T. Rama Krishna Rao v. State of Orissa, represented by the Secretary to the Government of Orissa
2002-03-21
A.S.NAIDU
body2002
DigiLaw.ai
JUDGMENT P. K. BALASUBRAMANYAN, CJ. — The petitioner was the licensee of Koraput No. II IMFL ‘OFF’ shop for the excise year 2000-01. The petitioner got the renewal of his licence for the excise year 2001-02 commencing on 1.4.2001 and ending on 31.3.2002. 2. The petitioner, in terms of the Orissa Excise (Exclu¬sive Privilege) Foreign Liquor Rules, 1989 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Rules’) had the obligation under Rule 6-A of the said Rules, to guarantee the sale of and to lift the minimum guaran¬teed quantity of foreign liquor as fixed by the Excise Commissioner. A minimum guaranteed quantity per month was fixed for the shop. For the months of April, May and June, 2001, the petitioner did not lift the minimum guaranteed quantity. He did not apply to the Collector for permission to lift the quota during the succeeding month in terms of Rule 6-A(2). He also did not lift it. In that situation, the Superintendent of Excise, Koraput issued a notice to the petitioner dated 9.11.2001 calling upon the petitioner to lift the unlifted quantity by 21.11.2001. It was stated therein that on his failing to do so, action will be taken. Why such a notice was not issued earlier, is not made clear. 3. Though the notice, Annexure-5 is dated 6.11.2001, the writ petitioner approached this Court with this writ petition only on 5.3.2002. The excise year was to end on 31.3.2002. In the meantime, the petitioner did not lift the minimum guaranteed quantities referred to in the notice. Nor did he make an application for permission to lift the unlifted quantity for the said months in terms of Rule 6-A(5) of the Rules. The application in that behalf was to be made to the Excise Commissioner. 4. In this writ petition, the petitioner has prayed for the issue of a writ of certiorari to quash the notice dated 6.11.2001 issued to him by the Superintendent of Excise, Kora¬put. The petitioner has not denied that he had not lifted the minimum guaranteed quantity of I.M.F.L. for the months of April, May and June, 2001. In other words, the fact that he did not lift the minimum guaranteed quantity for the months of April, May and June, 2001 is not disputed. That he had the obligation to lift it under Rule 6-A and on the terms of his licence is also not dis¬puted.
In other words, the fact that he did not lift the minimum guaranteed quantity for the months of April, May and June, 2001 is not disputed. That he had the obligation to lift it under Rule 6-A and on the terms of his licence is also not dis¬puted. The notice Annexure-5 issued by the Superintendent of Excise, Koraput is hence perfectly justified and valid. If at all it is to be faulted, it can be faulted to the extent of noting that the Superintendent of Excise, Koraput should have issued that notice earlier since the default in lifting the quantity by the petitioner related to the months of April, May and June, 2001 and the notice was issued only in November, 2001. 5. In addition to seeking the quashing of Annexure-5 notice, the petitioner has also prayed that this Court may permit him to lift the unlifted quantity by the end of March, 2002. In support of the latter prayer, learned counsel submitted that the Commissioner has the power under Rule 6-A(5) to permit the petitioner to lift the quantity before the expiry of the terms of the licence, i.e., before 31.3.2002, and hence, this Court can permit the petitioner to do so. We must notice that the petitioner has not sought any permission in terms of Rule 6-A(5). That apart, Rule 6-A(2)(iii) still insists that no unlifted quantity of foreign liquor shall be permitted to be lifted beyond the last day of February. It also appears that Rule 6-A(2) and Rule 6-A(5) operate in different fields. Whereas Rule 6-A(2) provides for lifting of unlifted quantity for a month during the succeeding month, Rule 6-A(5) insists that the entire quantity should be lifted before the expiry of the terms of the licence and provides for what is to happen to the unsold stock on expiry of the licence of the licensee. It is provided that the balance stock shall not be accounted for at the time of fixation of Minimum Guaranteed Quantity for the succeeding year, even if the licence of the licensee were to be renewed for the succeeding year.
It is provided that the balance stock shall not be accounted for at the time of fixation of Minimum Guaranteed Quantity for the succeeding year, even if the licence of the licensee were to be renewed for the succeeding year. Since Rule 6-A(2) applies to this case and no attempt was made by the petitioner to seek an extension of time to lift the stock the next month or before the end of February, 2002, the argument of counsel that he should be permitted now to lift the quantity cannot be accepted. The communication of the Under Secretary marked Annexure-4 cannot enable the authority to over¬look the scheme of the Rules or enable this Court to issue a direction as sought for by the petitioner. 6. The learned counsel for petitioner brought to our notice some earlier orders passed by this Court in respect of some contractors. Three of those orders do not discuss the legal position. Those writ petitions were disposed of on the undertak¬ing given by counsel for the licensees that they will lift the entire stock by 31.3.2001, i.e., before the end of the excise year. No adjudication is seen to have been made in those cases. They are not authorities for any proposition. We are not persuaded to adopt the course adopted in those orders. According to us, the writ petitioner should have approached the concerned authority at the appropriate time for extension of time to lift the minimum guaranteed quantity of liquor. The other order in OJC No. 2597 of 2002 dated 11.3.2002 brought to our notice does not refer to any of the relevant rules. It notices that the licence of the petitioner in that case was valid till 31.3.2002. It states that since the licensee had agreed to lift the short-fall, the authorities were to accept the licensee’s application for renewal of his licence. In case of renewal of licence, the licen¬see was to be allowed two months’ grace period, i.e., till the end of May, 2002, to lift the short-fall quantity of the guaranteed quantity of liquor. With respect, we are not in a position to accept the course adopted by this Court, in the teeth of the scheme of the relevant rules, the provisions governing and the conditions of the licence governing the grant of the privi¬lege to vend foreign liquor.
With respect, we are not in a position to accept the course adopted by this Court, in the teeth of the scheme of the relevant rules, the provisions governing and the conditions of the licence governing the grant of the privi¬lege to vend foreign liquor. The obligation to lift the minimum guaranteed quantity of liquor during the excise year is to be discharged during the subsisting licensing year. How it can be permitted to be lifted the next year is something that is not clear to us. The decision has not referred to any of the relevant provisions. The judgment directs the authority to renew the licence notwithstanding the default of the licensee for the current year. It has not referred to the relevant provisions in that regard. Nor has it considered whether such a direction could be issued on the scheme of the Act, the Rules and the conditions of the licence. The decision cannot, therefore, be accepted as a judicial precedent binding on us. It has to be considered to be one rendered per incuriam. It may be sub silentio. Hence, we do not find shackled by that decision in chartering our own course. 7. At this stage, we may observe that the jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is wide. But, the exercise of it is hemmed in by self-imposed restrictions. In our perception, one such self-imposed restriction is not to exercise this power to grant a relief not permitted by the relevant statute or to grant a relief against the statutory scheme. While exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the Court must always ensure this. It is not for the Court to pass orders to enable persons to get rid of the obligations legally undertaken by them or imposed on them by a statute or a licence or permission. The concept of rule of law governing us should not be sacrificed at the altar of what the Court thinks is expedient though unpermitted by the statute or the grant itself. 8. As we have set out earlier, the petitioner has failed to perform his obligation in this case. He had not even attempted to regularise his omission in terms of Rule 6-A(2) of the Rules at the appropriate time. The petitioner is hence not entitled to any relief. This writ petition is dismissed. A. S. NAIDU, J. I agree.
8. As we have set out earlier, the petitioner has failed to perform his obligation in this case. He had not even attempted to regularise his omission in terms of Rule 6-A(2) of the Rules at the appropriate time. The petitioner is hence not entitled to any relief. This writ petition is dismissed. A. S. NAIDU, J. I agree. Petition dismissed.