JUDGMENT 1. - Petitioner Gautam Lal is an elected Sarpanch of Gram Panchayat Patan Vaghera in District Banswara. Nine elected member of the Gram Panchayat expressed no confidence in him and a notice Anx.1 under Section 37(2) of the Rajasthan Panchayati Raj Act, 1994 (hereinafter referred to as "the Act") dated 1-3-2002 alongwith a copy of no confidence motion signed by nine members of Gram Panchayat was presented in person to the Chief Executive Officer. Zila Parishad, Banswara who thereupon forwarded the copy of the notice together with the copy of proposed motion to all the members of the Gram Panchayat concerned thereby convening a meeting at 12 noon at the Head Quarter of the Gram Panchayat Patanpura on 11-3-2002. The competent authority under the provision of Section 37(4) of the Act also nominated the Tehsildar Bagidora to preside over the meeting. Anx.1, copy of the notice, so forwarded by the Chief Executive Officer to the petitioner was received by him on 5-3-2002. In consequence of which the petitioner also participated in the meeting on 11-3-2002 in which the no confidence motion was carried. Out of nine members present in the meeting seven supported the no confidence motion whereas one Nathu alongwith petitioner Gautam Lal opposed it vide Anx. 3. Thereafter Gautam Lal filed this petition on 27-3-2002 with the prayer to quash Anx.3 alongwith the entire proceedings of no confidence motion. 2. First submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the competent authority should have presided over the meeting of no confidence motion and he could have nominated the Tehsildar only in case he was unable to preside himself. It is stated that Anx. 2 dated 1-3-2002 was presented before Shri Somnath Mishra, the Chief Executive Officer, who nominated Tehsildar Bagidora without assigning any reason as to why he was unable to preside himself. Another submission of the learned counsel was that seven days clear notice of the meeting was to be given to the members of the Gram Panchayat as per Section 37(3) (iii) of the Act whereas in the matter at hand Anx. 1 notice was received by the petitioner on 5-3-2002 for a meeting to be convened on 11-3-2002, therefore, seven days clear notice was not given. Therefore, according to the learned counsel mandatory provisions have not been complied with causing miscarriage of justice. 1 notice was received by the petitioner on 5-3-2002 for a meeting to be convened on 11-3-2002, therefore, seven days clear notice was not given. Therefore, according to the learned counsel mandatory provisions have not been complied with causing miscarriage of justice. Lastly it was submitted by the learned counsel that the motion was not put to vote through secret ballet papers and voting by show of hands was allowed which according to him was also against the provisions of law. In support of above legal submissions the learned counsel for the petitioners relied upon a few authorities which shall be dealt with at a proper place. 3. On the contrary, learned counsel for the respondents have submitted that the petition is thoroughly misconceived. All the mandatory provisions of the Act have been complied with. The petitioner himself was served upon the notice well in time. Notice Anx.1 was issued on 1-3-2002 itself, however, the petitioner may have delayed its delivery on 5-3-2002 yet he got sufficient time to oppose the same. The petitioner himself has participated in the no confidence proceedings and, therefore, no prejudice was caused to him. In support of their contentions the learned counsel for the respondents have also relied upon numerous pronouncements. 4. I have carefully considered the rival submissions made at the Bar. 5. Section 37(4) of the Act provide that the competent authority shall preside at such meeting but if he is unable to do so the officer nominated by him shall so preside. Though in the matter at hand the inability of the Chief Executive Officer to preside over the meeting on 11-3-2002 have not been mentioned in Anx.2 nor in the reply submitted on behalf of the respondents, however, off late it has been held in Smt. Sarki Devi v. State of Rajasthan, 1999 DNJ (Raj.) 784 , that where motion of no confidence was presided over by the Assistant Engineer whom the power was delegated by the Chief Executive Officer and inability of the Chief Executive Officer to preside over the meeting was neither mentioned nor proved, the Court was of the view that there was no illegality and the proceedings were not set aside. Similarly, in Smt. Sudesh Choudhary v. State of Rajasthan, 1998 DNJ (Raj.) 548 , the reasons were not recorded by the Competent Officer as to why he was unable to preside himself which was the law at that time. The Court was of the view that no prejudice has been shown by the petitioner in the meeting so held and, therefore, no miscarriage of justice has occurred. In the matter at hand also though the petitioner participated in the no confidence motion meeting held on 11-3-2002, yet he did not raise any objection as to why Chief Executive Officer has himself has not presided over the meeting or that the meeting held for no confidence motion presided over by the Tehsildar had prejudiced the petitioner in any way. 6. In Madanlal v. State of Rajasthan 1999 (2) WLC (Raj.) 443 , a Single Judge of this Court in the facts and circumstances of that case held that the Chief Executive Officer alone is competent to preside over the meeting and nominating Sub-Divisional Officer for that purpose without assigning any reason was not proper because even the Sub-Divisional Officer did not preside over the meeting and it was the Tehsildar who had presided as was clear from the proceeding Anx. 2 who has no authority to either presiding over the meeting or preside over the same. 7. A Division Bench of this Court in Bhure Khan v. State of "Rajasthan, 1976 WLN 73 , was dealing with a matter of no confidence motion against a elected Sarpanch of Gram Panchayat. The meeting was presided by the Naib Tehsildar acting as Tehsildar in which Bhure Khan the elected Sarpanch has lost confidence of 3/4th of the member of Panchayat. Bhure Khan was present in the meeting when motion was moved. He raised no objection with regard to the Presiding Officer nor any biased was shown against the Presiding Officer. In the above circumstances the Division Bench was of the view that though Naib Tehsildar acting as Tehsildar was not competent to preside over the no confidence motion however, when no bias is caused to the petitioner technicality should not invoke sympathy of the Court when the petitioner has lost faith of the members of the Gram Panchayat. Therefore, there was no substance in that objection. 8. Therefore, there was no substance in that objection. 8. Another submission of the learned counsel with regar to seven days clear notice is also devoid of merit. Though as per Section 37(3) (iii) of the Act Competent Authority shall give to the members a notice of not less than seven clear days of such meeting in such manner as may be prescribed. In the matter at hand notice Anx.1 was issued to the petitioner on 1- 3-2002, however, the same was received by the petitioner on 5-3-2002. As per Rule 21 of the Rajasthan Panchayati Raj Rules, 1996 written notice of no confidence motion shall be sent by the Chief Executive Officer by post under Certificate of Posting not less than seven clear days before the date of meeting. In the matter at hand notice Anx.1 was issued on 1-3-2002 for a meeting to be held on 11-3-2002, therefore, it was clear cut notice of more than seven days. If the petitioner some how received it on 5-3-2002, that by itself was not sufficient to vitiate the notice because he himself hap participated in the no confidence meeting and have not stated what prejudice has been caused to him. 9. In Smt. Kamlesh Kumari v. State of Rajasthan 2000(1) PLR (Raj.) 520 , manner of service of notice was not held to be mandatory where notice if received by the members by post U.P.C. will not nullify no confidence motion proceedings on such notice. In Smt. Sudesh Choudhary's case (supra) notice of meeting for considering no confidence motion was held to be directory and not mandatory. In that case meeting was held on 31st day of the date of notice delivered to the Chief Executive Officer under Section 37(1) of the Act. Similarly, in State of Rajasthan v. Madanlal Agarwal, 2002(2) WLN (Raj.) 17 , the competent authority fixed the meeting on 18-9-1998. Sarpanch challenged the notice and the High Court ordered to maintain status quo which was vacated on 7-10-1998. Thereafter by a fresh notice dated 13-10-1998 meeting was fixed 23-10-1998 which was challenged by the Sarpanch alleging that it is not 15 clear days notice. This Court was of the view that 15 days clear notice was provided by the Legislature so that the members who have to attend the very important meeting could adjust their schedule for attending it. This Court was of the view that 15 days clear notice was provided by the Legislature so that the members who have to attend the very important meeting could adjust their schedule for attending it. Further they can give serious thought to the proposed no confidence motion. The said purpose of legislation has been accomplished when the first notice of motion was given which could not be held and further the notice was issued informing the place and the date the meeting shall be held. According to the Court the meeting was convened in accordance with law but because of the order of status quo it could not be held earlier. The second notice issued on 13-10-1998 by which the meeting was fixed on 13-10-1998 is in furtherance of the notice issued on 2-8-1998 changing date of meeting only. 10. In Hukam Singh v. State of Rajasthan 1984 RLR 918 , the Court was also dealing with similar situation. In Radhey Shyam v. District Magistrate, Ganganagar, 1972 (1) WLN (1) 772 , also the Court was dealing with an identical provisions of the Rajasthan Municipalities Act. Section 72 (3) of the Act provided not less than seven clear days between the date of dispatch of notice and the date of meeting. Though the court was of the view that both these expressions "not less than" and "clear days" go to suggest that full seven days must intervene between the date of dispatch and the date of meeting. However, the Court did not think it proper to quash the proceedings under extra ordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 because the tradition of democracy require that a person who wants to hold the elected office of local body must give due respect to the wishes of the majority of members of that body and if he has lost the confidence of that majority then he should not try to stay in that office even for a moment and should not come forward to seek the protection of this Court under the extra ordinary jurisdiction. The Court further held that in order to create healthy conventions for the functioning of democracy it is necessary that the Court should be slow to help the persons who attempts to stick to his elected office even after unequivocal declaration of the majority that he has lost their confidence. 11. The Court further held that in order to create healthy conventions for the functioning of democracy it is necessary that the Court should be slow to help the persons who attempts to stick to his elected office even after unequivocal declaration of the majority that he has lost their confidence. 11. The Apex Court in Jai Charan lal v. State of U.P., AIR 1968 SC 5 , was also dealing with a similar matter relating to the U.P. Municipalities Act wherein the meeting was fixed for 25th November. Notices were sent by the District Magistrate on 17th November. According to the Apex Court there is no breach of provisions of Section 87-A(3) of the Act as seven clear days intervene between the date of dispatch of notice and the date of meeting. 12. Similarly, in Hajara Ram v. Panchayat Samiti, Padampur, SB Civil Writ Petition No. 1785/97, decided on 21-10-1997 (Reported in 1998 (2) Raj LW 1034 ) this Court was also dealing with an identical matter and placing reliance on Radhey Shyam's case (supra); Jai Charan Lal's case (supra) and Ramcharan Das v. Girjadevi, AIR 1966 SC 323 , came to the conclusion that even if there was a short fall in the time of the notice, it would not by itself make the proceedings of the meeting invalid. The meeting will be invalid only if the proceedings are affected by such irregularity. In that case the Tehsildar concerned sent the notice to the Sarpanch on 4-4-1997. It was dispatched on that very day by which the meeting was to be held on 22-4-1997. According to law applicable at that time 15 days clear notice was necessary. The notice was received on 7-4-1997, therefore, according to the petitioner therein it fell short of 15 days which has not found favour with the learned Judge because even if the notice may have fell short no prejudice has occasioned to the petitioner. 13. In the matter at hand as referred above notice Anx.1 was issued on 1-3-2002 for a meeting to be held on 11-3-2002. The same may have been received by the petitioner on 5-3-2002 for the reasons beyond control of the Chief Executive Officer. 13. In the matter at hand as referred above notice Anx.1 was issued on 1-3-2002 for a meeting to be held on 11-3-2002. The same may have been received by the petitioner on 5-3-2002 for the reasons beyond control of the Chief Executive Officer. When in compliance of above notice the petitioner participated and deliberated in the no confidence meeting and have not raised any objection nor prima facie any prejudice seems to have occasioned to the petitioner, therefore, on this ground also the no confidence motion cannot be quashed. 14. Last submission of the learned counsel was that in the no confidence motion voting was done through show of hands and not by secret ballet, is also not tenable because the mode of voting has not been prescribed under the Act or the Rules made thereunder. The settled rule in regard to the mode of voting is that where a statute prescribes the mode in which the vote of a body is to taken, then that method must be followed and failure to comply with the same is fatal to any action taken and that if the mode of voting is not prescribed then the mode of voting by show of hands and, if necessary by post must prevail. 15. In Hukam Singh's case (supra) an identical matter was under examination and the Court was of the view that the mode to ascertain wishes of members present at the meeting has been left to discretion of the Presiding Officer and members present. Obtaining signatures for and against the motion does not vitiate the proceedings of the meeting. During the course of arguments also the learned counsel could not indicate any rule or precedent showing that in no confidence meeting voting shall be done by secret ballet. Therefore, this plea of the learned counsel is also not tenable. 16. Consequently, there is no merit in this petition and the same stands dismissed.Petition dismissed. *******