JUDGMENT 1. - The petitioner joined the Rajasthan Judicial Service in the year 1976 and was promoted to R.H.J.S. in the year 1979. While he was serving as a member of the Rajasthan Higher Judicial Service, the following adverse remarks for the years 1980, 1981 and 1982 were conveyed to him vide three separate communications dated 13.6.1986.For the year 1980 "He must improve his relations with the staff and judicial officers, He is more interested in deciding criminal cases. He should improve the image." For the year 1981 "Should improve his relations with the staff and brother officers. Quality of his judgments needs improvement." For the year 1982 "Does not keep good relations with his staff and the members of the Bar. His knowledge of law and the quality of his judgments need improvement. He does not enjoy sound reputation." 2. Against the adverse remarks for all these three years, the petitioner submitted a joint representation and this representation was rejected by a common order in the year 1988/1989. Subsequently, the joint review petition dated 22.10.1998 was submitted and that too, was rejected by a common order dated 30.11.99. Against rejection of his representation as above, the petitioner preferred this writ petition on 18.4.2000. When the petition came up before the court, notice was issued to the respondent on 28.4.2000 and on 14.7.2000 while granting time to the respondents for filling reply, the court passed order to fix this matter for final hearing. 3. The prayers as made by the petitioner in the present writ petition are as under: (a) The respondent may kindly be called upon to produce the entire record pertaining to the case; (b) The adverse entries made in the A.P.A.Rs. of the petitioner pertaining to the year 1980, 1981 and 1982 may kindly be quashed and expunged. (c) The respondent High Court may kindly be directed to award all consequential benefits to the petitioner. (d) The respondent may kindly be restrained from taking into consideration the said adverse entries against the petitioner in any manner whatsoever; (e) Cost of the writ petition may also kindly be awarded to the petitioner. (f) Any other appropriate writ, order or direction which may be considered just and proper in the facts and circumstances of the case may kindly also be issued in favour of the Petitioner." 4. (f) Any other appropriate writ, order or direction which may be considered just and proper in the facts and circumstances of the case may kindly also be issued in favour of the Petitioner." 4. On behalf of the respondents, reply to the writ petition dated 13.2.2002 has been filed seeking to traverse the petitioner's case. 5. For the year 1980, the petitioner has stated in para 3 of the writ petition that he was posted as Additional Distt. Judge No.2 at Bharatpur in February, 1980 and it was a newly created post and the petitioner was the first judicial officer to be posted as such. Prior to that, he was posted as Additional Distt. Judge No.2, Always. It has been alleged that some other judicial officer namely Shri Niranjan Singh had also been transferred to Bharatpur as Additional Distt. Judge. Because the petitioner had joined at Bharatpur as Addl. Distt. Judge No.2 earlier than Shri Niranjan Singh, he had been allotted Government quarter by the district administration. The District Judge, Bharatpur did not like the allotment of the Government bungalow to the petitioner because he was interested in allotment of this bungalow to Shri Niranjan Singh. 6. Therefore, the Distt. Judge, Bharatpur wrote a letter dated 20.2.1980 to the district administration for allotment of the said bungalow to Shri Niranjan Singh. The other judicial officer Shri Niranjan Singh had occupied the said bungalow on the basis of oral permission of the concerned District Magistrate. On account of this unpleasant incident, the Distt. Judge felt annoyed from the petitioner. The petitioner had worked as Additional Distt. Judge at Bharatpur from February, 1980 to August, 1980. The case of the petitioner is that the Distt. Judge, Bharatpur felt annoyed from him and therefore, the remarks which have been recorded against him for the year 1980 are result of the annoyance of the Distt. Judge. 7. While these personal allegations against Shri M.C. Jain, Distt. Judge Bharatpur have been denied in para 3 of the reply, the manner in which the incident took place, has not been denied and it has been stated that the petitioner's insistence for the allotment of Government house of Addl.Distt. Judge No.1, Bharatpur despite the orders of the High Court, lowered down the petitioner's image in the eyes of staff and the lawyers. 8. Judge No.1, Bharatpur despite the orders of the High Court, lowered down the petitioner's image in the eyes of staff and the lawyers. 8. In pare 5 and 6 of the petition, it has been stated that the petitioner was transferred from Bharatpur to Nagaur in August, 1980 and there, it was Shri Ravindra Nath Kulshreshtha who was the Distt. Judge and his Reporting Officer. The petitioner has stated that while he was working as the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Jalore in the year 1978, Shri Ravindra Nath Kulshreshtha was already holding the post of Distt. Judge, Jalore in the year 1978. At that time, a vigilance meeting was convened for considering the complaints against Shri Ravindra Nath Kulshreshtha regarding corruption and in this meeting, the petitioner had also been called to participate. During the course of this meeting, between Shri Ravindra Nath Kulshreshtha and Shri Madan Mohan Joshi, President of the Bar Association, there was exchange of hot words while the petitioner was the silent spectator. Shri Ravindra Nath Kulshreshtha asked the petitioner not to disclose the conversation before anybody and the petitioner replied that he will not disclose the said conversation of his sown but in case anybody asked him about the happenings,of the meeting, he may make the correct disclosure. It was on this count that Shri Ravindra Nath Kulshreshtha got annoyed from the petitioner. 9. It has been further stated that the petitioner had also made some complaints against Shri Rajendra Nath Kulshreshth to the High Court and subsequently, Shri Ravinder Nath Kulshreshtha was dismissed from service. 10. In para 6 of the petition, it has further been stated that in the middle of the year 1981, one Shri Shiv Charan Lal Singhal was posted as Distt. Judge, Nagaur and when the petitioner came to know that Shri Shiv Charan Lal Singhal, Distt. Judge had drawn amount by submitting a false T.A. bill wherein the number of the personal car of the petitioner was used while in fact, such car was never used by Shri Shiv Charan Lal Singhal, the petitioner dared bring these facts to the notice of the High Court by submitting complaint incurring serious displeasure of Shri Shiv Charan Lal Singhal. Thus, it is the annoyance of Shri Ravindra Nath Kulshreshtha and Shri Shiv Charan Lal Singhal which may have resulted into the adverse remarks against him in the year 1981. 11. Thus, it is the annoyance of Shri Ravindra Nath Kulshreshtha and Shri Shiv Charan Lal Singhal which may have resulted into the adverse remarks against him in the year 1981. 11. In para 5 of the reply, it has been stated that the allegations made against Shri Ravindra Nath Kulshreshtha are of no consequence because the adverse remarks which were communicated to the petitioner, for the year 1980, were recorded by the Hon'ble Chief Justice. (It may be noted as a question of fact that the remarks for the year 1980 are basically with reference to the posting of the petitioner at Alwar and not at Nagaur whereas Shri Ravindra Nath Kulshreshtha was the Distt. Judge for certain period). 12. In para 6 of the reply to the petition, sending of the letter dated 18.12.81 by the petitioner to the Registrar, Rajansthan High Court, requesting that Shri Shiv Charan Lal Singhal should not be allowed to write his A.C.R. has been admitted but it has been stated that the adverse remarks for the year 1981 which were conveyed to the petitioner, were recorded by the Hon'ble Chief Justice. 13. Regarding the adverse remarks for the year 1982, it has been stated in para 7 of the petition that in March/April, 1982 Shri J.P. Bansal was posted as Distt. Judge, Nagaur where the petitioner was already posted. The petitioner has alleged that with regard to the election of President of the Rajasthan Higher Judicial Service Association which were held in the year 1978-79, the petitioner had already come into conflict with Shri J.P.Bansal. At that time, the petitioner was posted as A.C.J.M. (C.B.I. Cases), Jaipur, Shri J.P.Bansal approached the petitioner and insisted upon the petitioner to cast his vote in favour of Shri Mitruka on the ground the caste. The petitioner says that he did not succumb to this pressure and told that he would cast his vote in favour of Shri Bagarhatta, who was his Distt. Judge at that time and it annoyed Shri J.P. Bansal. 14. In para 8 of the petition, the petitioner has further stated that the then Chief Justice, Shri K.D. Sharma was not happily disposed of towards him and the same is obvious by the fact that in a period of seven months during 1982-83, the petitioner was transferred four times-in December, 1982, the petitioner was transferred to Deeg, in April, 1983 as Additional Distt. Judge, Alwar for a day, again transferred from Alwar to Kishangarhbas where he remained upto July, 1983 and in July, 1983, he was again transferred to Rajsamand and thus, it is clear that the petitioner was subjected to frequent transfer orders. 15. In the reply which has been filed by the High Court, the contents of para 7 of the writ petition have been denied by saying that there was nothing available on record to substantiate these allegations. And in para 8 of the reply, it has been stated that the petitioner remained posted at Deeg (Bharatpur) from 20.2.82 to 22.4.83, at Alwar from 23.4.83 to 26.4.83, at Kishangarh Bas from 27.4.83 to 11.7.83 and at Rajsamand from 22.7.83 to 12.4.84. It has been stated that there were no statutory rules or any administrative orders laying down the norms and guidelines for recording the annual confidential reports/annual performance appraisal reports of the Judicial Officers by the High Court and this averment made in para 2 of the writ petitioner has been replied in an evasive manner by saying that "contents of para 2 of the writ petition are not admitted in the manner state." 16. On the premises as aforesaid, we have to consider as to whether the adverse remarks recorded in the annual confidential reports of the petitioner deserve to be expugned or not. 17. It is clearly established that there are no statutory rules or any administrative circulars/guidelines framed by the High Court. Laying down the procedure for recording the annual confidential reports or annual performance appraisal reports and there is nothing on record to show that such procedure, as has been laid down by the Department of Personnel in the Government of Rajasthan, has been adopted by the High Court or that the same is otherwise followed. In this view of the matter, we have to go to the first principle as to whether the remarks have been recorded and conveyed to the petitioner in a fair manner on the basis of the parameters and guidelines to be tested on the first principle and the commonly known principles in this regard. 18. In this view of the matter, we have to go to the first principle as to whether the remarks have been recorded and conveyed to the petitioner in a fair manner on the basis of the parameters and guidelines to be tested on the first principle and the commonly known principles in this regard. 18. It has to be agreed on all hands that annual confidential reports/annual performance appraisal reports from the sole basis and plank'of the service career of an employee and the these reports, depends the future career of the concerned officer/employee and such remarks may marr or bless his service career. Such remarks may sometimes give boost in the service and at the same time, they can also be used to the serious prejudice of the employees for the purpose of supersession, compulsory retirement etc. In nut shell, it goes without saying that the remarks recorded in the annual confidential reports of an officer leave an indelible impression on his service career and it is through the A.C.Rs./A.P.A.Rs. that the over all performance, integrity and conduct of the officer can be peeped into. Therefore, we find that on the basis of the first principles, the following requirements must be followed for the purpose of recording the communication of the adverse remarks, when no procedure or written guidelines are available: (i) In case any defect is noted with regard to the work, conduct and performance of an officer/employee, the Reporting Officer, may immediately bring it to the notice of the concerned officer/employee to take care of such defect and if the defect yet persists, then only, the Reporting Officer should proceed to record adverse remarks. (ii) Satisfaction for the purpose of recording adverse remarks may be subjective satisfaction of the Reporting Officer but it must be based on objective facts which may also, in a given case, include the perception of the Reporting Officer with regard to the Reported Officer with reference to his over all performance and conduct. (ii) Satisfaction for the purpose of recording adverse remarks may be subjective satisfaction of the Reporting Officer but it must be based on objective facts which may also, in a given case, include the perception of the Reporting Officer with regard to the Reported Officer with reference to his over all performance and conduct. (iii) In case any adverse remark is to be recorded with regard to the integrity of an officer/official, it must precede a clear intimation in advance to the concerned officer that his integrity is reported to be doubtful and unless there is any cogent material on the basis of which his integrity could be found to be doubtful, the remarks may not be made against the integrity of the officer on the basis of remours. (iv) The remarks have to be recorded at the end of the year and must be conveyed to the concerned officer/official within a reasonable time because conveying of the remarks after long lapse of time, defeats the very purpose of recording the remarks. 19. If we examine the correctness, legality, validity and propriety of the adverse remarks for the years 1980,1981 and 1982 recorded in the A.P.A.R./A.C.R. of the present petitioner, on the touchstone of the first principles which have been summarised as above, we find that the basic norms and first principles have not been followed and on the touchstone of the aforesaid tests, adverse remarks for none of the these three years can be sustained. It is an admitted position that the remarks for all the three years i.e. 1980, 1981 and 1982 were conveyed to the petitioner simultaneously as late as in the year 1968 i.e. after a period of 6, 5 and 4 years respectively and such an inordinate and unexplained delay defeats the very purpose of recording the adverse remarks. In our opinion, in some cases, the delay in communicating the adverse remarks. In our opinion, in some cases, the delay in communicating the adverse remarks to the concerned officer/official defeats the very purpose of recording and communicating these remarks and in a given case like present one, it may be fatal. 20. In Jhavar Prakash v. Rajasthan High Court reported in 1995(2) WLC (Raj.) 517 [1996(4) SLR 229 (Raj.) ], relied upon by Mr. 20. In Jhavar Prakash v. Rajasthan High Court reported in 1995(2) WLC (Raj.) 517 [1996(4) SLR 229 (Raj.) ], relied upon by Mr. Ajay Rastogi, the adverse remarks for the year 1985 were communicated in August, 1986, those for the year 1987 were communicated on 30.9.89 and those for the year 1983 were communicated on 13.6.1986. Looking to the facts and circumstances of that case, delay was not held to be fatal. In the case at hand, there is delay of 6, 5 and 4 years which is an unexplained and inordinate delay. 21. In Kishori Lal Mathur v. The State of Rajasthan reported in 1998(1) WLC Raj. 462: [1997(7) SLR 772 (Raj.)] , relied upon by the Mr. Ajay Rastogi, adverse remarks were conveyed after two years but the lapse of two years time did not result into any adverse effect against the petitioner and as a question of fact, the court found that the adverse remarks were not vague and were based on evidence. The question as to whether the adverse entries be treated as washed off was not gone into. In the case before us, the damage had already been done in 1984 and the remarks were conveyed in 1986. 22. In this context, we may mention that in the case of State of Gujarat v. Patel Raghav Natha and others reported in AIR 1969 SC 1297 the Supreme Court has held that even in a case in which no limitation is fixed, power must be exercised within reasonable time and the length of the reasonable time must be determined by the facts of the case and the nature of the order. 23. In State of Haryana v. P.C. Wadhwa reported in AIR 1987 SC 1201 : [1987(2) SLR 393 (SC)] the Supreme Court has observed and held as held as under: "The whole object of the making and communication of adverse remarks is to give to the officer concerned an opportunity to improve his performances, conduct or character, as the case may be. The adverse remarks,should not be understood in terms of punishment, but really it should be taken as an advice to the officer concerned, so that he can act in accordance with the advice and improve his service career. The whole object of the making of adverse remarks would be lost if they are communicated to the officer concerned after an inordinate delay. The whole object of the making of adverse remarks would be lost if they are communicated to the officer concerned after an inordinate delay. In the instant case, it was communicated to the repondent after twenty seven months. It is true that the provision of Rules 5, 6, 6-A and 7 are directory and not mandatory, but that does not mean that directory provisions need not be complied with even substantially. Such provisions may not be complied with strictly, and substantial compliance will be sufficient. But, where compliance after an inordinate delay would be against the spirit and object of the directory provisions, such compliance would not be substantial compliance. In the instant case, while the provisions of Rules 5, 6, 6-A and 7 require that everything including the communication of the adverse remarks should be completed within a period of seven months, this period cannot be stretched to twenty seven months, simply because these Rules are directory, without serving any purpose consistent with the spirit and objectives of these Rules. We need not, however, dilate upon the question any more and consider whether on the ground of inordinate and unreasonable delay the adverse remarks against the respondent should be struck down or not, and suffice it to say that we do not approve of the inordinate delay made in communicating the adverse remarks to the respondent." 24. We feel fortified in our view by the Supreme Court decisions as above, that in the facts of the present case, delay must be treated to be fatal as it had already had adverse impact on the career of the petitioner and the remarks were conveyed after a long, unexplained and inordinate delay of 6, 5 and 4 years respectively. 25. 25. In the facts of the present case, if may be noted that the adverse remarks for the years 1980, 1981 and 1982 were conveyed to the petitioner in the year 1986 and in the meantime, on 21.12.1984, the petitioner had been posted as the Chief Judicial Magistrate i.e. a post in Rajasthan Judicial Service while he had already been promoted to the Rajasthan Higher Judicial Service in the year 1979 and thus, be stood deprived of his earned benefit and we cannot say as to how and in what manner the remarks recorded in the years 1980, 1981 and 1982 were used for the purpose of posting him in R.J.S. from R.H.J.S. in the year 1984 while passing the order dated 21.12.84. In all probability, they must have been used and it could be very well appreciated that had these very remarks been communicated to the petitioner every year on time immediately at the end of the year within a reasonable time, he could have taken immediate steps of making representation against the same and got these remarks expugned at that very time and could thereby save his posting to R.J.S. from R.H.J.S. We find that the delay of 6, 5 and 4 years respectively in communicating the adverse remarks to the petitioner, in the facts of the present case, has been fatal and these remarks deserve to be expugned on this ground alone. It may be noted that the very purpose of conveying the adverse remarks is that the officer is to be made alert and cautions of the defects in his working so that he may improve and cure those defects, may not repeat those defects and try to impose upon himself and save himself of such remarks of defects in the coming years. 26. For the year 1980, the remarks is that the petitioner must improve his relations with the staff and judicial officers. This very remarks has been repeated in the year 1981 and 1982 also. Had the remarks been conveyed in the year 1980 itself. The petitioner could have had an opportunity of taking care of this defect in future years i.e. 1981 and 1982. Part of the remarks for the year 1980 is that the petitioner is more interested in deciding criminal cases. Had the remarks been conveyed in the year 1980 itself. The petitioner could have had an opportunity of taking care of this defect in future years i.e. 1981 and 1982. Part of the remarks for the year 1980 is that the petitioner is more interested in deciding criminal cases. The same cannot be treated as adverse remarks and the other remarks for the year 1980 that he should improve his image could at the most be treated to be advisory and not adverse. 27. For the year 1980, the remark is that the petitioner must improve his relations with the staff and judicial officers. This very remarks has been repeated in the year 1981 and 1982 also. Had the remarks been conveyed in the year 1980 itself. The petitioner could have had an opportunity of taking care of this defect in future years i.e. 1981 and 1982. Part of the remarks for the year 1980 is that the petitioner is more interested in deciding criminal cases. The same cannot be treated as adverse remarks and the other remarks for the year 1980 that he should improve his image could at the most be treated to be advisory and not adverse. 28. For the year 1981, the first part of the remarks is again with regard to the improving relations with the staff and brother judicial officer and then it has been remarked that "quality of his judgment needs improvement." 29. Again, for the year 1982 also, similarly, it has been recorded that "his knowledge of law and quality of judgments need improvement." 30. So far as these remarks are concerned, we may first of all observe that no one is perfect and there is always a scope for improvement with any person and therefore, the remark that one should improve his image or that his knowledge of law and the quality of judgment needs improvement, cannot be said to be adverse remark by any norms, there is no ceiling for improvement and the scope of improvement is always there if any person wants to progress. The remark which has been given in the A.C.R. for the year 1982 at the end that he does not enjoy sound reputation is an absolutely bald and vague remark and it cannot be said as to whether this remark even if entered on the basis of subjective satisfaction of the concerned Reporting Officer is based on any objective fact or not. Learned counsel for the respondent has failed to point out that before recording these remarks, the minimum principles of fair play had been followed notwithstanding the absence of any statutory rules, parameters or guidelines prescribed by the High Court. In our opinion, the minimum requirements of fair play while recording these remarks against the petitioner for the years 1980, 1981 and 1982 have not been followed and the averments as have been made and replied, do create a lurking doubt in our minds that the recording of these remarks may have been for reasons which may not be germane. Even otherwise, in our opinion, the remarks were absolutely vague and bald and the remarks as a whole for all these three years i.e. 1980, 1981 and 1982 could at the most be treated to be advisory and not adverse except for part of the remarks for the year 1982 that the petitioner does not enjoy sound reputation. The reply to the writ petition does not show that the remark that he does not enjoy sound reputation is based on any objective fact and no material in this regard has been pleaded or pointed out. The reputation of a judicial officer cannot be tarnished by making such a remarks in a casual manner unless there is some material in support of it. Therefore, we find that there was no material on the basis of which such an opinion could be formed and therefore, the said remark also cannot be sustained. In no case the remarks for the three years recorded against the petitioner, could be treated as adverse as they only communicated that he should improve his relations with the members of the staff and colleagues or that he should improve his knowledge of law and quality of his judgments. 31. Before we part with the judgment, we may observe that looking to the importance of the annual confidential reports/annual performance appraisal reports by whatever nomenclature it may be called. 31. Before we part with the judgment, we may observe that looking to the importance of the annual confidential reports/annual performance appraisal reports by whatever nomenclature it may be called. The respondent will be well advised to prescribe the parameters and guidelines for the purpose of recording and communicating the adverse remarks made in the A.P.A.R./A.C.R., to the officers/officials so that the officers/officials as a class may know the definite and uniform norms with regard to the recording and communicating the adverse remarks and the same may be invariably followed by the Reporting, Reviewing and Accepting authorities and for each stage, a definite time schedule be fixed in such parameteres and guideline. 32. In the result, this writ petition succeeds and the impugned adverse remarks recorded, against the petitioner for the years 1980, 1981 and 1982 are hereby expugned with all consequences to follow. No order as to costs.Writ Petition allowed. *******