JUDGMENT 1. :- By way of instant writ petition, the Union of India through the General Manager, Northern Railway seeks direction to quash and set aside the order of the Central Administrative Tribunal, Jodhpur dated 4.3.1998 whereby the Original Application preferred by the respondent Deen Dayal and Satya Narain has been allowed with the direction to regularise them from the date of their appointment as Material Chasing Clerk (hereinafter referred to as MCC) with all consequential benefits. 2. Briefly stated the facts of the case are that the first respondent Deen Dayal was engaged as a Casual Labour on 13.12.1972 to utilise him as a Gangman with the Assistant Engineer, Northern Railway, Bikaner. Later on he was inducted in the Construction Organisation on 1.2.1976 on ad hoc basis as Gangman in Grade of Rs. 200-250/-. Subsequently his services were utilised on the post of MCC w.e.f. 15.10.1976. The second respondent Satya Narain was initially engaged as a Casual Labour and subsequently he was given appointment in Grade D as Valveman in the Grade of Rs. 196-232 w.e.f. 26.8.1972 under the Inspector of Works, Bikaner. Subsequently he was inducted in the Construction Organisation on being screened on the post of Khalasi in Grade of Rs. 196-232/- vide letter dated 1.2.1976. However, his services were utilised as MCC w.e.f. 15.7.1976. The General Manager, Northern Railway by order dated 11/15.2.1991 directed that all those persons who are working as MCC for more than 3 years on ad hoc basis in Construction Organisation may be screened and regularised on the post of MCC in the grade of Rs. 950-1500/- by giving one time exemption. Accordingly both the respondents were screened on the basis of their length of working as MCC and regularised from the date of panel dated 21.12.1992. Both the respondents filed an Original Application before the Central Administrative Tribunal, Jodhpur under Section 21 seeking direction for their regularisation on the post of MCC w.e.f. the date they were working on the said post i.e. October, 1976. The application was contested on the ground that it was barred by limitation inasmuch as the respondents were regularised on the post of MCC w.e.f. 21.12.1992 and they filed the Original Application in March, 1995 i.e. beyond 3 years. It was further submitted that the Original Application was barred by limitation of 19 years as the relief was sought for regularisation w.e.f. October, 1976. It was further submitted that the Original Application was barred by limitation of 19 years as the relief was sought for regularisation w.e.f. October, 1976. The respondents sought relief mainly on the ground that their case was covered by the decision of the Principal Bench of the Tribunal rendered in B.R. Rahi v. Union of India, O.A. No. 1395/92. With respect to the said contention the petitioner Union of India took the stand that the said judgment was delivered with reference to a particular division and not to the entire Railways. The Tribunal by the impugned order dated 4.3.1998 allowed the O.A. and granted the relief of regularisation on the post of MCC from the date of their appointment. 3. It is contended by Mr. Manoj Bhandari learned counsel appearing for the Union of India that the Tribunal having found that O.A. was barred by limitation has committed error in adjudicating the controversy on merit. He has invited our attention to the opening sentence of Para 5 which reads as follows: "Prima facie the application is barred by the limitation but looking to the circumstances of the case we consider it appropriate to consider the application on merit." we are of the view that the Tribunal having once found that the O.A. was barred by statutory limitation lacked jurisdiction to decide the application on merit. The judgment of the Tribunal deserves to be set aside on this ground alone. 4. As regards merit of the case, the Tribunal observed that the Railway Administration ought to have implemented decision of the Principal Bench of the Tribunal on all the Divisions of the Northern Railway uniformly as to avoid each affected employee to go to the Court for redressal of his grievances in this regard. It is brought to our notice that the said decision of the Tribunal in B.R. Rahi's, case was reversed by the Full Bench of the Central Administrative Tribunal in Ram Lubhaya v. Union of India . It is brought to our notice that the said decision of the Tribunal in B.R. Rahi's, case was reversed by the Full Bench of the Central Administrative Tribunal in Ram Lubhaya v. Union of India . The Full Bench of the Central Administrative Tribunal on consideration of the entire material arrived at the following conclusion: Railway servants hold lien in their parent cadre under a division of the Railways and on being deputed to construction organisation and there having been promoted on a higher post on ad hoc basis and continue to function on that post on ad hoc basis for a very long time would not be entitled to regularisation on that post in their parent division/office. They are entitled to regularisation in their turn, in the parent division/office strictly in accordance with the rules and instructions on the subject. The said judgment was considered by the Division Bench of the Delhi High Court in D.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 2916/2002 (Pritpal Singh v. Union of India and Ors. and similarly constituted matters. The Delhi High Court on consideration of the entire issue arrived at the conclusion that persons working in the Construction Department as MCC, cannot be granted regularisation with the retrospective date. The said decision of the Delhi High Court dated 12.8.2002 is based on a decision of the Apex Court in Union of India v. Kishan Gopal Vyas, 1996(7) SCC 134 . The learned counsel has also brought to our notice a Division Bench judgment of this Court in Durbeen Singh v. Union of India & Ors, 2001 (3) WLC (Raj.) 808 wherein it is held that the persons cannot claim regularisation against the Group C post dehors the rules. The Division Bench after relying on the relevant rules of the Indian Railway Establishment Manual arrived at the conclusion that regularisation cannot be claimed by the incumbents as they were working against the ex-cadre post in the Construction Organisation and were on deputation under the order of the Railway Administration. The decision of the Delhi High Court and this Court squarely covers the controversy involved in the instant case. The respondents were admittedly working as MCC on the ex-cadre post on deputation with the Construction Organisation. There was no channel of promotion from the post of Gangman to the clerical cadre. Thus, the question of regularisation w.e.f. 15.10.1976 does not arise. The respondents were admittedly working as MCC on the ex-cadre post on deputation with the Construction Organisation. There was no channel of promotion from the post of Gangman to the clerical cadre. Thus, the question of regularisation w.e.f. 15.10.1976 does not arise. It is of course true that some of the employees have been given benefit of the judgment of the Central Administrative Tribunal but it is well settled law that the concept of equality as envisaged under Article 14 of the Constitution of India cannot be enforced in a negative manner. When any authority shown to have committed any irregularity or illegality in favour of any individual, any other individual or group of individuals, either cannot claim the same irregularity or illegality on the ground of denial thereof to them. Wrong judgment passed in favour of one individual does not entitle others to claim similar benefits. Reference be made to State of Bihar and Ors. v. Kameshwar Prasad Singh and Anr., JT 2000 (5) SC 389 . In Gursharan Singh and Ors. v. NMDC and Ors., 1996 (2) SCC 459 , the Apex Court held that citizens have assumed wrong notions regarding the scope of Article 14 of the Constitution, which guarantees equality before law to all citizens. Benefits extended to some persons in an irregular or illegal manner cannot be claimed by a citizen on plea of equality as enshrined in Article 14 of the Constitution by way of writ petition filed in the High Court. The Court observed: "Neither Article 14 of the Constitution conceives within the equality clause this concept nor Article 226 empowers the High Court to enforce such claim of equality before law. If such claims are enforced, it shall amount to directing to continue and perpetuate an illegal order for extending similar benefits to others. Before a claim based on equality clause is upheld, it must be established by the petitioner that his claim being just and legal, has been denied to him, while it has been extended to others and in this process there has been a discrimination." 5. Before a claim based on equality clause is upheld, it must be established by the petitioner that his claim being just and legal, has been denied to him, while it has been extended to others and in this process there has been a discrimination." 5. Again in Secretary, Jaipur Development Authority, Jaipur v. Daulat Mal Jain and Ors., 1997 (1) SCC 35 , the Apex Court considered the scope of Article 14 of the Constitution and reiterated its earlier position regarding the equality as follows: "Suffice it to hold that the illegal allotment founded upon ultra vires and illegal policy of allotment made to some other persons wrongly, would not form a legal premise to ensure it to the respondent or to repeat or perpetuate such illegal order, nor could it be legalized. In other words, judicial process cannot be abused to perpetuate the illegalities. Thus considered, we hold that the High Court was clearly in error in directing the appellants to allot the land to the respondents." 6. No appointment in any establishment can be made in violation of the statutory rules or in violation of the provisions contained in Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India. The Apex Court in R.N. Nanjundappa v. T. Timmaiah and Anr., AIR 1972 Supreme Court 1767 has held-- "...Regularization cannot be said to be a form of appointment Counsel on behalf of the respondent contended that regularisation would mean appointment whereas counsel on behalf of the State contended that regularisation did not mean permanence but that it was a case of regularisation of the rules under Article 309. Both the contentions are fallacious. If the appointment itself is in infraction of the rules or if it is in violation of the provisions of the Constitution, illegality cannot be regularized. Ratification or regularisation is possible of an act, which is within the power and province of the authority but there has been some non-compliance with procedure or manner, which does not go to the root of the appointment. Regularisation cannot be said to be a mode of recruitment. To accede to such a proposition would be to introduce a new head of appointment in defiance of rules or it may have the effect of setting at naught the rules." 7. In B.N. Nagarajan and Ors. Regularisation cannot be said to be a mode of recruitment. To accede to such a proposition would be to introduce a new head of appointment in defiance of rules or it may have the effect of setting at naught the rules." 7. In B.N. Nagarajan and Ors. v. State of Karnataka and Ors., AIR 1979 Supreme Court 1676 , the Court held that regularisation cannot be a mode of recruitment in absence of a Statutory Rules. The Court observed: "...It was argued that the regularisation of the promotion gave it the colour of permanence and the appointments of the promoters as Assistant Engineers must therefore be deemed to have been made substantively right from the 1.11.1956. The argument however is unacceptable to us for two reasons. Firstly, the words "regular" or "regularization" do not connote permanence. They are terms calculated to condone any procedural irregularities and are meant to cure only such defects as are attributable to the methodology followed in making the appointments. They cannot be construed so as to convey an idea of the nature of tenure of the appointments. In this connection reference may with advantage be made to State of Mysore v. S.V. Narayanappa and R.N. Nanjundappa v. T Thimmaiah, (1972) 2 SCR 799 ." 8. The Apex Court in Union of India and Ors. v. Kishan Gopal Vyas, 1996 (7) SCC 134 has held: "Appointment to the post of a Storekeeper/Store Issuer/Clerk is regulated by certain rules governing recruitment to the post in the Department. The respondent, if eligible, is entitled to be considered for the same along with all others who may be candidates for the appointment. That is the only correct way of filling these posts which would ensure equal opportunity in the matter of employment as required by Articles 14 & 16 of the Constitution of India to all eligible persons who are candidates for these posts. A direction like the one given by the Tribunal in favour of the respondent or anyone like him has the effect of denying equal opportunity to the other eligible candidates by appointing a person not in accordance with the rules. A direction like the one given by the Tribunal in favour of the respondent or anyone like him has the effect of denying equal opportunity to the other eligible candidates by appointing a person not in accordance with the rules. Any order for absorption and regularisation of a person not appointed in accordance with the rules, given in the manner contained in the impugned order of the Tribunal would result in denial of equal opportunity in the matter of employment to the other eligible candidates for the public offices. Such a course must obviously be eschewed. The Tribunal's order is, therefore, set aside." 9. In the instant case, both the respondents were initially engaged as Casual Labour. They were granted temporary status of Gangman in the year 1972. Both the respondents worked with the Assistant Engineer, Northern Railway, Bikaner. In the year 1976 they were sent on deputation with the Construction Organisation. Both of them accepted the same assignment without any demur. Only in the Construction Division they were asked to work on ad hoc basis as MCC. Thus, the lien of both the respondents remains with the parent Department i.e. the Assistant Engineer, Northern Railway, Bikaner. Thus, the respondents have chance of promotion only in the parent Department wherein they were in Group D. Even their confirmation is to be considered in the parent Department. On the deputation post, they have no right to be considered either for promotion or Absorption. Even the order of regularisation can be issued only by the parent Department and not by the borrowing Department. Strictly speaking regularisation cannot be permitted to be made by borrowing Department as thereby it would amount to their permanent absorption therein. Be that as it may, in no case the respondents are entitled to regularisation on the post of MCC from the date of joining in the borrowing Department. Thus, we are of the view that the Tribunal has committed a manifest error in issuing a direction to the petitioner to regularise the services of the respondents on the post of MCC w.e.f. the date of their joining. 10. Consequently, we allow the writ petition and set aside the judgment of the Central Administrative Tribunal dated 4.3.1998. The O.A. filed by the respondents Deen Dayal Gupta and Satya Narain before the Central Administrative Tribunal stands dismissed. No order as to cost.Writ Petition Allowed. *******