Judgment R.C.Kathuria, J. 1. S.P.S. Rathore, petitioner-accused seeks quashing of the order dated 23.10.2001 passed by learned Special Judicial Magistrate, C.B.I., Ambala, whereby application moved Mrs. Madhu Parkash for adding offence under Section 306 of the Indian Penal Code to the offence under Section 354 I.P.C. for which report under Section 173 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (hereinafter referred to as `the Code) was filed in his Court, was allowed and the case was ordered to be committed to the Court of Sessions. 2. The essential facts, as gathered from the record, which have bearing on the controversy raised in the petition, have to be noticed in detail. On 11.8.1990, the petitioner, having the rank of Inspector General of Police with Haryana Government was posted on deputation with Bhakra Beas Management Board. He was also the President of Haryana Lawn Tennis Association, Panchkula (hereinafter referred to as `HLTA). He was running the office of HLTA in the garage of his House No. 469, Sector 6, Panchkula, which was under construction. A tennis court is located in Section 6, Panchkula, where girls used to play. Miss Ruchika daughter of S.C. Girhotra resident of House No. 363, Sector 6, Panchkula used to play tennis in that court. S.C. Girhotra was planning to send his daughter to Canada as his relatives were residing there. On 11.8.1990, the petitioner went to the house of S.C. Girhotra at about 12.00 Oclock and tried to persuade him not to send his daughter to Canada. He in turn suggested that he would render all help for building the career of Ruchika and asked S.C. Girhotra to send his daughter to his office on 12.8.1990. Accordingly on 12.8.1990, Ruchika along with her friends Miss Aradhana alias Reemu, daughter of Anand Parkash, Superintending Engineer, Haryana Agricultural Marketing Board, who was a member of HLTA, went to the office of the petitioner. The petitioner asked Reemu to go and call Tennis Coach, who was available at the backside of the house under construction. Reemu left that place so as to bring him. Getting the opportunity that Ruchika was all alone, the petitioner started misbehaving with her by holding her hand and putting his other hand around her waist. He dragged her towards him and embraced her. Ruchika tried to push away the accused with her hand which was not held by the accused. Reemu left that place so as to bring him. Getting the opportunity that Ruchika was all alone, the petitioner started misbehaving with her by holding her hand and putting his other hand around her waist. He dragged her towards him and embraced her. Ruchika tried to push away the accused with her hand which was not held by the accused. In the meantime, Reemu returned without the Coach. The petitioner further tried to send Reemu again to locate the Coach in order to bring him over there. Getting an opportunity, Ruchika ran out of the room and was followed by Reemu. While Reemu was leaving, the petitioner-accused told Reemu that she should tell Ruchika to cool down as he would try to do whatever would be desired by her. Ruchika informed Reemu as to what had happened with her. Both of them decided not to inform their parents as they apprehended that the petitioner-accused being Inspector General of Police would involve them as well as their parents in order to harass them. 13.8.1990 was a holiday and Reemu and Ruchika did not go to play tennis. On 14.8.1990 at about 4.30 p.m. Reemu along with Ruchika went to lawn tennis court. On that day at about 6.30 p.m. when Ruchika and Reemu were about to return, one Paltoo, Ball-picker came to them ad informed that they were called by the petitioner at his house immediately. Both of them had apprehension that the petitioner might misbehave with Ruchika again. Therefore, it was decided that they would inform their parents about the incident of molestation at the hands of the petitioner-accused. Thereafter, Ruchika informed her father about the incident of misbehaviour by the petitioner on 12.8.1990. Her father in the company of other respectable residents of Sector 6, Punchkula tried to see the petitioner on 14. 8.1990 but he was not available at his house under construction. On 15.8.1990, the parents of Ruchika and Reemu besides the parents of other boys and girls and members of HLTA collected at the residence of Anand Parkash at House No. 407, Sector 6, Panchkula. In that meeting it was decided that the matter be reported to the higher authorities of Haryana Government. Thereafter, a deputation of the citizens including the parents of the children met the Chief Minister and Home Minister of Haryana and submitted a memorandum in this regard. In that meeting it was decided that the matter be reported to the higher authorities of Haryana Government. Thereafter, a deputation of the citizens including the parents of the children met the Chief Minister and Home Minister of Haryana and submitted a memorandum in this regard. The enquiry was entrusted to the Director General of Police, Haryana who, after recording the statements of some of the persons who had signed the memorandum including Ruchika, Reemu, S.C. Girhotra, Madhu Parkash and Inspector Anil Dhawan, submitted report 3.9.1990 wherein he came to the conclusion that the petitioner-accused had molested Ruchika a minor girl of 15 years and further recommended that a case under appropriate sections of the I.P.C. be got registered on the statement of Ruchika and thereafter necessary investigation of the case be done. Instead of taking any action as per recommendations made in the above enquiry report, the State Government decided to initiate departmental proceedings against the petitioner-accused. 3. Dissatisfied with the action of the State Government, Mrs. Madhu Parkash, wife of Anand Parkash filed Criminal Writ Petition No. 1694 of 1997. As per order dated 21.8.1998 of Honble Judge of this Court, direction was given for registration of the case and handing over the investigation to Central Bureau of Investigation (hereinafter referred to as `C.B.I.) which was to be conducted by an officer not below the rank of Deputy Inspector General, C.B.I. with further direction that the investigation shall be verified by the Inspector General, C.B.I. before submitting the report under Section 173 of the Code. 4. The petitioner challenged the order dated 212.8.1998 passed in Criminal Writ Petition No. 1694 of 1997 in the Apex Court by filing Criminal Appeal No. 961 of 1998 which was dismissed by the Honble Supreme Court on 14.12.1999 upholding the direction given by this Court for handing over the investigation of the case to the C.B.I. During this period, Ruchika, the alleged victim of the crime had expired on 29.12.1993 and on the date of death she was aged 19 years. In pursuance to the direction of the Apex Court the case bearing FIR No. 516 was registered on 29.12.1999 in Police Station, Panchkula on the basis of memorandum dated 15.8.1990 signed and submitted by Ruchika for offences under Sections 354 and 509 I.P.C. against the petitioner-accused. In pursuance to the direction of the Apex Court the case bearing FIR No. 516 was registered on 29.12.1999 in Police Station, Panchkula on the basis of memorandum dated 15.8.1990 signed and submitted by Ruchika for offences under Sections 354 and 509 I.P.C. against the petitioner-accused. Thereafter, the investigation of the case was handed over to the C.B.I. In terms of the direction of the Court Case No. RC SI 1 2000 S 0001 was registered on 3.1.2000 by the C.B.I., New Delhi. The investigation of the case was entrusted to Shri Rajesh Ranjan, Deputy Inspector General, C.B.I., SIC, I, New Delhi. After completion of the investigation, the C.B.I. submitted the report under Section 173 of the Code after coming to the conclusion, on the basis of investigation carried by the Investigating Officer, that offence punishable under Section 354 I.P.C. was made out against the petitioner-accused. 5. Taking into consideration the report submitted under Section 173 of the Code coupled with the documents annexed with the report including the police statements of the witnesses, Shri A.K. Tyagi, Special Judicial Magistrate 1st Class, C.B.I., Ambala, as per his order dated 5.12.2000 came to the conclusion that prima facie case for commission of offence punishable under Section 354 I.P.C. was made out against the accused and thus found sufficient grounds for proceeding against him. Accordingly summons were ordered to be issued against the petitioner-accused for 11.1.2001. 6. During the pendency of the proceedings before the Special Judicial Magistrate, C.B.I., Ambala, application dated 8.10.2001 was filed by Mrs. Madhu Parkash stating therein that during the investigation, the C.B.I. had recorded the statements of Miss Aradhana alias Reemu, Smt. Madhu Parkash- applicant, Anand Parkash S.C. Girhotra, Dr. N.K. Mittal, Manish Arora, J.K. Duggal, IAS, Shri R.R. Singh, IPS, Director General of Police (now Retd.) and others. Witness Nos. 1 to 5 in their statements noticed above stated that hell like conditions were created for Miss Ruchika by the petitioner-accused which resulted in her death in December 1993 as she ended her life by consuming poison. In this manner, she had committed suicide because the petitioner- accused by outraging her modesty had spoiled her life. Witness Nos. 1 to 5 in their statements noticed above stated that hell like conditions were created for Miss Ruchika by the petitioner-accused which resulted in her death in December 1993 as she ended her life by consuming poison. In this manner, she had committed suicide because the petitioner- accused by outraging her modesty had spoiled her life. Additionally, it was submitted that Ashu brother of Ruchika was falsely implicated in six criminal cases at the behest of the petitioner, out of which he had been discharged in four cases by the Court and in the remaining two cases the Police found that allegations made against him were not substantiated and for that reason proceedings against him were dropped. It was further stated in the application that Ashu was not examined during the investigation of the case and even the post-mortem report of Ruchika and the inquest report was not taken into account by the C.B.I. Accordingly, it was stated that Ruchika had committed suicide on account of the continuous harassment faced by her and her family members including her brother. Thus, it was prayed that offence under Section 306 I.P.C. be added in the report submitted by the C.B.I. under Section 173 of the Code and the case be committed to the Court of Sessions. Further directions were sought to the C.B.I. to record the statement of Ashu and other witnesses in this regard. 7. this application was contested by the petitioner-accused who submitted his detailed reply dated 20.10.2001. It was pleaded by him that the application had not been submitted by the Central Bureau of Investigation and the applicant had no locus standi to file the application because she had only been allowed to address the Court during the course of proceedings in the two applications filed by the petitioner-accused in this regard, wherein she had sought to get herself impleaded as party to the petition. It was further stated that allowing the application filed by the applicant by the Court would tantamount to review of the earlier order passed by the predecessor of the Court as well as that of the High Court and the Apex Court which would be against the mandate of Section 301(2) of the Code. It was further stated that allowing the application filed by the applicant by the Court would tantamount to review of the earlier order passed by the predecessor of the Court as well as that of the High Court and the Apex Court which would be against the mandate of Section 301(2) of the Code. It was further submitted by him that death of Ruchika had taken place after 3-1/2 years of the alleged incident and there being no nexus between the two, the Police during the investigation conducted by it had formed an opinion that no offence under Section 306 I.P.C. was made out against the petitioner-accused. It was further stated in the reply that Dr. Naresh Mittal is a close relative of the applicant, who had been prosecuted in FIR No. 568 dated 7.11.1998 registered under Sections 353, 332 and 186 I.P.C. with Police Station, Sector 5, Pachkula and was also arrested for cheating and fraud in another case on 13.8.2001 registered against him by they Punjab Police on the basis of complaint made by Mrs. Babli Brar, daughter of Shri H.S. Brar. In respect of Anand Parkash, husband of the applicant, it was pointed out that he was initially posted as Sub-Divisional Engineer in P.W.D. by the name of A.P. Singla. During that period he had committed irregularities which resulted into losses to the State of Haryana amounting to Rs. 1.5 lacs approximately and when he came to know about it he resigned from his service. Later on, he joined the service of Haryana Agricultural Marketing Board after changing his name as Anand Parkash. The Civil suit for recovery of losses caused by him was also instituted by the State Government which is pending against him. Additionally, he had been also charge-sheeted in seven different cases relating to corruption, misuse of power, embezzlement and interpolation of record etc. He was also indicted for giving false affidavit by the Haryana Vigilance Bureau and he was compulsorily retired on account of has chequered record and dishonest reputation. 8. In respect of S.C. Girhotra, father of Ruchika, who was holding the post of Bank Manager, it was stated that he was arrested by the C.B.I. in case bearing RC No. 5/85 dated 20.1.1985 registered under Sections 120-B, 420, 471 and 477-A of I.P.C. and Section 5(2) of Prevention of Corruption Act and was dismissed from service. 8. In respect of S.C. Girhotra, father of Ruchika, who was holding the post of Bank Manager, it was stated that he was arrested by the C.B.I. in case bearing RC No. 5/85 dated 20.1.1985 registered under Sections 120-B, 420, 471 and 477-A of I.P.C. and Section 5(2) of Prevention of Corruption Act and was dismissed from service. It was also submitted that in another case bearing RC No. 6/85 registered by the C.B.I. under Sections 120-B, 420, 468 and 471 of I.P.C. read with Section 5(1d) and 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act he was convicted and sentenced for one year. 9. The C.B.I. in its separate reply dated 20.12.2001, while contesting the application filed by the applicant took up the stand that during the course of investigation, relevant facts and circumstances including the statements of PW-1 to PW-5 recorded under Section 161 of the Code, wherein they had maintained that hell like conditions for Miss Ruchika were created by the petitioner-accused, were thoroughly examined with regard to applicability of ingredients of offences under Sections 306 and 509 I.P.C. Since no offences under Sections 306 and 509 I.P.C. were made out against the petitioner-accused in view of the facts which had emerged during the course of investigation charge-sheet for the offence under Section 354 I.P.C. was submitted to the Court on completion of the investigation. 10. Shri Jagdev Sigh Dhanjal, Special Judicial Magistrate 1st Class, C.B.I., Ambala, taking into account the respective stand of the parties as per order dated 23.10.2001 came to the conclusion that prima facie case for addition of offence under Section 306 I.P.C. was made out against the petitioner-accused and accordingly ordered the committal of case to the Court of Sessions. It is this order which has been challenged in the present petition. 11. I have heard arguments of learned counsel representing the parties at length spreading for a number of days. It is this order which has been challenged in the present petition. 11. I have heard arguments of learned counsel representing the parties at length spreading for a number of days. Learned counsel for the petitioner, while assailing the order dated 23.10.2001 of the Special Judicial Magistrate, C.B.I., has pressed the grounds stated in the reply filed on 20.10.2001, to the application dated 8.10.2001 filed by applicant-Madhu Parkash, which are crystalised as under :- (I) The applicant not being a complainant in this case and being the mother of a friend of the deceased had no locus standi to file the application when it is not even supported by the C.B.I., which had presented the report under Section 173 of the Code against the petitioner-accused. (II) Once the cognizance was taken by Shri A.K. Tyagi, Special Judicial Magistrate, C.B.I., Ambala on 5.12.2000 when the report under Section 173 of the Code by the C.B.I. was submitted, the present Magistrate Shri Jagdev Singh Dhanjal could not review the order dated 5.12.2000 of his predecessor by order dated 23.10.2001 by coming to the conclusion that offence under Section 306 I.P.C. was disclosed against the petitioner-accused. (III) The learned Magistrate had failed to apply his judicial mind to the facts of the case as his findings for coming to the conclusion that offence under Section 306 I.P.C. was prima facie made out are not supported by the material on record. Rather, it is a case where the material on record discloses no case at all for the offence under Section 306 I.P.C. against the petitioner-accused. 12. The above stand taken on behalf of the petitioner-accused has been controverted by the counsel representating the C.B.I. as well as the counsel appearing on behalf of applicant-Madhu Parkash. 13. I shall deal with the points raised in seriatim. 14. It is manifest from the record that the present case was ordered to be registered initially on the direction of this High Court in Criminal Writ Petition No. 1694 of 1997 filed by Madhu Parkash and subsequently under the directions of the Apex Court in Criminal Appeal No. 961 of 1998. Therefore, it cannot be said that Madhu Parkash is totally a stranger to the proceedings initiated against the petitioner-accused. Therefore, it cannot be said that Madhu Parkash is totally a stranger to the proceedings initiated against the petitioner-accused. Counsel representing the petitioner sought to challenge the locus standi of Madhu Parkash to file the application primarily on the observations made in the order passed by this Court in Criminal Miscellaneous No. 1867 of 2001 in Criminal Misc. No. 4881-M of 2000, decided on 18.1.2001. Further strength was sought by the counsel for the petitioner from the decision in Shiv Kumar v. Hakam Chand, 1999(4) RCR(Crl.) 190 (SC), wherein while taking notice of the provisions of Sections 301 and 302 of the Code, it was laid down that Magistrate can permit any person to conduct prosecution with only the rider that such Magistrate cannot permit such prosecution to a Police Officer below the rank of Inspector. It was further stated in the above mentioned case that such person need not necessarily be a Public Prosecutor. After the permission is granted to such person, he can even appoint a counsel to conduct the case on his behalf in the Court of the Magistrate. At the same time, it was also laid down that prosecution in the Court of Sessions can only be conducted by the Public Prosecutor and not by anyone other than the Public Prosecutor. When a private counsel is permitted to make submissions he will only assist the Public Prosecutor and act on behalf of Public Prosecutor to act as junior Advocate. Reference was also made to Monmohan Lal Sachdev and others v. State, 2000(2) RCR(Crl.) 523. 15. Criminal Misc. No. 1867 of 2001, was an application filed by Madhu Parkash seeking permission to be impleaded as party in Criminal Misc. No. 46381-M of 2000 filed by the petitioner-accused challenging the order dated 5.12.2000 passed by the Special Judicial Magistrate, C.B.I., Ambala allowing the application of the respondent seeking condonation of delay in filing the charge-sheet and while disposing of the application of Madhu Parkash, it was observed that the applicant has no locus standi to file the application and the counsel for the applicant, however, may assist the counsel for the C.B.I. during the course of arguments. On the basis of this order it was submitted by the learned counsel for the petitioner that right of Madhu Parkash stood foreclosed by this order and for that reason she was debarred from filing the present application dated 8.12.2001. 16. On the basis of this order it was submitted by the learned counsel for the petitioner that right of Madhu Parkash stood foreclosed by this order and for that reason she was debarred from filing the present application dated 8.12.2001. 16. Opposing the above stand taken by the petitioner in this regard, reliance was placed on M/s J.K. International v. State Government of NCT of Delhi and others, 2001(2) RCR(Crl.) 106 (SC) : JT 2001(3) SC 130, wherein in para 12 of the judgment it was laid down as under :- "12. The private person who is permitted to conduct prosecution in the Magistrates court can engage a counsel to do the needful in the court in his behalf. It further amplifies the position that if a private person is aggrieved by the offence committed against him or against any one in whom he is interested, he can approach the Magistrate and seek permission to conduct the prosecution by himself. It is open to the court to consider his request. If the court think that the cause of justice would be served better by granting such permission the courts would generally grant such permission. Of course, this wider amplitude is limited to Magistrates courts, as the right of such private individual to participate in the conduct of prosecution in the sessions court is very much restricted and is made subject to the control of the Public Prosecutor. The limited role which a private person can be permitted to play for prosecution in the sessions court, has been adverted to above. All these would show that an aggrieved private person is not altogether to be eclipsed from the scenario when the criminal court takes cognizance of the offences based on the report submitted by the police. The reality cannot be overlooked that the genesis in almost all such cases is the grievance of one or more individual that they were wronged by the accused by committing offences against them." 17. The cases referred to above have amply explained the position with regard to rights of person aggrieved of an offence. As the proceedings had been initiated at the instance of the applicant in this case, she had a right to move application dated 8.12.2001 to the Court notwithstanding the fact that no such prayer was made by C.B.I. which had submitted the report under Section 173 of the Code. As the proceedings had been initiated at the instance of the applicant in this case, she had a right to move application dated 8.12.2001 to the Court notwithstanding the fact that no such prayer was made by C.B.I. which had submitted the report under Section 173 of the Code. The complainant had sought to bring to the notice of the Court the statements of witnesses PW-1 to PW-5 which were recorded during the course of investigation so as to point out that offence under Section 306 I.P.C. was made but. It is a different matter whether on the basis of the statements recorded such a conclusion could be, prima facie drawn was required to be decided by the Magistrate. Thus, there is no force in the stand taken by the petitioner in this regard. 18. Coming to the other submission made, it deserves notice that at the time when Shri A.K. Tyagi, Special Judicial Magistrate, C.B.I., Ambala had taken cognizance under Section 354 I.P.C., the petitioner-accused was not present. After the petitioner-accused had put in appearance before the trial Magistrate, the prosecution as well as accused were yet to be heard in respect of the charge to be framed against him. Before that stage could arrive, the present application was filed by Mrs. Madhu Parkash. Therefore, it cannot be said that moving of this application by Madhu Parkash tantamounts to seeking review of the order dated 5.12.2000. The reliance placed by the counsel representing the petitioner-accused on State of Himachal Pradesh v. Krishan Lal Pardhan and others, AIR 1987 SC 773 in this regard is wholly misplaced. The facts of that case were that a report under Section 173 of the Code had been filed in Court wherein names of Pratap Singh, Padam Singh and Jagdish Singh, respondents 7, 8 and 9 respectively were shown in column 2 as "accused persons not sent up for trial". The name of Jai Singh, respondent 10, was not at all shown. Subsequently, an application was moved before the Special Judge, Shimla by the Public Prosecutor for impleading respondents 7 to 10 as accused. The name of Jai Singh, respondent 10, was not at all shown. Subsequently, an application was moved before the Special Judge, Shimla by the Public Prosecutor for impleading respondents 7 to 10 as accused. The Special Judge taking into account the statements of the witnesses recorded by the Police under Section 161 of the Code came to the conclusion that a prima facie case of cheating, forgery and criminal conspiracy read with Section 5(1)(d)(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act were disclosed against Pratap Singh and Jai Singh and for that reason he posted the case for consideration of charge on 25.5.198. Subsequently, the change of the Presiding Officer took place and one Shri Surjit Singh came to be posted as Special Judge in place of the previous Judge. While hearing the arguments for charge, he came to the conclusion that there existed no ground for charging the accused with any of the offences for which they had been accused and ordered their discharge. This order was challenged in revision before the High Court but the revision was dismissed. The Special Leave Petition filed before the Honble Supreme Court was accepted on various grounds and one of the reasons taken notice of was that subsequent order of the Special Judge, in fact, amounted to review of the earlier order which the Special Judge was not entitled to do under the Code. In the circumstances of the present case, the observations made in Hemant P. Vissanji and others v. Mulshankar Shivram Rawal and another, 1991 Cr. L.J. 3144 again would not render any assistance to the petitioner in this regard. 19. In the above mentioned cases, the order of discharge was passed overturning the earlier orders passed by the predecessor Magistrate but in the present case the successor Judge had only entertained the application moved by Madhu Parkash in order to determine whether the circumstances of the case disclose offence under Section 306 I.P.C., and for this purpose it cannot be said that the entertainment of the application was impermissible. 20. 20. The primary question upon which the legality of the order dated 23.10.2001 hinges is whether after taking cognizance of the offence under Section 354 I.P.C. on the basis of the report submitted under Section 173 of the Code read with the statements of witnesses recorded under Section 161 of the Code the Special Magistrate, C.B.I., Ambala was justified in coming to the conclusion that offence under Section 306 I.P.C. was additionally made out against the petitioner-accused. Section 190 of the Code empowers the Magistrate to take cognizance of offence :- "190. Cognizance of offences by Magistrates. - (1) Subject to the provisions of this Chapter, any Magistrate of the first class, and any Magistrate of the second class specially empowered in this behalf under sub-section (2), may take cognizance of any offence - (a) upon receiving a complaint of facts which constitute such offence; (b) upon a police report of such facts; (c) upon information received from any person other than a police officer, or upon his own knowledge, that such offence has been committed. (2) xx xx xx xx xx xx xx" 21. The scope of Section 190 of the Code is well settled. In terms of the aforesaid provisions, the Magistrate takes cognizance of offence and not the offender. Where the report is submitted under Section 173 of the Code by the Police that no case is made out against the accused the Magistrate can ignore the conclusion arrived at by the Investigating Officer and independently apply his mind to the facts gathered during the investigation of the case, including the statements of the witnesses recorded by the Police. This position of law stands amply settled in case M/s India Carat Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Karnataka and another, AIR 1989 SC 885 and Hemant Dhasmana v. Central Bureau of Investigation, 2001(3) RCR(Crl.) 830. 22. Counsel representing the complainant also referred to the observations made in Sanjay Gandhi v. Union of India and others, AIR 1978 SC 514, wherein it was laid down that power of the Committing Magistrate under Section 209 of the Code is limited observing "the narrow inspection hole through which the Committing Magistrate has to look at the case limits him merely to ascertain whether the case, as disclosed by the police report, appears to the Magistrate to show an offence triable solely by the Court of Session. If it is so, the Magistrate has simply to commit for trial before the Court of Session." 23. In the light of what has been stated above the paramount consideration for the purpose of deciding the application dated 8.12.2001 filed by Madhu Parkash, the learned Magistrate was required to consider judicially whether on consideration of material consisting of report submitted under Section 173 of the Code coupled with the statements of the witnesses recorded under Section 161 of the Code, it can be prima facie said that the accused is reasonably connected with the offence under Section 306 I.P.C. alleged to have been committed by him. He is not required to accept any material which on the face of it does not connect the accused even remotely with the accusations sought to be made against him. At this stage, the Magistrate is required to see as to whether the material and documents on record on their face value disclose all the ingredients constituting the alleged offence. 24. On the basis of the report submitted under Section 173 of the Code by the C.B.I., the following facts were spelled out on record :- (a) The incident of outraging the modesty of Ruchika by the petitioner-accused had taken place on 12.8.1990 and both Ruchika and her friend Reemu had gone to play tennis in the tennis court on 14.8.1990. It was at 6.30 p.m. they were informed by Paltoo, Ball-picker that Ruchika was called by the petitioner, they got scared and decided to report the incident of 12.8.1990 to their parents. (b) After the incident of 12.8.1990 was reported by Ruchika to her father S.C. Girhotra and by Reemu to her father on 14.8.1990, they in the company of other respectable persons tried to meet the petitioner-accused at his house which was under construction but he was not available. (c) On 16.8.1990, father of Ruchika and father of Reemu in the company of other respectable persons of Sector 6, Panchkula met the Chief Minister and Home Minister and made a written report about the crime committed by the petitioner-accused against Ruchika on 12.8.1990 and Shri R.R. Singh, Director General of Police, Haryana was directed to hold an enquiry about the incident as per order dated 17.8.1990. (d) The enquiry regarding the incident was marked to Shri R.R. Singh, Director General of Police on 17.8.1990. (d) The enquiry regarding the incident was marked to Shri R.R. Singh, Director General of Police on 17.8.1990. Shri R.R. Singh, D.G.P. had recorded the statements of Ruchika on 21.8.1990 and Reemu, Madhu Anand, S.C. Girhotra and Anil Kumar on 26.8.1990 and thereafter submitted the enquiry report on 3.9.1990. 25. These witnesses had listed four prominent circumstances in their police statements during the investigation conducted by C.B.I., namely :- (i) After the incident of 12.8.1990, the petitioner-accused started harassing Ruchika, her father and other family members and Reemu and her family members for making complaint against the petitioner-accused; (ii) Ruchika cold not even visit the nearby market and for that reason Reemu used to make minor purchases for her : (iii) Ruchikas name, who was student of 10th Class in Sacred Heart School, Sector 26, Chandigarh, was struck off from the roll at the behest of the petitioner; (iv) Ashu, brother of Ruchika was falsely implicated in criminal cases and also beaten severely by officials of the Haryana Police at the behest of the petitioner-accused. (e) Madhu Parkash in her statement stated that the petitioner- accused had arranged demonstration by the residents of Rajiv Colony, Panchkula in front of the house of S.C. Girhotra, father of Ruchika, wherein slogans were raised in favour of S.P.S. Rathore and against S.C. Girhotra and his daughter. She further stated that Ruchika had died on 29.12.1993 after consuming poison on 28.11.1993 under mysterious circumstances. (f) S.C. Girhotra in his statement apart from referring to the demonstration held in front of his house as stated by Madhu Parkash stated that 2-3 days prior to the death of his daugther-Ruchika, she had cried and cursed the petitioner-accused for making her life useless by molesting her. He has further stated in his statement that he and his wife-Veena had narrated the death of Ruchika due to the wrong combination of allopathic and ayurvedic medicines to the local Police as she used to take medicines for slimming though later on from the post-mortem report, he learnt that she had consumed poison. Then it dawned upon him that she had ended her life due to the incident of molestation and continuous harassment thereafter. Then it dawned upon him that she had ended her life due to the incident of molestation and continuous harassment thereafter. (g) Anil Dhawan in his Police statement had stated with regard to the demonstration held by 200 persons in front of the residence of S.C. Girhotra, father of Ruchika, wherein slogans were raised in favour the petitioner- accused and against the family member of Ruchika. (h) While submitting the report under Section 173 of the Code, it was also mentioned that investigation of the case revealed that after the incident of molestation of Ruchika, she remained confined to her house and was constantly under depression. It was further mentioned that Ruchika committed suicide by consuming poison on 28.11.1990 and died on 29.11.1990 and that hell like conditions had been created for Ruchika by the petitioner-accused. 26. when Criminal Writ Petition No. 1694 of 1997 was filed by Smt. Madhu Parkash in this Court she had stated that she had submitted representation to the Senior Superintendent of Police, Panchkula and S.H.O. of Police Station, Sector 6, Panchkula or registration of criminal case under Sections 354 and 509 I.P.C. and this sought prosecution of the petitioner-accused under those offences by issuing direction to the State of Haryana, Senior Superintendent of Police, Panckhula and S.H.O., Police Station, Sector 6, Panckhula to get the case registered against the petitioner under Sections 354 and 509 I.P.C. No other averments with regard to the incident of demonstration held in front of the house of S.C. Girhotra, state of mind of Ruchika and harassment suffered by her after the incident of 12.8.1990 till her death on 29.11.1993 were made in the petition though this petition is dated 26.11.1997. 27. During the investigation, the circumstances enumerated in the statements of PW-1 to PW-5 had also been verified by the Investigating Officer of the CB.I. and the result of that verification is summarised as under :- (i) Name of Ruchika was struck off from the roll of Sacred Heard School, Chandigarh. Ruchika attended the school upto 25.8.1990 and thereafter there were school holidays upto 16.9.1990 but she remained absent upto 19.9.1990 and her name was struck off due to non-payment of frees from April 1990 onwards. Ruchika attended the school upto 25.8.1990 and thereafter there were school holidays upto 16.9.1990 but she remained absent upto 19.9.1990 and her name was struck off due to non-payment of frees from April 1990 onwards. (ii) Daya Ram, grand father of Ruchika and two maternal uncles of Ruchika, namely, N.S. Chauhan and another N.S. Chauhan and certified that the cause of death of Ruchika was due to taking of medicines for reducing her weight and they had not suspected the involvement of anyone in her death. (iii) Ashu, brother of deceased, Ruchika could not be examined by the Police because he did not make himself available. On this account his statement under Section 161 of the Code could not be recorded. (iv) The cause of death of Ruchika, as per Chemical Examination Report dated 21.2.1994 prepared by Dr. Opender Singh, Chemical Examiner, was poisoning case of "Chloro Compound Group of Insecticides". 28. On the strength of above circumstances, it was strenuously urged by the counsel for the petitioner that the ingredients of the offence under Section 306 I.P.C. are not at all made out. While justifying the impugned order of the learned Magistrate for the reasons stated therein it was also pointed out by the counsel representating the C.B.I. and the counsel representating the complainant, that the statements of father of deceased and other relatives in the inquest report has no relevance for deciding the issue of commission of offence under Section 306 I.P.C. 29. As the controversy turns around with regard to the applicability of the provisions of Section 306 I.P.C. to the facts of the present case, the necessary ingredients of Sections 306, 107 and 108 I.P.C. have to be noticed. Section 306 I.P.C. provides that "if any person commits suicide, whoever abets the commission of such suicide, shall be punished." As this section does not define the expression "abet", therefore, meaning of the abetment has to be gathered from the provisions of Section 107 I.P.C. coupled with the definition of the expression "abettor" as laid down in the Section 108 I.P.C. which read as under :- "107. Abetment of a thing. - A person abets the doing of a thing, who - First. - Instigates any person to do that thing : Secondly. Abetment of a thing. - A person abets the doing of a thing, who - First. - Instigates any person to do that thing : Secondly. - Engages with one or more other person or persons in any conspiracy for the doing of that thing, if an act or illegal omission takes place in pursuance of that conspiracy, and in order to the doing of that thing; or Thirdly. - Intentionally aids, by any act or illegal omission, the doing of that thing. Explanation 1. - A person who, why wilful mispresentation, or by wilful concealment of a material fact which he is bound to disclose, voluntarily causes or procures, or attempts to cause or procure, a thing to be done, it said to instigate the doing of that thing. Explanation 2. - Whoever, either prior to or at the time of the commission of an act, does anything in order to facilitate the commission of that act, and thereby facilitates the commission thereof, is said to aid the doing of that act. 108. Abettor. - A person abets an offence who abets either the commission of an offence, or the commission of an act which would be an offence, if committed by a person capable by law of committing an offence with the commission of an act which would be an offence, if committed by a person capable by law of committing an offence with the same intention or knowledge as that of the abettor. Explanation 1. - The abetment of the illegal omission of an act may amount to an offence although the abettor may not himself be found to do that act. Explanation 2. - To constitute the offence of abetment it is not necessary that the act abetted should be committed, or that the effect requisite to constitute the offence should be caused. Explanation 3. - It is not necessary that the person abetted should be capable by law of committing an offence, or that he should have the same guilty intention or knowledge as that of the abettor, or any guilty intention or knowledge. Explanation 4. - The abetment of an offence being an offence, the abetment of such an abetment is also an offence. Explanation 5. - It is not necessary to the commission of the offence of abetment by conspiracy that the abettor should concert the offence with the person who commits. Explanation 4. - The abetment of an offence being an offence, the abetment of such an abetment is also an offence. Explanation 5. - It is not necessary to the commission of the offence of abetment by conspiracy that the abettor should concert the offence with the person who commits. It is sufficient if he engages in the conspiracy in pursuance of which the offence is committed." 30. In Ramesh Kumar v. State of Chhattishgarh, 2001(4) RCR(Criminal) 537, at page 544 in para 20 it was observed that "instigation is to goad, urge forward, provoke, incite or encourage to do "an act". To satisfy the requirement of instigation though it is not necessary that actual words must be used to that effect or what constitutes instigation must necessarily and specifically be suggestive of the consequences. Yet a reasonable certainty to incite the consequence must be capable of being spelt out." 31. Learned counsel for the petitioner also referred to the observations made in Ranjit Singh v. State of M.P., 197(3) Crimes 256, wherein deceased had committed suicide in her quarter by hanging herself to the ceiling fan. In this case 5-6 days prior to the incident, the accused had outraged the modesty of the deceased for which offence under Section 354 I.P.C. was registered. It was held that said act of the accused could not be construed as an abetment to the deceased to commit suicide and for that reason conviction under Section 306 I.P.C. was not sustained. 32. In Gurdeep Singh v. State of Haryana, 1998(3) RCR(Crl.) 266, deceased committed theft of money of his master. Accused tried to have carnal intercourse with the deceased and probably on that account he felt ashamed and committed suicide. It was held that offence of abetting was not made out as there was no instigation on the part of the accused for committing the suicide. This was a case where the Additional Sessions Judge, Karnal had decided to frame charges under Sections 323, 506 and 306 read with Section 34 I.P.C. against the petitioner vide order dated 20.8.1997. This order was challenged in this Court, on the ground that the facts do not warrant any charge to be framed under Section 306 I.P.C. While accepting the revision petition, it was observed in paras 6 and 7 as under :- "6. This order was challenged in this Court, on the ground that the facts do not warrant any charge to be framed under Section 306 I.P.C. While accepting the revision petition, it was observed in paras 6 and 7 as under :- "6. Section 306 I.P.C. lays down that if any person commits suicide, whoever abets the commission of such suicide, shall be punished for abetment of suicide. The main point for consideration is whether in the light of the allegations levelled against the petitioners by the prosecution it can be said that there was abetment from the side of the petitioners. The learned counsel for the State relies on para No. 3 of the impugned order and maintains that there were constant threats from the side of the petitioners, as a result of which deceased Amit committed suicide and it tantamounts to abetment. I do not subscribe to the argument raised by the learned counsel for the respondent. As per provisions of Section 107 I.P.C. a person abets the doing of a thing, who instigates any person to do that thing; or engages with one or more other person or persons in any conspiracy for the doing of that thing, if an act or illegal omission takes place in pursuance of that conspiracy and in order to the doing of that thing; or intentionally aids, by any act or illegal omission, the doing of that thing. 7. A reading of the above provisions would show that there should be a direct nexus between the act complained of and the ultimate effect. If the deceased had resorted to commit suicide by sprinkling kerosene oil upon himself, it cannot be readily said that petitioners were responsible. As per the allegations of the prosecution one of the petitioners tried to have cardinal intercourse with the deceased. The deceased might have felt ashamed on this. He might have also felt ashamed of the fact that he had committed the theft of the money of the master. There was demand of money which was the material conduct on the part of the petitioners but it cannot be said that there was common abetment or that there was any instigation on the part of the petitioners to the deceased for committing of suicide. There was demand of money which was the material conduct on the part of the petitioners but it cannot be said that there was common abetment or that there was any instigation on the part of the petitioners to the deceased for committing of suicide. I do not dispute with the proposition of law that while framing the charge of the trial Court is supposed to see a prima facie case but if the parameters of prima facie case are totally beyond the circle and scope of Sections 227/228 Cr.P.C. certainly this Court has the power to interfere with the said illegal orders while exercising the powers in revision." 33. In Sudhakar and another v. State of Maharshtra, 2000(3) Crimes 122 (SC) : 2000(3) RCR(Crl.) 383 (SC) suicide was committed by the victim after 5-1/2 months of the alleged rape. In that case prosecutrix did not directly state any fact regarding cause of her death. Her statement did not state her mind for committing suicide allegedly on account of humiliation to which she was subjected to on account of rape committed on her by the accused. The Court came to the conclusion that relying upon the statement of the prosecutrix termed as dying declaration was unjustified. 34. Above mentioned cases do indicate as to how the Courts, while taking into account the facts and circumstances of each case, have answered the question of applicability of provisions of Section 306 I.P.C. in order to arrive at the criminal liability of the accused involved. 35. It is manifest from the impugned order of the learned Magistrate that he had not evaluated the circumstances on their face value keeping in view the touch-stone of ingredients of offence under Section 306 I.P.C. He had also failed to consider the import and meaning of Sections 107 and 108 I.P.C. The learned Magistrate cannot act merely as a post office or a mouth-piece of the prosecution or the complainant because he is duty bound to consider the total facts, evidence and documents produced before him for the purpose of finding out the ingredients of the offence involved. It is undisputed on record that at no stage Ruchika made any police statement during the investigation of the case. Ruchika after the incident of 12.8.1990 till she died on 29.11.1993 had never come in contact directly with the accused. It is undisputed on record that at no stage Ruchika made any police statement during the investigation of the case. Ruchika after the incident of 12.8.1990 till she died on 29.11.1993 had never come in contact directly with the accused. The record of this case further shows that during the life time of Ruchika and thereafter even when Criminal Writ Petition No. 1694 of 1997 was filed in the High Court, no grievance with regard to the harassment faced by Ruchika due to the incident of 12.8.1990 and about her mental state of mind till her death was made. The cumulative effect of the listed circumstances emerging from the statements of PW-1 to PW-5, which had been taken into consideration by the learned Magistrate in his order dated 23.10.2001, as noticed earlier, on their face value do not disclose that it was the petitioner who had abetted the suicide of Ruchika. Rather, there is no evidence in any of the elements of the listed circumstances taken into consideration by the learned trial Magistrate individually as well as collectively which would constitute the offence under Section 306 I.P.C. 36. While dealing with the controversy, the scope of power vested in the Court under Section 482 of the Code cannot be overlooked. The High Court is duty bound to correct any manifest error committed by the Magistrate when it finds that the Magistrate by passing the impugned order had failed to take into account that the act alleged against the petitioner does not constitute the offence. Primarily the power has been vested to prevent abuse of process of the Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. It cannot be ignored that it is the duty of this Court to ensure that judicial process is not allowed to be made an instrument of harassment of the person concerned. The circumstances brought on record fully justify intervention of this Court in exercise of the power vested under Section 482 of the Code. 37. For the aforesaid reasons, the petition is allowed and the order dated 23.10.2001 of the Special Judicial Magistrate 1st Class, C.B.I., Ambala is quashed. It is directed that the trial Magistrate shall proceed with the case expeditiously. The parties through their counsel are directed to appear in the trial Court on 19.2.2002.