D. P. SENGUPTA, J. ( 1 ) - In the present revisional application the petitioners have challenged an order dated 28. 11. 2000 passed by the learned Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Calcutta in Hare Street P. S. Case No. 782 of 1998 under sections 120b / 406 / 468 / 471 / 419 / 420 / 423 / 424 / 506 of the Indian Penal Code. ( 2 ) THE aforesaid case was registered on the basis of a complaint lodged by the present opposite party No. 1, who lodged a petition of complaint before the learned C. M. M. , Calcutta on 21. 2. 98. The said complaint was forwarded to the Deputy Commissioner of Police, Detective Dept. , Lalbazar for investigation under section 156 (3) Cr. PC, the allegations made in the said complaint is as follows:-the father of the complainant/o. P. No. 1 died a premature death at the age of 30 years, when the present opposite party No. 1 was a child of 7 years. Taking advantage of the helpless condition of the widow and her three children, the present accused / petitioner No. 1 induced the mother of the O. P. No. 1 to entrust him (the accused petitioner) fully with the welfare of the minor children as also of the movable and immovable properties. The present accused/petitioner in this way took the control of the entire movable and immovable properties owned by the deceased father of the complainant/o. P. No. 1. It was further alleged that the petitioner personified himself falsely as the father of the three minor children and to keep them away from other relations, put them in boarding school, where he fraudulently and dishonestly put his name as their father in the school record knowing fully well that he was their maternal uncle. It was alleged that the accused petitioner No. 1 along with other accused persons entered into a deep rooted conspiracy and manufactured false power of attorney containing all false statements, which was beyond the knowledge of the complainant/o. P. No. 1. The accused forged the signature of the complainant in the said document and got it registered with the Notary. The accused No. 5 identified the said forged signature as the signature of the complainant knowing it fully that it was not the signature of the complainant. The accused forged the signature of the complainant in the said document and got it registered with the Notary. The accused No. 5 identified the said forged signature as the signature of the complainant knowing it fully that it was not the signature of the complainant. Accused No. 4 put her signature as a witness in the said forged document. It was alleged that the accused petitioner No. 1 from time to time used the said forged power of attorney as genuine and transferred/sold away huge movable and immovable properties. Since the mother of the complainant/o. P. No. 1 was placed in a mental hospital and the complainant and his brothers were children, the accused petitioner No. 1 who was the maternal uncle of the complainant grabbed the entire property taking advantage of such a helpless situation of the complainant and his brothers. ( 3 ) AFTER the aforesaid case was registered, the investigation of the case was taken up by the Detective Dept. , Lalbazar. While the investigation was in progress, a petition was filed by the I. O of the case with a prayer for production of the said power of attorney dated 18. 11. 96 in original. Such prayer of the I. O. was allowed by the learned Magistrate and the accused petitioner was directed to produce the said document before the investigating officer of the case. The said order was passed by the learned Magistrate on 28. 11. 2000 and summons to produce the said document was issued on the same date. It is at this stage the petitioners have come up before this Court in revision challenging such order. ( 4 ) THE first point raised by the learned Advocate of the petitioners is that after lodging the aforesaid complaint the complainant/o. P. filed a Civil Suit in the Original Side of this Court being C. S. No. 346 of 1998 on 9. 9. 98 on the self same cause of action. The said suit is still pending in this Court. It is pointed out by Mr. Moitra, learned Advocate that in the said suit the complainant/o. P. No. 1 filed an application for injunction and on such application this Court passed an adinterim order of injunction and appointed joint Receiver in respect of the property in question. It is submitted by Mr. It is pointed out by Mr. Moitra, learned Advocate that in the said suit the complainant/o. P. No. 1 filed an application for injunction and on such application this Court passed an adinterim order of injunction and appointed joint Receiver in respect of the property in question. It is submitted by Mr. Moitra that the allegations made in the plaint of the aforesaid suit are the same as those are in the petition of complaint filed by the complainant/opposite party No. 1. In such circumstances, since the Civil Suit is pending before this Court, the present criminal proceeding should not be allowed to continue and the same should be quashed. Mr. Moitra submits that even if this Court is not inclined to quash the criminal proceeding, it should be stayed till the disposal of the Civil Suit. ( 5 ) IN support of his contention Mr. Moitra relies on a judgment of the Hon'ble apex Court reported in JT 2001 (3)SC 271 (Commissioner of Income Tax v. Bhupen Champak Lal Dalal and Anr. ). From a reading of the said judgment it appears that 12 cases were lodged before the Metropolitan Magistrate for offences under the Income Tax Act. Since the appeals were pending before the Appellate Authority under the Income Tax Act, the learned Magistrate passed an order directing stay of the proceeding till the disposal of the appeals before the Income Tax Authority. Such order was affirmed in revision by the learned Session Judge. The matter was brought to the High Court, which issued a Rule and granted an interim order staying the proceedings in the criminal cases. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in such circumstances was of the view that the High Court was justified in granting interim stay of further proceedings in criminal cases. ( 6 ) I have gone through the judgment referred to above and in my considered view the said judgment is not applicable in the present case in view of the fact that the present case is still at the state of investigation and there is no proceeding pending in any Court of law. Police has got a statutory right to investigate a cognizable offence. Investigation of an offence is an exclusive field of the police and Court's function begins with taking cognizance of the offence and not before that. In the present case. Police has got a statutory right to investigate a cognizable offence. Investigation of an offence is an exclusive field of the police and Court's function begins with taking cognizance of the offence and not before that. In the present case. since the case is still at the stage of investigation, it will not be proper for this Court to interfere with the investigation of the case. ( 7 ) THE next argument advanced by Mr. Moitra, learned Advocate appearing for the petitioners is that by the impugned order the learned Magistrate has compelled the accused person to disclose a document which is self incriminatory. In other words section 91 is not applicable to an accused person and it is, according to Mr. Moitra, a clear violation of Article 20 (3) of the Constitution of India. Mr. Moitra submits that Article 20 (3) of the Constitution of India gives protection to an accused person against self-incrimination by affording him protection against testimonial compulsion. By the impugned order the learned Magistrate directed the accused petitioner to produce certain document which is self incriminatory and such direction is in clear violation of Article 20 (3) of the Constitution of India. ( 8 ) IN support of his contention Mr. Moitra relied on a judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court reported in AIR 1965 Supreme Court 1251 (State of Gujarat v. Shyamlal Mohonlal ). In the said case Shyamlal who was a licensed money lender was prosecuted for failing to maintain Books of Accounts in accordance with the provision of the Act. An application was filed by the prosecution praying for a direction upon accused Shyamlal to produce daily book and ledger for a particular year. Such prayer was rejected by the Magistrate. The matter was ultimately brought upto the Supreme Court. The point which fell for consideration before the Hon'ble Supreme Court was whether the expression "person" in section 94 (1) Cr. PC (section 91 Cr. PC in the New Code) comprehends within its sweep a person accused of a offence and if it does so, whether an issue of summons to produce a document in his possession would violate the immunity against self-incrimination guaranteed under Article 20 (3) of the Constitution of India. The majority view in the said decision was that section 94 (1) Cr. The majority view in the said decision was that section 94 (1) Cr. PC (section 91 in New Code) upon its true construction does not apply to an accused person. ( 9 ) MR. Moitra next relies on a judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court reported in AIR 1961 SC 1808 (State of Bombay v. Kathi Kalu Oghad ). Relying upon the aforesaid judgment Mr. Moitra submits that Article 20 (3) of the Constitution of India has been interpreted by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Kathi Kalu Oghad (supra) to mean that an accused person can not be compelled to disclose documents which are self-incriminatory and based on his knowledge. Mr. Moitra submits that in the case of Shyamlal Mohonlal (supra) the case of Kathi Kalu Oghad was also taken into consideration. ( 10 ) THE next judgment relied upon by Mr. Moitra, learned Advocate is reported in AIR 1980 SC 185 (V. S. Kuttan Pillai v. Ramkrishnan ). After going through the said judgment it appears that the point which fell for consideration before the Hon'ble Supreme Court was quite different from the present case. In the case referred to above the complainant made an application before the learned Magistrate for issuance of search warrant to search the office premises and to seize certain documents. Such prayer was allowed, search warrant was issued and in execution of such warrant certain papers and documents were seized from the accused and the same were produced before the Court. Thereafter on an application filed by the accused petitioner to recall the warrant and return the seized articles, the learned Magistrate directed that anything recovered pursuant to the search warrant issued by him, be returned to the person from whom the same were recovered. The complainant thereafter preferred a revisional application before the High Court challenging the correctness of the order passed by the learned Magistrate. The High Court held that the provisions relating to search contained in section 93 (1) of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 are not hit by Article 20 (3) of the Constitution of India. Upholding the order of the High Court it was held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court that search of such a place like public institution under the authority of a general search warrant can easily be sustained under section 93 (1) (c) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. ( 11 ) MR. Upholding the order of the High Court it was held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court that search of such a place like public institution under the authority of a general search warrant can easily be sustained under section 93 (1) (c) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. ( 11 ) MR. Moitra next relies on a judgment reported in AIR 1986 SC 180 (Olga Tellis v. Bombay Municipal Corporation ). In the said decision it was held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court that there can be no estoppel against the Constitution. There also cannot be any waiver of fundamental rights. No individual can barter away the freedoms conferred upon him by the Constitution. A concession made by him in a proceeding, whether under a mistake of law or otherwise, that he does not possess or will not enforce any particular fundamental right, cannot create an estoppel against him in that or in nay subsequent proceeding. Such a concession, if enforced, would defeat the purpose of the Constitution. ( 12 ) I have gone through the judgment referred to above. The principles laid down are well founded and settled principles of law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court. But in my view, reference to the said judgment is not at all necessary for the decision of the present case. ( 13 ) RELYING upon the aforesaid judgment it is submitted by Mr. Moitra that the impugned order dated 28. 11. 2000 passed by the learned C. M. M. , Calcutta suffers from serious illegality inasmuch as by the said order the learned Magistrate directed the accused petitioner to produce a document, which is self incriminating in nature, in violation of the provision of Article 20 (3) of the Constitution of India. ( 14 ) MR. Sekhar Bose, learned Advocate of the complainant/o. p. No. 1 refers to Article 20 (3) of the Constitution of India which is as follows :-"20. (1)???????? (2)???????? (3)NO person accused of any offence shall be compelled to be a witness against himself. " ( 15 ) REFERRING to the aforesaid Article 20 (3) of the Constitution Mr. Bose submits that the provision of Article 20 (3) gives protection to an accused person against compulsion "to be witness" against himself. Laying an emphasis on the words "to be a witness" as appearing in Article 20 (3) of the Constitution, Mr. " ( 15 ) REFERRING to the aforesaid Article 20 (3) of the Constitution Mr. Bose submits that the provision of Article 20 (3) gives protection to an accused person against compulsion "to be witness" against himself. Laying an emphasis on the words "to be a witness" as appearing in Article 20 (3) of the Constitution, Mr. Bose refers to the case of Kathi Kalu Oghad ( AIR 1961 SC 1808 ) particularly paragraph 11 of the said judgment which runs as follows:"the matter may be looked at from another point of view. The giving of finger impression or of specimen signature or of hand writing strictly speaking, is not "to be a witness". "to be a witness" means imparting knowledge in respect of relevant facts, by means of oral statements or statements in writing by a person who has personal knowledge of the facts to be communicated to a Court or to a person holding an enquiry or investigation. A person is said "to be a witness" to a certain state of facts which has to be determined by a Court or authority authorised to come to a decision, by testifying to what he has seen, or something he has heard which is capable of being heard and in not hit by the rule excluding hearsay, or giving his opinion, as an expert, in respect of matters in controversy. *********** The accused may have documentary evidence in his possession which may throw some light on the controversy. If it is a document which is not his statement conveying his personal knowledge relating to the charge against him, he may be called upon by the Court to produce that document in accordance with the provisions of section 139 of the Evidence Act, which, in terms, provides that a person may be summoned to produce a document in his possession or power and that he does not become a witness by the mere fact that he has produced it;" ( 16 ) IT was further held in para 11 of the said judgment as follows :-"it is well established that clause. (3) of Article 20 is directed against self incrimination by an accused person. (3) of Article 20 is directed against self incrimination by an accused person. Self incrimination must mean conveying information based upon the personal knowledge of the person giving the information and cannot include merely the mechanical process of producing documents in Court which may throw a light on any of the points in controversy, but which do not contain any statement of the accused based on his personal knowledge. For example, the accused person may be in possession of a document which is in his writing or which contains his signature or his thumb impression. The production of such a document, with a view to comparison of the writing or the signature or the impression, is not the statement of an accused person, which can be said to be of the nature of a personal testimony. When an accused person in called upon by the Court or any other authority holding an investigation to give his finger impression or signature or a specimen of his handwriting, he is not giving any testimony of the nature of a personal testimony. " ( 17 ) RELYING upon the aforesaid judgment it is submitted by Mr. Bose that mere production of a document or giving information by an accused person does not amount to be a witness against himself. It is further submitted by Mr. Bose that paragraphs 10 and 11 of Kathi Kalu Oghad's case was not taken into consideration in the case of Shyamlal Mohanlal (supra ). ( 18 ) I have heard the learned Advocates of the respective parties. I have also gone through the judgments referred to above. In the present case the learned Magistrate directed the petitioner to produce the particular power of attorney in question which contains the signature of the Complainant / o. p. No. 1 and which is alleged to have been forged. Police is proceeding with the investigation of a case, in which the main allegation is that of forgery of signature of the complainant by the accused persons in the power of attorney and use of the said forged document, knowing it fully well that the said document was forged one, as genuine one before various authorities with an intention to grab the properties of the complainant and his brothers. So, the pivot of the entire case is the particular document (power of attorney) which is in the possession of the present petitioner. So, the pivot of the entire case is the particular document (power of attorney) which is in the possession of the present petitioner. If such a document is not made available to the investigating agency, entire investigation will be frustrated. The document in question does not contain the signature of the accused petitioner. It contains the signature of the complainant which is alleged to have been forged. The production of such a document, for the purpose of comparison of the writing or the signature, cannot be said to be the statement of the accused petitioner and it can never be said to be of the nature of a personal testimony. So in my considered view, the learned Magistrate committed no wrong in direction the petitioner to produce, a particular document in Court as prayed for by the investigating agency. ( 19 ) IN the case of Kathi Kalu Oghad (supra) the point for decision was whether obtaining specimen handwriting or thumb impression of the accused would contravene the constitutional guarantee in Article 20 (3) of the Constitution of India. The matter was heard by a Bench of 11 Judges. The majority view in the said judgment was that immunity from self-incrimination means conveying information based on the personal knowledge of the person giving the information and would not include merely the mechanical process of production documents in Court which may throw a light on any of the points in controversy, but which does not contain any statement of the accused based on his personal knowledge. What is the meaning of the words "to be a witness", as appearing in Article 20 (3) of the Constitution, has been clearly indicated in paragraphs 10, 11 and also in paragraph 16 of the judgment in the case of Kathi Kalu Oghad. So, it is very much clear from Kalu Oghad's case that if an accused produces a document that would not offend Article 20 (3) of the Constitution of India unless the document contains statements based on personal knowledge of the accused. By merely producing such a document the accused cannot be said to be a witness against himself. ( 20 ) IN view of the discussion made above I am of the view that the impugned order does not suffer from any illegality. By merely producing such a document the accused cannot be said to be a witness against himself. ( 20 ) IN view of the discussion made above I am of the view that the impugned order does not suffer from any illegality. The learned Magistrate rightly directed the petitioner to produce the document before the Court in exercise of his power under section 91 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. I am of the view that by mere production of a document in Court a person cannot be said to have become a witness against himself. Signature of a person appearing in a particular document cannot be a statement within the meaning of Article 20 (3) of the Constitution of India. Compulsion regarding document is prohibited only if the document conveys the personal knowlede of the accused person. I do not find any reason to interfere with the order impugned. The revisional application accordingly fails and the same is dismissed. Let urgent xerox certified copy of this order if applied for be supplied to the learned Advocate for the respective part as at early date. Application dismissed