JUDGMENT 1. - This matter was argued by Shri Kewalram on behalf of the petitioner but during pendency of pronouncement of judgment, since he died, it is pronounced in his absence. Therefore, a certified copy of this judgment be sent to the petitioner. 2. Jodh Singh petitioner by way of this petition has sought to challenge his termination from services of Rajasthan Rajya Vidyut Prasaran Nigam Limited (for short "Nigam") and further prayed for grant of consequential benefits viz. (1) treating him in continuous service, (2) granting graded pay scale alongwith other allowances such as D.A., H.R., C.C.A. as admissibied to a Class IV servant or Order lies as revised from time to time from the date of his first appointment on 1.1.1979; (3) payment of bonus in arrears for previous years as paid to other employees of the respondents under the Payment of Bonus Act, 1965 or ex gratia bonus; and (4) making him member of Employees Provident Fund under the Employees P.Fs & Misc. Provisions Act, 1952 and then deposit it in his account, (5) shares of employee & employer with interest as allowable as per rules for his service tenure. 3. Undisputably, the petitioner was appointed as Orderly at a consolidated pay of Rs. 240/- per month for working at the residence of the Assistant Engineer (134-A) Sub Station Procurement Circle, R.S.E.B. Jaipur by an order dated 6.1.1979 (Ann. 2) on the following conditions: 1 . The appointment is purely temporary and on ad hoc basis for a period of three months. 2. His services are likely to be terminated at any time without any further notice. 3. Other terms & conditions of service will be the same as are applicable from time to time to the employees of his cadre in the R.S.E.B. 4. It is further petitioner's case that he continued as Orderly by getting temporary extension from time to time on the same terms and conditions as stated in his initial appointment order dated 6.1.1979 (Ann. 2) as is event from last order dated 30.9.1990 (Ann. 3) by which such term was lastly extended from 1.10.1990 to 31.12.1990. However, he was paid a consolidated pay of Rs. 240/- per month only during the entire period of 11 years from 1.1.1979 till the impugned order was passed on 6.11.1990 terminating his service. Hence this petition. 5. 2) as is event from last order dated 30.9.1990 (Ann. 3) by which such term was lastly extended from 1.10.1990 to 31.12.1990. However, he was paid a consolidated pay of Rs. 240/- per month only during the entire period of 11 years from 1.1.1979 till the impugned order was passed on 6.11.1990 terminating his service. Hence this petition. 5. It is the case of the petitioner that he has been performing similar duties as having been performed by other class IV employees but he- has been given only consolidated monthly pay of Rs. 240/- since 1979 while other Orderlies were being paid graded pay scale of Rs. 240-5-260-7-372 which was revised to Rs. 400-6-430-10-550-15-640 from 1.4.1980 plus D.A., H.R.A., C.C.A. & other allowances duly further revised subsequently. Further case on his behalf was that during entire tenure he was not allowed any leave, weekly holidays, nor any bonus was paid under the Payment of Bonus Act, 1965 nor ex gratia payment was made to him, besides exceeding benefit of the Employees PF & Misc. Provisions Act, 1952. 6. Shri Kewalram learned counsel for the petitioner contended that the petitioner has not been paid any compensation as required Under section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 before terminating his II years' uninterrupted and continuous service, rather he was discriminated qua similarly placed Orderlies by non payment of equal pay despite his having performed similar & identical official work as Class IV employees throughout his entire II years' service with the respondents which has resulted in denial of equal pay for equal work in violation of Articles 14, 16, 39-a & 41 of the Constitution besides violative of provisions of s.25F of the I.D. Act. 7. Mr. J.K. Singhi, learned counsel for the respondents contended that once the petitioner had never been appointed on regular basis by following process of recruitment as prescribed under the service Rules of the respondents for the post of Orderly of his initial appointment was only under a particular sponsored scheme but that scheme having been abolished, he stood surplus, inasmuch as he was not found suitable and therefore was not selected by the Screening Committee and that being so, as is evident from his termination letter dated 6.1 1.1990 (Ann. 5) sent by registered post, he was also offered to collect due & admissible amount, for which Banker's cheque was also sent by way of compensation for a sum of Rs. 1718/- Under section 25-F of the I.D. Act, which the petitioner accepted afterwards albeit after twice refusal of registered post letters. As regards grant of regular pay scale apart from other allied allowances with bonus, PF contribution and ex gratia payment, Shri Singhi asserted that once the petitioner was not a regular employee of the Nigam, the question of payment of these amounts does not arise in any case. 8. At the time of admission of this petition, while considering stay petition, this Court by its interim order dated 18.12.1990, ordered that operation of order dated 6.11.1990 terminating the services of the petitioner is stayed and the petitioner shall be allowed to continue as earlier as he was continuing prior to the passing of the impugned order dated 6.11.1990. This interim stay order dated 18.12.1990 has been confirmed under order dated 25.2.1991. 9. Be that as it may the petitioner may have been continuing as Orderly only upon stay orders as earlier as he was working at a consolidated monthly pay of Rs. 240/- prior to the issuance of the impugned termination order, and not at a regular employee, but that by itself would not give him an indivisible legal right to continue in service of the Nigam. That apart, as is evident from the impugned termination order dated 6.11.1990 (Ann. 5), the petitioner has not been selected by the Screening Committee which he was initially appointed in 1979. Further, as is evident from Appendix A & C to the termination. order dated 6.11.1990 (Ann. 5) filed by the petitioner, retrenchment compensation Under section 25-F of the I.D. Act has also been remitted to him which he subsequently accepted. However, it is not in dispute that the petitioner was albeit offered compensation in compliance of the provisions of Section 25-F of the I.D. Act but initially he refused to accept the cheque of compensation amount offered to him. Thus in my considered view, it cannot be held that in case of the petitioner, the respondent employer has violated provisions of Section 25-F of the I.D. Act before terminating his services, under the impugned order. 10. Thus in my considered view, it cannot be held that in case of the petitioner, the respondent employer has violated provisions of Section 25-F of the I.D. Act before terminating his services, under the impugned order. 10. As regards other claims of the petitioner as to the equality on the issue of equal pay for equal work to the daily wages or monthly reted workers, and further seeking regularisation of their services in view of having worked for considerably long period of time, in my view, the principles firmly laid down in the well considered decision of Jasmer Singh (JT 1996 10) SC 876) followed in State of Orissa v. Balaram Sahu, (1T 2002 (8) SC 477) : [2002(6) SLR 542 (SC)] are squarely applicable to the instant case because the employees employed with persons in regular service. Such workers or employees are not required to possess qualification prescribed under the service Rules nor do they have to fulfil the requirement relating to age during recruitment nor they are selected in the manner in which regular employees are elected, nor they can be equated with regular workmen for the purposes of their wages, nor can they claim the minimum of the regular pay scale of the regularly employed. In Jasmer Singh case (supra) the Apex Court held that the High Court was not right in directing that the respondents should be paid the same salary and allowances as are being paid to regular employees holding similar posts with effect from the dates when they were employed. In State of Orissa v. Bala Ram Sahu (supra), the Apex Court held thus : 13.... that the High Court was in serious error in directing that the respondents should be paid the same salary and allowances as were being paid to the regular employees holding similar posts. The respondents workers cannot be held to hold any posts to claim even any comparison with the regular and permanent staff, for any or all purposes including a claim for equal pay and allowance. The respondents workers cannot be held to hold any posts to claim even any comparison with the regular and permanent staff, for any or all purposes including a claim for equal pay and allowance. The fact that no materials were placed before the High Court as to the nature of duties of either categories should have been viewed as a disentitling factor so far as the workers are concerned and dissuaded the High Court from embarking upon an inquiry in the abstract and with no factual basis and not to empower the court to assume and persume equality in the absence of proof to the contra or of any unequal nature of the work performed by them. To claim a relief on the basis of equality, it is for the claimants to substantiate a clear cut basis of equivalence and a resultant hostile discrimination before becoming eligible to claim rights on part with the other group vis-a-vis an alleged discrimination." In the light of the decision directly on this issue rendered in Jasmer Singh (supra) we are unable to perused ourselves to countenance the claim for minimum basic salary given in some unreported decisions brought to our notice which appear on the face of it to be certain directions given on the peculiar facts and circumstances of the same without an objective Consideration of any principle of law. An order made to merely dispose of the case before court by issuing certain directions on the facts and for the purposes of the said case, cannot have the value or effect of any binding precedent and particularly in the teeth of the decision in Jasmer Singh's case (supra)." 11. In the case at hand, admittedly, the candidature of the petitioner had been considered by the Screening Committee due to abolition of the Scheme under which screened him in the year 1989 due to abolition of the scheme, under which he was initially engaged as monthly rated worker on consolidated pay, but he has not found fit for being selected for being retained in service rather was declared as surplus by way of his termination. Thus the petitioner has never been found suitable or eligible or entitled for being regularised and taken as permanent member of the respondent establishment. Thus the petitioner has never been found suitable or eligible or entitled for being regularised and taken as permanent member of the respondent establishment. Thus viewed, the petitioner will not be eligible or entitled to regularisation, what to talk of grant of pay equal to that of the regular employed staff, to be given to the daily rated or monthly consolidated pay. 12. It is equally settled law that even for Class IV employees recruitment according to Rules is a pre-condition. It is seen that scheme in which the petitioner was engaged had come to an end and therefore he has necessarily been terminated for want of work and abolition of the scheme, itself. The Court cannot give any directions to re-engage such employees in any other work or appoint them against existing vacancies, since otherwise, the judicial process would become other mode of recruitment de hors the rules. My view is fortified from the decision of the Apex Court in State of H.P. v. Suresh Kumar Verma, (1996) (72) FLR 804 : [ 1996(2) SLR 321 (SC)], wherein it has also been observed that the appointment on daily wages can not be a conduit pipe for regular appointment which would be a back door entry, determinant to the efficiency of service and would breed seeds of nepotism and corruption. 13. Moreover, unless a person is appointed on regular basis according to Rules after consideration of the claims on merits, there is no question of regularisation of the services or grant of regular pay scale with allied allowances admissible to the regularly selected employee. My view is fortified from the decision in Union of India v. Bishamber Dun, (1997 (1) SLR 135), wherein also admitted position was that the employees were receiving the consolidated pay of Rs. 500/- per month but the Central Administrative Tribunal directed to regularise the service, against which the Apex Court allowed the appeals of the Union of India and set aside the direction of regularisation. Even in Himanshu Vidyarthi v. State of Bihar, (1998 (2) LLJ 15) : [ 1997(2) SLR 570 (SC)], the employees were also not appointed to the posts in accordance with the rules but were engaged on the basis of need of the work, the Apex Court held that their disengagement from service cannot be construed to be a retrenchment under the I.D. Act. Further in State of U.P. v. Ajay Kumar, (1997 (2) LLJ 1204) : [ 1997(2) SLR 234 (SC)] the employee appointed on daily wage basis on February 14, 1985 as Class IV employee, Nursing Orderly in the Medical College by the Medical Superintendent and he filed writ petition which was dismissed by the learned Single Judge, against which the Division Bench gave direction of regularising his service but the Apex Court observed that there should exist a post and either administrative instructions or statutory rules must be in operation to appoint a person to the post. The Apex Court further observed that Daily wages appointment would be obviously in relation to contengent establishment and continues so long as the work exists and therefore, the direction of the Division Bench was held illegal and appeal was allowed. 14. I have perused the decision cited by the learned counsel for the petitioner-ratio decendi whereof is not at all attracted to the facts and circumstances of the case nor the principles laid down therein render any help to the petitioner in advancing his case especially when the contentions urged on his behalf are devoid of any merit in view of the decisions of the Apex Court referred to above. 15. In the result, this writ petition being devoid of merit and substance is hereby dismissed with no order as to costs.Petition dismissed. *******