S. P. MEHROTRA, J. This writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India has been filed by the petitioner, inter- alia, seeking quashing of the judgment and order dated 23-7-1980 (Annexure 2 to the writ petition) passed by the learned IVth Additional District Judge, Etawah (Respondent No. 1 ). 2. The dispute relates to the upper portion of house in Kasba Dibiapur, Pargana Auraiya, district Etawah. The said upper portion has, hereinafter, been referred to as "the disputed portion". 3. It appears that Beni Ram, Respondent No. 2 filed a release application under Section 21 (1) (a) of the U. P. Act No. XIII of 1972 (in short "the Act") against Shyam Sundar, Respondent No. 3 for the release of the disputed portion. It was, inter- alia, stated by the said Beni Ram, Respondent No. 2 in the said release application that he (Respondent No. 2) was the owner of the said house situate in Kasba Dibiapur Pargana Auraiya, District Etawah which was a two storyed house; and that in the ground floor portion of the said house, the Respondent No. 2 was residing, while in the disputed portion on the upper floor, the said Shyam Sundar (Respondent No. 3) was the tenant at a monthly rent of Rs. 10/- and that the Respondent No. 2 had bona- fide need for additional accommodation; and that the Respondent No. 3 had no need of any kind for the disputed portion; and that as the Respondent No. 3 has his own residential house, he could not object to the said release application filed by the Respondent No. 2. The said release application was registered as Release Case No. 53 of 1976. 4. The said Shyam Sundar, Respondent No. 3 contested the said release application, inter-alia, alleging that the (Respondent No. 3) was not the tenant in the disputed portion, and he was never in occupation of the disputed portion as tenant; and that Shahjahan alias Sharda Devi, petitioner was the tenant in the disputed portion since the time of Sukriti Lal, and petitioner was in possession of the disputed portion; and that in fact, the Respondent No. 3 had filed suit for surety for the payment of rent by the petitioner; and that the Respondent No. 3 never required to take the disputed portion on rent, as he was residing with his family in his own house. 5. 5. In view of the denial of contract of tenancy by the said Shyam Sundar (Respondent No. 3) and his claim that the petitioner was the tenant in the disputed portion, the petitioner was impleaded as a party in the said release application. It was, inter- alia, alleged by the said Beni Ram (Respondent No. 2) by amendment in the release application that the petitioner was never the tenant of the Respondent No. 2, nor did the petitioner ever pay any rent to the Respondent No. 2 and that there was no relationship of landlord and tenant between the Respondent No. 2 and the petitioner; and that the petitioner was never the tenant of Sukriti Lal also; and that in 1966 when the Respondent No. 2 got possession of the said house in question, the petitioner was not in occupation of the disputed portion; and that the Respondent No. 3 without any consent of the Respondent No. 2 had allowed the petitioner to occupy the disputed portion as a sub- tenant for the last about one year in violation of law; and that in his statement dated 20-10-1977, in Misc. Case No. 1 of 1977 Sukriti Lal v. Beni Ram, in the Court of IInd Additional Munsif, Etawah, the Respondent No. 3, inter- alia, stated that the petitioner never paid any rent, and that no kirayanama was executed in favour of the petitioner by Sukriti Lal or the Respondent No. 2 and that the Respondent No. 3 continuously paid rent in respect of the disputed portion. 6. A copy of the said release application has been filed as Annexure CA-1 to the counter affidavit filed on behalf of the Respondent No. 2 in the writ petition. 7. The petitioner filed her written statement in the said release case. It was, inter-alia, alleged by the petitioner that the said Shyam Sunder (Respondent No. 3) had no concern with the disputed portion, nor was the Respondent No. 2 residing in the disputed portion; and that the petitioner was never the tenant of the said Beni Ram (Respondent No. 2), but she was continuing as the tenant of Sukriti Lal; and that the said Beni Ram (Respondent No. 2) was not the owner of the said house in question; and that the status of the petitioner was not that of sub-tenant. 8. 8. The parties filed affidavit and documents in support of their respective cases. 9. The learned Prescribed Authority/munsif, Etawah by his judgment and order dated 7-3-1979 dismissed the said release application filed by the said Beni Ram (Respondent No. 2 ). It was, inter- alia, held by the learned Prescribed Authoritythat it was proved by the perusal of the documents on record that the previous owner of the said house in question Sukriti Lal had mortgaged the said house in favour of the Respondent No. 2 and his (Respondent No. 2) brother; and that as the said Sukriti Lal failed to redeem the mortgaged property, that is, the said house in question, the Respondent No. 2 and his brother filed a suit being Suit No. 234 of 1963, against the said Sukriti Lal; and that the said suit was decreed in favour of the Respondent No. 2 and his brother; and that in pursuance of the said decree. The Respondent No. 2 and his brother got possession of the said house in question as owner; and that Ram Sanehi, the brother of Respondent No. 2 died issueless, consequently, the Respondent No. 2 became owner of the entire house in question; and that thus, the Respondent No. 2 was proved to be the sole owner of the said house in question. It was, inter-alia, further held by the learned Prescribed Authority that while it was established on record that the petitioner was in occupation of the disputed portion since before the filing of the said release application, but it was not established that the petitioner was sub-tenant of the Respondent No. 3. It was, inter-alia, further held by the learned Prescribed Authority that in view of the contradictory evidence, it was not possible to conclude that the said Beni Ram (Respondent No. 2) was residing on the ground floor of the said house in question or not; and that it was also not established by the evidence that the said Shyam Sundar (Respondent No. 3) was still in occupation of the disputed portion or had been ever in occupation earlier. The learned Prescribed Authority, inter-alia, held that the said Beni Ram (Respondent No. 2) could not establish his relationship of landlord and tenant with the said Shyam Sunder (Respondent No. 3) and/or the petitioner , nor could the said Beni Ram (Respondent No. 2) establish his bona-fide need for the disputed portion; and that as the said Beni Ram (Respondent No. 2) himself did not accept the petitioner as a tenant, it was not possible to allow the release application treating the petitioner to be tenant of the disputed portion. 10. Against the said judgment and order dated 7-3-1979 passed by the learned Prescribed Authority/munsif, Etawah, the said Beni Ram (Respondent No. 2) filed an appeal under Section 22 of the Act which was registered as Civil Appeal No. 40 of 1979. 11. The learned IVth Additional District Judge, Etawah (Respondent No. 1) by his judgment and order dated 23-7-1980 (Annexure 2 to the writ petition) allowed the said appeal filed by the Respondent No. 2, set aside the said judgment and order dated 7- 3-1979 passed by the learned Prescribed Authority and allowed the said release application files by the Respondent No. 2. 12. It was, inter-alia, held by the Respondent No. 1 that it was fully established that there was relationship of landlord and tenant between the said Beni Ram (Respondent No. 2) and the said Shyam Sundar (Respondent No. 3) and that the said Shyam Sunder (Respondent No. 3) was the tenant of the disputed portion for and on behalf of the said Beni Ram (Respondent No. 2) and that the status of the petitioner could be either that of a sub- tenant or a trespasser, however, that was not going to affect the merit of the case. The Respondent No. 1, inter-alia, further held that the said Shyam Sundar (Respondent No. 3) had admitted that he had got a big house of his own in Kasba Dibiyapur and had been living there, and in this view of the matter, the said Shyam Sunder (Respondent No. 3) could not agitate or oppose the release application in view of the provision of Explanation (i) to Section 21 (1) of the Act; and that the need of the said Beni Ram (Respondent No. 2) for the disputed portion was bona-fide; and that in paragraph 17 of the written statement, the said Shyam Sundar (Respondent No. 3) had stated that he was not in need of the disputed portion, and, therefore, "the need of the tenant and landlord be need not to be compared. " 13. Thereafter, the petitioner filed the present writ petition, inter-alia, challenging the said judgment and order dated 23-7-1980 passed by the Respondent No. 1. Counter affidavit and rejoinder affidavit have been exchanged between the parties. 14. During the pendency of this writ petition, the said Shyam Sundar (Respondent No. 3) died, and the substitution application filed on behalf of the petitioner for bringing on record the heirs and legal representatives of the said Shyam Sunder (Respondent No. 3) was allowed by the order dated 25-4- 2001. 15. Further, during the pendency of the writ petition, an application dated 1-8-2001 was filed on behalf of the petitioner supported by a supplementary affidavit sworn by the petitioner on 31st July, 2001. It has, inter-alia, been stated in the said supplementary affidavit that during the pendency of this writ petition, the said Beni Ram (Respondent No. 2), landlord of the said house in question had sold away the said house in question to Sri Arun Kumar Pandey son of Sri Jai Nararin Pandey, resident of Kakrahi Bazar, Dibiyapur, Pargana Auraiya, district Etawah for a sum of Rs. 40,000/- by registered sale-deed dated 30-8- 1993; and that the alleged need of the said Beni Ram (Respondent No. 2) had vanished, and he had no interest left in the said house in question; and that the release application had become infructuous. A certified copy of the said sale-deed dated 30-8- 1993 has been filed as Annexure SA-1 to the said supplementary affidavit. 16. A certified copy of the said sale-deed dated 30-8- 1993 has been filed as Annexure SA-1 to the said supplementary affidavit. 16. I have heard Sri M. M. D. Agarwal, learned Counsel for the petitioner and Sri Tej Bhan Pandey, holding brief of Sri B. N. Mishra, learned Counsel for Respondent No. 2. 17. Learned Counsel for the petitioner submitted that as during the pendency of the present writ petition, the said Beni Ram (Respondent No. 2) sold the said house in question to the said Sri Arun Kumar Pandey, the said Beni Ram (Respondent No. 2) ceased to be the owner and the landlord of the said house in question, and as such, there was no question of release of the disputed portion in favour of the said Beni Ram (Respondent No. 2 ). Learned Counsel for the petitioner further submitted that the transferee of the said house in question; namely Sri Arun Kumar Pandey had not sought his impleadment in the present writ petition, and even otherwise, the release application having been filed on the ground of the alleged need of the said Beni Ram (Respondent No. 2) and his family members, the said release application could not be continued or taken benefit of by the said transferee Sri Arun Kumar Pandey. Learned Counsel for the petitioner submitted that it was open to the said transferee Sri Arun Kumar Pandey to file a fresh suit for rejectment or release application under the relevant provisions in case the requirements of such provisions were fulfilled, but it was not open to the said transfree Sri Arun Kumar Pandey to continue to pursue the release application which had been filed by the said Beni Ram (Respondent No. 2) on the ground of the alleged need of his own and his family members; Learned Counsel for the petitioner stressed that no such rejectment suit of release application had been filed by the said transferee Sri Arun Kumar Pandey. In the circumstances, the contention proceeds, the writ petition filed by the petitioner deserves to be allowed, and the judgment and order dated 23-7-1980 passed by the Respondent No. 1 was liable to be quashed. 18. Learned Counsel for the petitioner placed reliance the following decision: (a) Hasmat Rai v. Raghunath Prasad, AIR 1981 SC 1711 . (b) M/s Variety Emporium v. V. R. M. Mohd. Ibrahim Naina, AIR 1985 Supreme Court 207. 18. Learned Counsel for the petitioner placed reliance the following decision: (a) Hasmat Rai v. Raghunath Prasad, AIR 1981 SC 1711 . (b) M/s Variety Emporium v. V. R. M. Mohd. Ibrahim Naina, AIR 1985 Supreme Court 207. (c) Jagdish Swarup and another v. Ist Additional District Juge, Aligarh and others, 1992 (2) Allahabad Rent Cases 155. (d) Savani Transport (P.) Limited v. L. Rajamanikkam, 1995 (1) Allahabad Rent Cases 331 (Supreme Court ). (e ). R. Kanthimathi and another v. Mrs. Beatrice Xavier, 2002 (1) Allahabad Rent Cases 101 (Supreme Court ). 19. In reply, it was submitted on behalf of the Respondent No. 2 that the petitioner could not take advantage of the subsequent event; namely sale of the said house in question by the Respondent No. 2 in favour of the said Arun Kumar Pandey. The rights of the parties, the contention proceeded, were crystallized on the date of filing of the suit or the release application. The suit or the release application, it was contended, was to be decided with reference to the date of filing of the suit or the release application, and subsequent events could not be taken into account. 20. It was submitted on behalf of the Respondent No. 2 that Shyam Sundar (Respondent No. 3) who was the tenant of the disputed portion had not filed any writ petition challenging the judgment and order dated 23-7-1980 passed by the Respondent No. 1, and the present writ petition at the instance of the petitioner who had been held to be either a sub-tenant or a trespasser was not maintainable. As the Respondent No. 3 (Shyam Sundar) who was the tenant in the disputed portion did not challenge the said judgment and order dated 23-7-1980, the contention proceeded, the said judgment and order dated 23- 7-1980 became final as against the tenant Shyam Sundar (Respondent No. 3) and the petitioner was not entitled to get any relief in the present writ petition. 21. It was further submitted on behalf of the Respondent No. 2 that in any case, the subsequent events could be considered only if the suitable amendments were made in the pleading and evidence was led to substantiate the allegations added by the amendments. In the absence of suitable amendments in the pleadings and the evidence to substantiate the same, subsequent events could not be taken into consideration. 22. In the absence of suitable amendments in the pleadings and the evidence to substantiate the same, subsequent events could not be taken into consideration. 22. The reliance was placed on behalf of the Respondent No. 2 on the following decisions: (1) Vallampatti Kalavathi v. Haji Ismail, (2001) 4 SCC 26 . (2) Om Prakash Gupta v. Ranbir B. Goyal, (2002) 2 SCC 256 . 23. In rejoinder, learned Counsel for the petitioner submitted that the release application in respect of the premises in question should be decided with reference to the facts and circumstances as existed on the date of filing of the release application, would apply only if the landlord who had filed the release application continued to remain landlord of the premises in question throughout the pendency of the litigation, or in the event of his death, his heirs and legal representatives who inherited his rights in respect of the premises in question were brought on record, as landlord, and as such heirs and legal representatives continued to remain landlord of the premises in question throughout the continuance of the litigation. The said principle, the contention proceeded, would not apply to a case where the landlord who filed the release case transferred the premises in question during the pendency of the litigation to a third person, as in such a situation, such third person would become the landlord of the premises in question, and there would be no occasion to consider the release case with reference to the need of the original landlord. It was submitted on behalf of the petitioner that such subsequent event could be taken into consideration by the Courts and the appropriate relief should be granted keeping in view such subsequent event. 24. In order to appreciate the rival contentions of the parties, it is necessary to reproduce Section 21 of the U. P Act No. 13 of 1972 (in short "the Act"): "21. 24. In order to appreciate the rival contentions of the parties, it is necessary to reproduce Section 21 of the U. P Act No. 13 of 1972 (in short "the Act"): "21. Proceedings for release of building under occupation of tenant.- (1) The prescribed authority may, on an application of the landlord in that behalf, order the eviction of a tenant from the building under tenancy or any specified part thereof it is satisfied that any of the following grounds exists, namely - (a) That the building is bona-fide required either in its existing form or after demolition and new construction by the landlord for occupation by himself or any member of his family, or any person for whose benefit it is held by him, either for residential purposes of for purposes of any profession, trade or calling, or where the landlord is the trustee of a public charitable trust, for the objects of the trust (b) That the building is in a dilapidated and is required for purposes of demolition and new construction: Provided that where the building was in the occupation of a tenant since before its purchase by the landlord, such purchase being made after the commencement of this Act, no application shall be entertained on the grounds, mentioned in clause (a), unless a period of three years has elapsed since the date of such purchase and the landlord has given a notice in that behalf to the tenant not less than six months before such application, and such notice may be given even before the expiration of the aforesaid period of three years: Provided further that if any application under clause (a) is made in respect of any building let out exclusively for non- residential purposes, the prescribed authority while making the order of eviction shall, after considering all relevant facts of the case, award against the landlord to the tenant an amount not exceeding two years rent as compensation and may, subject to rules, impose such other conditions as it thinks fit: Provided also that no application under clause (a) shall be entertained - (i) for the purposes of a charitable trust, the objects of which provide for discrimination in respect of its beneficiaries in respect of its beneficiaries on the ground of religion, caste, or place of birth; (ii) in the case of any residential building, for occupation for business purposes; (iii) in the case of any residential building, against any tenant who is a member of the armed forces of the Union and in whose favour the prescribed authority under the Indian Soldiers (Litigation) Act, 1925 (Act No. IV of 1925) has issued a certificate that he is serving under special conditions within the meaning of Section 3 of that Act, or where he has died by enemy action while so serving then against his heirs: Provided also that the prescribed authority shall, except in cases provided for in the Explanation, take into account the likely hardship to the tenant from the grant of the application as against the likely hardship to the landlord from the refusal of the application and for that purpose shall have regard to such factors as may be prescribed. Explanation.- In the case of a residential buildings: (i) where the tenant or any member of his family (who has been normally residing with or is wholly dependent on him) has built or has otherwise acquired in a vacant state or has got vacated after acquisition a residential building in the same city, municipality, notified area or town area, no objection by the tenant against an application under this sub-section shall be entertained; Note.- For the purposes of this clause a person shall be deemed to have otherwise acquired a building, if he is occupying a public building for residential purposes as a tenant, allottee or licensee. (ii) ( * * * *) " (iii) where the landlord of any building is - (i) a serving or retired Indian Soldier as defined in the Indian Soldiers (Litigation) Act, 1925 (Act No. IV of 1925), and such building was let out at any time before his retirement, or (2) a widow of such a soldier and such building was let out at any time before the retirement or death of her husband, which ever occurred earlier, and such landlord needs such building for occupation by himself or the members of his family for residential purposes, then his representation that he needs the building for residential purposes for himself or the members of his family shall be deemed sufficient for the purposes of clause (a), and where such landlord owns more than one building this provision shall apply in respect of one building only. " (iv) * * * * (1-A) Notwithstanding anything contained in Section 2, the prescribed authority shall, on the application of a landlord in that behalf order the eviction of a tenant from any building under tenancy, if it is satisfied that the landlord of such building was in occupation of a public building for residential purposes which he had to vacate on account of the cessation of his employment: Provided that an application under this sub-section may also be given by a landlord in occupation of such public building at any time within a period of one year before the expected date of cessation of his employment, but the order of eviction on such application shall take effect only on the date of his actual cessation ). (2) The prescribed authority may on an application of the landlord in that behalf order the eviction of a tenant from any surplus land appurtenant to the building under tenancy if it is satisfied that the land is required for constructing one or more new buildings, or for dividing it into several plots with a view to the sale thereof for purposes of construction of new buildings, and in either case, that the competent authority under any law for the title being in force has approved a plan for the said purpose. Explanation.- Where the appurtenant land including passage exceeds double the covered area of the building, excess area shall be deemed to be surplus land. (3) No order shall be made under sub-section (1) or sub-section (1-A) or sub-section (2), except after giving to the parties concerned a reasonable opportunity of being heard: Provided that where the tenant being a servant of Government or of any local authority or any public sector corporation does not contest the application, then a reasonable opportunity of being heard shall be given to the District Magistrate, who shall have the right to oppose the application ). (4) An order under (sub-section (1) or sub-section (1-A) or sub- section (2), may be made notwithstanding that the tenancy has not been determined: Provided that no such order shall be made in the case of tenancy created for a fixed term by a registered lease before the expiry of such term. (5) On an order being made under (sub-section (1), or sub- section (1-A) or sub-section (2)), the building or part of appurtenant land as the case may be, shall stand released in favour of the landlord: Provided that on the occurrence of any of the circumstances mentioned in Section 24, any building or part thereof (but not appurtenant land alone) released as above, shall without prejudice to the provisions of Section 24, be deemed to become again subject to allotment in accordance with Chapter III. (6) On the expiration of a period of thirty days from an order under (sub-section (1) or sub-section (1-A) or sub-section (2)), the tenancy of the tenant shall stand determined in its entirety or, as the case may be, in respect of any part of appurtenant land released in favour of the landlord, and in the latter case, the rent payable for the remainder of the building under tenancy shall be such as may be determined under Section 8. ( (7) Where during the pendency of an application under clause (a) of sub-section (1), the landlord dies, his legal representatives shall be entitled to prosecute such application further on the basis of their own need in substitution of the need of the deceased. (8) Nothing in clause (a) of sub-section (1) shall apply to a building let out to the State Government or to a local authority or to Public Sector Corporation or to a recognized educational institution unless the Prescribed Authorityis satisfied that the landlord is a person to whom clause (ii) or clause (iv) of the Explanation to sub-section (1) is applicable: Provided that in the case of such building the District Magistrate may, on the application of the landlord, enhance the monthly rent payable therefore to a sum equivalent to one twelfth of ten percent of the market value of the building under the tenancy, and the rent so enhanced shall be payable from the commencement of the month of tenancy following the date of the application: Provided further that a similar application for further enhancement may be made after the expiration of a period of five years from the date of the last order of enhancement. " 25. A perusal of clause (a) of sub-section (1) of Section 21 shows that the landlord may file release application on the ground that the building is bona-fide required for occupation by himself or any member of his family. Fourth proviso to sub-section (1) of Section 21 of the Act provides that the Prescribed Authority shall take into account the likely hardships to the tenant from the grant of the release application as against the likely hardships to the landlord from the refusal of the release application, and for that purpose the Prescribed Authority shall have regard to such factors as may be prescribed, that is, prescribed by the Rules framed under the Act. Rule 16 of the Rules framed under the Act prescribes the factors which are to be considered by the Prescribed Authority in deciding the release application under Section 21 (1) (a) of the Act. 26. It is thus, evident that the release application is filed by the landlord under Section 21 (1) (a) of the Act for the bona- fide need of his own or his family members. Further the landlord is also required to establish that he would suffer greater hardships in case of rejection of the release application than would be suffered by the tenant in case, the release application is allowed. 27. Hence, it follows that the release application filed by the landlord can be allowed only if it is established that the need of the landlord for the premises in question for himself or his family members is bona-fide and further, the landlord would suffer greater hardships on his hardships being compared with the hardships which the tenant would suffer. Evidently, the need of the landlord or his family members and the hardships to be suffered by the landlord as narrated in the release application should continue to exist throughout the pendency of the litigation. 28. In case, the landlord transfers the premises in question to a third person, he ceases to be the landlord, and the release application at his instance ceases to be maintainable. Further, in such a situation, the need of the landlord for himself or his family members and the hardships to be suffered by the landlord as narrated in the release application cease to exist. In fact, once the landlord transfers the premises in question to a third person, it demolishes his case that he bona-fide required the premises in question for himself or his family members and that he would suffer greater hardships as compared with the hardships which the tenant would suffer. 29. So far as the third person to whom the premises in question is transferred, is concerned, he can no longer pursue the release application filed by the erstwhile landlord on the ground of the latter bona- fide need. 29. So far as the third person to whom the premises in question is transferred, is concerned, he can no longer pursue the release application filed by the erstwhile landlord on the ground of the latter bona- fide need. Such third person may file a fresh release application on the ground of his own bona- fide need but it will not be open to him to continue to pursue the release application filed by the erstwhile landlord on the ground of bona-fide need of the erstwhile landlord or his family members. 30. It may be pointed out that the position a transfree is different from the position of a transferee is different from the position the legal representative of the landlord. 31. Sub-section (7) of Section 21 lays down that in case, the landlord dies during the pendency of the release application under Section 21 (1) (a) of the Act, his legal representatives shall be entitled to prosecute such application further on the basis of their own need in substitution of the need of the deceased. 32. Thus, the Act itself permits the legal representatives of the deceased landlord to continue to prosecute the release application filed by the deceased landlord on the basis of their own need in substitution of the need of the deceased landlord. However, this provision will not apply to a case where the landlord makes a transfer inter-vivos in favour of a third person. Such a transferee cannot continue to prosecute the release application filed by the landlord in view of the position explained above. 33. Let us now consider the facts of the present case in the light of the aforesaid legal position. As noted above, during the pendency of the present writ petition, the Respondent No. 2 sold the said house in question in favour of the said Arun Kumar Pandey by registered, sale-deed dated 30-8-1993. A certified copy of the said registered sale-deed dated 30-8-1993 has been brought on record by the petitioner by filing the same as Annexure to the supplementary affidavit sworn on 31st July, 2001. 34. Hence, on the execution of the said sale-deed on 30-8-1993, the Respondent No. 2 ceased to be the landlord of the said house in question, and instead, Arun Kumar Pandey became the landlord of the said house in question including the disputed portion. 34. Hence, on the execution of the said sale-deed on 30-8-1993, the Respondent No. 2 ceased to be the landlord of the said house in question, and instead, Arun Kumar Pandey became the landlord of the said house in question including the disputed portion. The execution of the said sale-deed during the pendency of the present writ petition shows that the Respondent No. 2 no longer required the disputed portion for his any alleged need. 35. The said Arun Kumar Pandey has not sought any impleadment in the writ petition even though the said sale-deed was executed on 30-8-1993. Even otherwise, the said Arun Kumar Pandey could not continue to prosecute the release application, which had been filed by the Respondent No. 2 as the same was based on the alleged need of the Respondent No. 2. It was is open to the said Arun Kumar Pandey to file a fresh release application, but the cannot prosecute the release application which had been filed by the Respondent No. 2 on the ground of his (Respondent No. 2) need. 36. The need is personal to a landlord and/or his family members, as such, a transferee cannot continue to prosecute the release application filed by the erstwhile landlord. Therefore, the said Arun Kumar Pandey is not entitled to prosecute the release application filed by the Respondent No. 2 which has given use to the present writ petition. 37. In view of the aforesaid discussion, it is evident that that Respondent No. 2 ceased to be the landlord on the execution of the said sale deed on 30-8-1993, and the alleged need of the Respondent No. 2 also ceased, to exist. Therefore, the impugned judgment and order dated 23-7-1980 which has allowed the release application of the Respondent No. 2 in respect of the disputed portion has lost his efficacy, and the same is liable to be quashed. In case, the impugned judgment and order dated 23-7-1980 is allowed to stand, it would result in various complications. For example, in case the said judgment and order dated 23-7-1980 is allowed to stand, and the Respondent No. 2 is permitted to enforce the release order granted in the said judgment and order dated 23-7-1980, it would mean that the Respondent No. 2 who is no longer the landlord of the said house in question, would be permitted to enforce the release order. Similarly, if the impugned judgment and order dated 23-7-1980 is allowed to stand, and the said Arun Kumar Pandey (transferee) is permitted to enforce the release order granted in the said judgment and order dated 23-7-1980, it would mean that the said Arun Kumar Pandey could be permitted to enforce a release order which is not based on his bona-fide need. Hence, the said impugned judgment and order dated 23-7-1980 cannot be permitted to stand in view of the subsequent development, namely, sale of the said house in question by the Respondent No. 2 in favour of the said Arun Kumar Pandey by the registered sale deed dated 30-8-1993. 38. Coming to the submissions made on behalf of the Respondent No. 2 that the impugned judgment and order dated 23-7-1980 has become final as against Shyam Sundar (Respondent No. 3), and as such, no relief could be granted to the petitioner in the present writ petition, I am of the view that the said submission is not well founded. The petitioner had contested the release application claiming herself to be the tenant of the disputed portion. Respondent No. 3 (Shyam Sundar) also denied that he was the tenant of the disputed portion. In fact, the Respondent No. 3 (Shyam Sundar) also asserted that the petitioner was the tenant of the disputed portion. Thus; the status of the petitioner was in issue before the Prescribed Authorityas well as the Appellate Authority. 39. The Prescribed Authority as well as the Appellant Authority accepted that the petitioner was in occupation of the disputed portion. One of the main questions before the Prescribed Authority as well as the Appellate Authority was as to whether the Respondent No. 3 (Shyam Sundar) was the tenant of the disputed portion. Coupled with this question was the question as to what was the status of the petitioner who was in occupation of the disputed portion, namely, tenant or sub-tenant or transferee. 40. Therefore, even though the Respondent No. 3 (Shyam Sundar) did not challenge the said impugned judgment and order dated 23- 7- 1980, the petitioner, who was a party in the proceedings before the authorities below, had right to challenge the said impugned judgment and order dated 23-7-1980. 41. 40. Therefore, even though the Respondent No. 3 (Shyam Sundar) did not challenge the said impugned judgment and order dated 23- 7- 1980, the petitioner, who was a party in the proceedings before the authorities below, had right to challenge the said impugned judgment and order dated 23-7-1980. 41. Coming now to the submissions made on behalf of the Respondent No. 2 that the release application ought to be decided with reference to the date of filing of such application, and subsequent event, such as, sale of the said premises in question cannot be taken into consideration, it will be relevant to refer to various judicial decisions wherein these questions have been considered. 42. In Hasmat Rai and another v. Raghunath Prasad (supra) relied upon by the learned Counsel for the petitioner, their Lordships of the Supreme Court laid down as follows (paragraph 14 of the said AIR): " (14 ). . . . . . . Therefore when an action is brought by the landlord under Rent Restriction Act for eviction on the ground of personal requirement, his need must not only be shown to exist at the date of the suit, but must exist on the date of the appellate decree, or the date when a higher Court deals with the matter. During the progress and passage of proceeding from Court to Court if subsequent events occur which if noticed would non suit the plaintiff, the Court has to examine and evaluate the same and mould the decree accordingly. . . . . . . . " "therefore, it is now incontrovertible that where possession is sought for personal requirement it would be correct to say that the requirement pleaded by the landlord must not only exist on the date of the action but must subsist till the final decree or an order for eviction is made. If in the meantime events have cropped up which would show that the landlords requirement is wholly satisfied then in that case his action must fail and in such a situation it is incorrect to say that as decree or order for eviction is passed against the tenant he cannot invite the Court to take into consideration subsequent events. He can be precluded from so contending when the decree or order for eviction has become final. " 43. Again, in M/s Variety Emporium v. V. R. M. Mohd. He can be precluded from so contending when the decree or order for eviction has become final. " 43. Again, in M/s Variety Emporium v. V. R. M. Mohd. Ibrahim Naina (supra) relied upon by the learned Counsel for the petitioner, their Lordships of the apex Court laid down as follows (paragraphs 16 and 17 of the said AIR): " (16) No authority is needed for the proposition that, in appropriate cases, the Court must have regard to events as they present themselves at the time when it is hearing the proceeding before it and mould the relief in the light of those events. (17) The High Court having failed to consider the circumstances which had arisen before it for the first time, it becomes our duty to have regard to them. Having considered the evidence in the case, particularly the fact that the landlord has obtained decrees for possession against 3 out of the 4 tenants on the ground floor and 1 out of the 3 tenants on the first floor, we do not see any justification for evicting the appellant from the premises in his occupation. The landlords requirement such as it is, is more than adequately met by the eviction of those 4 tenants. " 44. In Kamleshwar Prasad v. Pradumanju Agarwal, 1997 (2) JCLR 94 (SC) ; 1997 (1) ARC 627 (SC), their Lordships of the Supreme Court were dealing with the provisions of Sections 21 (1) (a) and 22 of the Act. Their Lordships observed as follows (paragraph 3 of the A. R. C.): " (3 ). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Under the Act, the order of the Appellant Authority is final and the said order is a decree of the Civil Court and decree of a Competent Court having become final cannot be interfered with by the High Court in exercise of its power of superintendent under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution by taking into account any subsequent event which might have happened. The apart, the fact that the landlord needed the premises in question for starting a business which fact has been found by the Appellate Authority, in eye of law, must be that on the day of application for eviction which is the crucial date, the tenant incurred the liability of being evicted from the premises. The apart, the fact that the landlord needed the premises in question for starting a business which fact has been found by the Appellate Authority, in eye of law, must be that on the day of application for eviction which is the crucial date, the tenant incurred the liability of being evicted from the premises. Even if the landlord died during the pendency of the writ petition in the High Court, the bona-fide need cannot be said to have lapsed as the business in question can be carried on by his widow or any elder son. . . . . . " 45. In Gaya Prasad v. Pradeep Srivastava, 2001 (1) JCLR 907 (All) ; 2001 (1) ARC 352,their Lordships of the apex Court while dealing with the provisions of Section 21 (1) (a) of the Act, laid down as follows (paragraphs 10,11,12, 13, 14, 15 and 17): " (10) We have no doubt that he crucial date for deciding as to the bona-fide of the requirement of the landlord is the date of his application for eviction. The antecedent days may perhaps have utility for him to reach the said crucial date of consideration. If every subsequent development during the post- petition period is to be taken into account for judging the bona-fides of the requirement pleaded by the landlord there would perhaps be no end so long as the unfortunate situation in our litigative slow process system subsists. During 23 years after the landlord moved for eviction on the ground that his son needed the building, neither the landlord nor his son is expected to remain idle without doing any work, lest, joining any new assignment or starting any new work would be at the peril of forfeiting his requirement to occupy the building. It is a stark reality that the longer is the life of the litigation the more would be the number of developments sprouting up during the long interregnur. If a young entrepreneur decides to launch a new enterprise and on that ground he or his father seeks eviction of a tenant form the building, the proposed enterprise would not get faded out by subsequence development during the traditional lengthy longevity of the litigation. His need may get dusted, patina might stick on its surface, nonetheless the need would remain intact. All that is needed is to eras the patina and see the gloss. His need may get dusted, patina might stick on its surface, nonetheless the need would remain intact. All that is needed is to eras the patina and see the gloss. It is pernicious, and we may say, unjust to shut the door before an appellant just on the eye of his reaching the finale, after passing through all the previous levels of the litigation, merely on the ground that certain developments occurred pendente lite, because the opposite party succeeded in prolonging the matter for such unduly long period. (11) We cannot forget that while considering the bona-fide of the need of the landlord the crucial date is the date of petition. In Ramesh Kumar v. Kesho Ram, 1992 Suppl. (2) SCC 623: 1992 SCFBRC 322, a two- Judge Bench of this Court (M. N. Venkatachalia, J. , as he then was, and N. M. Kasliwal, J.) pointed out that the normal rule is that rights and obligations of the parties are to be determined as they were when the lis commenced and the only exception is that the Court is not precluded from moulding the reliefs appropriately in consideration of subsequent events provided such events had an impact on those rights and obligation. What the learned Chief Justice observed therein is this: "the normal rule is that in any litigation the rights and obligations of the parties are adjudicated upon as they obtain at the commencement of the lis. But this is subject to an exception. Wherever subsequent events of facts or law which have a material bearing on the entitlement of the parties to relief or on aspects which (sic) bear on the moulding of the relief occur, the Court is not precluded from taking a `cautious cognizance of the subsequent change of fact and law to mould the relief. (12) The Court reiterated the same principle in Kamleshwar Prasad v. Pradumanju Agarwal, 1997 (2) JCLR 94 (SC): 1997 (1) ARC 627, the crucial date normally is the date of filing the petition. (13) In our opinion, the subsequent events to over shadow the genuineness of the need must be of such nature and of such a dimension that the need propounded by the petitioning party should have been completely eclipsed by such subsequent events. (13) In our opinion, the subsequent events to over shadow the genuineness of the need must be of such nature and of such a dimension that the need propounded by the petitioning party should have been completely eclipsed by such subsequent events. A three-Judge Bench of this Court in Pasupuleti Venkateswarlu v. Motor and General Traders, 1975 (1) SCC 770 , which pointed to the need for re- moulding the reliefs on the strength of subsequent events affecting the cause of action in the field of rent control litigation, forewarned that cognizance of such subsequent events should be taken very cautiously. This is what learned Judges of the Bench said then: "we affirm the proposition that for making the right or remedy claimed by the party just and meaningful as also legally and factually in accord with the current realities, the Court can, and in many cases must, take cautious cognizance of events and developments subsequent to the institution of the proceedings provided the rules of fairness to both sides are scru-pulously obeyed. " (14) The next three-Judge Bench of this Court, which approved and followed the above decision, in Hasmat Rai v. Raghunath Prasad, 1981 (3) SCC 103 , has taken care to emphasize that the subsequent events should have "wholly satisfied" the requirement of the party who petitioned for eviction on the ground of personal requirement. . . (15) The Judicial Tardiness, for which unfortunately our system has acquired notoriety, causes the lis to creep through the line for long years from the state to the ultimate termini, is a malady afficiting the system. During this long interval events are bound to take place which might happen in relation to the parties as well as the subject-matter of the lis. If the cause of action is to be submerged in such subsequent events on account of the malady of the system it shatters the confidence of the litigant, despite the impairment already caused. (17) Considering all the aforesaid decisions, we are of the definite view that the subsequent events pleaded and highlighted by the appellant are too insufficient to overshadow the bona- fide need concurrently found by the fact finding Courts. " 46. (17) Considering all the aforesaid decisions, we are of the definite view that the subsequent events pleaded and highlighted by the appellant are too insufficient to overshadow the bona- fide need concurrently found by the fact finding Courts. " 46. In G. C. Kapoor v. Nand Kumar Bhasin & others, 2002 (1) JCLR 616 (SC) ; 2001 (2) ARC 603, their Lordships of the Supreme Court dealt with the provisions of Section 21 (1) (a) of the Act, and reiterated the principle laid down in Gaya Prasad v. Pradeep Srivastava (supra) that the crucial date for deciding as to bona-fide of requirement of the premises in question is the date of filing of the release application. 47. In Vallampati Kalavathi v. Haji Ismail (supra) relied upon on behalf of the Respondent No. 2, their Lordships of the Supreme Court while dealing with the case arising out of the petition under Section 10 of the Andhra Pradesh Building (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1960 seeking eviction of the tenant, laid down as follows (paragraph 12 of the said SCC): " (12 ). . . . . . . . . . . . When the litigation lingers on for years certain factual developments are bound to take place. All such developments are not necessarily relevant for adjudication of the case. No doubt, in proceedings for eviction of the tenant on the ground of personal requirement of the landlord sometimes subsequent developments may be relevant to be looked into for enabling the authorities to make a fair and proper adjudication of the controversy. While taking note of subsequent developments the authorities/court should keep in mind whether such material is relevant and can the balance in the case; the controversy should be decided with reference to the pleadings of the parties and the findings placed on record. . . . . . . . . " 48. While taking note of subsequent developments the authorities/court should keep in mind whether such material is relevant and can the balance in the case; the controversy should be decided with reference to the pleadings of the parties and the findings placed on record. . . . . . . . . " 48. In Om Prakash Gupta v. Ranbir B. Goyal (supra) relied upon on behalf of the Respondent No. 2, their Lordships of the apex Court laid down as follows (paragraphs 11 and 12 of the said SCC): " (11) The ordinary rule of civil law is that the rights of the parties stand crystallized on the date of the institution of the suit and, therefore, the decree in a suit should accord with the rights of the parties as they stood at the commencement of the lis. However, the Court has power to take note of subsequent events and mould the relief accordingly subject to the following conditions being satisfied: (1) that the relief, as claimed originally has, by reason of subsequent events, become inappropriate or cannot be granted; (ii) that taking note of such subsequent event or changed circumstances would shorten litigation and enable complete justice being done to the parties; and (iii) that such subsequent event is brought to the notice of the Court promptly and in accordance with the rules of procedural law so that the opposite party is not taken by surprise. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . " (12) Such subsequent event may be one purely of law or founded on facts. In the former case, the Court may take judicial notice of the event and before acting thereon put the parties on notice of how the change in law is going to affect the rights and obligations of the parties and modify or mould the course of litigation or the relief so as to bring it in conformity with the law. In the former case, the Court may take judicial notice of the event and before acting thereon put the parties on notice of how the change in law is going to affect the rights and obligations of the parties and modify or mould the course of litigation or the relief so as to bring it in conformity with the law. In the latter case, the party relying on the subsequent event, which consists of facts not beyond pale of controversy either as to their existence or in their impact, it expected to have resort to amendment of pleadings under Order 6 Rule 17 CPC such subsequent event, the Court may permit being introduced into the pleadings by way of amendment as it would be necessary to do so for the purpose of determining real questions in controversy between the parties. . . . . " Following principles, amongst others, emerge from the aforesaid judicial decisions: (1) The crucial date for deciding as to bona-fide requirement of the landlord is the date of filing of the release application for the ejectment of the tenant. Rights and obligations of the parties are to be determined as they were when the lis commenced. (2) Every subsequent development taking place during the pendency of the litigation is not to be taken into account for judging the bona-fide of the requirement pleaded by the landlord, otherwise, there would be no end to the litigation. (3) Subsequent events may be considered in the following situation: (a) Subsequent events are such on account of which the requirement of the landlord is wholly satisfied. (b) Subsequent events of such nature and of such a dimension that the need propounded by the landlord is completely eclipsed of overshadowed by such subsequent events. (c) Subsequent events are such which can turn the balance in the case. (d) Taking note of such subsequent events or changed circumstances would lead to early end of the litigation and would result in complete justice being done. (e) On account of subsequent events, relief as originally claimed has become in appropriate, or the same cannot be granted. (4) In order that the subsequent events may be considered, the events should be brought to the notice of the Court promptly and in accordance with the rules of procedural law so as to ensure that the opposite party is not taken by surprise. 49. (4) In order that the subsequent events may be considered, the events should be brought to the notice of the Court promptly and in accordance with the rules of procedural law so as to ensure that the opposite party is not taken by surprise. 49. Keeping in view the aforesaid principles, let us examine the facts of the present case. As noted above, during the pendency of the present writ petition, the Respondent No. 2 sold the said house in question in favour of the said Arun Kumar Pandey by registered sale deed dated 30-8-1993. A certified copy of the said registered sale deed dated 30-8-1993 was brought on record by the petitioner along with the aforementioned application dated 1-8- 2001 which was supported by a supplementary affidavit sworn by the petitioner on 31st July, 2001. A copy of the said application was served in the office of the learned Counsel for the Respondent No. 2 on 1-8-2001. 50. The aforementioned facts regarding the sale of the said house in question by the Respondent No. 2 in favour of the said Arun Pandey, by registered sale deed dated 30-8-1993, have not been disputed on behalf of the Respondent No. 2. 51. Thus, the subsequent development regarding the sale of the said house in question by the Respondent No. 2 in favour of the said Arun Kumar Pandey was brought on record of the writ petition in accordance with the rules of procedure after giving due notice thereof to the Respondent No. 2. 52. Further, as discussed above, in view of the said subsequent development, the release application at the instance of the Respondent No. 2 ceased to be maintainable, and the alleged need of the Respondent No. 2 ceased to exist. Thus, the said subsequent development has completely eclipsed the alleged need of the Respondent No. 2 for the release of the disputed portion. The said subsequent event has turned the balance in the case. 53. It will also be noticed that in view of the subsequent development, the relief, as originally claimed by the Respondent No. 2 has become inappropriate and cannot be granted. 54. Hence, the said subsequent event can be taken into consideration by this Court while deciding the present writ petition. 55. 53. It will also be noticed that in view of the subsequent development, the relief, as originally claimed by the Respondent No. 2 has become inappropriate and cannot be granted. 54. Hence, the said subsequent event can be taken into consideration by this Court while deciding the present writ petition. 55. In view of the said subsequent development, as discussed above, the judgment and order dated 23- 7-1980 cannot be permitted to stand, and the same is liable to be quashed. 56. In Jagdish Swarup and another v. II Additional District Judge, Aligarh and others (supra) relied upon by the learned Counsel for the petitioner, the Prescribed Authority had allowed the release application under Section 21 (1) (a) of the Act in respect of the shop holding the need of the landlady to be bona-fide. The appeal filed by the tenant under Section 22 of the Act was dismissed by the Appellate Authority. Thereupon, the tenant filed writ petition before this Court. 57. During the pendency of this writ petition before this Court, the tenant petitioner filed a supplementary affidavit, inter- alia, bringing on record subsequent development. It was pointed out that a dispute arose between the husband of the landlady and his three brothers who were members of the joint Hindu family. The dispute was referred to for arbitration. The arbitrator gave his award whereby the shop in dispute (which as in the tenancy of the tenant petitioner) fell in the share of Lala Dharam Pal who was one of the brothers of the husband of the landlady. In view of the said subsequent development, it was pointed out that the landlady who had filed the release application ceased to be the owner and landlord of the shop in question, and Lala Dharam Pal became the owner and landlord of the shop in question. This Court took into consideration the said subsequent events, and passed the following order (paragraph 16 of the said ARC): " (16) In view of the above, the petition is allowed. The orders of the Prescribed Authoritydated 5th February, 1983, and that of the Appellate Authority dated 23rd April, 1984, are hereby quashed. The release application is hereby dismissed as not maintainable. In the circumstances of the case, the parties are directed to bear their own costs. " 58. The principle laid down in this case is fully applicable to the present case. 59. The release application is hereby dismissed as not maintainable. In the circumstances of the case, the parties are directed to bear their own costs. " 58. The principle laid down in this case is fully applicable to the present case. 59. In Savani Transport (P) Limited v. L. Rajamanikkam (supra) relied upon by the learned Counsel for the petitioner, their Lordships of the apex Court laid down as follows: "as on today, the position has drastically changed because the landlord how obtained an order of eviction on the ground of bona-fide need has sold away the property in favour of V. Mani of T. V. Swamy Road (West), R. S. Puram, Coimbatore who is now before us as respondent. Therefore, the need of the original landlord (Rajamanikkam) could no longer be sustained. Accordingly, this appeal will stand allowed. However there shall be no order as to costs. " 60. The decision in this case is fully applicable to the present writ petition. 61. In R. Kanthimathi and another v. Mrs. Beatrict Xavier (supra) relied upon by the learned Counsel for the petitioner, a suit for eviction on the ground of wilful default and also of committing an act of waste under the provisions of the Tamil Nadu Building (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960 was filed by the landlady against the tenant. The decree for eviction was passed against the tenant by the trial Court, which was confirmed by the Appellate Authority as well as by the High Court. The tenant approached the Supreme Court. 62. The facts of the case were that though the tenant paid rent regularly up to March, 1977 but, thereafter, did not pay rent regularly. On request of the tenant to the landlady, she agreed to sell the disputed premises to the tenant. As a consequence, the agreement of sale was executed on 4-5-1977. According to the landlady, the tenant committed a breach, hence, she repudiated that agreement by returning the amount she received under it and then she filed a suit for eviction against the tenant. It was not in dispute that in terms of the said agreement, the total sale consideration was a sum of Rs. 25,000/- out of this, the tenant paid Rs. 20,000/- to the landlady on the date of the agreement itself. The balance of Rs. 5,000/- remained to be paid on the date of registration of the sale deed. It was not in dispute that in terms of the said agreement, the total sale consideration was a sum of Rs. 25,000/- out of this, the tenant paid Rs. 20,000/- to the landlady on the date of the agreement itself. The balance of Rs. 5,000/- remained to be paid on the date of registration of the sale deed. 63. Considering the said case, their Lordships of the Supreme Court laid down as follows (Paragraphs 6, 9 and 10 of the said ARC): " (6) Any jural relationship between two persons could be created through agreement and similarly could be changed through agreement subject to the limitations under the law. Earlier when the appellants were inducted into tenancy it only means both agreed that their relationship was to be that of landlord and tenant. Later when the landlord decided to sell this property to the tenant and the tenant agreed by entering into agreement, they by their positive act changed their relationship as purchaser and seller. When the seller-landlord accepts the sum he actually acts under this agreement. This acceptance preceded by agreement of sale changes their relationship. This is how they intended. Once accepting such a change, their relationship of landlord tenant ceases. (9) Thus within this legal premises, the submission by learned Counsel for the respondent for revival of their old relationship of landlord and tenant when the repudiates this agreement by sending back to the tenant Rs. 20,000 through a cheque (which according to the appellant was not encashed) cannot be accepted. So we have no hesitation to reject the same. Every conduct of the landlady right from the date of entering into agreement of sale, accepting money towards the sale consideration, delivering possession in lieu of such agreement all clearly indicates and has to be construed in law that she repudiated her old relationship of landlord and tenant. Thus after this parties enter into a new book seller and purchaser and their relationship is to be governed under the said terms of the agreement. Every right and obligation thereafter would flow from it. Even if parties under the agreement of sale do not perform their obligation, remedy may be availed in law as permissible under in law. Hence we have no hesitation to hold that the Courts below including the High Court committed error in holding that the tenant committed wilful default. Every right and obligation thereafter would flow from it. Even if parties under the agreement of sale do not perform their obligation, remedy may be availed in law as permissible under in law. Hence we have no hesitation to hold that the Courts below including the High Court committed error in holding that the tenant committed wilful default. When the appellant is no more the tenant how can non- payment be construed as wilful default? (10) Accordingly, we find merit in this appeal and the same is allowed. The judgment of the High Court and that of the Rent Controller and the Appellate Authority is hereby set aside. However, this is without prejudice to the rights of the parties to pursue their remedy as is available to them under the law. Costs on the parties. " 64. It will thus be noticed that in this case, the apex Court considered the change in jural relationship between the landlady and the tenant, and set aside the judgments and orders of the Courts below. 65. In the present case also, during the pendency of the writ petition, there has been a change in the jural relationship, inasmuch as, the Respondent No. 2 has ceased to remain the owner and landlord of the said house in question and in fact, the said Arun Kumar Pandey has become the owner and the landlord of the said house in question. Keeping in view this change in the jural relationship, the impugned judgment and order dated 23-8-1980 passed by the Respondent No. 1 cannot be permitted to stand, and the same is liable to be quashed. 66. In view of the aforesaid discussion, the writ petition deserves to be allowed, and the impugned judgment and order dated 23-7-1980 passed by the Respondent No. 1 (Annexure 2 to the writ petition) is liable to be quashed. 67. The writ petition is accordingly allowed. The impugned judgment and order dated 23-7-1980 passed by the Respondent No. 1 (Annexure 2 to the writ petition) is quashed. However, in view of the facts and circumstances of the case. There will be no order as to costs. Petition allowed. .