M. P. CHINNAPPA, J. ( 1 ) HEARD C. H. Jadhav the learned counsel for the petitioners; Sri S. Krishnaiah and Smt. Sheela Krishna in Crl. p. 1236/99 and Sri T. K. Vishwajith in Cr. P. 1476/99. ( 2 ) THE brief facts of the case in P. C. R. No. 18/99 are that the respondent filed a complaint alleging that she had filed a suit O. S. 61/90 on the file of the learned civil Judge (Sr. Dn.) Chickmagalur, against the petitioners for recovery of Rs. 60,000/- on the basis of the on-demand pronote executed by the accused persons. When the suit was pending, the accused persons produced the documents purported to have been executed by the complaint in O. S. 61/90 marked as Ex. D-3, D-27 and D-33. The complainant stated that the above said documents were not genuine and signatures found therein were forged signatures of the complainant, so also the signatures of late T. N. Krishna Bhat and K. V. Ramappaiah who are highly regarded and respected persons of Sringeri Tk. and these documents are got up documents. On the basis of this complaint, the Court has taken cognizance and directed issue of notice to the accused persons therein. These accused persons filed Cr. P. 1236/99 before this Court to quash the proceedings pending before the Court. ( 3 ) ONE Nagaraj filed a suit in O. S. 26/90 on the file of the learned Civil Judge, Chickmagalur, to recover a sum of Rs. 40,000/- along with interest against the petitioners. The petitioners/defendants filed their written statement on the ground that they had not taken any loan from the said Nagaraj and the respondent who is a close associate of the said Nagaraj had advanced a sum of Rs. 40,000/- on a condition that the petitioner should deliver areca crop grown in the garden land of the petitioners. The respondent got executed a money bond for Rs. 40,000/- in the name of Nagaraj. In pursuance of the terms of the money bond, the petitioners handed over the areca crop grown in their land to the respondent and have thus repaid the loan. The respondent got executed a money bond for Rs. 40,000/- in the name of Nagaraj. In pursuance of the terms of the money bond, the petitioners handed over the areca crop grown in their land to the respondent and have thus repaid the loan. It is further averred that having received the loan amount, the respondent in order to wreck vengeance has got filed a suit for recovery of the course of evidence as defendant has produced the receipts issued by the respondent herein stating that the loan is repaid. This being the true state of affairs, the respondent who is not concerned whatsoever with the said suit is also not a party has filed a private complaint in PCR No. 23/99 on the file of the J. M. F. C. , Sringeri, alleging that the documents produced by the petr. No. 2 in the Court were forged documents for the purpose of cheating the complainant, etc. The learned Magistrate has referred the matter to the police for investigation by order dt. 27-3-1999. Being aggrieved by that order of the Judicial Magistrate First Class dt. 27-3-1999 in PCR. No. 23/99 the petitioner filed petition Cr. P. 1476/99. ( 4 ) THE learned counsel for the petitioners has vehemently argued that the order passed by the Court is contrary to law and facts of the case. It is contrary to the mandate of S. 195, Cr. P. C. The production of forged documents in the Court attracts bar under S. 195 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The Magistrate cannot proceed on the basis of the private complaint persented by either of the parties. The entire proceedure followed by the learned Magistrate is illegal. The Court should have rejected the complaint without referring to the police. Therefore, he contended that the order is liable to be set aside. The Magistrate cannot proceed on the basis of the private complaint persented by either of the parties. The entire proceedure followed by the learned Magistrate is illegal. The Court should have rejected the complaint without referring to the police. Therefore, he contended that the order is liable to be set aside. ( 5 ) THE learned counsel while emphasising this argument has placed reliance on a judgment of the Supreme Court reported in State of U. P. v. Mata Bhikh (1994) 4 SCC 95 : (1994 AIR SCW 1935) wherein their Lordships have discussed the scope and purport of 195 (1) (a) and held that the provisions of S. 195 no doubt are mandatory and the Court has no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the offence mentioned therein unless there is a complaint in writing of the public servant concerned as required by the section without which the trial under S. 188 of the IPC becomes void ab initio. A written complaint by a public servant concerned is sine qua non to initiate a criminal proceeding under S. 188 of the IPC. No private complaint can be allowed to initiate any criminal proceeding in his individual capacity. In that case, the offences alleged against the accused therein were under Ss. 465, 468 and 471, IPC. ( 6 ) HE also further relied on a decision of the Supreme Court in Surjit Singh v. Balbir Singh 1996 SCC (Cri) 521 : (1996 Cri LJ 2304) wherein Their Lordships have held :"the object of Section 195 is to protect persons from needless harassment by prosecution for private vendetta; to preserve purity of the judicial process and unsullied administration of justice; to prevent the parties of the temptation to pre-empt the proceedings pending in a Court and to pressurise and desist parties from proceeding with the case. Equally when the act complained of relates to an offence, i. e. contempt of lawful authority of public servant, or against public justice or for offences relating to documents produced or given in evidence, public justice demands absolute bar of private prosecution and that power be given to the Court to lay complaint under S. 340 of the Code as per the procedure prescribed therein. "after taking cognizance of an offence, the document, the foundation for forgery, if produced before the Court or given in evidence, the bar of taking cognizance under S. 195 (1) (b) (ii) gets attracted and the criminal Court is prohibited from taking cognizance of offence unless a complaint in writing is filed as per the procedure prescribed under S. 340 of the Code by or on behalf of the Court. The object thereby is to preserve purity of the administration of justice and to allow the parties to adduce evidence in proof of certain documents without being compelled or intimidated to proceed with the judicial process. The bar of S. 195 is to take cognizance of the offences covered thereunder. From this decision it is clear that the bar is only in regard to taking cognizance of the offence and not referring the case to the police for investigation as provided under S. 195 and also ruled by the Supreme Court. " ( 7 ) IN the case on hand admittedly the Court has not taken cognizance. On the other hand, the Court has referred the case to the police for investigation under S. 156 (3) Cr. P. C. and it is also settled law that when the matter is referred to the police, it is deemed that the Court has not taken cognizance of the offence. Therefore, at this stage, the question of taking cogtnizance does not arise. ( 8 ) IN similar circumstances in Sachidanand Singh v. State of Bihar 1998 SCC (Cri) 660 : (1998 Cri LJ 1565) the Supreme Court has held that the complaint was filed in the Court of the Chief Judicial Magistrate alleging offences, inter alia, under Ss. 468, 469 and 471, IPC on the facts that the appellant had forged the document and produced it in Court of the executing Magistrate which was then dealing with the proceedings under S. 145 of the Code. The Chief Judicial Magistrate forwarded the complaint to the police as provided in S. 156 (3) of the Code. The police registered an FIR on the basis of the said complaint and after investigation laid a charge-sheet against the appellants for those offences. The Chief Judicial Magistrate took cognizance of those offences and issued process to the accused. The appellants then moved the Patna High Court under S. 482, Cr. The police registered an FIR on the basis of the said complaint and after investigation laid a charge-sheet against the appellants for those offences. The Chief Judicial Magistrate took cognizance of those offences and issued process to the accused. The appellants then moved the Patna High Court under S. 482, Cr. P. C. for quashing the prosecution on the main ground that the Magistrate could not have taken cognizance of the said offences in view of the bar contained in S. 195 (1) (b) (ii) of the Code. Before the High Court the appellants cited the decision of the Supreme Court in Gopala-krishna Menon v. V. D. Raja Reddy (1983) 4 SCC 240 : (1983 Cri LJ 1599) but the High Court relying on the Supreme Court decision in Patel Laljibhai Somabhai v. State of Gujarath (1971) 2 SCC 376 : (1971 Cri LJ 1437) dismissed the petition of the appellant. Therefore, the appellant approached the Supreme Court. Therefore, their Lordships while considering the scope and purport of S. 195 have held that S. 195 (1) (b) (ii) Cr. P. C. reveals two main postulates for operation of the bar mentioned there. First is, there must be an allegation that an offence (it should be either an offence described in S. 463 or any other offence punishable under Ss. 471, 475, 476 of the IPC) has been committed. Second is that such offence should have been committed in respect of a document produced or given in evidence in a proceeding in any Court. It is undisputed that if forgery has been committed while the document was in the custody of a Court, then prosecution can be launched only with a complaint made by that Court. Again, if forgery was committed with a document which has not been produced in the Court, then the prosecution would lie at the instance of any person. The question arises whether in the latter situation production of such document will make any difference. Now, even if the clause is capable of two interpretations, the narrower interpretation has to be chosen. Provision curbing the general jurisdiction of the Court must normally receive strict interpretation unless the statute or the context requires otherwise. ( 9 ) IN this case also, it is clear that the document was not forged while it was in the custody of the Court. Provision curbing the general jurisdiction of the Court must normally receive strict interpretation unless the statute or the context requires otherwise. ( 9 ) IN this case also, it is clear that the document was not forged while it was in the custody of the Court. On the other hand, according to the allegation in the complaint, these documents were forged and thereafter filed before Court in pending suits. Therefore, the question of following the procedure under S. 340 does not arise at this stage and there is no prohibition by the Court to take cognizance under S. 195. ( 10 ) THE learned counsel for the petitioners also placed reliance on a judgment reported in M. S. Ahlawat v. State of Haryana, 2000 SCC (Cri) 193 : (2000 Cri LJ 388) wherein their Lordships have held that where the petitioners filed affidavits with forged signatures and made false statements at different stages before it, infliction of punishment under S. 193, IPC on the writ petitioner by the Supreme Court after a show-cause notice held that the Supreme Court ought to have rather followed the procedure under Ss. 195 and 340, Cr. P. C. That was a proceeding regarding contempt of Court and under the circumstances, on facts, the case is not applicable to the case on hand. ( 11 ) HOWEVER, the stage is not reached to take cognizance of the offence as indicated above. Therefore, these decisions also are not helpful to the petitioners' case. ( 12 ) THE learned counsel for the respondents also cited a decision rendered by the Supreme Court in Kamaladevi Agarwal v. State of W. B. , 2002 SCC (Cri) 200 : (2001 Cri LJ 4733) wherein the Supreme Court has held that the inherent power under S. 482 should be exercised sparingly. When the trial Court found that the complainant had made out a prima facie case against the accused persons, of forgery of a document (a deed of dissolution of partnership firm), held, High Court was not justified in quashing the criminal proceedings merely on the ground that the same document was under Scrutiny by it in a civil proceeding initiated by the same complainant under Ss. 465, 467, 468, 471 and 120-B. ( 13 ) FROM these decisions also it is abundantly clear that it is not a stage at which this Court can interfere with the order passed by the Court below directing the police to investigate into the matter. Therefore, viewed from any angle, these petitions do not have any merit. Accordingly, the petitions stand dismissed. Petitions dismissed. --- *** --- .