JUDGMENT 1. :- The petitioner, a member of the Rajasthan Judicial Service, has filed the present writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India against the order dated 23.12.2000 issued by the order of the Governor under the signatures of the Deputy Secretary to the Government, Personnel (Ka-3) Department, Government of Rajasthan, whereby the penalty of removal from service was imposed against the petitioner on the basis of the recommendations made by the Full Court of the Rajasthan High Court in its meeting dated 8.11.2000. 2. The petitioner has come with the case that he had joined the Rajasthan Judicial Service (RJS) on 27.7.1985. On the basis of his selection by the Rajasthan Public Service Commissioner (R.P.S.C.) to the Rajasthan Judicial Service, the petitioner was appointed as a Judicial Officer in Rajasthan Judicial Service. The petitioner was confirmed on successful completion of two years' period of probation vide order dated 21.11.1987. The petitioner has given details about his posting uptill 31.5.1994 and has stated that he was promoted as Civil Judge-cum-Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate by order dated 24.5.1994. He has also given the details of his posting as Civil Judge-cum-Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate by order dated 24.5.1994. He has also given the details of his posting as Civil Judge-cum-Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate. He has submitted that he was granted the selection scale of RJS with effect from 4.4.198 on the basis of the merit vide order dated 25.6.1999. In para No. 1.5 of the petition, the petitioner has given the yearwise disposal of the cases from 1985 till the year 2000 as under : 27.7.1985 to 21.8.1987 150% 21.8.1987 to 31.12.1987 160% Year 1988 149% Year 1989 159% + 117% Year 1990 175% Year 1991 175% Year 1992 159% Year 1993 179% Year 1994 98%+134%+150% Year 1995 88%+52%+170% Year 1996 135%+40%+170% Year 1997 128% Year 1998 129% Year 1999 252% Year 2000 above 160%" 3. Through these details, he has sought to convey that the rate of the output of the work to his credit has throughout been good or very good. It has also been stated that he had organised Lok Adalats regularly whereby good number of cases were decided and he also organised 24 to 28 Legal Literacy Camps in a year. Through these details, he has sought to convey that the rate of the output of the work to his credit has throughout been good or very good. It has also been stated that he had organised Lok Adalats regularly whereby good number of cases were decided and he also organised 24 to 28 Legal Literacy Camps in a year. He has also submitted that his service record has been very good and outstanding and no adverse entry whatsoever had been conveyed to him, except for the adverse entry based on the subject matter of the charge and allegations. It is the submission of the petitioner that all along his work has been appreciated by his superiors, and in the Annual Inspection Report dated 19.1.1990, the District Judge has appreciated his work, integrity, devotion and disposal of cases. A part of the Inspection Report relied upon by the petitioner is as under : "During inspection, it appeared that Presiding Officer has disposed of old cases. On overall view it is evident that the level of disposal of cases by the Presiding Officer has been good which is 159% in the year 1989. The Presiding Officer has also discharged additional work of the court of Judicial Magistrate, Barmer, for the year 1989 and which disposal has been 117% which is also commendable. The judgments and orders and standard of judgments is good. As to integrity, no adverse comment/material has been brought to my notice during my tenure. In dialogue with the advocates of the Bar, it has come out that the temperament of the Presiding Officer is quiet and polite." 4. The petitioner goes on to state in the petition that he is a member of scheduled Tribe and hails from rural area and has unblemished record of service to his credit on the basis on which selection scale was granted to him on 4.4.1998. 5. While the petitioner was posted as Munsif & Judicial Magistrate, Sadul Sahar, vide memorandum dated 12.2.1991 issued under the signatures of Justice J.R. Chora, Disciplinary Authority, an enquiry under Rule 16 of the Rajasthan Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1958 was proposed against him on the basis of the allegations as set out in the statement of allegations enclosed with this memorandum along with charges. In all, four charges were sought to be enquired into against the petitioner and the same are reproduced as under : "CHARGE NO.1 That while Shri B.R. Meena, was functioning as Munsif & Judicial Magistrate, Barmer from 21.8.87 to 26.4.90, the District & Sessions Judge, Balotra issued order on 19.2.90 to all subordinate courts including the Munsif & Judicial Magistrate, Barmer that cases arising and registered after 30.1.90 under the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 shall be committed to his court for disposal. On 26.3.90, Constable Man Singh submitted a challan of State v. Nathu Singh and others C.R. No. 30/90, P.S. Barmer Sadar u/section 430 I.P.C. & under Section 3(13) S.C./S.T. (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 before Shri B.R. Meena, Munsif & Judi. Magistrate, Barmer. Shri Meena instead of entertaining the same, threatened the said constable to send him to the jail. Then Shri Hari Prakash Vyas A.P.P. (1) appeared before Shri Meena who instead of entertaining the case told that the order dated 19.2.90 of the Sessions Judge, Balotra was wrong and threatened Shri Vyas also that a case may be registered against him too. These acts amounted to gross misconduct, indiscipline, insubordination & dereliction of duty. CHARGE NO.2. That while Shri B.R. Meena was functioning as above he did not pass any other for registering the above case of C.R. No. 30/90 State v. Nathu Singh & others on 26.3.90 rather he dictated, typed and pronounced it on 27.3.90 rather he dictated, typed and pronounced it on 27.3.90 purported to have been dictated and pronounced on 26.3.90. By aforesaid deeds, Shri Meena committed the acts of manipulation, substitution, addition and alteration in the judicial record which amounts to misconduct. CHARGE NO.3. That while Shri B.R. Meena was functioning as above no bail application was moved by the advocate for the accused or accused persons themselves on 26.3.90 and copy of no such application was ever delivered to the A.P.P. (1) but this fact was intentionally mentioned in the order dated 26.3.90 to cover up the facts mentioned in the charge No.2. When the file was requisitioned by the District Judge on 30.3.90 he found an application for bail purported to have been moved on 26.3.90. Which in fact was got moved by the advocate subsequently at his instance. When the file was requisitioned by the District Judge on 30.3.90 he found an application for bail purported to have been moved on 26.3.90. Which in fact was got moved by the advocate subsequently at his instance. Thus, by this deed Shri Meena become instrumental in manipulation and creation of false & incorrect judicial record and thus he has misused his power and position by pressurising the advocate to move an anti-dated application and thus seriously misconducted himself. CHARGE NO.4 That while Shri B.R. Meena was functioning on the aforesaid post lodged an F.I.R. under section 3(9) S.C./S.T. (Prevention of Atrocities) Ac, 1989 against Shri Hari Prakash Vyas, A.P.P.(I) in the P.S. Barmer on 1.4.90, alleging that Shri Vyas had made a false complaint against him to the District and Sessions Judge, Balotra which was enquired by the District Judge, Balotra. He at the time of registration of the F.I.R. by the S.H.O., P.S. Barmer maliciously and falsely alleged that enquiry conducted by the District Judge was to cause him harm. Thus he unnecessarily and falsely implicated the District Judge, Balotra also in this matter. This amounts to serious insubordination an act of gross indiscipline on the part of Shri Meena and that resulted in undermining the posting of the District and Sessions Judge, Balotra. 6. The petitioner filed reply to the chargesheet on 7.3.91 reserving his right to file the additional reply after inspecting the record. Vide letter dated 23.3.91 issued by the Registrar of the High Court, the petitioner was directed to appear before the Disciplinary Authority on 12.4.1991 for the purpose of recording his plea. The petitioner then raised the grievance that until the copies of the statements of witnesses recorded during the preliminary enquiry, the copy of the enquiry report, list of witnesses of department and copy of the list of documents relied upon by the department in this enquiry, are made available, it was not possible for him to file reply. The plea of the petitioner was recorded on 12.4.1991 and he also submitted additional written statement of defence on 6.1.1992. The enquiry against the petitioner was conducted by four Disciplinary Authorities/Enquiry Judges as under: "From 12.2.1991 to September, 1992 by Hon'ble Mr. Justice, J.R. Chopra (as His Lordship then was) as Disciplinary Authority at Jodhpur; From October, 1992 to March, 1997 by Hon'ble Mr. The enquiry against the petitioner was conducted by four Disciplinary Authorities/Enquiry Judges as under: "From 12.2.1991 to September, 1992 by Hon'ble Mr. Justice, J.R. Chopra (as His Lordship then was) as Disciplinary Authority at Jodhpur; From October, 1992 to March, 1997 by Hon'ble Mr. Justice V.K. Singhal (as His Lordship then was) as Disciplinary Authority and Enquiry Judge at Jaipur; From January, 1998 to August, 1998 by Hon'ble Mr. Justice Rajendra Saxena (as His Lordship then was) as Enquiry Judge at Jaipur; From January, 1998 to august, 1998 by Hon'ble Mr. Justice Rajendra Saxena (as His Lordship then was) as Enquiry Judge at Jaipur; From November, 1999 to 15.7.2000 by Hon'ble Mr. Justice Shri P.K. Tewari (as His Lordship then was) as Enquiry Judge." 7. In the enquiry, nine witnesses (P.W. 1. to P.W. 9.) were examined by the department. It is also the case of the petiticner that Shri Hari Prakash Vyas, A.P.P. (P.W. 8) did not appear as a witness on behalf of the department on several dates and ultimately when he appeared before the Disciplinary Authority on 15.3.1994, he expressed that he did not want to give any evidence against the present petitioner. The petitioner examined Shri Gopal Jingar (Criminal Clerk in MJM Court, Barmer) as DW 1, Shri Narain Singh (Clerk of Shri Swaroop Singh, Advocate) as D.W. 2. He had also submitted written arguments on 7.3.2000. On the basis of the enquiry, the enquiry report dated 15.7.2000 was prepared and the same was sent to the petitioner vide memorandum dated 29.8.2000. The petitioner submitted his representation on 17.9.2000 seeking opportunity of personal hearing. He also submitted additional representation on 1.11.2000 again praying for opportunity of personal hearing and stated that during the pendency of the enquiry proceedings, the Full Court Resolution dated 30.10.1971 had been repealed and the new Resolution was adopted in 1995 which has been used but the same had not been published. 8. Vide order dated 14.11.2000, the petitioner was kept awaiting posting orders and thereafter the news of dismissal of the petitioner from service was published in different newspapers including Rajasthan Patrika. 9. On 8.1.2001, the order dated 23.12.2000 issued by the Department of Personnel, Government of Rajasthan, Jaipur, was served upon him under the covering letter dated 4.1.2001. By this order dated 23.12.2000, the penalty of removal from service was imposed against the petitioner. 9. On 8.1.2001, the order dated 23.12.2000 issued by the Department of Personnel, Government of Rajasthan, Jaipur, was served upon him under the covering letter dated 4.1.2001. By this order dated 23.12.2000, the penalty of removal from service was imposed against the petitioner. The petitioner has also stated that during the pendency of the enquiry as aforesaid against him, he had preferred S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 139 of 1993 at Jaipur Bench, Rajasthan High Court which was transferred to the Principal Seat at Jodhpur which was registered as D.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 5360/1993 challenging the enquiry proceedings as above, but the same was dismissed as withdrawn on 11.1.1995. It is this order of penalty of removal from service which has been challenged through this writ petition. The writ petition was admitted on 5.7.2001, the respondent filed reply on behalf of the respondent No.3, Rajasthan High Court on 20.9.2001 seeking to traverse the case of the petitioner and denying the correctness of all the averments made by the petitioner. 10. It has been stated that the disposal of cases by the petitioner during his service tenure was as under : "Year Percentage 1985 84% 1986 154% 1987 185% 1988 143% 1989 213% 1990 190% 1991 145% 1992 142% 1993 140% 1994 132% 1995 137% 1996 148% 1997 129% 1998 130% 1999 255% 2000 163% 11. It has been denied that the petitioner's service record was good or outstanding and along with reply, Schedule 'A' has been filed which is to be treated as part and partial of the reply to illustrate the adverse service record of the petitioner. However categorical figures relating to the work disposal as stated by the petitioner in para No. 15 of the petition have not been disputed. The contents of the inspection note dated 19.1.1990 has not been disputed but it has been submitted that it has no relevance to the controversy. The petitioner was promoted as Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate vide order dated 24.5.1994 and granted the selection scale on merit with effect from 4.4.98 vide order dated 25.6.1999. It has been stated in this context while replying para No. 1.5 of the writ petition that the petitioner had lodged in F.I.R. the Assistant Public Prosecutor had filed the writ petition and the writ petition was dismissed without going into the merits of the matter. It has been stated in this context while replying para No. 1.5 of the writ petition that the petitioner had lodged in F.I.R. the Assistant Public Prosecutor had filed the writ petition and the writ petition was dismissed without going into the merits of the matter. In the FIR, FR was given and therefore the petitioner had tiled the protest petition which was dismissed by the Chief Judicial Magistrate Barmer on merits and that the petitioner had been transferred from Banner after the representation dated 4.4.90. While replying para No. 1.14, the petitioner has stated that Shri Dev Chand Meena, Additional District Judge was served with a chargesheet under Rule 16 of the C.C.A. Rules, 1958, Mr. Justice V.K. Singhal was nominated as disciplinary authority against Shri Dev Chand Meena. After recording the evidence in the enquiry, Shri Dev Chand Meena submitted his apology which was accepted by the disciplinary authority without going into the merits of the case and the disciplinary authority has observed that it was a fit case in which the officer should be discharged of the alleged misconduct for which a chargesheet was issued and the apology will not come in the way for considering his promotion/seniority. The report, was placed before the Hon'ble Chief Justice and thereafter, Justice P.K. Palli was nominated as disciplinary authority against Shri Dev Chand Meena who submitted the report on 25.1.1995. The matter of Shri Dev Chand Meena was placed before the Full Court on 8.2.1996. The Full Court resolved after considering the report of Mr. Justice P.K. Palli that the report of Mr. Justice V.K. Singhal be accepted and the enquiry against Shri Dev Chand Meena was dropped and this was communicated to Shri Dev Chand Meena was dropped and this was communicated to Shri Dev Chand Meena by the Registrar vide letter dated 14.3.1996. In para No. 1.15, it is submitted that the petitioner submitted an additional reply on 6.1.1992. Mr. Justice J.R. Chopra was Enquiry Judge from Nov. 1990 to July, 1992, Mr. Justice V.K. Singhal was Enquiry Judge from July 1992 to Dec. 1997, Mr. Justice R.P. Saxena was Enquiry Judge from Dec. 1997 to May 1998 and Mr. Justice P.K. Palli was the Enquiry Judge from November, 1999 to 15.7.2000, who ultimately submitted the enquiry report against the petitioner holding the charges to be proved. 1990 to July, 1992, Mr. Justice V.K. Singhal was Enquiry Judge from July 1992 to Dec. 1997, Mr. Justice R.P. Saxena was Enquiry Judge from Dec. 1997 to May 1998 and Mr. Justice P.K. Palli was the Enquiry Judge from November, 1999 to 15.7.2000, who ultimately submitted the enquiry report against the petitioner holding the charges to be proved. In para No. 1.18, the details about the enquiry proceedings have been given. The petitioner's submission with regard to the representation dated 17.9.2000 and 1.11.2000 have been admitted. The case of the respondents is that the charges were proved as per the enquiry report and the findings are based on evidence and after consideration of the enquiry report, the Full Court resolved to impose the penalty of removal from service against the petitioner and in terms of the recommendations of the Full Court, the impugned order was passed against the petitioner.In Schedule "A" to the reply, it has been stated that between the period 1.1.90 to 26.4.90, his integrity was suspicious, his conduct showed that he was not impartial to persons not belonging to SC/ST, he is short tempered, his official conduct was also not the mark, he lacked proper control over the office work, his capacity to control the proceedings in court with firmness and follow the procedure prescribed by law not upto the mark, he is irresponsible officer, remained out of Headquarter from 9.2.90 to 22.2.90 and remained absent from duty on 28.2.90, he even lodged FIR in police against the District Judge, members of the Bar also have very poor opinion about his conduct and work, he was not a good officer, being hot headed and partial, his integrity was also doubtful and that he is a bad officer. It is submitted that as per Schedule "A" para No. 323 of the paper book the petitioner's representation for expunction of above remarks was rejected. Petitioner's writ petition against the adverse remarks and the rejection of his representation for expunction of his.remarks was also rejected on 11.1.1995 and SLP which has been preferred by the petitioner before the Supreme Court was also rejected. SLP No. 8279/95 was decided on 29.1.1997 against the decision in DB Civil Writ Petition 5712/93 decided on 11.1.1995. Petitioner's writ petition against the adverse remarks and the rejection of his representation for expunction of his.remarks was also rejected on 11.1.1995 and SLP which has been preferred by the petitioner before the Supreme Court was also rejected. SLP No. 8279/95 was decided on 29.1.1997 against the decision in DB Civil Writ Petition 5712/93 decided on 11.1.1995. In the Schedule "A", it has been mentioned that the petitioner had also been subjected to warning under Rule 17 of C.C.A. Rules for the reasons that while posted as MJM Barmer during 1990, he violated the provisions of rule 496 of General Rules (Civil) 1986 as he did not join the duty in time and a warning was issued on 10.12.1992 to be careful in future to maintain absolute devotion to duty and dignity of office held by him. The below standard judgments year wise have been given to show that the petitioner's judgments were blow standard in the years mentioned as under and the number of judgments found below standard of each year is as under : "Year No. of Judgments found Below Standard. 1987 1 1987 1 1989 15 1991 1 1995 2 1996 2 1998 2 1999 2 12. The matter has been argued before us on the basis of the pleadings as aforesaid. Shri Jagdeep Dhankhar, Senior Advocate, appearing for the petitioner has raised the following grounds before us: (i) That the finding recorded by the Enquiry Officer are untenable and are not supported by any evidence. (ii) That the petitioner was asked as to whether he wanted personal hearing, the petitioner had asked for the personal hearing, yet the order was passed without affording any personal hearing to the petitioner. (iii) That the copies of the documents had been denied inasmuch as the copy of the preliminary enquiry report was not supplied. (iv) That the copies of the statements of witnesses recorded during the aforesaid enquiry were not supplied. (v) That the Full Court resolution dated 6.1.1995 had not been published and yet the same had been made use of against the petitioner. (vi) That the Rajasthan Public Service Commission was not consulted before passing the order of punishment of removal as is mandatory under Rule 15(2) of the C.C.A. Rules. (vii)That the punishment of removal from service as imposed against the petitioner is highly excessive and shockingly disproportionate and is discriminatory. 13. Shri Jagdeep Dhankar Sr. (vi) That the Rajasthan Public Service Commission was not consulted before passing the order of punishment of removal as is mandatory under Rule 15(2) of the C.C.A. Rules. (vii)That the punishment of removal from service as imposed against the petitioner is highly excessive and shockingly disproportionate and is discriminatory. 13. Shri Jagdeep Dhankar Sr. Counsel appearing for the petitioner pointed out the mitigating circumstances and has also submitted that the charges levelled against him were identical to the charges which were levelled against Shri Dev Chand Meena who was in Higher Judicial Service and yet in his case, the apology had been accepted and the enquiry was withdrawn whereas the petitioner was subject to the penalty of removal from service. 14. Shri Prem Asopa appearing for the respondent No.3 has submitted that the findings are based on evidence and the correctness of the findings of facts cannot be subjected to re-appreciation in the writ of certiorari; that all the documents had been supplied except the preliminary report and the petitioner was not entitled to the copy of the preliminary enquiry report which has not been made use of in the regular enquiry for the purpose of holding any charge to be proved. Shri Prem Asopa has also submitted with the aid of the settled procedure followed in the enquiries in the High Court and the record relating to the enquiry, the copies of the statement are supplied in all such cases to the delinquent officer and the same were in fact supplied to the petitioner also and the grievance in this case is wholly misplaced and misconceived. On the question of non-publication of the Full Court Resolution dated 6.1.1995, it has been submitted that earlier the Full Court Resolution relating to the question of major penalties as was made on 30.10.1971 had already been circulated and the amendment which was made vide Resolution dated 6.1.1995 about which the grievance has been raised that was not published, does not relate to the procedure for major penalties. It was meant only for the cases of minor penalties under Rule 17 and all that was done by the Resolution dated 6.1.1995 was that even the matters under Rule 17 are required to be placed before the Full Court. It was meant only for the cases of minor penalties under Rule 17 and all that was done by the Resolution dated 6.1.1995 was that even the matters under Rule 17 are required to be placed before the Full Court. Whereas, the Resolution dated 30.10.1971 had been circulated and had been dealt with, there was no question of any grievance on account of non-circulation or the non-publication of the amendment Resolution dated 6.1.1995 relating to the minor penalties and no prejudice whatsoever has been caused to the petitioner on this count. The ground that the Rajasthan Public Service Commission was not consulted has been replied by saying that there is no requirement under Article 235 of the Constitution of India to consult the RPSC. Article 235 of the Constitution of India vests complete control of subordinate judicary in the High Court. He has also made reference to Rule 15(f) of the Rajasthan High Court Rules, 1952 and has submitted that the only requirement under Article 235 of the Constitution of India is that the order of major penalty is to be passed by the Governor on the recommendation of the High Court and Rule 15(2) of the CCA Rules 1958 cannot be applied in cases of Judicial Officers. On the question of punishment being shockingly disproportionate and discriminatory; the learned counsel for the respondent Shri Prem Asopa has submitted that the disciplinary authority has found the punishment of removal to be adequate in the facts of this case and looking to the proved charges and allegations against the petitioner, it cannot be said that the punishment is shockingly disproportionate. Shri Asopa has submitted that the petitioner was posted as Munsif & Judicial Magistrate at Barmer from 21.8.1987 to 28.4.1990 and during this period, he had been invested with the jurisdiction to hear all cases arising and registered after 30.1.1990 under the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989. Or, 26.3.1990, Constable Man Singh submitted a challan in the case of State v. Nathu Singh under section 430 I.P.C. and section 3(13) of the Act of 1989. The allegation against the petitioner is that instead of entertaining the case, he threatened that the constable would be sent to jail on account of wrong presentation of challan. Or, 26.3.1990, Constable Man Singh submitted a challan in the case of State v. Nathu Singh under section 430 I.P.C. and section 3(13) of the Act of 1989. The allegation against the petitioner is that instead of entertaining the case, he threatened that the constable would be sent to jail on account of wrong presentation of challan. Thereafter, the constable approached Hari Prasad Vyas, Assistant Public Prosecutor who appeared before the petitioner on that very date, i.e., 26.3.90, and submitted that under the order of the District Judge and in accordance with the provisions of Section 54(2) read with section 193 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the challan had to be presented in his court. The petitioner did not pass any order to register the case, but threatened to register case against Shri Vyas and announced that he will pass an order on 27.3.1990. On 27.3.1990, the Assistant Public Prosecutor submitted a written complaint against the petitioner to the District and Sessions Judge, Shri S.P. Pathak, narrating the allegations.On the basis of the complaint, the District Judge called for the file concerning the said challan and it was found from the file that an order had been passed on 26.3.1990 by the petitioner in the case of State V. Nathu Singh. The allegation against the petitioner was that this order purporting to the order passed on 26.3.90 was in fact dictated on 27.3.90 and thereafter it was back dated to show that it had been passed on 26.3.90. The petitioner had passed an order on 26.3.90 in the case of State V. Hari Singh. In that case, no bail application was moved by or on behalf of the accused on that date, i.e. on 26.3.90 the A.P.P. had not been given a copy of any such application on 26.3.90 and it could be seen from the order that the records of the court had been manipulated. On 30.3.90, the petitioner forced the advocate for the accused to present a bail application which was actually entered in the Court Fee Register on 30.3.90 but it was shown as to have been entered on 26.3.90. On 30.3.90, the petitioner forced the advocate for the accused to present a bail application which was actually entered in the Court Fee Register on 30.3.90 but it was shown as to have been entered on 26.3.90. On 1.4.90, the petitioner lodged an F.I.R. against the A.P.P. Shri Vyas alleging that he had lodged a false complaint against the petitioner to the District and Sessions Judge, Balotra; that evidence had been collected against the petitioner by force threatening the witnesses to harm him and in the F.I.R. which was lodged by the petitioner, the irregularities committed by the A.P.P. Shri Vyas were stated and-it was held out that by reason of suppressing the irregularities committed in the challan, he gave false and fabricated informations to the District Judge, Barmer against him, as a result of which, the District Judge Balotra had to come in the official capacity in the police van and made the enquiry in connection with the file in question; as a result of the enquiry made by the District Judge, he had suffered great mental agony and the evidence was collected against him after giving threats to the witnesses to cause loss to the petitioner. On 2.4.90, the District Judge, Balotra, after taking evidence of Shri Vyas, the A.P.P. Shri Lekhraj, Stenographer, Tarachand Parmer, Reader, Swaroop Singh, Advocate and Man Singh, Constable, sent a report to the Rajasthan High Court for initiating disciplinary proceedings against the petitioner and thereafter a departmental enquiry was initiated against him under Rule 16 of the C.C.A. Rules, 1958. Shri Prem Asopa has submitted that there are charges of committing acts of manipulation, substitution, addition and alteration in the judicial records amounting to misconduct and there are charge of being instrumental in manipulation and creaton of false and incorrect judicial record, misusing his power and position by pressuring the advocate to move antedated application and his conduct in lodging the F.I.R. in which the District Judge was implicated are sufficient to establish the gravity and seriousness of the charges and keeping in view the adverse remarks, his integrity was suspicious coupled with other remarks against him and the warning as was issued under rule 17, it cannot be said that the punishment is shockingly disproportionate. In this regard, Shri Prem Asopa has placed reliance on the decision of the Supreme Court in the cases of State of U.P. & Ors. In this regard, Shri Prem Asopa has placed reliance on the decision of the Supreme Court in the cases of State of U.P. & Ors. v. Nand Kishore Shukla & Anr. , (1996)3 SCC 750 : [ 1996(2) SLR 504 (SC)], Ved Prakash Gupta v. M/s. Delton Cable India (P) Ltd.; (1984)2 SCC 569 : [1984(2) SLR 5 (SC)] and Bharat Ram Meena v. Rajasthan High Court at Jodhpur and Anr., (1997)3 SCC 233 : [1996(1) SLR 678 (SC)]. Shri Asopa has submitted that even the punishment being disproportionate is enough for this court to interfere with the quantum of punishment but the punishment must be shockingly disproportionate and he has submitted that this is not a case in which the punishment can be said to be shockingly disproportionate, keeping in view the proved charges and the element of misconduct. With regard to passing antedated orders and manipulating the record and saying in the open court that the order of the District Judge was invalid order and therefor, it has been submitted by Shri Asopa learned counsel for respondent No.3 that in such a back ground there is no question of interference on the ground of quantum of punishment.He has also submitted that so far as the Officer Shri Dev Chand Meena is concerned, there was no allegation of passing antedated order in his case and the case of Shri Dev Chand Meena in which the apology has been accepted is not all the comparable with the case of the petitioner. It has been further submitted that in the instant case,. the petitioner did not tender any apology at any stage of enquiry proceedings till the final order was passed against him and it is not open for the petitioner to challenge the quantum of punishment on the ground of discrimination. 15. We have considered the submissions made on behalf of both the sides and have also gone through the cases cited before us. 16. 15. We have considered the submissions made on behalf of both the sides and have also gone through the cases cited before us. 16. So far as the first ground as has been raised before us that the charges cannot be said to be proved and that the findings are untenable and not supported by the evidence is concerned, we were not inclined to enter into the question of appreciation of evidence, yet the leanred counsel for the petitioner Shri Dhankhar has read out the evidence before us and has also considered the evidence in its entirety and the finding as has been recorded by the Enquiry Judge, we find that so far as the charge No.1 is concerned, it has been held that there is no order passed by the petitioner with regard to the return of challan, and the challan papers remained in the court itself and the same were not returned to the Constable, Man Singh but what has been held to be proved against the petitioner is that the petitioner had said that the order dated 19.2.90 passed by the District Judge was wrong and that he had used the words of filing wrong challan and that Constable Man Singh and A.P.P. Shri Vyas were liable to be punished, has been held to be proved. We have gone through the statements of Man Singh and Shri Vyas, A.P.P. also that of the District Judge Shri Pathak. Constable Man Singh may not have stated in his statement that such a threat was given by the petitioner to him but this much is proved by the evidence that at least it was said to the concerned A.P.P. Not only this, the other facts which are available on record and the very fact that the petitioner himself had gone to the Additional District Judge, Shri Dev Chand Meena for consultation in this regard, go to show that he had used the word with regard to the wrong filing of the challan and also that the order of the District Judge dated 19.2.90 was wrong and we find that for this purpose, there is sufficient material available on record and the finding of the Enquiry Judge has been correctly arrived at and is supported by evidence. Charge No. 2, 3 and 4 have been dealt with and considered simultaneously because they are found to be interrelated. Charge No. 2, 3 and 4 have been dealt with and considered simultaneously because they are found to be interrelated. By referring to the contents of the Rojnamcha dated 26.3.90, wherein it has been mentioned that the bail was granted on 26.3.90, the bail bonds had also been signed by 26.3,90. It was argued that the order had in fact been passed on 26.3.90 and in this regard, our attention was invited by Shri Dhankhar to initials of the District Judge made on the right hand side in the margin of the ordersheet dated 26.3.90. The initial of the District Judge appears to be dated 26.3.90 and it has been submitted that on the 27th March the District Judge took over the files and at that time the order was already there in the date of 26.3.90. It is of course true that this bail application appears to be presented on 26.3.90 under the signatures of the petitioner but it was entered on 30.3.90 and the stamps were punched on that date but the facts remains that in the dictation book of the Stenographer as has been taken on record and the statement which were made by concerned Stenographer make it clear that the order may have been dictated on 27.3.90 but it was drawn in the date on 26.3.90. Moreover, it cannot be disbelieved that the District Judge did not find the bail application on record on 27.3.90 but he could not have found such bail application on record without requisitioning the file on 30.3.90. The needle of suspicion therefore swings in favour of the finding as has been recorded by the enquiry Judge with regard to the charges No.2 and 3. 17. The Charge No.4 is to the effect that the petitioner had lodged an F.I.R. against A.P.P. Shri Vyas at Police Station Barmer on 1.4.90 that the petitioner made a false complaint against the Additional District Judge, Balotra which was enquired into by the District Judge. At the time of registration of this FIR, the petitioner says that the enquiry conducted by the District Judge was to cause harm to him. A reading of the chargesheet shows that a false complaint had been made to the District Judge and for that reason, he had to ask for report. Shri Hari Prakash Vyas APP did not file such report. A reading of the chargesheet shows that a false complaint had been made to the District Judge and for that reason, he had to ask for report. Shri Hari Prakash Vyas APP did not file such report. The valuable time of the District Judge would not have been lost to this extent but for the situation precipitated by the petitioner. We may find that there was nothing so as to implicate the District Judge too in the later part when he says that the evidence was collected by threatening the witnesses in order to cause harm to the petitioner was certainly objectionable and it seeks to impute motive against the District Judge. In our opinion, the Enquiry Judge has rightly found that this was certainly a statement against the District Judge without any basis that in the preliminary enquiry he collected the evidence against the petitioner by threatening the witnesses. 18. Having considered the entire evidence as is found on record, we find that the first ground which has been raised by Shri Dhankhar that the findings are not tenable and that the same are not supported by evidence cannot be accepted and it is not possible for this court to say after considering the evidence in its entirety that the findings are not tenable or that they are not supported by evidence. On the contrary, it is clear from the material available on record that the petitioner did say that the order dated 19.2.90 issued by the District Judge was a wrong order, he may have threatened the action against the concerned APP and even if it is clear that the challan was not refused and that the challan papers were retained in the court on 26.3.90 without passing any order, the fact remains that the order dated 26.3.90 may have been drawn on 27.3.90 and it also appears that the petitioner from very beginning acted under the belief that the criminal case which was already registered, was registered for the offence under section 430 I.P.C. as well as the offence under the SC/ST (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 and he proceeded under this impresson that although the offences under the SC/ST Act were non-bailable, the police itself granted the bail and therefore he may have decided that they were liable to be prosecuted and punish for filing a wrong challan whereas the factual contention was that on 26.3.90 when the bail was granted by the police the case was registered only under section 430 Indian Penal Code. The case was registered under the SC/ST (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 later on i.e. after 26.3.90 and therefore, the petitioner had proceeded under wrong impression. It also appears from the preponderance and probability of the evidence that the order purporting to be dated 26.3.90 wag - only drawn in the date of 26.3.90. Thus, the first contention as has been raised before us on behalf of the petitioner falls and is hereby rejected. 19. Shri Dhankhar, learned counsel for the petitioner may be right in telling that it was communicated to the petitioner as to whether he wanted personal hearing and in response thereto, he had stated that he did want a personal hearing and yet no personal hearing was afforded to the petitioner before passing the order. However, we find from the scheme of the C.C.A. Rule that there is no statutory requirement of giving a personal hearing and therefore even if it was mentioned in the letter that he wanted to be heard in person and the petitioner replied that he wanted to be heard in person and yet he was not afforded an opportunity of personal hearing, in our opinion would not vitiate the order. It cannot be said more particularly when we notice that earlier, when the punishment as was published was for dismissal from service and ultimately, the penalty or removal from service i.e. the lessor penalty than the dismissal has been ordered. In this regard, reliance has been placed on a decision in the case of M.D. E.C.I.L. Hyderabad v. B. Karunakar, (1993)4 SCC 727 : [1993(5) SLR 532 (SC)] rendered by the Constitutional Bench of Hon'ble the Supreme Court. It was essentially a case on the question of supply of the copy of the enquiry report and in the facts of the present case, the copy of the. enquiry report was supplied and the petitioner had made his representation and after considera in of the representation, the Full Court had resolved that it was not necessary to give the opportunity of personal hearing as there was no requirement of rule of this effect. Therefore, we find that in this regard no prejudice can be said to have been caused and this point as has been raised by the petitioner is hereby rejected. 20. Regarding the grievance of denial of opportunity, it is admitted before us by the learned counsel for the petitioner that all other documents had been supplied to him except the preliminary enquiry report. The non-supply of the preliminary enquiry report does not impinge upon the validity of the enquiry, more particularly when it is established that the preliminary enquiry report has not been made use of in the regular enquiry by the Enquiry Judge so as to hold the charge to be proved. Such grievance about the non-supply of the preliminary enquiry report has been raised often before the court but the same has not found favour with the courts. This contention is therefore rejected. 21. The petitioner's next ground with regard to the denial of the copies of the statements of witnesses during the course of enquiry is factually incorrect. The copies were supplied to the petitioner during the course of enquiry proceedigs itself and the signatures of the petitioner had also been taken it is established practice and procedure during the course of enquiry that the copies of the statements of the witnesses recorded during the course of enquiry are supplied to the delinquent officer then and there and in this regard an additional affidavit dated. 18.1.2002 has been placed on record. 18.1.2002 has been placed on record. It is, therefore, not possible for us to hold that any reasonable opportunity were denied or that the statements had in fact not been supplied to the petitioner and in our opinion no prejudice has been caused to the petitioner. 22. The next contention is about the non-publication of the resolution dated 6.1.95. On this question we are satisfied with the reply as has been given by Shri Asopa that this resolution relates to the case of minor penalties placed before the Full Court and only by way of amendment of earlier resolution dated 30.10.1971 which has been duly circulated. It is not the case of the petitioner that the resolution dated 30.10.1971 had not been circulated. Once the resolution dated 30.10.1971 had been circulated, the amendment in respect of minor penalties even if not circulated cannot have any impact, so far as the correctness and fairness in the case at hand is concerned, which were followed for major penalty under rule 16 of the CCA Rules. This contention, therefore fails. 23. The ground that the Rajasthan Public Service Commission was not consulted and the final order was passed deserves to be o'tt rightly rejected on the basis of the provisions of Article 235 of the Constitutions of India and in our opinion, when the orders are passed by the Full Coun in the matters of punishment, it is not necessary to consult the R.P.S.C. because the High Court has the full control over the subordinate courts and for that purpose, the High Court need not go to consult the R.P.S.C. as to whether the disciplinary powers are required to be exercised or not. Particularly keeping in view the provisions of Article 235 of the Constitution of India. The mandate of rule 15(2) of C.C.A. Rules 1958 cannot be made applicable in the decisions and matters relating to the subordinate judicial officers in view of the constitutional provisions contained in Article 235 of the Constitution of India. Therefore, this contention also fails and the same is hereby rejected. 24. Having failed on all the contentions and faced with such a situation Shri Dhankhar has submitted that in any view of the matter, this is certainly a case in which the punishment of removal from service is shockingly disproportionate and that it is also a case of uneven punishment. 24. Having failed on all the contentions and faced with such a situation Shri Dhankhar has submitted that in any view of the matter, this is certainly a case in which the punishment of removal from service is shockingly disproportionate and that it is also a case of uneven punishment. Looking to the charges as were levelled against Shri Dev Chand Meena who was a member of the R.H.J.S. and in his case the apology was accepted and he was pardoned. Shri Dhankhar has also pointed out that in the present case, there are number of mitigating circumstances which are obtaining so as to warrant a lenient view. Apart from the fact that the petitioner has been an officer of good record and unimpeachable conduct except for a short period in the year 1990 and that too relating to the very same allegations of which this enquiry has been held; that the petitioner has already suffered the agony of prolonged enquiry proceedings for a period of nearly one decade, that during the pendency of the enquiry he was a period of nearly one decade, that during the pendency of the enquiry he was granted the senior scale in the year 1994 and selection scale with effect from 4.4.98 on the basis of merit and was promoted as Civil Judge-cum-Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, that his work, conduct, performance and integrity have been appreciated by the same District Judge, also, as per the annual inspection report dated 19.1.1990 which has been quoted in the earlier part of this order, are the consideration which may weigh in his favour for reducing the punishment. 25. That the petitioner is a member of Scheduled Tribe and is from rural areas that charge against the petitioner and Shri Dev Chand Meena is substantially the same but the punishment given to the petitioner is highly disproportionate, and it was hardly a case of penalty of removal from services whereas in face of similar allegations against Shri Dev Chand Meena, his apology was accepted. 26. 26. We have gone through the contents of the charges, findings and the evidence available on record more than once, while the charges have been held to be proved and the findings cannot be disturbed as have been recorded by the Enquiry Judge, we do find that there is nothing against the petitioner to indicate that he acted with an ulterior motive or that there was anything against him on the point of integrity in the manner he as acted on 26.3.90 and thereafter. The question as to what had the petitioner gained for himself or what he could have gained by acting in the manner he has acted, remains unanswered. It appears that right from beginning, the petitioner was under the impression that the criminal case as was registered was for non - bailable offence, and he may have over reacted because he himself is a member of Scheduled Tribe and the offence was with regard to the prevention of atrocities against the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes. The petitioner himself granted the bail and later on when he realised that initially the case was registered only under section 430 I.P.C. and that he ought not to have acted in the manner in which he acted on 26.3.90, he granted the bail. It has been argued by Shri Asopa himself that actions which the petitioner took after 26.3.90 were only to cover the mistake, which was committed on 26.3.90 as referred in charge No.2 itself. It is , therefore, obvious that it was not with any oblique motive or for any personal gain. It was only an action taken on the basis of mistaken belief and in doing so, the petitioner has reacted against the official who presented the challan and he also said that the order dated 19.2.90 passed by the District Judge was a wrong order. Because of lack of experience he acted in hot haste so as to file an F.I.R. against the A.P.P. These things certainly constitute a misconduct. However, the question is whether the conduct of the petitioner in doing of these actions was a case of such a misconduct so as to entail the punishment of removal from service. The petitioner has been in service since 1985. It is a fact that prior to the date of incident in question, his service record is clean. On the contrary, the same was commended. The petitioner has been in service since 1985. It is a fact that prior to the date of incident in question, his service record is clean. On the contrary, the same was commended. The date and details with regard to the disposal of cases by the petitioner as has been produced in the reply filed by the High Court itself show that the disposal of cases of this officer has remained not only good or very good but even outstanding for some years. Such an officer if at one point of time is reported to have committed one mistake under the mistaken belief, had taken unwarranted steps so as to cover up the earlier mistake and thereby misconducted himself, in our opinion, it is really shocking, if he is punished with the extreme punishment of removal from service. No doubt, from the very beginning, strong words and vocabulary has been used against the petitioner by the respondents, it is a matter which has taken a shape in a wrong direction only on account of lack of experience, incorrect application and wrong wrong perception of the fact. We find in this case that there was no mischievous or oblique motives on the part of the petitioner. He has acted in a hot haste in which he remained under the impression that the criminal case as was registered initially, was a non-bailable and yet the police had granted the bail. He could not notice that offence as was initially registered was an offence under section 430 I.P.C. only, and no case till 3.30 p.m. was registered against the persons under the provisions of SC/ST Act. Therefore, we find that any mischievous act or oblique motive, on the part of the petitioner is throughout lacking. It is case of mistaken belief and thereafter taking further steps in order to cover up the earlier mistake. The bail in this case was granted and in fact it appears from the Rojnamcha also. The order was drawn on 27.3.90 in the date of 26.3.90. Such practice has to be deprecated and cannot be encouraged. We are of the considered opinion that the punishment of removal from service against the petitioner is shockingly disproportionate. The bail in this case was granted and in fact it appears from the Rojnamcha also. The order was drawn on 27.3.90 in the date of 26.3.90. Such practice has to be deprecated and cannot be encouraged. We are of the considered opinion that the punishment of removal from service against the petitioner is shockingly disproportionate. We are of the opinion that it is the mischief which should be punished and the mistake is to be pardoned.The petitioner has no doubt been at mistake, he could have acted wisely and could have also avoided the action or utterance in haste, but certainly there is no mischief and neither he gained nor he could gain anything for himself by acting in the manner he acted at the time of alleged incident in question. To err is human. Even most able judges are likely to err some time but the magnitude of error and the consequences of such error would determine as to whether it is punishable or not and if punishable to what extent? We have to remember that punishment must be proportionate to the element of misconduct involved in the case and fact situation in which the offence was committed. We are of the opinion, that, for the element of misconduct in this case, the petitioner is liable to be punished only by a punishment, which may be any punishment short of rendering him jobless. 27. The contention of uneven punishment (as compared to Dev Chand Meena's case) has also engaged our attention considerably while taking the above view. On this aspect of the matter, we were reminded of a Judgment rendered by Hidayatullah C.J. as he then was in 1970. We must commend Shri Prem Asopa Sr. Counsel, though appearing for respondents in this case made efforts, devoted time and very candidly produced before us the case of Rameshwar Dayal v. State of U.P. , 1971(3) SCC 924 i.e. Criminal Appeal No. 168 of 1969 decided on February 2, 1970 (quorum : M. Hidayatullah C.J. A.N. Ray and I.D. Dua, JJ.). The contents of this order are reproduced as under : "Hidayatullah, C.J. - This appeal has been admitted only on the question of sentence by this Court in somewhat unusual circumstances. The contents of this order are reproduced as under : "Hidayatullah, C.J. - This appeal has been admitted only on the question of sentence by this Court in somewhat unusual circumstances. Two members of the Police Armed Constabulary who had joined very recently and who were only trainee recruits, wished to go to their village and applied for leave on the ground that their wives were ill. This was their defence. The finding is that they did not apply but deserted their post and therefore committed an offence under Section 6(a) of the U.P. Pradeshik Armed Constabulary Act, 1948. The prosecution case had been accepted that they deserted service. Unfortunately the two cases were tried before two different Sessions Judges. Although the offences were the same, the defences were also the same and the facts were absolutely the same, the sentences passed on their conviction were widely different. The present appellant received 7 years rigorous imprisonment an the other accused was sentenced to 4 years rigorous imprisonment. They both appealed and unfortunately again, the appeals came before different Judges in the High Court. One learned Judge reduced the sentence of 7 years to 4 years' and the other learned Judge reduced the sentence of 4 years' to three months. This show how the question of sentences awarded in a crime may be viewed differently by different Judges, a problem which has never been solved satisfactorily so far. However, the two cases being identical, it looks somewhat odd that one of the accused should be sentenced to 4 years' imprisonment while another who committed the identical offence and in the like circumstances should be sentenced to three months' imprisonment. We must do something to make the punishment even in these two cases. We are told that the appellants in this case have undergone imprisonment for nearly ten months and we think it would be enough to say that the appropriate sentence in his case is the period of imprisonment already undergone by him. The appeal is allowed to this extent." 28. It is therefore clear whether the matter is of a civil or criminal nature so far as the parity is concerned, courts have always favoured even standards and have discarded the application of uneven standards in similar or identical cases. Uneven treatment is not at all palatable to the judicial conscience of the court. 29. It is therefore clear whether the matter is of a civil or criminal nature so far as the parity is concerned, courts have always favoured even standards and have discarded the application of uneven standards in similar or identical cases. Uneven treatment is not at all palatable to the judicial conscience of the court. 29. The result of the aforesaid discussion is that the impugned order dated 23.12.2000 imposing the penalty of removal from service against the petitioner is hereby quashed and set aside. The respondents are directed to reinstate the petitioner forthwith in the service and it will he open for the respondents to pass any appropriate order of punishment against him which may be short of rendering him jobless. However, the consequences for the intervening period from the date of the order of punishment till the date the petitioner is reinstated and put back in service will depend upon the order which may now he passed by the disciplinary authority including the order as to how this period is to be regulated with regard to the petitioner. The petitioner shall also be entitled to all consequential benefits. 30. This writ petition is hereby allowed in part as above. No order as to costs.Petition partly allowed. *******