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2002 DIGILAW 1762 (RAJ)

M. D. Omana v. Rajasthan Rajya Sahakari Bhoomi Vikas Bank Ltd.

2002-10-25

SHIV KUMAR SHARMA

body2002
JUDGMENT 1. - By this writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution the petitioner seeks to challenge the order dated December 21, 1993 of the respondents rejecting her representation with regard to the regularisation of her services. A further prayer has been made to regularise her services condoning the age limit as well as the qualification in view of the verdict of the Hon'ble Supreme Court with all consequential benefits including the emoluments in regular pay scale. 2. As per facts averred in writ petition, the petitioner was a pointed as Typist in Rajasthan Rajya Sahakari Bhoomi Vikas Bank Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as 'the Bank') on August 28, 1979 and she was working at the Training centre. She continued to work upto 1982 and her services were terminated w.e.f. February 27, 1982. The said order was challenged by petitioner by filing the writ petition, which was allowed vide order dated November 3, 1988 and the order dated February 27, 1982 was set aside and the Bank was directed to reinstate the petitioner forthwith. The Bank was also to pass orders about petitioner's posting. As regard back wages, the petitioner was directed to move application under Sec. 33-C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. Pursuant to the order dated November 3, 1988, the petitioner was posted as Typist at Sri Ganganagar on fixed salary Rs. 740/- per month vide order dated November 18, 1988. The petitioner had assailed the said order by filing another writ petition, which was decided by Division Bench of this Court on January 17, 1989. A liberty was granted to petitioner to make representation to the Bank and the Bank was directed that as and when some vacancy of the post of Typist at Jaipur arose, the petitioner shall be accommodated without being obsessed by the fact that she had filed writ petitions. The Bank was also directed to allow the petitioner to join her duties and it was left open for the petitioner to agitate the matter about her pay scale. 3. The Bank was also directed to allow the petitioner to join her duties and it was left open for the petitioner to agitate the matter about her pay scale. 3. The Bank although posted the petitioner at Jaipur yet rejected her claim for regularisation vide order dated December 20, 1993 mainly on the ground that she was retained on contractual basis and was only rendering her services as English Typist where volume of work some what was limited, in view of the fact that office work and official correspondence was done in Hindi, She had to render very little work on typing in English. Furthermore, she did not fulfil educational qualification since she was not a Graduate. 4. The petitioner assailed the said order dated December 20, 1993 by filing the writ petition No. 444/94. Single Judge of this Court dismissed the writ petition vide order dated January 24, 1996. It was observed that the writ petition involved disputed questions of fact and the petitioner should avail the remedy provided by the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. However the Division Bench in D.B. Civil Special Appeal No. 281/96 allowed the appeal vide judgment dated January 18, 1997 and set aside the judgment of learned Single Judge. The Division Bench was of the view that the petitioner cannot be denied the right of minimum scale of pay in the post of a Typist in Category-III in the scale of Rs. 950-1680 with effect from the date she was put back in service pursuant to High Court order. As an employee she was entitled to the minimum scale available to her and that status along with the consequential benefits. She was also entitled for regularisation from the date any employee in this grade had been appointed after her appointment dated November 18, 1988 in the regular pay scale. It was also made clear that her lack of educational qualification by not being a graduate or her being over age do not stand in her way in this regard. 5. The Bank preferred SLP before the Hon'ble Supreme Court. Their Lordships of Supreme Court allowed the SLP vide judgment dated July 23, 1997 and issued following directions: "The learned Single Judge came to the conclusion that the questions raised by the respondent in her writ petition were disputed questions of fact. 5. The Bank preferred SLP before the Hon'ble Supreme Court. Their Lordships of Supreme Court allowed the SLP vide judgment dated July 23, 1997 and issued following directions: "The learned Single Judge came to the conclusion that the questions raised by the respondent in her writ petition were disputed questions of fact. He took the view that the respondent should avail of the remedy provided by the Industrial Disputes Act and that her case was not a fit case for invoking jurisdiction under Article 226. In the Letters Patent Appeal filed by the respondent the Division Bench, by the order under appeal, came to the conclusion that the respondent's writ petition would lie. Having come to that conclusion, it observed that the respondent could not be denied the right to the minimum scale of pay in the post of Typist Category-3. We find that whereas there has been an elaborate discussion of the conclusion that the writ petition was maintainable there has been little discussion of reason why relief was granted to the respondent. We think that the Division Bench ought to have remanded the writ petition to the learned Single Judge for consideration upon the basis that it was maintainable, and that is the order that we propose to pass. The appeal is allowed. The order under appeal is set aside insofar as it grants relief upon the writ petition to the respondent. The writ petition (W.P. No.444/94)shall now be remanded to the learned Single Judge to be heard and disposed of on merits upon the basis that it is maintainable. Having regard to the time that has elapsed, the writ petition shall be heard and disposed of expeditiously. No order as to costs." 6. In these circumstance, the matter has been heard by me afresh on merits. 7. Mr. Mahendra Shah, learned counsel for the petitioner vehemently canvassed that the petitioner could not be treated as over age and deny the regularisation for not possessing the minimum qualification of graduation and the salary in regular pay scale of the post of LDC/Typist. The denial of regular pay scale in the post of LDC/Typist would be travesty of justice in her case. The denial of regular pay scale in the post of LDC/Typist would be travesty of justice in her case. The stand taken by the Bank was contrary to the settled legal position because the educational qualification has to be seen from the time of her initial entry in service and it could not be looked into at the present stage when she was urging her claim for regularisation or confirmation in service when she had already put in 14 years of satisfactory service to her credit with the respondent Bank. Reliance is placed on (1) Bhagwati Prasad v. Delhi State Mineral Development Corporation, AIR 1990 SC 371 . 8. It is further contended by learned counsel for the petitioner that the act of respondent Bank in not regularising the service of petitioner was also discriminatory in nature because quite a number of persons similarly situated namely Mrs. Savita, Sitaram Meena and Devi Singh were also matriculates at the time of their entry in service but they were posted as LDC/Clerks in the regular pay scale thereafter. The petitioner was also a Secondary passed candidate at the time of her initial appointment when there was no prescribed qualification to the effect that Graduates only would be recruited. There was thus no justification to deny her the benefit of regularisation just because she lacked the qualification of Graduation, which is now taken to be the minimum qualification for entry into the service. It is also contended that even those who came to be appointed in contravention of the Rules, by virtue of their rendering services for more than ten years, would be retained in service. In this context reliance is placed on (2) H.C. Puttaswamy v. the Hon'ble Chief Justice of Karnataka High Court, 1991(1) SLR 166. 9. Learned counsel for the petitioner further urged that the act of respondent Bank in denying the petitioner the pay scale was also unjustified, unwarranted and arbitrary in view of her continuous rendering services as a Typist, which is of Category-III in the staffing pattern of the respondent Bank. That apart, similarly situated persons were being paid in the pay scale of the post and she ought to have been confirmed and regularised in the pay scale of Rs. 950-1680 of Category-III. That apart, similarly situated persons were being paid in the pay scale of the post and she ought to have been confirmed and regularised in the pay scale of Rs. 950-1680 of Category-III. That apart, just because she was initially appointed on a contractual basis and the employer Bank was a dominating party in the contract, the petitioner cannot be deprived of her legitimate rights to claim regularisation and fitment in proper scale in confirmance with the fair justice principle. 10. Per contra, Mr. N.K. Joshi, learned counsel for the respondent Bank urged that the petitioner was not entitled to regularisation of her services in view of the fact that her services originated out of a contract and she was still retained in contractual service. She was already overage and she did not possess the requisite minimum educational qualification of a Graduate for being absorbed to the post of regular Typist/LDC. Learned counsel further canvassed that whether the petitioner was really rendering her services as an LDC and was doing office work has to be established on evidence which was beyond the scope of the writ jurisdiction. Reliance is placed on (3) State of H.P. v. Ashwani Kumar and others, (1996)1 SCC 773 ; (4) Jawaharlal Nehru Krishi Vishwa Vidyalaya, Jabalpur, M.P. v. Bal Kishan Soni & Others, (1997)5 SCC 86 ; (5) State of U.P. and Others v. J.P. Chaurasia and Others, (1989)1 SCC 121 ; and (6) State of W.B. and Others v. Hari Narayan Bhowal and Others, (1994)4 SCC 78 . 11. I have given my thoughtful consideration to the rival submissions and scanned the material on record. 12. Facts situation emerged from the material on record may be summarised thus: (i) The petitioner was appointed as Typist on August 28, 1979. She had already put in 23 years of service to her credit with the Bank. (ii) At the time of her initial appointment there was no prescribed qualification to the effect that Graduate only would be recruited to the post of LDC. (iii) Similarly situated persons Mrs. Savita, Sitaram Meena and Devi Singh were also matriculate at the time of their entry in service and they have been posted as LDC/Clerk in the regular pay scale thereafter. 13. In Bhagwati Prasad v. Delhi State Mineral Development Corpn. (iii) Similarly situated persons Mrs. Savita, Sitaram Meena and Devi Singh were also matriculate at the time of their entry in service and they have been posted as LDC/Clerk in the regular pay scale thereafter. 13. In Bhagwati Prasad v. Delhi State Mineral Development Corpn. (supra), three Judge Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, while dealing with the writ petitions of daily rated workers observed as under: "The main controversy centres round the question whether some petitioners are possessed of the requisite qualifications to hold the posts so as to entitle them to be confirmed in the respective posts held by them. The indisputable facts are that the petitioners were appointed between the period 1983 and 1986 and ever since, they have been working and have gained sufficient experience in the actual discharge of duties attached to the posts held by them. Practical experience would always aid the person to effectively discharge the duties and is a sure guide to assess the suitability. The initial minimum educational qualification prescribed for the different posts is undoubtedly a factor to be reckoned with, but it is so at the time of the initial entry in the service. Once the appointments were made as daily rated workers and they were allowed to work for a considerable length of time, it would be hard and harsh to deny them the confirmation in the respective posts on the ground that they lack the prescribed educational qualifications." 14. In H.C. Puttaswamy v. the Hon'ble Chief Justice of Karnataka High Court (supra) the Hon'ble Supreme Court has enunciated the principle that even those who came to be appointed in contravention of the Rules, by virtue of their rendering services for more than ten years, would be retained in service. 15. In State of H.P. v. Ashwani Kumar and others (supra), two judge bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court ruled that where the project is completed and dosed due to non-availability of funds, the employees had to go along with the closed project and High Court was not right to give direction for regularisation of the employees or to continue them in the other places as no vested right accrue in temporary employment. 16. 16. In State of U.P. and Others v. J.P. Chaurasia and Others (supra), Two Judge Bench of Hon'ble Supreme Court, explained the nature and scope of right to Equal Pay for Equal Work and observed that the principle of Equal Pay for Equal Work is conscience of our Constitution. They are rooted in social justice. In matters of employment the government of a socialist State must protect the weaker sections. It must be ensured that there is exploitation of poor and ignorant. It is the duty of the State to see that the under-privileged or weaker sections get their due. 17. In State of W.B. and Others v. Hari Narayan Bhowal and Others (supra), the Bench of Two Judges of the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that the claimants must not only establish that the nature of work is identical but also that there was no reasonable basis to treat them separately. Mere similarity in the nature of the work of two groups not sufficient. 18. In Jawaharlal Nehru Krishi Vishwa Vidyalaya, Jabalpur, M.P. v. Bal Kishan Soni & Others (supra), Two Judge Bench of Hon'ble Supreme Court indicated that the services of staff employed in sponsored project cannot be regularised. Such post could continue only till the project is existed. 19. Bearing in mind the ratio indicated in aforequoted decisions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, I proceed to consider the contentions advance before me. From the material on record, it is established that the petitioner at the time of her initial appointment was Secondary pass candidate and there was no prescribed qualification to the effect that only Graduates would be recruited. The petitioner was allowed to work for a considerable long time and it would be hard and harsh not to regularise her services on the post of Typist/Clerk just because she lacked the qualification of Graduate, which now taken to be the minimum qualification for entering into service. It appears that the petitioner has been continuously rendering the services as Typist Category-III in staffing pattern of respondent Bank. Moreso, the services of similarly situated persons who were matriculates at the time of their appointment have been regularised to the post of LDC/Clerk and they are being paid the salary in the pay scale of Rs. 950-1680. It appears that the petitioner has been continuously rendering the services as Typist Category-III in staffing pattern of respondent Bank. Moreso, the services of similarly situated persons who were matriculates at the time of their appointment have been regularised to the post of LDC/Clerk and they are being paid the salary in the pay scale of Rs. 950-1680. Just because the petitioner was initially appointed on contractual basis, the employer Bank being a dominant party to the contract, cannot deprive the petitioner of her legitimate right to claim regularisation and fitment in the proper scale. I do not see any moment in the submissions advanced on behalf of the respondent Bank that the petitioner was not entitled for regularisation because of over age and lack of qualification. I am unable to persuade myself to agree with the submissions of learned counsel for respondents that the petitioner should establish that she was rendering her services as LDC/Typist and was doing office work. The fact that the petitioner has been rendering services as LDC/Typist can be inferred from the facts and circumstances of the case and it cannot be presumed that the petitioner has been sitting idle all through 23 years of her service. 20. In view of the ratio indicated in Bhagwati Prasad v. Delhi State Mineral Development Corpn. (supra), I hold that the educational qualification is a matter of consideration at the time of entry in service and after the petitioner has entered in service and gained experience that experience was itself criterion for her regularisation and/ or confirmation. In my opinion, case of petitioner stands on a better footing because the qualification at the time of entry in service and the petitioner was appointed after following a particular procedure. The act of respondent Bank in denying the benefit of regularisation/confirmation to the petitioner on the ground that she was not graduate as per present day qualification, is arbitrary. It also appears from clause 6 of the Bank Service regulation as well that Graduation has not been a necessary qualification for the post of Typist. Clause 6 only gives out that Graduates would be given additional increment. Therefore, it is evident that Graduation is not the prescribed educational qualification even today, for appointment to the post of LDC/Typist, since Graduates claim additional grade increment. 21. Clause 6 only gives out that Graduates would be given additional increment. Therefore, it is evident that Graduation is not the prescribed educational qualification even today, for appointment to the post of LDC/Typist, since Graduates claim additional grade increment. 21. After having considered the submissions advanced before me by learned counsel for parties, I am of the opinion that the petitioner cannot be denied the right of minimum scale pay on the post of Typist in Category-III in the scale of Rs. 950-1680 with effect from the date she was put back in service by an order of substantive appointment dated November 18, 1988. The petitioner is entitled to the minimum scale available to her and that status. In view of the ratio indicated in Bhagwati Prasad v. Delhi State Mineral Development Corpn. (supra) and H.C. Puttaswamy v. the Hon'ble Chief Justice of Karnataka High Court (supra) the petitioner shall be entitled to be considered for regularisation of her services w.e.f. November 18, 1988 in the regular pay scale with all consequential benefits. The arrears shall be calculated and paid to the petitioner within ninety days from today. 22. The writ petition stands allowed as indicated above. There shall be no order as to costs.Petition Allowed. *******