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2002 DIGILAW 175 (MAD)

Mohammed Alias Bawa Sahib v. B. Vimal Chand

2002-03-01

K.GNANAPRAKASAM

body2002
Judgment :- 1. On remand by the Supreme Court of India by the order dated 29.1.1999, these Civil Revision Petitions are restored to the file of this Court. 2. These Civil Revision Petitions were filed by two tenants. 3. One B. Vimalchand, as Manager and Karta of the joint family, consisting of himself and his brother and mother filed the Rent Control petitions. RCOP. No. 2679 of 1985 was filed against one Mohammed Alias Bawa Sahib in respect of the Shop bearing Old No. 64B, New No. 27, Jeenis Road, Saidapet, Madras 15 and RCOP. No. 2680 of 1985 was filed against Vijayaraghavan, in respect the Shop bearing Old No. 64A, New No. 27, Jeenis Road, Saidapet, Madras 15. Both the petitions were filed under Section 10(3)(a)(iii) of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960. 4. It is the case of the petitioner/landlord that both the shops were bonafide required for the purpose of running wholesale business in medicine for his brother Rajendrakumar, who is carrying on the said business under the name and style of ‘Sayar Pharma Distributors’ in the rented Shop at No. 2, Alandur Road, Saidapet, Madras 15. The petitioner also stated that he is carrying on his Pawn Broker Shop in the passage of No. 65 (New No. 27), Jeenis Road, Saidapet, Madras 15, and his brother, namely, Nirmalc hand is carrying on retail business in medicine. The petitioner has no other shop in his occupation in the city of Madras and his brother, Rajendrakumar, who is carrying on his wholesale business in medicine in the rented shop, is not occupying any other shop of his own in the city of Madras. The petitioner, therefore, requires these shops for the bonafide purpose for his brother Rajendrakumar to carry on wholesale business in medicine. The shop occupied by these tenants, namely, Mohammed Alias Bawa Sahib and Vijayaraghavan were partitioned by the Partition Wall and both the shops are necessary for carrying on wholesale business in medicine. 5. The respondent in RCOP. No. 2679 of 1985, in his counter, has stated that the petition is not maintainable under Section 10(3)(a)(iii) of the Act. The petitioner is neither the ‘Manager’ nor the ‘Karta’ of the joint family and therefore, the petition is not maintainable. The petitioner does not require the shops for bonafide use. 5. The respondent in RCOP. No. 2679 of 1985, in his counter, has stated that the petition is not maintainable under Section 10(3)(a)(iii) of the Act. The petitioner is neither the ‘Manager’ nor the ‘Karta’ of the joint family and therefore, the petition is not maintainable. The petitioner does not require the shops for bonafide use. Only with a view to hike the rent, the petitioner has filed this petition. The petition should have been filed for additional accommodation under section 10 (3) (c) and the pe tition filed under Section 10(3)(a)(iii) is not maintainable. 6. The petitioner has filed reply statement, stating that Vimalchand is the ‘Manager’ and ‘Karta’ of the joint family and he has been collecting the rent and therefore, he is entitled to maintain the petition. 7. The tenant/respondent in RCOP. No. 2680 of 1985, has raised almost the very same objections, stating that the petitioner has no right to file the petition and he is not the ‘Karta’ of the joint family. There are 8 shops in the very same place and the petitioner himself is in occupation of 2 shops in the petition premises and running a Pawn Broker Shop and a Jewellery Shop and therefore, the petition, which is filed on the ground of owners occupation, is not maintainable. The petitioner and his family members own number of buildings both residential and non-residential and there is absolutely no bonafide requirement of the petitioner. The petitioners another brother Nirmalchand is carrying on retail business under the name and style of ‘Sayar Pharmacy’ and therefore, Rajendrakumar, for whom the petition premises required, could join with him and run the business. That apart, there are two other big shop portions situated on the rear side of the petition premises and the petitioner could occupy the same. The respondent also contended that his brother Gnanasambandam alone is the tenant and not the respondent. 8. The respondent also filed additional counter, wherein it is stated that under the provisions of the Rent Control Act, the definition of the landlord does not mean and include the ‘Karta’ of the joint family and therefore, the petition is not maintainable. As the petitioner himself is in occupation of the two shops in the petition premises for non-residential purposes, the petitioner cannot ask for another shop for owners occupation. 9. As the petitioner himself is in occupation of the two shops in the petition premises for non-residential purposes, the petitioner cannot ask for another shop for owners occupation. 9. The Rent Controller after taking into consideration all the aspects of the case and also both the oral and documentary evidence, came to the conclusion that the petitioner is entitled to succeed in the petitions and allowed both the petitions. As against the same, the tenants have preferred appeals in RCA. Nos. 724/1990 and 291/1990 and both the appeals came to be dismissed by the Appellate Authority by the common order dated 25.11.1992. Aggrieved by the same, the tenants have preferred these Civil Revision Petitions. 10. The revision petitioner in CRP. No. 58 of 1994 arising out of RCA. No. 724 of 1990 in RCOP. No. 2679 of 1985 died and the application to implead the Legal Representatives is pending. 11. The learned advocates for the revision petitioners have, no doubt, made their submissions separately, but they have raised common grounds for allowing the revision petitions. The revision petitioners have made the following points for considerations of this court: — i. Whether B. Vimalchand is the ‘Manager’ and ‘Karta’ of the joint family and whether the petition filed as such is maintainable? ii. Whether there is bonafide on the part of the petitioner, requiring the shops from the tenants for the personal use by his brother Rajendrakumar? iii. Whether P.M. Abdul Hameed, the legal representative of the tenant in RCOP. No. 2679 of 1985 is entitled to continue the proceedings and whether he is continuously associated with the business carried on by his father? iv. Whether the petition for eviction filed under Section 10(3)(a)(iii) of the Tamilnadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act 18/1960 as amended by the Act 23/1973 is maintainable? 12. Point (i): — Mr. G. Subramanian, learned senior advocate for the petitioner in CRP. No. 213 of 1994, has submitted that the petition filed for eviction by Vimalchand, as Manager and Karta, is not maintainable. Vimalchand is not the ‘Manager’ and ‘Karta’ of the joint family. 12. Point (i): — Mr. G. Subramanian, learned senior advocate for the petitioner in CRP. No. 213 of 1994, has submitted that the petition filed for eviction by Vimalchand, as Manager and Karta, is not maintainable. Vimalchand is not the ‘Manager’ and ‘Karta’ of the joint family. It is submitted that petitioners family had already got divided and in support of the same, pointed out a portion in para 6 of the petition, wherein it is stated that “The shops occupied by the respondent and other tenant, Mohammed Alias Bawa Sahib, are partitioned by the Partition Wall and both the shops are necessary for carrying on wholesale business in medicines”. The learned advocate would contend that the petitioner himself has admitted that the shops were partitioned among the members of the joint family and therefore, there was no joint family in existence on the date of the filing of the petition and the petition filed in the capacity of ‘Manager’ and ‘Karta’ of the family is not maintainable. But that submission is not correct. Admittedly, Vimalchand is the senior male member in the family and it is in evidence that the family is joint family. What all has been stated in para 6 of the petition is that the shops, occupied by the respondent and the other tenant Mohammed Alias Bawa Sahib, are partitioned by the partition wall and both the shops are necessary for carrying on wholesale business in medicine. It is manifestly clear that the shops occupied by the tenants are separated by the partition wall and that does not mean that the parties have partitioned the property as contended by the learned advocates for the revision petitioners and therefore, the said contention is rejected. 13. The learned advocate for the tenants has further submitted that there is no locusstandi for the petitioner to file the petition. It is clearly stated in the petition that Vimalchand has filed the petition, as a ‘Manager’ and ‘Karta’ of the joint family. In para 3 of the petition also, it is stated that “The petitioner as “Karta” of the joint family consisting of himself and his brother and mother, filed the petition.” The landlord also filed documents Exs.P6, P7 and P16. Ex.P6 is the order dated 27.3.1981, demanding income tax, wherein B. Vimalchand was described as ‘Hindu Undivided Family. Ex.P7 dated 13.3.1968 is the demand for the payment of income tax. Ex.P6 is the order dated 27.3.1981, demanding income tax, wherein B. Vimalchand was described as ‘Hindu Undivided Family. Ex.P7 dated 13.3.1968 is the demand for the payment of income tax. Ex.P16 is the copy of the order passed by the appellate authority in HRA. No. 912/1979 in RCOP. No. 3138 of 1977, which petition was also filed by the petitioner as the ‘Manager’ and ‘Karta’ of the joint family against the tenant for eviction. Ex.P17 dated 11.3.1968 issued by the Income Tax Department, is the demand for the payment of income tax, addressed to Sri Bovex Mull Sowcar, trading business as HUF. The petitioners father died in the year 1966 and thereafter also, the petitioners family continued to be joint and there is absolutely no material to come to the conclusion that the petitioner is the divided brother of the joint family and in the absence of the same, it could easily be inferred that the petitioner and others still are the members of the Hindu joint family and the description of the petitioner viz. Vimalchand as ‘Manager’ and ‘Karta’ of the joint family is maintainable. 14. The learned advocate for the tenants has further submitted that each brother is carrying on separate business and therefore, it has got to be construed that the family was not joint. The mere fact that the members of the joint family carrying on different business, would not give rise to any presumption or inference that the family is divided unless the contrary is proved and established. There is no prohibition for a member of a joint family to carry on a separate business of his own. It is made out f rom the evidence of PW.1 that even after the demise of his father, the petitioner alone has been collecting the rent and all the tenants have been paying the rent only to him. To put it differently, in this connection it will be useful to refer the definition of ‘landlord’. It is made out f rom the evidence of PW.1 that even after the demise of his father, the petitioner alone has been collecting the rent and all the tenants have been paying the rent only to him. To put it differently, in this connection it will be useful to refer the definition of ‘landlord’. Section 2(6) of the Act defines, the ‘landlord’, includes the person who is receiving or is entitled to receive the rent of a building, whether on his own account or on behalf of another or on behalf of himself and others or as an agent, trustee, executor, administrator, receiver or guardian or who would so receive the rent or be entitled to receive the rent, if the building were let to a tenant.” and therefore, the petitioner comes within the definition of ‘landlord’, as he comes within the purview of “on behalf of himself and others” and also “be entitled to receive the rent”, and can maintain this petition. As Vimalchand has been receiving the rent and entitled to receive the rent, he would squarely fall within the definition of ‘landlord’. 15. Point iv: — The learned advocate for the revision petitioners has further submitted that the petitioners another brother Nirmaichand is carrying on retail business in Pharmacy in the petition premises and that therefore, the petitioner cannot seek eviction of tenants from the petition premises on the ground of owners occupation under Section 10(3)(a)(iii) of the Act. If at all the petitioner requires the premises, it could be possible only under Section 10(3)(c) i.e for additional accommodation. 16. In this connection, it is useful to refer the provisions, Sections 10(3)(a)(iii) and 10(3)(c) of the Act. If at all the petitioner requires the premises, it could be possible only under Section 10(3)(c) i.e for additional accommodation. 16. In this connection, it is useful to refer the provisions, Sections 10(3)(a)(iii) and 10(3)(c) of the Act. Section 10(3)(a)(iii) states “in case it is any other non-residential building, if the landlord or any member of his family is not occupying for purposes of a business which he or any member of his family is carrying on, a nonresidential building in the city, town or village concerned, which is own” Section 10(3)(c) states “A landlord who is occupying only a part of a building, whether residential or non-residential, may, notwithstanding anything contained in clause (a), apply to the Controller for an order directing any tenant occupying the whole or any portion of the remaining part of the building to put the landlord in possession thereof, if he requires additional accommodation for residential purposes or for purposes of a business which he is carrying on, as the case may be.” 17. The difference and distinction between these two sections have been dealt with by this court. Each sub section works on its own force and vigour. Section 10(3)(a)(iii) is concerned with the whole building in the occupation of a tenant, which is distinct and separate from the non-residential building in the occupation of the landlord. Under Section 10(3)(c), both the landlord and the tenant are in the same building and the landlord in this case requests for additional accommodation and thereby seeks eviction. This fundamental difference has to be borne in mind. This was the observation made by the Division Bench of this Court in the case of Laswaran Chettiar v. K. Subbarayan ( (1970) 83 L.W. 696 ). 18. Reliance is placed upon the case of A.P. Kumarasway Chettiar v. V.M. Paramasivam Mudaliar (79 LW SN 4). That is the case where the owner of a theatre was also the owner of the adjacent premises, which had its door number in the adjacent street and in which there were two tenants. The Application for eviction of the tenant was made on the ground of owners requirement of additional accommodation under Section 10(3)(c) of the Act for the use of the space for car parking. The Application for eviction of the tenant was made on the ground of owners requirement of additional accommodation under Section 10(3)(c) of the Act for the use of the space for car parking. It was held by Veeraswamy, J., as he then was, that the mere fact that the landlord is in occupation of another building fo r purposes of his business will not bar him from obtaining relief under clause (c). That is the effect of the non-obstante clause in clause (c). The word ‘only’ in the clause does not imply that he should not be in occupation of any other building for the application of clause (c) and its only meaning, in the context is that he is in occupation of nothing more than a part of the building. The words ‘only a part’ are used in antithesis of the ‘whole of the building’. 19. The word ‘landlord’ in Sub Section 3(a)(1) of Section 10 of the Rent Control Act, will cover not only a single or sole landlord, but also one of the joint landlords, as it was held in the case of T.N.K. Govindaraju Chetty v. P. Urajlal Dulabdass & Co. ( 1967 2 MLJ 465 ). In this case, a firm purchased a property, the purchase really being by its partners and let it out. One of the partners of the firm required the premises for his own occupation and the firm represented by him applied under Section 10(3)(a)(i) of the Act for eviction of the tenants. Veeraswami, J., as he then was of the view that the words ‘the landlord’ will cover not only a single or sole landlord, but also one of the joint landlords and where the property is owned by the partners constituting a firm and one of them requires the building for his own occupation it will squarely fall within the ambit of section 10(3)(a)(i) of the Act. 20. In the case of Sri Ram Pasricha v. Jagannath and Others ( 1976 4 SCC 184 ), the plaintiff instituted the suit for eviction of the defendants on the ground that he requires the premises for his own occupation as well as for the occupation of the members of the joint family, consisting of his mother and and his married brother. The trial court decreed the suit on both the grounds, namely, default in payment of rent and reasonable requirement of the premises for his own occupation. On appeal by the tenants, the lower appellate court, did not accept the plea of ‘default’, but, affirmed the finding of ‘reasonable requirement.’ In the Second Appeal, the defendants/tenants did not dispute the factual existence of reasonable requirement of the landlord. It was, however, contended before the learned single judge that even though the actual reasonable requirement of the premises was established, the plaintiff was not entitled to a decree for eviction being only a cosharer and as such not “the owner” of the premises within the meaning of Section 13(1)(i) of the West B engal Premises Tenancy Act. In that case, the Supreme Court held that a co-owner is as much an owner of the entire property as any sole owner of a property is. Jurisprudentially, it is not correct to say that a co-owner of a property is not its owner. He owns every part of the composite property along with others and it cannot be said that he is only a part-owner or a fractional owner of the property (emphasis supplied). The position will change only when partition takes place. In our case, the landlord filed the petition, describing himself as ‘Manager’ and ‘Karta’ of the joint family and no partition took place in the family and therefore, he is entitled to maintain the petition. 21. In the case of S.S. Khader Mohammed Rowther and Co. v. G.S. Sundaram and Brothers (1978 I MLJ 79), (V. Balasubramanyam, J.), the learned single judge of this court has observed that “when a landlord files a petition to evict the tenant of a non-residential building, naturally, the Rent Controller will first examine whether the petitioner satisfies the two initial requirements, one, that the landlord is badly in need of the building for carrying on his business, and two, that he has no other building which he can call his own elsewhere in the same city. These are the basic requiremen ts for filing a petition for eviction under Section 10(3)(a))(iii) of the Act. These are the basic requiremen ts for filing a petition for eviction under Section 10(3)(a))(iii) of the Act. In our case, the petitioner has filed the petition for eviction on the ground that his brother Rajendrakumar, who has been carrying on wholesale business in medicine in a rented building elsewhere, requires the petition premises and he does not own any other building elsewhere in the city and therefore, he squarely satisfies the requirements of the Section 10(3)(a)(iii) of the Act. 22. Further, the petitioner filed petition for himself and on behalf of the joint family as ‘Manager’ and ‘Karta’. The essence of joint Hindu family property is unity of ownership and community of interest, and the shares of the members are not defined. In a joint family business, no member of the family can say that he is the owner of one-half, one-third or one-fourth. A family carrying on trade in a particular commodity may legitimately extend it to another commodity, and whether such extension would amo unt to a new business or not depends upon the nature or type of the extended business and not on the particular commodifies it deals with. There is no presumption that a business carried on by a member of a joint family is joint family business. Even if a coparcener starts a business on the joint property, with the consent of other coparceners, and the other coparceners do not make any capital contribution to such business, it is held to be not a business started by the coparceners. There is no presumption that a business standing in the name of or started by even a ‘Manager’ is joint family business, but if the joint family funds are utilised in opening a new branch, then the new branch will be regarded as part of the old business. 23. In our case, Rajendrakumar is already carrying on wholesale business in medicine in a different premises and the petition premises are required for his business and therefore, the petition was filed under Section 10(3)(a)(iii) of the Act. Now, I have to consider whether the business carried on by Rajendrakumar in a rented premises is a separate business or a joint family business. In order to constitute a business as a joint family business, unless the other coparceners make any capital contribution to such business, it cannot be held as a business run by the coparceners. Now, I have to consider whether the business carried on by Rajendrakumar in a rented premises is a separate business or a joint family business. In order to constitute a business as a joint family business, unless the other coparceners make any capital contribution to such business, it cannot be held as a business run by the coparceners. Unless a business is a coparceners business, the petition premises cannot be asked for additional accommodation under Section 10(3)(c). But, if the business, which has already been carried on by Rajendrakumar is a separate business, then the petition under Section 10(3)(a)(iii) of the Act is maintainable. There is evidence of PW.1 that the family is the undivided family, but the business is carried on by the members of the joint fa mily separately. All of them pay income tax under the head “HUF. But, however, there is no evidence that the capital for the business was contributed by the coparceners or from joint family funds and in the absence of the same, it could easily be construed that the business run by Rajendrakumar is his separate business and not a joint family business. If that be so, the petition filed by Vimalchand for Rajendrakumar under Section 10(3)(a)(iii) is maintainable. 24. The learned advocate for the respondent/landlord has pointed out that the petitioners brother, Nirmalchand is carrying on pharmacy business under the name and style of “Sayar Pharmacy’ in retail, but, whereas the petitioners another brother Rajendrakumar, also requires the petition premises to carry on wholesale business in medicine and the said Rajendrakumar is not carrying on any business in the tenanted building and that therefore, the petition filed under Section 10(3)(a)(iii) is maintainable. He also pointed out a portion from the counter filed by the respondent/tenant, wherein he has admitted that the “petitioners another brother is carrying on the same business under the name and style of ‘Sayar Pharmacy’ in one of the shops in the petition premises”. Nowhere, it is stated in the counter filed by the tenant that Rajendrakumar is already carrying on his business in a portion of the petition premises. 25. Nowhere, it is stated in the counter filed by the tenant that Rajendrakumar is already carrying on his business in a portion of the petition premises. 25. There is also no material, which would indicate that the landlord owns several buildings of their own, in which the petitioners brother can carry on his wholesale business in pharmacy and in the absence of the same, it could be concluded that the requirement of the premises is justified and a bonafide one. 26. In this connection, the learned advocate for the respondent/landlord also relied upon the case of M. Mani v. D. Ramalingam (1985 I MLJ 329 = 98 L.W. 299), wherein also the ‘Karta’ of the family brought out the petition and it was observed that “the premises required for the occupation of the landlords brother is an ancestral house, in which the respondent landlord and his brother have undoubtedly a right of residence and so held that the petition filed by the “Karta” of the joint family is maintainable.” 27. A similar view was also taken by this court in the case of Raju v. A. Ponnammal (1994 1 LW 623), wherein the landlords son requires the building for her sons occupation and the petition was filed by the mother/landlady and it was held such a petition is maintainable. Point No.(i) is answered in favour of the landlord. 28. Point (ii): — The learned senior advocate for the revision petitioner/tenant in CRP. No. 213 of 1994 has further submitted that there is no bonafide on the part of the landlord, requiring the premises. It is submitted that Rajendrakumar is doing business in a portion of the premises in question, which has been admitted by PW.1 and that therefore, the petition filed under Section 10(3) (a)(iii) of the Act is not maintainable and it should have been filed only under Section 10(3)(c) of the Act. This submi ssion of the learned advocate for the tenant has been repelled by the learned advocate for the respondent/tenant by pointing out that the said submission is not correct on the face of the record. 29. This submi ssion of the learned advocate for the tenant has been repelled by the learned advocate for the respondent/tenant by pointing out that the said submission is not correct on the face of the record. 29. I have gone through the records with regard to that aspect of the matter also to find out what is the exact and real position and it is very much seen that Rajendrakumar has been carrying on business only in the rented premises and not in the premises for which, the petition has been filed. The learned advocate for the tenant has pointed out that there is an admission in the chief-examination of PW.1 Vimalchand that ‘Sayar Pharmacy’ in the tenanted premises is run by Nirmalchand and then by Rajendrakumar. I have verified the said evidence of PW.1 and it makes no meaning. In fact, Rajendrakumar was examined as PW.2 and no question has been put to him by the tenant that he is carrying his business in the petition premises. But, on the other hand he has stated that he was running a wholesale business at No. 2/2, Alandur Road, in a rented premises and thereafter it was shifted to No. 8, Balaji Singh Street. In fact, Vijayaraghavan, in his additional counter, in para 5, has stated that “Further the petitioners another brother is also carrying on the same business in the name and style of “Sayar Pharmacy” in one of the shops in petition premises. While so seeking the demised shop for the very same non-residential purpose is a malafide.” This would indicate that the petitioners another brother, namely, Nirmalchand alone was carrying on the business in the petition premises and not Rajendrakumar and that therefore, the argument, advanced on behalf of the tenants that Rajendrakumar has already been carryi ng on business in one shop, in the petition premises and that therefore, the petitioner can, at best, ask for additional accommodation and not for owners occupation, is not maintainable. It has been established by the landlord that Rajendrakumar is carrying on wholesale business in a rented building, for whom the petition premises are required. Rajendrakumar is not occupying any part of the petition building. 30. Mr. It has been established by the landlord that Rajendrakumar is carrying on wholesale business in a rented building, for whom the petition premises are required. Rajendrakumar is not occupying any part of the petition building. 30. Mr. G. Subramanian, learned senior counsel forme petitioner in C.R.P. No. 213 of 1994 relied upon the Judgment reported in 1998 (2) L.W. 89 ( Mohammod Alias Bawa Sahib And Another v. B. vimalchand As Manager & Kartha Of Joint Family ) (orders in C.R.P. No. 58 of 1994 & in C.R.P. No. 213 of 1994) That is the decision rendered by the learned Single Judge of this Court, in these Civil Revision Petitions on earlier occasion by order dated 22.12.1997 and the same was questioned before the Supreme Court by the Landlord in Civil Appeal Nos. 417-418 of 1999. Learned Senior advocate pointed out and relied upon certain observations and findings of the learned Single Judge, more particularly, para 11 and 15 of the Judgment. The said observations were found to be incorrect by the Supreme Court, which runs as follows: “The Common judgment rendered by the High Court by way of the impugned orders show that the High Court proceeded on the basis that Rajendra Kumar was already occupying a tenanted shop in the very same building where the tenanted premises are situate. According to learned senior counsel for the appellant this observation on the part of the High Court was factually incorrect and therefore, the entire judgment based on this wrong premises obviously gets vitiated. Learned counsel for the respondents fairly stated before us that Rajendra Kumar is not occupying any part of the building where the suit premises are situate. We also find that the aforesaid mistake becomes apparent as in paragraph 3 of the impugned judgment, learned Judge has himself noted that admittedly said Rajendra Kumar is doing business only in the rented premises and not in the premises where the tenants are carrying on business. While in the later part of the very same judgment at paragraph 15 at page 26, it is observed that Rajendra Ku mar is doing business in a portion of the premises in question which has been admitted by P.W.1. While in the later part of the very same judgment at paragraph 15 at page 26, it is observed that Rajendra Ku mar is doing business in a portion of the premises in question which has been admitted by P.W.1. Therefore, this apparent inconsistency has resulted in lopsided decision on all other aspects of the case by the High Court.” The Supreme Court after having come to such a conclusion had also observed that “the impugned orders are set aside and both the revision petitions are restored to the file of the High Court with a request to redecide the same in accordance with law”. As such, I have not placed any reliance upon the judgment rendered by the learned Single Judge and I have come to my own conclusion independent of the said findings. As such this decision is of no help to the tenants/Revision Petitioners. 31. Mr. T.V. Viswanatha Rao, learned advocate for the revision petitioner in CRP. No. 58 of 1994 placed reliance upon the case of Super Forgings and Steels (Sales) Privatre Limtied v. Thyabally Resuljee (Dead) through L. Rs. ( 1995 1 MLJ 59 ) That case deals about the claim made by the landlord for non-residential building in occupation of the landlord who is the co-owner of the said building. No. 58 of 1994 placed reliance upon the case of Super Forgings and Steels (Sales) Privatre Limtied v. Thyabally Resuljee (Dead) through L. Rs. ( 1995 1 MLJ 59 ) That case deals about the claim made by the landlord for non-residential building in occupation of the landlord who is the co-owner of the said building. It was held that “If a landlord is a co-owner of a non-residential building in the city, town or village concerned, which he is occupying for purposes of carrying on his business, will he not be occupying therefor, a non-residential building of his own envisaged in the above Section 10(3)(a)(iii) as would disentitle him to the ground of eviction available thereunder being the real question needing our answer in the light of the aforesaid plea of learned counsel for respondents urged in questioning the sustainability of the contention raised on behalf of the appellant-tenant we have to find the answer therefore, the answer to the said question, in our view, cannot be anything other than that a non-residential building in occupation of landlord which is ‘his own’ envisaged in Section 10(3)(a)(iii) above, is not only that of which he is an absolute owner but also that of which he is a co-owner, for a co-owner of a building who is its landlord is regarded under Rent Control Laws of our country as its owner entitled to obtain possession of such a building from a tenant for his bonafide requirement” 32. In the case of Nataraja Trading Company rep. by its Partners and Others v. K. Manohar ( 1995 2 MLJ 27 ), the learned Judge (Thanikkachalam, J., as he then was) had an occasion to consider the case of the landlord, who filed the petition under Section 10(3)(a)(iii) and 10(3)(c) of the Act. In that case, the landlord were in occupation of the I Floor and the tenant was in occupation of the ground floor. The landlords filed the application under Section 10(3)(a)(III) of the Act and in the said context, it was held that the petition should have been filed under Section 10(30(c) and not under Section 10 (3)(a)(iii) of the Act. 33. The tenant also relied upon the case of Gajendra Sha and another v. M. Govindarajan ( 1996 1 MLJ 564 ). The landlords filed the application under Section 10(3)(a)(III) of the Act and in the said context, it was held that the petition should have been filed under Section 10(30(c) and not under Section 10 (3)(a)(iii) of the Act. 33. The tenant also relied upon the case of Gajendra Sha and another v. M. Govindarajan ( 1996 1 MLJ 564 ). In the said case also the eviction petition was filed under Section 10(3)(a)(iii) of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act 18/1960. There the landlord wanted to shift his electrical goods business from Sembudoss street to the petition premises. In the said case, it was found that the electrical goods business was flourishing in the street in which he was carrying on and therefore, there was no bonafide on the part of the landlord to shift the said business from that street to the petition premises. In the said context, it was held that there was no bonafide on the part of the landlord in claiming the petition premises. 34. The revision petitioner also relied upon the case of Meenal Eknath Kshirsagar v. Traders and Agencies and another ( 1996 5 SCC 344 ) which also deals with the bonafide requirement of the landlord. In that case, the landlady was the owner of the demised flat and her husband was a tenant of another flat, but, he had left it long back and since then it was remaining in possession of his brother and family and the same was not sufficient to accommodate the landlady and her family. The said fact was not considered necessary for the landlady to be disclosed initially before the trial Court. The Supreme Court held that the appellant/landlady proved her case of bonafide requirement and the trial Court was right in passing eviction decree in her favour. 35. The decisions referred to above relied upon by the revision petitioner in CRP. No. 58 of 1994 do not support the case of the tenant. 36. The requirement of the petition premises by the landlord is being disputed by the tenants on the ground that the landlord is having separate buildings on the rear side of the petition premises i.e. on the eastern side, where they can very well carry on the business. Admittedly, there is construction on the eastern side of the petition premises. 36. The requirement of the petition premises by the landlord is being disputed by the tenants on the ground that the landlord is having separate buildings on the rear side of the petition premises i.e. on the eastern side, where they can very well carry on the business. Admittedly, there is construction on the eastern side of the petition premises. But, the question is whether the said portion is suitable for nonresidential purpose? It is the case of the landlord that there are 7 brothers in the family and about 40 members of the family are residing in the rear portion of the petition premises and that therefore, the landlord cannot carry on business in the rear portion as suggested by the tenants. As it has been submitted on behalf of the landlord that the family is undivided and all the members of the joint family are residing on the rear portion of the petition premises and there are about more than 40 members in the said family, I do not think that the suggestion of the tenants that the landlord can carry on the proposed business on the rear side of the petition premises, is possible and it cannot be accepted. Further it is left to the landlord to choose the premises, which is suitable for his requirement and in fact, he is the “best Judge of his requirement”. Hence, this point is also answered in favour of the landlord and against the tenants. 37. Point No. (iii): — In CRP. No. 58 of 1994, the sole tenant, namely, Mohammed Alias Bawa Sahib died and necessary applications have been filed in CMP. Nos. 21638 and 21639 of 2001. P.M. Abdul Hameed, S/o. Mohammed Alias Bawa Sahib has filed the affidavit, wherein he has stated in para 3 that “I humbly submit that even during the life time of my father, I alone was associated with the business of running the Hardware Store in the petition premises. Even after the death of my father, the business is being run by me. Hence, I am entitled to come on record as legal representative of the deceased (petitioner) herein to continue the proceedings. 38. As there is a delay in filing the application, a separate application has also been filed to condone the delay. Even after the death of my father, the business is being run by me. Hence, I am entitled to come on record as legal representative of the deceased (petitioner) herein to continue the proceedings. 38. As there is a delay in filing the application, a separate application has also been filed to condone the delay. One of the sons of the tenant has sworn in an affidavit that he was associated with the business of his father in the petition premises and even after his demise, he has been continuing. It is opposed by the learned advocate for the landlord by stating that he is not entitled to maintain the petition. As seen from the affidavit, it is made out that the deponent of the affidavit P.M. Abdul Hameed has come out with a definite case that even during the life time of his father, he alone was associated with the business of running the Hardware Store in the petition premises and even after the demise of his father, the business is being run by him and no other person has come forward with any plea contrary to the same and in the said circumstances, I am inclined to accept P.M. Abdul Hameed, who has filed the affidavit, as the legal representative of his father, entitled to continue the proceedings and the said petition is allowed. The reasons set out in the affidavit to condone the delay are also accepted and the petition is allowed. 39. In the result, C.M.P. Nos. 21638 and 21639 of 2001 are allowed. But, however, CRP Nos. 58 and 213 of 1994 are dismissed. No costs. Consequently, C.M.P. Nos. 455 and 7612 of 1994 are closed. After the pronouncement of the Order, learned advocate for the revision petitioners have requested some time for vacating the premises. Accordingly, three months time is granted from today for vacating the premises.