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2002 DIGILAW 174 (CAL)

Basumati Corporation Ltd. v. Benoy Das

2002-03-13

ASHOK KUMAR MATHUR, GIRISH CHANDRA GUPTA

body2002
JUDGMENT The judgment of the Court was as follows:–– Gupta, J. : This appeal is directed against an order dated 4.6.1992 by which a learned Single Judge of this Court allowed the writ petition. The facts and circumstances of the case briefly stated are as follows:– The respondent No. 1 (hereinafter referred to as the respondent) an employee of the appellant Corporation working as a lino operator was charge-sheeted and suspended by an order dated 15.3.1980 on the ground that he assaulted one lino mechanic Sri Ravi Sadhukhan who was then on duty. By a letter dated 20.5.1980 the respondent denied the charges. An enquiry was thereafter held. The respondent was granted leave to engage a lawyer to defend him. A lawyer was in fact engaged by the respondent. The enquiry officer held that the charges levelled against the respondent were proved. Accordingly, the appellant by its order dated 31.5.1982 punished the respondent by suspending him from the work with effect from 7.6.1982 for a period of 3 months. He was directed to rejoin his duties with effect from 7.9.1982. No copy of the enquiry report was however furnished to the respondent. Subsistence allowance for the period commencing from 7.6.1982 to 6.9.1982 was also not paid to the respondent on the ground that the suspension was by way of punishment and therefore no subsistence allowance was payable to him. 2. On 13.10.1982 the respondent appears to have moved this Court challenging the charge sheet-cum-suspension order dated 15.3.1980 and the final order of punishment dated 31.5.1982. 3. A rule appears to have been issued as prayed for on 13.10.1982 itself. The petition ultimately was heard and disposed of by the impugned order dated 4.6.1982 by which a learned Single Judge held that the order of punishment could not be sustained inter alia on the ground that the defence case of the petitioner was not dealt with in the said order nor was the enquiry report furnished to the respondent. The order of punishment contained in the letter dated 31.5.1982 was set aside. The appellant was directed to give all service benefits including all monetary benefits to the respondent. It is against this order that the present appeal is directed. 4. The order of punishment contained in the letter dated 31.5.1982 was set aside. The appellant was directed to give all service benefits including all monetary benefits to the respondent. It is against this order that the present appeal is directed. 4. The order dated 31.5.1982 inflicting punishment upon the respondent indicates that the appellant did in fact consider the matter at its own level which would be evident from the following:– "The Management, on consideration of the entire matter, concur with the said findings of the Enquiry Officer that, on evidence as recorded, the charge of misconduct levelled against you has been proved beyond any shadow of doubt." 5. The defence case was considered by the enquiry officer and then he came to the conclusion that the charges against the respondent were proved. The punishing authority appears to have concurred with the finding of the enquiry officer. Any further consideration of the defence case, in our view, was not necessary. Reference in this regard can be made to the case of (1) The State of Madras v. Srinivasan reported in AIR 1966 SC 1827 . In Paragraph-15 of the said judgment the Supreme Court held as follows:– "............ It is conceivable that if the State Government does not accept the findings of the Tribunal which may be in favour of the delinquent officer and proposes to impose a penalty on the delinquent officer, it should give reasons why it differs from the conclusions of the Tribunal, though even in such a case, it is not necessary that the reasons should be detailed or elaborate. But, where the State Government agrees with the findings of the Tribunal which are against the delinquent officer, we do not think as a matter of law, it could be said that the State Government cannot impose the penalty against the delinquent officer in accordance with the findings of the Tribunal unless it gives reasons to show why the said findings were accepted by it." 6. Insofar as the contention that for non-supply of the enquiry report the punishment is vitiated on account of breach of the principles of natural Justice our view is that the order of punishment being prior to 20.11.1990 the same cannot be set aside on this ground. Justification for this view is to be found in the case of (2) Managing Director, E.C.I.L., Hyderabad v. B. Karunakar etc. Justification for this view is to be found in the case of (2) Managing Director, E.C.I.L., Hyderabad v. B. Karunakar etc. reported in AIR 1994 SC 1074 where in Their Lordships laid down the law as follows:– ........In view of the unsettled position of the law on the subject, the authorities/managements all over the country had proceeded on the basis that there was no need to furnish a copy of the report of the Inquiry Officer to the delinquent employee, and innumerable employees have been punished without giving them the copies of the reports. In some of the cases, the orders of punishments have long since become final while other cases are pending in Courts at different stages. In many of the cases, the misconduct has been grave and in others the denial on the part of the management to furnish the report would ultimately prove to be no more than a technical mistake. To reopen all the disciplinary proceedings now would result in grave prejudice to administration which will far outweigh the benefit to the employees concerned. Both administrative reality and public interests do not, therefore, require that the orders of punishment passed prior to the decision in Mohd. Ramzan Khan's case (supra), without furnishing the report of the inquiry officer should be disturbed and the disciplinary proceedings which gave rise to the said orders should be reopened on that account." 7. Our attention has been drawn to the case of (3) State of Maharashtra v. B.A. Joshi reported in 1971 (1) SLR 113 which, we find, was also considered by Their Lordships in the aforesaid case. As a matter of fact, the aforesaid judgment has also been reported in (4) AIR 1969 SC 1302 and in (5) 1969 (3) SCR 917 . We are, therefore, unable to sustain the impugned order and the same is set aside. The appeal is allowed. There will be no order as to costs. Mathur, C.J.: I agree. Later––Stay of operation of this judgment, as prayed for, is considered and the same is rejected. Mathur, C.J. Gupta, J.