JUDGMENT 1. - The prayer of the petitioner in the instant writ petition is as under : (i) To quash and set aside para 3(III) of the terms of service and the order dated September 23, 2002 and direct the respondents to reinstate the petitioner on the post of Under Secretary with all consequential benefits. (ii) To modify the appointment order dated April 11, 2002 and allow the petitioner to continue on the post of Under Secretary on the terms and conditions on which the appointment has been offered to similarly situated person Shri G.C. Rout. 2. As per the averments made in the writ petition the petitioner came to be initially appointed as Lecturer in Electronics Engineering Department in Bapu Saheb Shivaji Rao Deore College of Engineering Dhule, Maharashtra on February 7, 1992. The petitioner submitted application pursuant to advertisement published by All India Council for Technical Educational (A.I.C.T.E.) for the post of Assistant Director to be filled on deputation/contract basis. The petitioner was appointed as Assistant Director in A.I.C.T.E. vide order dated Feb.6, 2001. No objection certificate was granted from the College of Engineering Dhule and the petitioner was relieved on February 22, 2001. Lien of the petitioner was kept for one year and the petitioner joined as Assistant Director A.I.C.T.E. on Feb.27, 2001. While the petitioner was working as Assistant Director A.I.C.T.E., an advertisement was published by the National Council of Teacher Education, New Delhi for the post of Under Secretary. Pursuant to which the petitioner submitted application and the petitioner was adjudged suitable and appointed as Under Secretary in N.C.T.E. vide order dated April 11, 2002 in the pay scale of 10,000-15,200. The petitioner further averred that two candidates were selected as Under Secretary by the committee constituted to hold the selections. The petitioner was selected for Northern Regional Committee and one Shri G.C. Rout was selected under Secretary for N.C.T.E. headquarter New Delhi. The petitioner was at No.1 whereas Shri G.C. Rout was at No.2 in the panel, but the respondents adopted two different yardsticks. The petitioner was appointed on contract for a period of one year whereas Shri G.C. Rout was appointed for a period of three years. The petitioner joined at Northern Regional Committee, N.C.T.E. Jaipur on April 22, 2002. The petitioner was at No.1 whereas Shri G.C. Rout was at No.2 in the panel, but the respondents adopted two different yardsticks. The petitioner was appointed on contract for a period of one year whereas Shri G.C. Rout was appointed for a period of three years. The petitioner joined at Northern Regional Committee, N.C.T.E. Jaipur on April 22, 2002. The petitioner made an attempt to seek appointment on the post of Assistant Director A.I.C.T.E. and requested the respondent N.C.T.E. to forward the application but the N.C.T.E., instead of forwarding it, informed the petitioner after expiry of date of submitting application, to apply directly and then prevented the petitioner from seeking the appointment on the post of assistant Director A.I.C.T.E. On the contrary the services of the petitioner were terminated vide order dated September 23, 2002. Contention of the petitioner in the instant writ petition is that the impugned order of termination is against the principles of nature justice and the petitioner was discriminated by the N.C.T.E. in making appointment only for one year. 3. The respondents filed return to the writ petitions and averred that the petitioner was appointed on the post of Under Secretary on short term contract in pursuance to the notice inviting application. After the process of selection order of appointment was issued and in the said appointment order it was in unmistakable words stated that the appointment was purely temporary and liable to be terminated without assigning any reason and notice. Along with the appointment order a proforma contract was also sent to the petitioner. The petitioner challenged the condition No.3 of the terms of contract of appointment. Maintainability of writ petition was also questioned on the ground that direction for cancelling the contract agreement and enforcing the contract to continue the petitioner in service cannot be sought. As per the condition of appointment, it was not necessary for the respondents to provide any opportunity of hearing to the petitioner before terminating his services. It was also averred that an explanation was sought from him vide communication dated August 12, 2002 of his unsatisfactory service. As per the condition of appointment, it was not necessary for the respondents to provide any opportunity of hearing to the petitioner before terminating his services. It was also averred that an explanation was sought from him vide communication dated August 12, 2002 of his unsatisfactory service. The petitioner submitted reply to the said explanation and after considering the reply and the entire record the matter was referred to the Regional Director, Northern Regional Committee of N.C.T.E. at Jaipur, who after consideration of record submitted his comments on each instance of unsatisfactory work to the member Secretary of N.C.T.E. The petitioner deliberately concealed these material facts from this Court and pleaded his services were terminated without hearing him. Concealment of those facts disentitles the petitioner from invoking the equitable jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution. The petitioner having accepted the terms and conditions of appointment cannot be permitted to be challenged as the petitioner cannot be permitted to approbate and reprobate as the principle of estoppel comes in his way. Shri G.C. Rout, before his appointment on deputation, was serving in Ministry of Human Resource Development, Department of Education of Government of India and therefore he was appointed on deputation whereas the petitioner was appointed on contract basis. The petitioner who resigned from the Engineering College without waiting for order of appointment cannot bind the respondents to alter the terms and conditions of appointment. The petitioner was never compelled to join N.C.T.E. on the terms and conditions stated in the offer of appointment. The application of the petitioner for appointment on the post of Assistant Director in A.I.C.T.E. could not be forwarded due to the reason that the petitioner was on contract employment in N.C.T.E. Complete service credentials of an employee are kept by a substantive employer and not by the employer under whom a person is working temporarily on contract basis. The petitioner could have submitted application to AICTE directly. If the petitioner has any grievance against A.I.C.T.E. he may raise his grievance before the appropriate forum. The respondents had nothing to do with the defeated chance of the petitioner for the appointment on the post of Assistant Director in AICTE. Under Article 311 of the constitution of India it is necessary to extent a change of hearing to a substantive employee and in case of the contract employment these principles cannot be applied. The respondents had nothing to do with the defeated chance of the petitioner for the appointment on the post of Assistant Director in AICTE. Under Article 311 of the constitution of India it is necessary to extent a change of hearing to a substantive employee and in case of the contract employment these principles cannot be applied. For the irregularities committed by the petitioner a chance of hearing was given to him and he submitted reply to the memorandum. The appointing authority consider the entire material and thereafter arrived at a conclusion that services of the petitioner could be terminated before the period of one year. The terms of appointment on contract basis cannot be equated with the terms and conditions of a substantive employee. Challenge to the condition No.3 (Ill) of the Contract cannot bring writ petition within the purview of Article 226 for the reason that terms and conditions as stipulated on contract can be challenged by way of a civil suit only. 4. It is contended on behalf of the petitioner that the order dated September 23, 2002 and condition No.3 (iii) of the terms of contract of appointment are totally illegal, arbitrary and in violation of Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution. Condition No.3(iii) could not be invoked without any enquiry being conducted, since it is caused a serious impact and stigma on the career of the incumbent. Order dated September 23, 2002 was passed without any authority of competence. The petitioner was appointed after due approval of the Central Government in terms of section 10 of 1993 Act. Therefore it was necessary to seek approval of the Central Government before terminating the services of the petitioner. It is further contended that at the stage when the terms of the contract were finalised, the petitioner had no occasion to assail the said terms as he had already resigned from the post of Senior Lecturer. College of Engineering and no option was left except to accept the conditions. The conditions of contract are in violation of section 23 of the Contract Act. Since the petitioner was not in equal bargaining position on the date when the contract was signed and under the compelling circumstances he had to accept the terms and conditions of the appointment. It was lastly urged that the respondents adopted different yardsticks in offering appointment to two incumbents. Since the petitioner was not in equal bargaining position on the date when the contract was signed and under the compelling circumstances he had to accept the terms and conditions of the appointment. It was lastly urged that the respondents adopted different yardsticks in offering appointment to two incumbents. The petitioner who was at No.1 in the penal was given appointment only for one year whereas Shri G.C. Rout was offered appointment for three years on deputation. Two different standards adopted in offering appointment were in clear violation of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. Reliance is placed on various decisions that shall be considered at the appropriate juncture. 5. Per contra on behalf of the respondents it is canvassed that virtually the writ petition is for enforcement of contract and it is not maintainable. The petitioner was afforded change of hearing before terminating his services. This fact was deliberately concealed by him and on this ground alone the writ petition deserves to be dismissed. It is further contended that the petitioner joined N.C.T.E. in terms of offer of appointment after accepting the same. Having accepted the terms and conditions of the appointment the petitioner is now estopped from assailing the same. It is further urged that Shri G.C. Rout was already working in the Ministry of Government of India therefore he was appointed on deputation whereas the petitioner was appointed on contract. basis and once the petitioner accepted appointment on the terms which were offered to him he cannot now say that it was discriminatory. It is lastly contended that it was not necessary to seek approval of the Central Government before terminating the services of the petitioner as section 10(1) of the 1993 Act only provides for approval of the Central Government before offering appointment order. Terms and conditions of contract of appointment are perfectly legal, valid and justified. Protection of Article 311 of the Constitution is not extended to employees engaged on contract basis. 6. I have given my anxious consideration to the reival submissions and scanned the material on record. 7. It will be appropriate at this juncture to consider the provisions contained in the National Council for Teacher Education Act, 1993 (in short 1993 Act). Section 10(1) of 1993 Act provides for appointment of officers and other employees of the Council. 6. I have given my anxious consideration to the reival submissions and scanned the material on record. 7. It will be appropriate at this juncture to consider the provisions contained in the National Council for Teacher Education Act, 1993 (in short 1993 Act). Section 10(1) of 1993 Act provides for appointment of officers and other employees of the Council. It reads as under: "10(1) For the purpose of the enabling the Council to discharge its functions efficiently under this Act, the Council shall, subject to such regulations as may be made in this behalf appoint (whether on deputation or otherwise) such number of officers and other employee as it may consider necessarily. Provided that the category of posts equivalent to Group 'A' posts in the Central Government shall be subject to the approval of the Central Government. (2) Every officer or other employee appointed by the Council shall be subject to such conditions of service as may be determined by regulations. 8. A look at the appointment order of the petitioner goes to show that petitioner was appointed temporarily for a period of one year on contract basis. Condition 3(iii) of the terms of contract provides that the service of the petitioner could be terminated by the Council or their officers having proper authority without any previous notice if the petitioner was guilty of insubordination, in termperance or other misconduct or if any breach or non performance of any of the provisions of any rules pertaining to breach of the public service or for the efficient performance of duties. 9. following undisputed facts that appear from the material on record, need be noticed: (i) As per condition No.4 of the vacancy notice (Annexure-3) published in the month of November 2001, the period of deputation/contract was upto three years; (ii) In the panel of selected Under Secretaries, the petitioner was placed at No.1 whereas Shri G.C. Rout was at No.2; (iii) The petitioner was appointed on contract for a period of one year whereas Sh.G.C. Rout was appointed on deputation for three years; (iv) The same under Secretary Sh. G.C. Rout issued the impugned termination order of the petitioner. 10. G.C. Rout issued the impugned termination order of the petitioner. 10. As per the scheme of 1993 Act the National Council for Teacher Education (for short 'the Council') is empowered under sub-section (1) of Section 10 to appoint officers of other employees on deputation or otherwise, for the purpose of discharging its functions efficiently under the Act. But such appointment is subject to Regulations to be framed by the Council and prior approval of the Central Government is also required to be obtained. The council admittedly has not framed Regulations as yet to determined conditions of service of its employees in view of sub-section (2) of Section 10 of 1993 Act. 11. It is therefore to be examined whether framing of Regulations is discretionary and the Council can enter into contract with its employees ignoring the mandate of 1993 Act. As already stated all appointments are controlled by the Regulations framed by the Council. The said Regulations are required to be laid before the Parliament under Section 33 of 1993 Act. The Council instead of framing the Regulations, made the appointments through contract. To appoint an officer on the post (equivalent to Group 'A') on contract/deputation was no doubt, under the domain of the council but till Regulations are framed, approval of the Central Government is required before taking any action against the officer. Not only the appointment but all the service conditions including the termination of the service of the officer are required to be controlled by the Central Government in absence of Regulations in view of sub section (2) of Section 10. Council can not be permitted to remain inactive for all times to come and flout the mandate of Section 10 of 1993 Act. Once an officer or employee is appointed by the Council he is as per sub section (2) of Section 10 only subject to such conditions of service as may be determined by regulations and not by the terms of contract appointment. 12. Undeniably the petitioner was appointed on the post of Under Secretary which is equivalent to Group 'A' post in the Central Government. The appointment of petitioner was made after obtaining the prior approval of the Central Government. 12. Undeniably the petitioner was appointed on the post of Under Secretary which is equivalent to Group 'A' post in the Central Government. The appointment of petitioner was made after obtaining the prior approval of the Central Government. Although the petitioner accepted the terms of contract-appointment but that hardly makes any difference as after the appointment the service of the petitioner was to be controlled by such conditions as would be determined by Regulations in view of sub section (2) of Section 10 of 1993 Act. If Regulations were not framed, the N.C.T.E. was required to obtain prior approval of the Central Government, before terminating the services of the petitioner. 13. It is rather a strange coincidence that Sh. G.C. Rout, Under Secretary, appointed along with the petitioner on deputation, terminated the services of the petitioner. The act of N.C.T.E. in measuring the petitioner and Shri G.C. Rout by two different yardsticks, is not justified. The explanation of N.C.T.E. that Shri G.C. Rout was given appointment for three years as he was on deputation whereas petitioner was appointed for one year as he was on contract, does not sound reasonable. If the appointment was accepted by the petitioner under compulsion of his need for livelihood it does not mean that he gave consent to the terms of appointment. The petitioner had no choice but to give his assent being a weaker party to the terms of contract imposed by N.C.T.E., a stronger party. There was inequality of bargaining power between them. Their Lordships of the Supreme court in Central Inland Water Transport Corporation v. Brojo Nath Ganguly (1986) 3 SCC 156 : [1986(2) SLR 345 (SC)] indicated that the test of reasonableness or fairness of a clause in a contract where there is inequality of bargaining power is another theory recognised in the sphere of law of contracts. The Courts will not enforce and will, when called upon to do so, strike down an unfair and unreasonable contract or a clause in a contract, entered into between parties who are not equal in bargaining power. 14. Coming to condition 3 (iii) of the terms of the contract it may be seen that it gives arbitrary powers to N.C.T.E. to terminate the services of the petitioner. 14. Coming to condition 3 (iii) of the terms of the contract it may be seen that it gives arbitrary powers to N.C.T.E. to terminate the services of the petitioner. It provides that the services of the petitioner could be terminated by the council or their officers having proper authority without any previous notice if the petitioner was guilty of insubordination, intemperance or other misconduct or any breach of non performance of duties. In my opinion the said condition which confers absolute and arbitrary powers upon N.C.T.E. can be termed as 'Henry VIII Clause'. In para 97 of Central Inland Water Transport Corporation v. Brojo Nath Ganguly (supra) their Lordships of the Supreme Court indicated that "the Henry VIII Clause" is a provisions occasionally found in legislation conferring delegated legislative power, giving the delegate the power to amend the delegating Act in order to bring that Act into full operation or otherwise by order to remove any difficulty, and at times giving power to modify the provisions of other Acts also. The Committee on Ministers powers in its report submitted in 1932 (Cmd. 4060) pointed out that such a provision had been nicknamed " the Henry VIII Clause" because "that King is regarded popularly as the impersonation of executive autocracy". The Committee's Report (at page 61) criticised these clauses as a temptation to slipshod work in the preparation of bills and recommended that such provisions should be used only where they were justified before Parliament on compelling grounds. Legislation enacted by Parliament in the United Kingdom after 1932 does not show that this recommendation had any particular effect." (Emphasis Supplied) 15. Mr. R.N. Mathur, learned Addl. Advocate General, placed reliance on Major Chandra Bhan Singh v. Latafat Ullah Khan and others, ( AIR 1978 SC 1814 ) , Suneela Agrawal v. State of Haryana and others (2000) 2 SCC 615 : [ 2000(4) SLR 289 (SC)E , Om Prakash Sukla v. Akhilesh Kumar Shukla ( AIR 1986 SC 1043 ) : [1986(1) SLR 699 (SC)] , Dr. G. Sarana v. University of Lucknow ( AIR 1976 SC 2428 ) : [1976(2) SLR 509 (SC)] , Manak Lal v. Dr. Prem Chand ( AIR 1957 SC 425 ) , D.K. Yadav v. J.M.A. Industries Ltd. (1993) 3 SCC 259 : [1993(4) SLR 126 (SC)] and canvassed that the instant writ petition is virtually for enforcement of contract and is not maintainable. Prem Chand ( AIR 1957 SC 425 ) , D.K. Yadav v. J.M.A. Industries Ltd. (1993) 3 SCC 259 : [1993(4) SLR 126 (SC)] and canvassed that the instant writ petition is virtually for enforcement of contract and is not maintainable. The principles of natural justice were followed before terminating the services of the petitioner, but the fact was deliberately concealed by the petitioner and on this ground alone the writ petition deserves to be dismissed. The petitioner was fully aware of the terms of offer and after accepting the same the petitioner is estopped from challenging condition 3(iii) of the terms of contract of appointment. The learned Addl. Advocate General further urged that Shri G.C. Rout was already working in the Ministry of Government of India and therefore he was given deputation for a period of 3 years and the case of the petitioner distinguishable with that of the case of Shri G.C. Rout. 16. It is well settled that contract of personal service cannot ordinarily be specifically enforced and a Court normally would not give a declaration that the contract subsists and the employee, even after having been removed from service can be deemed to be in service against the will and consent of the employer. This rule, however, is subject to three well recognised exceptions-(i) where a public servant is sought to be removed from service in contravention of the provisions of Article 311 of the Constitution of India (ii) where a worker is sought to be reinstated on being dismissed under the Industrial Law; and (iii) where a statutory body acts in breach or violation of Industrial Law; and (iii) where a statutory body acts in breach or violation of the mandatory provisions of the statue (vide Vaish Degree College v. Lakshmi Narain (1976) 2 SCC 76) . 17. I do not find any merit in the first submission of Shri R.N. Mathur learned Additional Advocate General. As already noticed that the N.C.T.E. acted in breach of the violation of the mandatory provisions of section 10 of 1993 Act. Without framing the Regulations the N.C.T.E. arbitrarily settled the terms of contract of appointment. Thus the exception (iii) to the rule propounded in Lakshmi Narain's case (supra) is attached and writ petition is maintainable. 18. As already noticed that the N.C.T.E. acted in breach of the violation of the mandatory provisions of section 10 of 1993 Act. Without framing the Regulations the N.C.T.E. arbitrarily settled the terms of contract of appointment. Thus the exception (iii) to the rule propounded in Lakshmi Narain's case (supra) is attached and writ petition is maintainable. 18. As regards the second contention of Shri Mathur, learned Additional Advocate General relating to dectrine of estoppel is concerned, I am of that view that the principles of estoppel are not applicable as the petitioner and N.C.T.E. were not equal in bargaining power at the time of entering into contract. Clause 3(iii) of the Contract was imposed by the N.C.T.E., a stronger party on the petitioner who was a weaker party and was in need of livelihood. Thus the petitioner is not estopped from assailing Clause 3(iii). The ratio indicated in the case law on which reliance is placed by Mr. R.N. Mathur, learned Addl. Advocate General is not applicable in the facts and circumstances of this case. In those cases the doctrine of estoppel was made applicable in view of the conduct of the employees. In none of the cases the employee had accepted arbitrary condition of the contract as weaker party and there was no inequality of bargaining power. 19. The N.C.T.E., that is duty bound to frame Regulations in regard to service conditions of its employees, cannot be permitted to act whimsically under the terms of contract, ignoring the mandate of section 10 of 1993 Act. Rights provided to the employees under the 1993 Act cannot be rendered nugatory through arbitrary terms of contract. The philosophy of the Indian Constitution, as it has evolved, from precedent to precedent, has broadened the horizons of the right of the employees and they have been assured security of tenures and ensured protection against arbitrariness and discrimination. 20. For the reasons aforementioned I dispose of the writ petition in the following terms: (i) The N.C.T.E. is directed to frame Regulations and place the same before the Parliament as required under Sections 32 and 33 of 1993 Act, as expeditiously as possible preferably within six months. Till Regulations are framed the service conditions of the petitioner and other employees shall be controlled by the Central Government and not by the N.C.T.E. in view of Section 10 of 1993 Act. Till Regulations are framed the service conditions of the petitioner and other employees shall be controlled by the Central Government and not by the N.C.T.E. in view of Section 10 of 1993 Act. (ii) Para 3(iii) of the terms of contract appended with the order dated April 11, 2002 (Annexure-5) stands set aside. (iii) The impugned order of termination dated September 23, 2002 (Annexure-10) issued by Shri G.C. Rout, also stands quashed and set aside. The respondents are directed to forthwith reinstate the petitioner on the post of Under Secretary with continuity of service, full back salary and all consequential benefits. (iv) The petitioner, if he so chooses, may approach the Central Government for giving him equal treatment as has been provided to Shri G.C. Rout. (v) All arrears shall be paid to the petitioner within one month from the date of receipt of certified copy of the order. (vi) There shall be no order as to costs. Petition allowed. *******