Non-applicants, money suit 41/98 was decreed by the District Judge, Anantnag vide Judgment dated 14-10-1999 after the defendants failed to file written statement before the court and were proceeded against under Order 8 Rule 10 of CPC, resulting in pronouncement of above judgment against him, followed by drawing of decree for the principle amount with interest. 2. The respondents while filing appeal against the judgement and decree, have also filed an application for extension of time/condonation of delay in filing appeal beyond the prescribed period under Order 41 Rule 3(a) CPC. 3. The appeal is time barred by 601 days. In the application, reasons given and cause made out for delay is that the applicants are migrants and live at Amritsar. They could not come to Anantnag to defend the suit. Some of their friends informed them of matter on 20-7-2001 and they filed the appeal on 6.9.2001. Applicants could not come to the State in abnormal situation over here. The delay in filing the application is neither wilful nor deliberate. There is no negligence on their part to defend the suit. 4. The other side has resisted the application and in the objections, it is stated that the decree for recovery off the principal amount with interest has been passed after the defendants-applicants failed to file the written statement and despite opportunities did not defend the suit. The court pronounced the judgment and decreed the suit on appreciation of the evidence upon hearing the parties. No plausible explanation or reason is given to warrant condonation of delay. Defendants received the notice and were fully aware about pendency of the suit. They were represented by their counsel. The applicants counsel concealed the fact that before filing this appeal alongwith the condonation application, the applicant did approach the trial court for setting aside the judgment and decree under Order 9, Rule 13 CPC which application came to be dismissed on 16-6-2001. Petitioners were in full knowledge of the fact that decree has been passed against them, otherwise how it come that they should have filed an application for setting aside decree and judgment before the District Judge. Petitioners were in full knowledge of the fact that decree has been passed against them, otherwise how it come that they should have filed an application for setting aside decree and judgment before the District Judge. It is a lie and untrue statement that applicants came to know about existence of the decree only in July 2001, when in fact the application was moved for setting aside the decree before the trial court on 1-6-2000 and was disposed of on 16-6-2001. 5. What would constitute sufficient cause under section 5 of the Limitation Act depends upon the facts and circumstances of each case. 6. Notwithstanding, the pragmatic and the non pedantic liberal attitude with Justice oriented approach, it is not possible to give go bye in toto to provisions of Section 5 of the Limitation Act so as to hold that whatever be the delay and how-so-ever unsatisfactory, the explanation offered is court is to condone delay. Sufficient cause is to be liberally construed when no negligence or in action or want of bonafide is imputable to a party. Sufficient cause has to be of the type which is beyond control of party invoking the provisions of Section 5 of Limitations Act. An avoidable cause for delay by due care and attention cannot be a sufficient cause. Cause attributable to negligence or inaction of the party cannot be Sufficient cause. Negligence and latches on the part of the counsel cannot be condoned. 7. The application for condonation gives an impression that the applicants/defendants in the suit are so negligent that even wrong date is mentioned about the decision of the suit. Not only that even in para 1 of the application, suit decided is shown as 19-7-2001 . In para 2, it is stated "that is a delay of one year 11 months and 14 days. The applicants have come to know on 20-07-2001 that the suit has been decided." In fact the delay is 1 year and, 236 days, when in para 2 in the application is it 1 year 25 months. 8. If the delay is construed in terms of para 1 and para 2, it is only 1 days delay, obviously it is demonstrably wrong. 8. If the delay is construed in terms of para 1 and para 2, it is only 1 days delay, obviously it is demonstrably wrong. Apart from this caviller attitude, it is seen that the applicants are stated not to have been able to reach the Anantnag courts and that they came to know about the matter through clerk of the advocate. The advocate is not named and clerk is not named. It is stated that the delay in filing is neither wilful nor deliberate, though they had engaged counsel, but they did not know the whereabouts of the counsel. Even, it is stated that the court fee is not paid and it will be paid only when the court admits the appeal. No explanation, whatsoever, much less details and reasons therefor have been have been given. Contextually it merits to be noted that the judgment and decree has been passed on 14-10-1999 after the defendants repeatedly failed to file power of attorney despite opportunities sought through their counsel Mr.G.M.Shawl, who happen to be the Government Advocate in the High Court, so engaged soon after the judgment was pronounced. The very counsel Mr. G.M.Shawl, moved an application before the trial court in June, 2000, for setting aside the judgment and decree. However, this application after hearing the parties was dismissed on 16-6-2001. In this matter also Mr.G.M.Shawl, was representing the applicants, defendants. Obviously, it shows that the applicants-defendants had full knowledge of decree, passed against them in presence of their counsel on 14-10-1999 and dismissal of their application for setting aside exparte decree in June, 2000. They came up with this application only in September 2001, without any explanation, whatsoever for the inordinate delay. Obviously, they have not exercised due clear and diligence. The delay could have been avoided as same was within the control of the applicants. Applicants bonafidies are questionable, in as-much-as, due care and attention has been taken by the party. The case for filing the appeal much beyond statutorily prescribed period of time has arisen from the negligence of the party and their counsels inaction. The court after all cannot grant the indulgence out of the sheer benevolence irrespective of merits of the plea of condonation advanced by a party. The case for filing the appeal much beyond statutorily prescribed period of time has arisen from the negligence of the party and their counsels inaction. The court after all cannot grant the indulgence out of the sheer benevolence irrespective of merits of the plea of condonation advanced by a party. In P.K. Ramachandran v. State of Kerala, AIR 1998 SC 2276, Supreme Court stated :-- "Law of limitation may harshly affect a particular party but it has to be applied with all its rigour when the statute so prescribe and the Courts have no power to extend the period ofd limitation on equitable grounds. The discretion exercised by the High Court was, thus, neither proper nor judicious. The order condoning the delay cannot be sustained. This appeal, therefore, succeeds and the impugned order is set aside. Consequently, the application for condonation of delay filed in the High Court would stand rejected and the Miscellaneous First Appeal shall stand dismissed as barred by time." 10. The law laid down in State of Punjab v. Charan Jit Singh, 1993 (5) SLR 635 ; Amarnath & Ors. AIR 1975 P&H 246 and CMP (LPA) 130/99 of this court decided on 25-08-1999 is no different. 11. In result, the application for condonation of delay is dismissed alongwith CIMA and other Misc. applications. Interim direction, if any shall also stand vacated. Disposed of.