Research › Search › Judgment

Rajasthan High Court · body

2002 DIGILAW 1910 (RAJ)

Man Singh v. The State of Rajasthan

2002-12-03

PRAKASH TATIA

body2002
JUDGMENT : 1. Heard learned counsel for the parties. 2. The petitioner has challenged the action of the respondents by which the petitioner's candidature for the post of Motor Vehicle Sub-Inspector was rejected by the Rajasthan Public Service Commissioner (for short 'the R.P.S.C.') order dated 21.6.2002. Brief facts of the case are that the petitioner in pursuance of the advertisement dated 1.10.2001 published on 15.10.2001 applied for the selection to the post of Motor Vehicles Sub-Inspector. The petitioner took the examination and was declared passed in that examination but on 21.6.2002 the petitioner was informed by the R.P.S.C. that after declaration of the result it was found that he was not eligible on the ground that he was not possessing requisite qualification having Heavy Motor Vehicle Driving Licence. 3. According to the learned counsel for the petitioner the action of the respondents is contrary to law. It is submitted that the petitioner is being discriminated. The persons who yet appeared in final year examination are permitted to produce their certificates till at the time of interview whereas it is denied in the matter of driving licence. According to the learned counsel for the petitioner as per the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court, eligibility is to be seen as on the date of interview and not as on the date of advertisement. 4. The learned counsel for the petitioner also submits that this Court in S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 4742/2002 issued notice for final disposal to the respondent and granted interim ex-parte order and permitted the candidate to appear in the interview and in another writ Petition No. 2234/2002 passed an order to keep one post vacant for the petitioner of that case. The learned counsel for the petitioner relied upon the judgment rendered in the case of Vishnu Traders v. State of Haryana and ors. reported in 1995 Supp(1) SCC 461 wherein the Hon'ble Apex Court held that there is a need for consistency of approach and uniformity in the exercise of judicial discretion respecting similar cases and the desirability to eliminate occasions for grievances of discriminatory treatment requires that all similar matters should receive similar treatment except where factual differences require a different treatment. Therefore, learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the writ petition of the petitioner deserves to be given same treatment of keeping it pending and same interim order be passed. 5. Therefore, learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the writ petition of the petitioner deserves to be given same treatment of keeping it pending and same interim order be passed. 5. Learned counsel for the respondent submits on merits that the matter is squarely covered by the various judgments of the Hon'ble Apex Court. One of which is case of Bhupendrapal Singh and ors. v. State of Punjab and ors., 2000 (V) SCC 262 , wherein the Hon'ble Apex Curt held that if cut off date is laid down in the relevant rules for qualification it has to be followed otherwise it may be prescribed in advertisement, and if no such date is prescribed, eligibility has to be determined as on the last date of receipt of applications. The Hon'ble Apex Court held that State of Punjab was following prompt practice of determining eligibility conditions as on the last date of interview, the practice was directed to be discontinued. 6. Before proceeding to examine the legal effect of the judgment relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioner delivered in the case of Vishnu Traders v. State of Haryana and others, 1995 Supp(1) SCC 461 , it will be relevant to refer the facts of the present case. 7. The present writ petition was filed on 7.8.2002 and was listed in this Court on 9.8.2002. Adjournment was sought by the petitioner, therefore, the case was listed in Court on 19.8.2002. Again on request, it was adjourned to 21.8.2002 but before different Bench on last two occasions. On 21.8.2002, brother justice Shri S.K. Garg passed the order to issue notice to the respondent for writ petition as well as of the stay petition. At this stage it was not pointed out that this Court has already issued notice of final disposal in S.B. Civil Writ Petition No 2234/2002 and passed the interim order keeping one post vacant. Therefore, the order dated 21.8.2002 was passed by the Court in presence of the petitioner and at that time, no request was made to pass a similar order nor the above order dated 11.7.2002 was placed before the Court on 21.8.2002. Therefore, the order dated 21.8.2002 was passed by the Court in presence of the petitioner and at that time, no request was made to pass a similar order nor the above order dated 11.7.2002 was placed before the Court on 21.8.2002. When the court has issued notice to show cause to the respondents then the respondents have every right to show cause why the writ petition may not be admitted or interim order may not be granted, otherwise the very purpose of order dated 21.8.2002 will frustrate. The learned counsel of the respondents again relied upon the order of this Bench delivered in S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 4742/2002 wherein also this Court issued notice for final disposal and granted ad interim order after recording the plea raised by the petitioner in S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 2802/2002, another Bench has not passed any interim order. It appears that when different advocates appear or the petitioner appears in person in an identical matter, they may not have knowledge of the interim order passed by the Courts and that may be a bona-fide reason for not pointing out the earlier orders. Here in all cases, it is clear that the earlier orders were not placed before the Bench who passed the different orders. 8. In the light of the above facts, we have to examine the legal position as understood by the learned counsel for the petitioner is correct or not. First of all the Hon'ble Apex Court was seized of the matter wherein the grievance of the petitioner was that condition for grant of stay vary widely from Bench to Bench in the High Court and that while in an earlier writ petition and the connected cases, a Division Bench had ordered unconditional stay on 17.6.1993 and continued the same order on 7.9.1993 but, in the case before the Hon'ble Supreme Court, the Bench of the High Court imposed a condition of payment of 25% of the demand. The Hon'ble the Apex Court, after considering the facts of the case observed as under:- "In the matters of interlocutory orders, principle of binding precedents cannot be said to apply. The Hon'ble the Apex Court, after considering the facts of the case observed as under:- "In the matters of interlocutory orders, principle of binding precedents cannot be said to apply. However, the need for consistency of approach and uniformity in the exercise of judicial discretion respecting similar causes and the desirability to eliminate occasions for grievances of discriminatory treatment requires that all similar matters should receive similar treatment except where factual differences require a different treatment so that there is assurance of consistency, uniformity, predictability and certainty of judicial approach." 9. From a bare perusal of the above decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court, it is clear that Hon'ble the Apex Court specifically held that in the matter of interlocutory orders, principle of binding precedents cannot be said to apply but, thereafter, held that there must be similarity in the orders provided the facts are same. Therefore, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has not held that even in the matter where there occurs differences of facts even then similar orders are required to be passed. 10. It may result into great hardship to the litigants also if the court looking to the facts of the case and having sufficient time to serve notice upon the respondent, refuses to pass interim order so that other party may also be heard without causing any hardship to the petitioner but on this ground alone, that in earlier petition, no stay order was granted, in another petition stay sought when the threat is imminent without there being any change in the fact of the case except to approaching of the petitioner of subsequent petition late in court with all the sufficient reasons available to the petitioner. In this circumstance, if the court refuses to pass the interim order for which the court was satisfied even on earlier occasion but has not passed the interim order looking to the circumstances in which the petitioners came before the court without there being any change in "fact of the case." 11. Even requirement of rule of procedure is that to pass similar order even then there is a distinction here in this case. The earlier cases were cases in which ad interim orders were passed and the writs were kept pending and the writ petitions have not been admitted by the court. Even requirement of rule of procedure is that to pass similar order even then there is a distinction here in this case. The earlier cases were cases in which ad interim orders were passed and the writs were kept pending and the writ petitions have not been admitted by the court. Here in this case, the circumstance and the fact have changed in view of the reason that after notice, the respondents have put in appearance, filed their replies. The petitioner has also submitted his rejoinder and the case is matured for hearing for admission which may result into, either admission of the writ petition or rejection of the writ petition and in case the court thinks proper to admit the writ petition, the court may pass interim order or may refuse the interim relief after satisfying with the arguments of the respondents. None of the above facts were available in any other case referred by the learned counsel for the petitioner. Issuing notice for final disposal in any petition, cannot preclude the court from deciding finally another petition in which the pleadings are complete and the purpose of issuing notice has already been served with the appearance of the respondents with their defenses. It is also in the interest of justice to settle the dispute as early as possible so that similarly situated persons may know their position in law and may not remain in illusion or dream of getting same relief or the respondents may not proceed on a wrong assumption of denying the relief to the legitimate person. It is desirable to settle the controversy as early as possible finally rather than to keep it pending and, thereby inviting unnecessary litigations. The finality of the order also permits the aggrieved party to challenge the order by filing appeal which is also in the interest of justice and shorten the time of litigation. Therefore, the request of the learned counsel for the petitioner that even when the pleadings are complete, this Court should only pass an interim order of stay and refuse to take cognizance of the order passed on 21.8.2002 of issuing notice to the respondent to show cause notice with respect to the pleading taken by the petitioner, cannot be accepted. Therefore, the request of the learned counsel for the petitioner that even when the pleadings are complete, this Court should only pass an interim order of stay and refuse to take cognizance of the order passed on 21.8.2002 of issuing notice to the respondent to show cause notice with respect to the pleading taken by the petitioner, cannot be accepted. It is further clear that the stage has changed substantially in the present writ petition from the stage which was available in earlier writ petition in which the interim orders were passed. Therefore, there is no force in the submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner to keep the writ petition pending and pass the interim order in favour of the petitioner by ignoring all the pleadings raised by the respondents. 12. On merits, the learned counsel for the petitioner relied upon the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court delivered in the case of Ashok Kumar Sharma and another v. Chander Shekher and another and connected matter, 1993 Supp (2) SCC 611 , wherein the Hon'ble Apex Court held that "In order to have wider selection, it was in public interest to entertain applications of the candidates who did not possess requisite educational qualification on the date of application but possessed it on the date of interview." The learned counsel for the respondents pointed out that the said judgment was reviewed by the Hon'ble Apex Court and the Hon'ble Apex Court held that the view taken in the above judgment is unsustainable and amounted to clear error of law apparent on the face of record. This review judgment is reported in 1997 (4) SCC 18 . Therefore, the controversy is settled by the Hon'ble Supreme Court that the qualification are to be seen as on the date of advertisement and not to the date of interview. Hence there is no force in the submission of the petitioner on this point. 13. The learned counsel for the petitioner vehemently submitted that the entire process of selection itself deserves to be quashed on the ground that the respondents permitted production of the educational qualification certificates till the date of start of interview but denied for production of driving licence. 13. The learned counsel for the petitioner vehemently submitted that the entire process of selection itself deserves to be quashed on the ground that the respondents permitted production of the educational qualification certificates till the date of start of interview but denied for production of driving licence. The argument is of two folds; one is that the petitioner is also entitled for the same treatment and should have been permitted to produce the driving licence before the date of start of interview and, secondly, in case this relief cannot be granted to the petitioner then in view of the judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court delivered in the case of Ashok Kumar Sharma and others v. Chander Shekhar and another, (1997) 4 SCC 18 , fixing a subsequent date for submitting the educational qualification certificate by the candidate from the date of advertisement makes the entire process of selection illegal. 14. It is settled law that a person taking chance of selection in the process of selection and failing in that, cannot be permitted to challenge the process of selection itself, therefore, the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner deserves to be rejected only on the this ground. It is also further clear that Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of State of Bihar v. Kameshwar Prasad Singh, (2000) 9 SCC 94 observed that : "When any authority is shown to have committed any illegality or irregularity, in favour of any individual or group of individuals, others cannot claim the same illegality or irregularity on the ground of denial thereof to them." 15. Not only this, but the Hon'ble Apex Court further observed that "wrong judgment passed in favour of one person does not entitle others to claim the same benefits." When the petitioner is not entitled to challenge the process of selection, this Court need not to decide whether the permission granted to the persons to submit their educational qualification certificates till the date of interview is valid or not. 16. Therefore, there is no force in the writ petition and the same is hereby dismissed.Petition dismissed.