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2002 DIGILAW 183 (GAU)

Thanzuala v. Union of India and Ors.

2002-04-30

RANJAN GOGOI

body2002
RANJAN GOGOI, J- The instant writ application has been filed seeking a writ of mandamus directing the respondent Army authority to pay adequate compensation with interest to the petitioner for illegal occupation of the land allegedly belonging to the petitioner by the respondent Army authority since the year 1970 and for further direction for acquisition of the land of the petitioner by following the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. Alternatively, directions for release of the land, if the respondent authority do not permanently require the name and for adequate compensation for the use of the said land has been prayed for by means of the present writ application. 2. The facts on which the aforesaid claims have been made in the present writ application may be capsuled as hereunder. The petitioner claims that an area of land measuring about 11 bighas equivalent to 14,721.18 sq.mtr. was originally granted to the petitioner on the basis of a Garden, Pass in the year 1960 bearing No. 250 of 1960 by the then Member, incharge House Site Passes, Mizo District Council. The petitioner claims that the aforesaid land Pass was subsequently converted into a Land Settlement Certificate in the year 1987 by the competent authority of the State and a Land Settlement certificate bearing No. G-2/87 was issued in favour of the petitioner by the Assistant Settlement Officer, Land Revenue Department, Aizawl, under Section 4(2) of the Mizo District (Agricultural Land) Act, 1963. The case of the petitioner is that, the respondent Army authority had set up a Counter Insurgency and Jungle Warfare school at Variegate and in connection with the same, the land of the petitioner was occupied by the Armed Forces in the year 1970. The petitioner has averred that after the initial occupation of his land by the authority, he was allowed to use the same for agriculture from 8.00 a.m. in the morning to 4.00 p.m. in the evening. However, after a few years, the petitioner was not allowed to enter into the land in question belonging to him. The petitioner also claims to have submitted a representation dated 2.11.93 before the respondent authorities i.e. respondent No. 2 who in his reply dated 20.12.93 had taken the stand that the land in occupation of the Jungle Warfare School was obtained by Army authorities on lease from the Forest Department, Government of Mizoram. The petitioner also claims to have submitted a representation dated 2.11.93 before the respondent authorities i.e. respondent No. 2 who in his reply dated 20.12.93 had taken the stand that the land in occupation of the Jungle Warfare School was obtained by Army authorities on lease from the Forest Department, Government of Mizoram. In the aforesaid reply dated 20.12.93 it was further mentioned by respondent No. 2 that, as the land in possession of the Army authorities was leased out by the Forest Department on payment of rent, the Land Settlement Certificate issued in favour of the writ petitioner in the year 1987 appeared to be of doubtful authenticity. The respondent authorities, having made its stand known by the aforesaid letter dated 20.12.93, and having no option, the writ petitioner had instituted the present writ proceedings before this Court sometime in the year 1994. An amended petition containing the above mentioned averments has been filed before this Court on 26.7.2001. In the amended petition, respondent Nos. 5, 6 & 7 have been imp leaded as party respondents pursuant to the leave granted by this Court by order dated 23.7.2001. 3. Affidavits have been filed by the respondent Army authority both in response to the original writ application as well as the amended writ petition. The case of the respondents authorities as put forward in both the affidavits is naturally the same. Apart from questioning the validity of the initial Garden Pass and the subsequent land settlement certificate issued in favour of the writ petitioner, the stand of the authority as evident from the affidavit filed, is that, initially a plot of land measuring about 80 acres was taken on lease from the Forest Department on payment of rent. The said land was developed in course of time for the purpose of the lease i.e. he set up the Jungle Warfare School and therefore, the rights claimed by the writ petitioner on the basis of the House/Garden Pass and the L.S.C. must necessarily be without any substance as the land claimed by the petitioner had been leased out to the Army authorities by the Forest Department of the State. It has been additionally stated in the affidavit filed that the areas in the vicinity of the existing Jungle Warfare School at Variegate have been sought to be additionally acquired for the purposes of the Jungle Warfare School but no acquisition proceeding has been initiated as yet in respect of such additional land. If the land of the petitioner is included within such areas, the claims made in the instant writ petition are sought to be contended to be premature. 4. In making the aforesaid contention, reliance has been placed by Mr P.N. Choudhury, learned Addl. C.G.S.C., on the affidavit filed by the State in the case. The said affidavit would go to show that it is the stand of the State Govt. that the land claimed by the petitioner is a part of the additional land in respect of which an acquisition proceeding is in the process of initiation for the purposes connected with the Jungle Warfare School. However, as the said acquisition proceeding has not yet been initiated, no rights, as claimed by the writ petitioner, would be available to him, it is asserted. 5. The pleadings brought on record by the respective parties to the present proceeding would go to show that there is a dispute between the parties on a core question in the present controversy which would have a bearing on the entitlement of the writ petitioner. While the writ petitioner asserts that the land covered by Garden Pass No. 250 of 1960 and LSC No. G-2/87 issued in his favour has been in occupation of the Army authorities right from the year 1970, the Army authorities have denied any such occupation of land belonging to the petitioner. On the contrary, the specific case of the Army authority is that the land in their occupation and use had been leased out to them by the Forest Department of the State on payment of a yearly rent. Therefore unless the aforesaid core question is decided, the entitlement of the writ petitioner to compensation cannot be determined. 6. Mr P.N. Choudhury, learned Addl. C.G.S.C. in the Court of his arguments has pointed out that the conduct of the writ petitioner in not raising any grievance with regard to alleged illegal, occupation of his land by the Army authority exposes the extreme vuloverability of the claims now raised. 6. Mr P.N. Choudhury, learned Addl. C.G.S.C. in the Court of his arguments has pointed out that the conduct of the writ petitioner in not raising any grievance with regard to alleged illegal, occupation of his land by the Army authority exposes the extreme vuloverability of the claims now raised. Learned counsel has pointed out that if the writ petitioner had been granted a valid Garden Pass in the year 1960, which is alleged to have been subsequently converted into a L.S.C. in the year 1987 and if the writ petitioner had been deprived of his possession of the land in question since the year 1970, it is not comprehensible as to why no complaint in this regard was lodged by the writ petitioner at any point of time prior to the belated institution of the present proceeding in the year, 1994. 7. A highly disputed question of fact therefore, does appear to have been raised by the parties to the present proceedings. It is not the province of the writ Court to adjudicate any such disputed questions of fact in order to determine the entitlement of either party to any relief. It is trite law that if a writ petition raises disputed questions of fact having a bearing on the entitlement of the parties to the reliefs sought for, the writ petition has to necessarily fail. 8. In view of the above, notwithstanding the arguments advanced by the respective parties to persuade this Court to embark upon a fact finding exercise, I am not inclined to undertake any such exercise. Instead, I would consider it more appropriate to leave the writ petitioner to have all disputed questions settled and resolved in an appropriate forum, if he so chooses. In the event, the writ petitioner seeks to approach the civil Court for appropriate relief, the period of pendency of the present writ application before this Court will be taken into account by such civil Court in determining the question of limitation, if such a question arises. 9. In view of the above, this writ petition has to fail and is accordingly dismissed, but without any costs.