BIMAL CHIMANLAL SHAH v. DEPUTY COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX
2002-03-08
D.A.MEHTA, M.U.SHAH
body2002
DigiLaw.ai
M. S. SHAH, J. ( 1 ) ORDINARILY, I think that, when there is difference of opinion as to whether a petition requires admission or not, normally, the petition would be admitted. However, in view of the fact that I am unable to agree with the reasons given by my learned Brother for dismissing the petition, I record my dissenting opinion. ( 2 ) RULE. Mr. M. R. Bhatt, learned Advocate appears and waives service of Rule on behalf of the respondent. ( 3 ) THE petitioner, an individual, has challenged notice under Section 148 of the Income Tax Act,1961 (the Act) dated 28/5/2001 at Annexure "a" issued by the Deputy Commissioner of Income Tax, Circle-I, Ahmedabad. ( 4 ) ON 3/10/1994 the petitioner returned a total income of Rs. 1,53,080. 00 for assessment year 1994-95. A scrutiny assessment was framed under Section 143 (3) of the Act on 28/2/1991 at a total income of Rs. 1,54,170. 00. ( 5 ) MR. S. N. SOPARKAR, learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner submitted that the impugned notice under Section 148 of the Act has been issued beyond the period of four years from the end of the relevant assessment year and hence, in light of the Proviso to Section 147 of the Act, it would be incumbent upon the respondent to show that there was any omission or failure on the part of the petitioner :[i] to make a return under Section 139 or in response to notice under Section 142 (1) or Section 148 of the Act, or[ii] to disclose fully and truly all material facts necessary for the assessment year. Admittedly, the first situation was absent, the petitioner having filed his return and having been assessed under Section 143 (3) of the Act. He contended that in light of the reasons recorded by the respondent under Section 148 (2) of the Act, it was apparent that there was no failure on the part of the petitioner to disclose fully and truly all material facts as required under the Proviso to Section 147 of the Act. That the respondent ought to have formulated "reason to believe" that the income chargeable to tax has escaped assessment due to omission or failure on the part of the petitioner.
That the respondent ought to have formulated "reason to believe" that the income chargeable to tax has escaped assessment due to omission or failure on the part of the petitioner. It was further submitted that from the reasons recorded it could be seen that the surrender value of the tenancy rights received by the petitioner and claimed and allowed as exempt from levy of Income Tax in the original assessment order was now sought to be treated as taxable income under different head of income. He, therefore, submitted that in absence of any new information or material coming to the knowledge of the respondent, the impugned notice issued by the respondent be held to be bad, illegal, contrary to law and be quashed and set aside. ( 6 ) AS against this, Mr. B. B. Nayak, learned Standing Counsel for the Income Tax Department contended that the petitioner had specifically claimed during the course of original assessment proceeding that the amount of Rs. 12 lacs received as consideration for surrender of tenancy rights was exempt. However, the issue was not whether the said amount was taxable or not, but whether any tenancy existed, when in fact, as could be seen from the terms of the deed of surrender, there was no relationship of tenant and landlord between the petitioner and M/s. S. S. Gyani and Co. from whom the petitioner had received the said amount. He further submitted that the amount having been received as a part of the business deal which had not gone through the amount was taxable as business income or income from other sources. That the petitioner having taken a specific stand during the course of original assessment proceedings cannot be permitted to challenge the initiation of reassessment, if the falsity of the petitioners stand during the course of the assessment proceeding was detected subsequently. According to Mr. Nayak, admittedly, the petitioner was residing at Valsad and so called occupation of premises at Mumbai could not be accepted, or at least required investigation. That there was nothing to show why the petitioner was permitted to occupy the premises even if such occupation was accepted to have existed at the relevant point of time. That the payment was in relation to separation on account of a business deal which had not been carried through.
That there was nothing to show why the petitioner was permitted to occupy the premises even if such occupation was accepted to have existed at the relevant point of time. That the payment was in relation to separation on account of a business deal which had not been carried through. Therefore, the subject matter of the reassessment proceedings was in relation to the aspect of occupation of the premises and the nature of payment, and only after both these aspects were ascertained, can it be said whether the amount was taxable or not, and if taxable, under which head ? He therefore urged that the Court should not intervene at this stage i. e. at the stage when the petitioner was merely called upon to submit his return in response to the notice under Section 148 of the Act. ( 7 ) DURING the course of hearing after perusal of the original file which was produced before us, the Court called upon the respondent to submit; (i) order sheet entries in relation to original assessment proceedings, (ii) the assessment note and the office note. ( 8 ) THE order sheet entries for assessment year 1994-95 commenced with the entry dated 31/10/1994 recording that the return of income was filed. The second entry pertains to issuance of notice under Section 143 (2) of the Act on 14/7/1995 for hearing on 2/8/1995. Thereafter, various hearings have taken place from time to time and ultimately entry No. 8 on 16/12/1996 reads as follows : ( 21 ) THE Supreme Court in the case of Parashuram Pottery Works Co. Ltd. vs. ITO 106 ITR 1, after following the principles laid down in its earlier decision in case of Calcutta Discount Co. Ltd. Vs. ITO 41 ITR 191 observed that the assessing authority should familiarise himself with the relevant provisions and become well-versed with the law. Any remissness on the part of the assessing authority can only be at the cost of the national exchequer and that there must be a point of finality in all legal proceedings, so that stale issues are not reactivated beyond a particular stage and the controversies are set at rest.
Any remissness on the part of the assessing authority can only be at the cost of the national exchequer and that there must be a point of finality in all legal proceedings, so that stale issues are not reactivated beyond a particular stage and the controversies are set at rest. ( 22 ) APPLYING the aforesaid ratio it is apparent that the impugned notice issued under Section 148 of the Act could not have been issued after the period of four years from the end of the relevant assessment year since the condition for exercise of the power beyond four years as contemplated by the Proviso to Section 147 of the Act did not exist. ( 23 ) IN the result the petition is allowed. The impugned notice dated 28/05/2001 at Annexure "a" to the petition is quashed and set aside. Rule made absolute. There shall be no order as to costs. .