to the crux of the matter. The trial Court considered Ex.D2, the letter given by the Plaintiff consenting for running the theatre by the Defendant in the suit schedule property. Another document which the trial Court considered is Ex.D1, a receipt issued by the Plaintiff for having received Rs.4,500/- from one Ganapathi Bhat towards advance. The said amount was paid to Ganapathi Bhat by the Defendant. On the basis of these documents the trial Court held that the intention of the parties become clear to create permanent lease. It was held that there was implied contract between the parties for permanent lease and hence the trial Court without hesitation held that the lease was permanent and not temporary. 6. The trial Court considered the matter in a wrong approach. The document Ex.D2 is interpreted wrongly by the trial Court. The first appellate Court considered the said document and found that the tenancy was for a period of five years with an option to the Defendant to continue the same. It was found that after expiry of five years the Defendant has not exercised the said option. There is no document to prove extension of lease. In view of the expiry of the period in Ex.D2 and in the absence of extension of lease, the first appellate Court rightly held that the tenancy came to an end and the possession of the Defendant was that of a tenant holding-over. 7. The first appellate Court also considered Ex.D2 and held that the consent given therein for running permanent/semi permanent cinema does not mean that the lease was permanent. 7. The first appellate Court also considered Ex.D2 and held that the consent given therein for running permanent/semi permanent cinema does not mean that the lease was permanent. But the trial Court wrongly held that the intention was to create permanent lease. 8. The first appellate Court considered the provisions of Section 107 of Transfer of Property Act and the Registration Act. It was held that under Section 107 of Transfer of Property Act the lease of immovable property from year to year or for any term shall be made only by a registered document and there is no such registered lease deed in favour of the Defendant. The Defendant cannot claim permanent lease on the basis of unregistered document. Such a claim is contrary to the provisions of Transfer of Property and Registration Act. Therefore, the first appellate Court has rightly held that claim based on unregistered document cannot be taken into consideration for the purpose of determining the nature of right. The trial Court has not adverted to these aspects of the case. 9. While the trial Court based its findings on the basis of Ex.D2 to hold that the lease was permanent, the first appellate Court was justified in reversing those findings holding that Ex.D2 was not the lease deed. It is not the document entered into between the Plaintiff and Defendant. It is a mere consent letter or 'No Objection' letter issued by the Plaintiff in favour of the Defendant to submit the same to the District Registrar for obtaining the license from him for running the semi-permanent cinema theatre. The same cannot be the basis to hold that the lease of the suit schedule premises was permanent. The first appellate Court rightly held so, as the same is on proper appreciation of facts, evidence on record and in conformity with the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act and Indian Registration Act. There is no document produced by the Defendant evidencing permanent lease of the suit schedule property. Hence, the finding recorded by the first Appellate Court is supported by the decision of the Apex Court reported in 2001 (3) KCCR 2085 (Samir Mukherjee Vs. Davinder K. Bajaj) wherein it is held at paragraphs 7 and 8 as under: 7. There is no document produced by the Defendant evidencing permanent lease of the suit schedule property. Hence, the finding recorded by the first Appellate Court is supported by the decision of the Apex Court reported in 2001 (3) KCCR 2085 (Samir Mukherjee Vs. Davinder K. Bajaj) wherein it is held at paragraphs 7 and 8 as under: 7. In the case in hand we are concerned with an oral lease which is hit by the first paragraph of Section 107 of the Transfer of Property Act. Under Section 107 parties have an option to enter into a lease in respect of an immovable property either for a term less than a year or from year to year, for any term exceeding one year or reserving a yearly rent. If they decide upon having a lease in respect of any immovable property from year to year or for any term exceeding one year, or reserving yearly rent, such a lease has to be only by a registered instrument, in absence of a registered instrument no valid lease from year to year or for a term exceeding one year or reserving a yearly rent can be created. If the lease is not a valid lease within the meaning of the opening words of Section 106 the rule of construction embodied therein would not be attracted. The above is the legal position on a harmonious reading of both the sections. 8. In Ram Kumar Das (supra), Section 106 was considered by a bench of four Judges of this Court. This Court held that this Section 106 lays down the rule of construction which is to be applied when there is no period agreed upon between the parties and in such cases duration has to be determined by the reference to the object for purpose for which tenancy is created. It was also held that rule of construction embodied in this section applies not only to express leases of uncertain duration but also to leases implied by law which may be inferred from possession and acceptance of rent and other circumstances. It was further held that it is not disputed that a contract to the contrary as contemplated by Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act need not be an express contract; it may be implied, but it certainly should be a valid contract. It was further held that it is not disputed that a contract to the contrary as contemplated by Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act need not be an express contract; it may be implied, but it certainly should be a valid contract. On the facts of that case, the Court held that 'the difficulty in applying this rule to the present case arises from the fact that tenancy from year to year or reserving an yearly rent can be made only by registered instrument as lays down in Section 107 of the Transfer of Property Act'. (Emphasis supplied). Mr. Gopal Hegde and Viswajith Rai, learned Counsel for the Plaintiff have also rightly placed reliance upon the decision of this Court reported in Virupakshaiah @ Veeraiah Vs. Shivaputrappa Basappa Golappanavar, ILR (1995) KAR 2865 wherein it is held that where lease of immovable property is not made under registered lease deed, the lease of the immovable property has to be taken as monthly lease. In view of this legal position enunciated by the Apex Court and this Court, since there is no registered lease deed in the instant case in respect of the suit schedule property and in the absence of rebuttal evidence in this regard, the contention urged by the learned Counsel on behalf of the Defendant that the lease of the suit schedule property was permanent does not hold water and therefore the findings of the first Appellate Court after setting aside the erroneous findings of the trial Court on contentious issues are perfectly legal and valid, which cannot be interfered with by this Court in exercise of its jurisdiction and power. On the other hand, the reliance placed by the learned Counsel for the Appellant/Defendant on the decision reported in Sivayogeswara Cotton Press, Devangere and Others Vs. M. Panchaksharappa and Another, AIR 1962 SC 413 , Chapsibhai Dhanjibhai Danad Vs. Purushottam, AIR 1971 SC 1878 and Smt. Juthika Muliek and another Vs. Dr. Mahendra Yashwant Bal and others, AIR 1995 SC 1142 is misplaced and therefore the law laid down by the Apex Court in those cases are wholly inapplicable to the facts of this case. 10. M. Panchaksharappa and Another, AIR 1962 SC 413 , Chapsibhai Dhanjibhai Danad Vs. Purushottam, AIR 1971 SC 1878 and Smt. Juthika Muliek and another Vs. Dr. Mahendra Yashwant Bal and others, AIR 1995 SC 1142 is misplaced and therefore the law laid down by the Apex Court in those cases are wholly inapplicable to the facts of this case. 10. For the foregoing reasons, the first appellate Court was justified in holding that no materials have been placed by the Defendant to show that the renewal of lease of the suit schedule property was made in favour of the Defendant from time to time. The mere continuation of the possession by the Defendant cannot be construed as renewal of lease of the suit schedule property in favour. The reliance placed upon the decisions of the Apex Court by the learned Counsel for the Defendant reported in Ram Kumar Das Vs. Jagadish Chandra Deb Dhabal Deb and Another, AIR 1952 SC 23 , Biswabani Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Santosh Kumar Dutta and Others, AIR 1980 SC 226 and AIR 2000 SC 3523 in support of the contention urged by the Defendants Counsel that there is difference between Sections 106 and 107 of the T.P. Act to show that the lease of the suit schedule property is permanent cannot be accepted in view of the clear enunciation of law laid down by the Apex Court reported in 2001 (3) KCCR 2085 referred to supra. Hence the substantial question of law framed at the time of admission of this appeal is answered in favour of the Plaintiff and against the Defendant holding the substantial question would not arise in this Appeal. 11. During the course of arguments, learned Counsel for the Defendant submitted that substantial question of law relating to issuance of notice under Section 106 of T.P. Act is not framed by this Court and therefore requested to frame the question and consider the same. Reliance was placed upon the decisions reported in Dattonpant Gopalvarao Devakate Vs. Vithalrao Maruthirao Janagaval, AIR 1975 SC 1111 and 1975 (2) Kar LJ 271 (Rangaiah Setty K.S. by L Rs.v. Vasudeva Murthy L.S.) in support of the contention by the learned Counsel for the Defendant that the quit notice got issued to the Defendant was defective and therefore the tenancy of the Defendant in respect of the suit schedule property is not determined. The contention urged on behalf of the Defendant is wholly untenable in law and deserves rejection. In the instant case, the Plaintiff got issued legal notice dated 20.6.1988 to the Defendant determining the tenancy of the suit schedule property calling upon the Defendant to quit the suit schedule premises and deliver vacant possession to him. Admittedly there is no extension of lease of the suit schedule property in favour of the Defendant. Thus, there is valid termination of tenancy by issuance of notice as required under law. The reliance placed upon the decisions by the learned Counsel for the Respondent/Plaintiff on the decisions reported in Lalbhai Ramjibhai Vs. A.V. Seth, AIR 1974 Cal 362 , AIR 1965 Pat 311 (Gurdit Singh Vs. Tata Iron and Steel Co. Limited) and 1966 (1) Mad LJ 71 are well-founded. By careful reading of the decisions referred to supra the law laid down by the various High Courts regarding determination of tenancy of the suit schedule property are all with fours applicable to the facts of the case. Therefore the contention urged on behalf of the Defendant in support of the question of law raised by him is wholly untenable in law. Hence, the substantial question of law sought to be raised at the time of arguments by the learned Counsel for the Defendant does not arise for consideration and answer the same. The reliance placed upon the judgments of the Apex Court reported in Kanai Lal Garari and Others Vs. Murari Ganguly and Others, JT (1999) 10 SC 45 by the learned Counsel on behalf of the Defendant that this Court need not exercise its jurisdiction and power is also not tenable in law and therefore reliance placed upon the above case of no use to the Defendant. 12. In the result, appeal is dismissed. 13. At this stage, learned Counsel for the Appellant/Defendant prays for reasonable time to vacate the premises. Learned Counsel for the Plaintiff opposed grant of time on the ground that Defendant has stopped running the theatre and he has no valid license for running of the theatre. Since some time is required for the Defendant for removing the fittings, fixtures and other materials from the premises in question, three months time is granted to the Defendant to quit, vacate and deliver vacant possession of the petition schedule premises to the Plaintiff. Since some time is required for the Defendant for removing the fittings, fixtures and other materials from the premises in question, three months time is granted to the Defendant to quit, vacate and deliver vacant possession of the petition schedule premises to the Plaintiff. The time is granted to the Defendant subject to the condition that the Defendant shall file an undertaking by way of affidavit that he will vacate the premises within the stipulated time without seeking any extension of time and also pay rents regularly.