JUDGMENT B. PANIGRAHI, J. — This appeal assails the judgment and order dated 11.07.1995 passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Jeypore, in Sessions Case No. 80 of 1994 (S.C. No. 297/94 of Sessions Judge, Jeypore), convicting the appellant under Section 302, IPC and sentencing him to undergo imprisonment for life. 2. Shorn of unnecessary details, the prosecution case is that 6 to 7 days preceding the date of incident, the appellant’s wife had gone to her father’s house as the appellant was quarrel¬ing with her frequently. As such, the appellant was staying in his house with his three children. In the night of 25/26.05.1994, he slept in the house along with his children after bolting the door from inside. At about 3.00 A.M., Ramachandra Hontal (P.W.3), the son of the appellant, heard some noise which aroused him from the sleep. He noticed that the appellant stabbed knife blows on the neck of his sister Lalita (daughter of the appellant) which caused her instantaneous death. At about dawn time, P.W.3 and his grandmother Sambari Hontal (P.W.6) informed the other villagers that the appellant had killed his own daughter by stabbing on her neck by means of a knife in the previous night. The knife had been snatched away by P.W.3 and kept in the corner of the room near the dead body. Hearing this, many villagers including Madan Pujari, Bhaskar Rao, and Sunadhar Sisa gathered near the house of the appellant. At the time the villagers gathered, the appellant was present in his house. On query to the appellant, he admitted to have killed his daughter by means of a knife as there was quarrel during the previous night. So, the villagers detained the appellant in the village and some of them, namely, Damburu Naik and Basudeb Patra, went to Semiliguda P.S. The incident was orally explained to the officer-in-charge of Semiliguda P.S., who reduced the same to writing and treated it as F.I.R. (Ext.1). Immediately after such F.I.R. was registered, the O.I.C. sprang into action. He arrested the appellant, sent the dead body to the hospital for post mortem examination, examined witnesses and seized the knife (M.O.I.). After completion of investigation, the investigating officer placed charge-sheet in Court. 3. The plea of the appellant was one of denial of the occurrence. Immediately after such F.I.R. was registered, the O.I.C. sprang into action. He arrested the appellant, sent the dead body to the hospital for post mortem examination, examined witnesses and seized the knife (M.O.I.). After completion of investigation, the investigating officer placed charge-sheet in Court. 3. The plea of the appellant was one of denial of the occurrence. A further plea of insanity of the appellant was taken at the time of hearing of the case before the trial Court. 4. In order to prove its case, prosecution examined ten witnesses. P.W.3 is the minor son of the appellant, who claims to be an eye-witness. P.W.6 is the mother of the appellant before whom, P.W.3 is alleged to have disclosed the incident in the early morning. P.Ws.1, 2 and 4 are the co-villagers before whom the appellant is stated to have made extra judicial confession. P.W.5 is a witness to the seizure. P.W.7 is the constable who accompanied the dead body to the Community Health Centre for post mortem examination. P.W.9 is the doctor who conducted autopsy over the dead body. P.Ws.8 and 10 are the investigating officers. 5. P.W.9 on examination found two stab injuries on the neck of the deceased, which, according to his opinion, were sufficient in ordinary course of nature to cause death. Death was due to massive haemorrhage and hypo-volumic shock arising out of the stab injuries. A reading of the evidence of P.W.9 and his opinion as regards the cause of death of the minor child Lalita leaves no room for doubt that she met a homicidal death due to the stab injuries on her neck. 6. In this case, P.W.3 is said to be an eye-witness. He is the son of the appellant and brother of the deceased. From his evidence, it transpires that all the inmates including the appel¬lant went to bed around 8.00 P.M. All of them slept in one room after bolting the door from inside. On hearing the shriek of the deceased “MARIGALI MARIGALI”, he immediately rose from the slum¬ber and noticed that the appellant was inflicting stab injuries by means of M.O.I. on her neck. It also transpires that this witness snatched the knife away from the appellant and kept it at the back of the door. From his cross-examination it further transpires that the appellant had no previous enmity with or ill feeling towards the deceased. It also transpires that this witness snatched the knife away from the appellant and kept it at the back of the door. From his cross-examination it further transpires that the appellant had no previous enmity with or ill feeling towards the deceased. But he was quarrelling with his mother, for the reason whereof she had left the house and gone to her father’s place. P.W.3 has also stated that the appellant used to quarrel with and assault his mother frequently due to mental derailment. He also used to quarrel with other villagers and assault them. He used to move here and there. P.W.6 is the mother of the appellant who has testified that the appellant had no ill feeling towards the deceased. P.W.6 is not an eye-witness nor has she stated anything with regard to the occurrence. 7. The trial Court, after closely examining the evidence, has come to the conclusion that the appellant had inflicted the injuries on the neck of the deceased Lalita. It also disbelieved the plea of insanity advanced by the appellant and convicted him under Section 302, IPC for committing the offence of murder of his own daughter and sentenced him as stated hereinbefore. 8. Mr. Misra, learned State Defence Counsel has seriously contended that though the plea of insanity was taken by the appellant, the trial Court did not at all discuss about such plea and mechanically passed the judgment of conviction, which is unsustainable in law. It is further contended that no sane man will put an end to the life of his own daughter with whom he had no prior enmity. It is submitted that in the night of occurrence, the appellant along with his three children including P.W.3 slept in one room after bolting the door from inside. Around 3.00 A.M., when P.W.3 woke up after hearing the sound “MARIGALI MARIGALI”, he found the appellant inflicting stab blows on the neck of the deceased. The appellant was standing amazed and looking at his own daughter. After plunging the knife on the neck of the de¬ceased, he did not make any attempt to flee away from the scene of occurrence; rather he remained in the room till morning. The knife was also lying near the dead body. All these circumstances go to show that the appellant was suffering from insanity at the time of occurrence. 9. After plunging the knife on the neck of the de¬ceased, he did not make any attempt to flee away from the scene of occurrence; rather he remained in the room till morning. The knife was also lying near the dead body. All these circumstances go to show that the appellant was suffering from insanity at the time of occurrence. 9. In the background as narrated above, we are to find out whether the appellant had committed the offence on account of insanity because of which protection under Section 84, IPC can be given to him. 10. When a plea of insanity is taken, the Court is to consider as to whether the accused has established that at the time of committing the act, he was of unsound mind. If so, the further question will arise as to whether the unsoundness was of such a degree and nature that he was not in a position to know about his own acts. While determining such fact, the Court will have to take into account the behaviour of the person which preceded, attended and followed the crime. The Court shall deter¬mine (i) whether there were deliberation and preparation for the act; (ii) whether it was done in a manner which showed a desire for concealment; (iii) whether, after the crime, the offender showed consciousness of guilt and made effort to avoid detention; and (iv) whether, after his arrest, he offered false excuses or made false statements. In the instant case, from the evidence of P.W.3 it appears that there was no previous enmity between the appellant and the deceased. When the appellant committed the offence, there was no reaction. It is not understood as to why the appellant will commit such a dastardly act of killing his own daughter, particularly when there was no enmity between them. It seems he was not able to know about the consequence of his own act. In this connection, the evidence as to the appellant’s conduct before and after upto the time of trial is admissible as presump¬tive evidence of his mental condition when the act was committed. It is seen from the evidence of P.W.3 that preceding the incident the appellant was suffering from mental insanity. He was moving here and there, quarrelling with and assaulting his wife and other villagers. It is seen from the evidence of P.W.3 that preceding the incident the appellant was suffering from mental insanity. He was moving here and there, quarrelling with and assaulting his wife and other villagers. In course of commission of the offence also, it has been established that without any rhyme or reason he commit¬ted the sinful act of killing his own daughter. He did not repent for the said act nor did he try to escape from the scene of occurrence. On the other hand, he handed over the knife to his son and remained in the house till others arrived there. In this connection, reliance has been placed on the decision in Dayabhai Chhaganbhai Thakkar v. State of Gujarat, AIR 1964 SC 1563 . In that case, the apex Court has laid down guidelines, which are quoted hereinbelow: The doctrine of burden of proof in the context of the plea of insanity may be stated in the following propositions : (1) The Prosecution must prove beyond reasonable doubt that the accused had committed the offence with the requisite mens rea; and the burden of proving that always rests on the prosecution from the beginning to the end of the trial. (2) There is rebuttable presumption that the accused was not insane, when he committed the crime, in the sense laid down by Sec. 84 of the Indian Penal Code; the accused may rebut it by placing before the Court all the relevant evidence - oral, docu¬mentary or circumstantial, but the burden of proof upon him is no higher than that rests upon a party to civil proceedings. (3) Even if the accused was not able not establish conclusively that he was insane at the time he committed the offence, the evidence placed before the Court by the accused or by the prosecution may raise a reasonable doubt in the mind of the Court as regards one or more of the ingredients of the offence, including mens rea of the accused and in that case the Court would be entitled to acquit the accused on the ground that the general burden of proof resting on the prosecution was not discharged.” 11. On analysing the evidence placed by the prosecution we do not find that any mens rea has been attributed to the appel¬lant. On analysing the evidence placed by the prosecution we do not find that any mens rea has been attributed to the appel¬lant. Nothing whatsoever has been established by the prosecution as to why the appellant did away with his own daughter. In a recent judgment in T.N. Lakshmiah v. State of Karnataka, 2001 (II) OLR (SC) 711, relying on the judgment in Dayabhai’s case (supra), the apex Court has held that the Court will have to find out as to the legal insanity of the accused at the time of com¬mission of the offence. The doctrine laid down in Dayabhai’s case (supra) has also been taken note of in that decision. 12. Unless the prosecution adduces evidence with regard to the mens rea, it would be difficult to call upon the appellant to discharge his part of the burden. It is no doubt true that the appellant shall discharge his burden regarding the plea of insan¬ity. But once such plea is taken, it is obligatory on the part of the prosecution to adduce clear, cogent and unimpeachable evi¬dence that the act was committed with a definite mens rea. In the instant case, prosecution has failed to establish the mens rea. Although in the trial Court the plea of insanity was taken by the appellant under Section 84, IPC, but unfortunately the trial Court did not direct itself to discuss the plea and only took into account the act committed by the appellant and convicted him under Section 302, IPC. 13. In order to ascertain legal insanity, the Court has to determine that the cognitive faculty of the accused was so de¬stroyed as to make it impossible for him to know the nature of his act or that what he was doing was wrong or contrary to law. If such factor is established, then he shall be exempted from criminal responsibility. It is true that a person who is conceit¬ed cannot be regarded to be insane. On the other hand, if it is noticed that the cognitive faculty of a person is so weak that he is not in a position to know about his own acts, whether it is right or wrong, definitely such a person can claim exemption under Section 84, IPC. 14. On the other hand, if it is noticed that the cognitive faculty of a person is so weak that he is not in a position to know about his own acts, whether it is right or wrong, definitely such a person can claim exemption under Section 84, IPC. 14. On a careful consideration of the facts and circum¬stances of the case and also considering the evidence from all angles, we find that the prosecution has signally failed to prove motive or mens rea against the appellant for committing the sinful act of murdering his own daughter. Accordingly, the appel¬lant is entitled to the benefits of Section 84, IPC. 15. For the reasons stated above, we are unable to agree with the learned Additional Sessions Judge and upset his finding and acquit the appellant of the charge under Section 302, IPC. 16. In the result, the appeal is allowed and the order of conviction and sentence passed against the appellant is set aside. He be released from jail custody and set at liberty forth¬with, if his detention is not required in connection with any other case. CH. P. K. MISRA, J. I agree. Appeal allowed.