ORDER Dipak Misra, J. In these two appeals sustainability of the order dated 20-11-2001 passed by the learned Single Judge in M.P. No. 3953/89 is called in question under clause 10 of the Letters Patent Appeal, one by the appellant, Life Insurance Corporation, the employer, being aggrieved by the grant of arrears of wages for a certain period and other, by the legal heirs of the employees who are aggrieved and dissatisfied because of non-interference in the matter relating to imposition of penalty by the management. The essential facts which need to be adumbrated are: The original writ petitioner, Shri T.C. Choudhary had knocked at the door of this Court, invoking the extraordinary jurisdiction under Articles 226 and 227 of Constitution of India, assailing the defensibility of the order passed by the Disciplinary Authority, the appellate Authority and eventually that of the Chairman of the Life Insurance Corporation (hereinafter referred to as 'the Corporation'), in a departmental proceeding initiated against him. The delinquent officer was removed from service by the Disciplinary Authority which has been affirmed by the appellate Authority. However, on a memorial being preferred the quantum of punishment was modified by the Chairman under Regulation 49 of the LIC of India (Staff) Regulations 1960 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Staff Regulations'). The original petitioner was holding the post of Development Officer and while he was posted at Damoh, a charge-sheet was issued alleging that the petitioner had approached one Shri H.S. Bagga in the month of June, 1983 for a new proposal and Shri Bagga expressed his inability to go for a new policy because of stringent financial conditions. The petitioner advised him to obtain loan against his policy. As put forth he got some blank forms and papers signed by Shri Bagga on the pretext of getting loan from the Corporation. The delinquent officer got the said policy surrendered and managed to book a fresh proposal which later on resulted in a new policy which was in breach of Regulations 21 and 24 of the Staff Regulations. An enquiry officer was appointed to enquire into the allegations. On considerations of documentary and oral evidence the enquiry officer returned a finding that said delinquent officer had not committed any fraud in the technical sense of the term but, had manipulated the things and got the policy. An enquiry officer was appointed to enquire into the allegations. On considerations of documentary and oral evidence the enquiry officer returned a finding that said delinquent officer had not committed any fraud in the technical sense of the term but, had manipulated the things and got the policy. It was concluded by him that the officer had managed to book a fresh proposal out of his self-interest and much against the interest of the party which ultimately led to the lodgement of complaint against him. On the basis of the aforesaid conclusion the enquiry officer found him guilty of the charge. The Disciplinary Authority upon perusal of the enquiry report and after complying with the formalities imposed the penalty of removal. The original petitioner preferred an appeal but it did not meet with success. Thereafter, he submitted a memorial to the Chairman which was decided during the pendency of the writ petition. The Chairman modified the punishment and altered it to reduction of five stages in the time scale of pay. It was further ordered by him that the period of his absence from the date of his removal till rejoining of his duty would be treated as period not spent on duty. Before the learned Single Judge, it was contended that the charge framed was not within the purview of the Regulation 21 and 24 of the Staff Regulations and in any case the same was not proved. It was highlighted that once a finding has been recorded by the enquiry officer that fraud had not been established, it should be presumed, the charge had failed and, therefore, no punishment could have been imposed against the official. It was also urged that the penalty of reduction of five stages in the pay scale was unwarranted inasmuch as the Chairman did not find any justification with the punishment of removal and in any case it was not commensurate with the guilt, and hence was totally unreasonable and arbitrary. The learned Single Judge affirmed the modified punishment as far as the reduction at five stages in the pay scale is concerned. The learned Single Judge also came to hold that the petitioner was guilty of the misconduct as stipulated under the Regulations 21 and 24 of the Staff Regulations. The learned Single Judge affirmed the modified punishment as far as the reduction at five stages in the pay scale is concerned. The learned Single Judge also came to hold that the petitioner was guilty of the misconduct as stipulated under the Regulations 21 and 24 of the Staff Regulations. As far as the order pertained, to treating of the period from the date of removal i.e. 24-10-1988 till the date of reinstatement 4-9-1990 not to have been spent on duty was not accepted and accordingly the learned Judge directed payment of salary for the said period within 3 months. Being aggrieved by the said order the legal heirs of the original writ petitioner have preferred L.P.A. No. 26/2002 and the Corporation has preferred L.P.A. No. 25/2002. We have heard L.P.A. No. 26/2002 as Mr. Samaiya submitted that if the punishment by the authority is set aside the direction for salary for the period which has been granted by the learned Single Judge would not be available for challenge and the LPA No. 25/2002 would be governed by the said order. Mr. Ruprah learned Counsel for the Corporation did not controvert the said position. Hence, we shall advert to the appeal filed by the legal representatives of the original petitioner. Mr. Samaiya learned Counsel submitted that the charge framed against the original writ petitioner is not within the purview of Regulations 21 and 24. It is putforth by him the fraud having not been committed and the enquiry officer having not found the official guilty of fraudulent motive, no punishment could have been imposed on that bedrock. It is canvassed by him that the whole case is based on suspicion and the law is well settled that suspicion cannot take the place of proof. In support of his submission he has placed reliance on the decision rendered in the case of Commissioner of Income Tax, Bhubaneshwar and another vs. Parameshwari Devi Sultania and others, AIR 1998 SC 1277. It is also urged by him that certain documents have not been properly scrutinised and appreciated by the enquiry officer and, therefore, the findings recorded by him should not have been given the stamp of approval by the disciplinary authority. It is also urged by him that certain documents have not been properly scrutinised and appreciated by the enquiry officer and, therefore, the findings recorded by him should not have been given the stamp of approval by the disciplinary authority. The learned Counsel further urged that the misconduct as is understood would not come within the ambit and sweep of Regulations 21 and 24 of the Staff Regulations and the learned Single Judge has erred in law by holding that the factum of misconduct had been established. It is his submission that the deceased delinquent officer had not caused any loss to the Corporation or to the customer and hence, the punishment was unwarranted. It is argued by Mr. Samaiya that the appellate authority in a mechanical manner confirmed the order of the disciplinary authority and the Chairman has not directed himself properly to deal with the facts in issue and in a cryptic manner, modified the punishment as if the qunatum of punishment was the singular challenge before him and while so doing directed that the period shall be considered not to have been spent on duty though such a direction was wholly unnecessary. Mr. T.S. Ruprah, learned Counsel for the respondents in LPA. No. 26/2002 contended that the enquiry officer has given detailed reasoning for every aspect and the disciplinary authority concurred with the same and, therefore, ascribing of elaborate reasons were not imperative. The learned Counsel further putforth that the Chairman has given cogent reasons and the order is based on proper appreciation of facts and material brought forth on record and thus, the same should not be interfered with by this Court. In support of his submission he has placed reliance on the decisions rendered in the cases of Apparel Export Promotion Council Vs. A.K. Chopra, and U.P. State Road Transport Corporation and Others Vs. Mahesh Kumar Mishra and Others, . At this juncture we feel obligated to briefly refer to the assail in the other L.P.A. As far as LPA No. 25/2002 is concerned Mr. Ruprah learned Counsel for the respondents submitted that the learned Single Judge has erroneously expressed the opinion that the Chairman has found, that the punishment imposed was not proper though, such a finding runs contrary to the reasons recorded in the order. It is submitted by Mr. Ruprah learned Counsel for the respondents submitted that the learned Single Judge has erroneously expressed the opinion that the Chairman has found, that the punishment imposed was not proper though, such a finding runs contrary to the reasons recorded in the order. It is submitted by Mr. Ruprah that the Chairman had modified the punishment and while so doing he was within his jurisdiction to treat the period as he has done and in any case as the delinquent officer had not worked, his legal heirs are not entitled to the arrears. Resisting the aforesaid submissions it is canvassed by Shri Samaiya that the Chairman had substituted the punishment which was quite onerous and after the said punishment is substituted further direction for stoppage of salary for the period from date of removal till the date of reinstatement amounts to double jeopardy. To appreciate the submissions of the learned Counsel raised at the Bar in LPA No. 26/2002 we have carefully perused the charge sheet as well as the findings of the enquiry officer. The enquiry officer has referred to the documents brought on record by the Corporation and thereafter discussed the evidence produced by the delinquent officer vide D/1, the document which was brought on record by the delinquent officer to show that said Bagga had never complained against the petitioner. To appreciate the scenario in entirety we may profitably reproduce the findings recorded by the enquiry officer: "Shri H.S. Bagga appeared in this enquiry as main witness on behalf of the management and he was examined and was also allowed to be cross- examined by Shri T.C. Choudhary. During his cross-examination of Shri Bagga, Shri Choudhary has confronted him mainly on two points, viz. (i) about the No. of blank forms which he signed and (ii) a letter (Ex. D/1) on 25-8-1983) given by Shri Bagga to the Branch Manager, Damoh. Shri Bagga has, however, maintained the same position what he had been writing in his complaints and he was categorical that Shri Choudhary came to his shop and when he expressed his financial difficulties he suggested him to raise loan from L.I.C. and got blank forms signed for securing loan from L.I.C. on his Policy. However, later Shri Choudhary fraudulently got his policy surrendered and booked a fresh proposal out of surrender value which he had never agreed. However, later Shri Choudhary fraudulently got his policy surrendered and booked a fresh proposal out of surrender value which he had never agreed. Shri Choudhary in his cross-examination has been trying to got that Shri Bagga, besided signing blank forms for loan, also signed the proposal forms, which Shri Bagga had denied. However, on referring to his complaint dated 15-10- 1983 which has come on record along with his affidavit (Ex. P/15), it is clearly stated by Shri Bagga that Shri Choudhary got fraudulently his signatures on the Surrender Value Papers and the proposal forms. I would like to give credence to the statement of Shri Bagga in his earlier complaint letter dated 15-10-1983 and hold that besides other blank papers he did sign the proposal forms." After so holding the enquiry officer referred to the application form for surrendering value, Ex. P/2, discharge form of surrender value (Ex.P/3), agent's confidential report (Ex.P/6), proposal form (Ex.P/5) and medical examination and thereafter opined that the entire amount of surrender value has been transferred for the new proposal which is far in excess of the required amount. He has also expressed the view that the delinquent officer was in knowledge of the whole thing and he had got the surrender value calculated and filled up all the forms. The concealment of this information in the proposal form was apparently done to avoid any objection in getting the new proposal accepted. Thereafter, the enquiry officer has also come to hold that the delinquent officer had manipulated the blank papers and got them signed from Shri Bagga. In view of this factual backdrop, the document D/1, which was produced by late Shri Choudhary was not given credence. We may usefully reproduce the final opinion expressed by the enquiry officer as we consider it as extremely relevant to appreciate the real controversy: "Shri Choudhary has submitted one document marked (Ex. D/1) in his defence to prove that Shri Bagga had full knowledge of having taken a fresh insurance, surrender his Policy and then writing for cancelling the new policy. This letter is without date and is written by Shri Bagga to Branch Manager, Damoh and acknowledged on 25-8-1983. It was in the custody of Shri Choudhary and produced it during the enquiry in his defence. This particular letter came up for cross-examination of Shri Bagga by Shri Choudhary. This letter is without date and is written by Shri Bagga to Branch Manager, Damoh and acknowledged on 25-8-1983. It was in the custody of Shri Choudhary and produced it during the enquiry in his defence. This particular letter came up for cross-examination of Shri Bagga by Shri Choudhary. Shri Bagga, in reply to various questions has stated that this letter was dictated by Shri Choudhary and got signed by him and also taken by him (Shri Choudhary) come out that one day Shri Choudhary went to his (Shri Bagga's) shop when he complained about giving of new insurance and surrendering his policy, he advised Shri Bagga to write what he wants and he dictated the letter. This letter was in original and there was no copy. However, Shri Choudhary, before submitting to the Office got a photo copy done and obtained acknowledgment of the original on the photo copy and kept it with him. The manner in which Shri Choudhary has got this letter and preserved it to be used in his defence gives me an impression that it was done with a design. I am inclined to agree with the contention of the Presenting Officer that Shri Choudhary took advantage of the innocence of the party and dictated the letter in such a way and with a motive to preserve it and use it for his defence. I, therefore, do not accept it as a genuine document and hold that it was a design to cover the wrong done by him. Besides this, Shri T.C. Choudhary has stated in his defence that this was a manipulated complaint, by Shri H.S. Bagga and it is booked by some persons who are jealous of him. Shri Choudhary has however, not given any evidence to show or substantiated this point and, therefore, I do not accept his contention and do not, give any credence to it. As against this the complainant, Shri H.S. Bagga has been subjected to vigorous cross-examination by Shri Choudhary and he could have got any untruth in his statement by cross-examination which I do not find to have been obtained. The evidence on record does not amply show "fraud" or fraudulent act of Shri Choudhary in the technical sense of the term as his fraudulent motives are not firmly established. The evidence on record does not amply show "fraud" or fraudulent act of Shri Choudhary in the technical sense of the term as his fraudulent motives are not firmly established. However, it is established that he manipulated the things and got the Policy of Shri Bagga wrongfully surrendered and managed to book afresh proposal out of it in his self- interest and much against the interest of the party which ultimately led to the complaint and grievance against him." The learned single Judge has discussed these aspects in paragraph 6 of his order and we find that he has taken note of entire factual scenario and concurred with the same. Submission of the learned Counsel to the effect that the whole thing has been done on the basis of conjectures and surmises is absolutely incorrect as the enquiry officer has returned a categorical finding on proper analysis. Submission of Shri Samaiya is that D/1 has not been properly scruitnised is also not acceptable as the enquiry officer has ascribed cogent reasons for not placing reliance on D/1 and in that finding we perceive no perversity of approach. It is not a case where suspicion has taken the place of proof. On the contrary the charge has been proved to the hilt. Hence, the decisions cited by him are of assistance. It is next contended by Shri Samaiya that allegation do not constitute a misconduct under Regulations 21 and 24. To appreciate the said submission we have carefully perused the aforesaid Regulations and on a perusal of the same we are of the considered opinion that the action of the delinquent officer comes within the ambit and sweep of misconduct and hence, we concur with the view taken by the learned single Judge that the act was a misconduct and that has been clearly proved. In view of the aforesaid premises we do not find any merit in LPA No. 26/2003. Now we shall advert to LPA No. 25/2002. The learned single Judge in paragraph 8 of the judgment has held that the Chairman himself found that the punishment imposed was not proper. He has also referred to the findings of the enquiry officer and arrived at the conclusion that fraudulent intention was not involved. Now we shall advert to LPA No. 25/2002. The learned single Judge in paragraph 8 of the judgment has held that the Chairman himself found that the punishment imposed was not proper. He has also referred to the findings of the enquiry officer and arrived at the conclusion that fraudulent intention was not involved. Quite apart from the above, the learned single Judge has observed that it was not justified to deny the salary, to the delinquent officer for the period, since he was imposed penalty of reduction in time scale by five stages. At this juncture, we think it proper to refer to relevant portion of the order passed by the Chairman. The Chairman enumerated the facts and, thereafter, came to hold as under: "I am further convinced that Shri Choudhary is guilty of the charges though not fully in regard to fraudulently surrendering the policy. I also find that while coming in Memorial, Shri Choudhary has also filed a writ petition No. 3953 of 1989 in the High Court of Madhya Pradesh at Jabalpur challenging his removal from service. Although the guilt established against the Memorialist itself does not warrant any leniency. I am inclined on purely compassionate grounds to give the Memorialist one more chance by reinstating him in service by modifying the penalty of 'removal' imposed by the Disciplinary Authority and upheld by the appellate Authority into one of reduction in pay by 5 stages in the time scale applicable to him. Now, therefore, upon considering the Memorial dated 15-6-1989 of Shri T.C. Choudhary, I order that the penalty of 'removal' as imposed by the Disciplinary Authority and confirmed by the appellate Authority be and is hereby modified into one of reduction in pay by 5 stages in the time scale applicable to the Memorialist. I further order that the period of his absence from the date of his removal till he rejoins duty pursuant to this order be treated as period not spent on duty. It is submitted by Mr. Ruprah that the Chairman of the Corporation who is at the helm of the affairs substituted the punishment to afford an opportunity to the delinquent officer and while so doing he directed absence of duty from the date of removal from his service till rejoining of his duty shall be treated as period not spent on duty. Ruprah that the Chairman of the Corporation who is at the helm of the affairs substituted the punishment to afford an opportunity to the delinquent officer and while so doing he directed absence of duty from the date of removal from his service till rejoining of his duty shall be treated as period not spent on duty. Learned Counsel has also submitted that the Chairman has not reversed the finding of the enquiry officer but has, in fact, concurred with the same and has only taken a compassionate view. It is canvassed by him that the Courts do not ordinarily interfere with the quantum of punishment unless the same is totally disproportionate to the guilt of the delinquent officer but the case at hand portrays a different scenario. In this context we may usefully refer to the decision rendered in the case of A.K. Chopra (supra) wherein the Apex Court ruled thus:-- "The High Court appears to have overlooked the settled position that in departmental proceedings, the Disciplinary Authority is the sole Judge of facts and in case an appeal is presented to the Appellate Authority, the appellate Authority has also the power and jurisdiction to re-appreciate the evidence and come to its own conclusion, on facts, being the sole fact finding authorities. Once findings of fact, based on appreciation of evidence are recorded, the High Court in writ jurisdiction may not normally interfere with those factual findings unless it finds no evidence or that the findings were wholly perverse and/or legally untenable. The adequacy or inadequacy of the evidence is not permitted to be canvassed before the High Court. Since, the High Court does not sit as an Appellate Authority, over the factual findings recorded during departmental proceedings, while exercising the power of judicial review, the High- Court cannot normally speaking substitute its own conclusion, with regard to the guilt of the delinquent, for that of the Departmental authorities. Even so far as imposition of penalty or punishment is concerned, unless the punishment or penalty imposed, by the Disciplinary or the Departmental Appellate Authority, is either impermissible or such that it shocks the conscience of the High Court, it should not normally substitute its own opinion and impose some other punishment or penalty. Even so far as imposition of penalty or punishment is concerned, unless the punishment or penalty imposed, by the Disciplinary or the Departmental Appellate Authority, is either impermissible or such that it shocks the conscience of the High Court, it should not normally substitute its own opinion and impose some other punishment or penalty. Both the learned single Judge and the Division Bench of the High Court, it appears, ignored the well-settled principle that even though Judicial Review of administrative action must remain flexible and its dimension not closed, yet the Court in exercise of the power of judicial review is not concerned with the correctness of the findings of fact on the basis of which the orders are made so long as those findings are reasonably supported by evidence and have been arrived at through proceedings which cannot be faulted with for procedural illegalities or irregularities which vitiate the process by which the decision was arrived at. Judicial Review, it must be remembered, is directed not against the decision, but is confined to the examination of the decision-making process. In the case of Mahesh Kumar Mishra (supra) the Apex Court held as under:-- "It is not, that the High Court can, in no circumstances, interfere with the quantum of punishment imposed upon a delinquent employee after disciplinary proceedings. Not only Supreme Court but also the High Court can interfere with the punishment inflicted upon the delinquent employer if, that penalty, shocks the conscience of the Court. From the aforesaid exposition of law it is quite clear and intelligible that the Court can interfere in regard to the quantum of punishment if it is shockingly disproportionate and not commensurate with the guilt proved. The appellate authority or the higher authority can irrefragably interfere with the punishment. The learned single Judge has observed that the Chairman had not found that, the charges were not proved. On the contrary, on a scrutiny of the order passed by the Chairman it is plain as noon day that he has, recorded in categorical and unequivocal terms that the charges against the delinquent officer were established. Thus, in our considered view, the learned Single Judge has fallen into error in appreciating, the order of the Chairman. On the contrary, on a scrutiny of the order passed by the Chairman it is plain as noon day that he has, recorded in categorical and unequivocal terms that the charges against the delinquent officer were established. Thus, in our considered view, the learned Single Judge has fallen into error in appreciating, the order of the Chairman. To put it differently, the Chairmen has not converted the punishment on the ground that, the officer concerned deserved leniency but he passed the order on the ground of compassion and indubitably it was within the province of the Chairman. From the aforesaid it cannot be said that the Chairman had exonerated the original writ petitioner and, therefore, the direction given by him that the period of absence shall be treated as period not spent on duty is flawed. It is submitted by Mr. Samaiya, learned Counsel for the legal heirs of the deceased-employee with immense vehemence that the backwages should have been given by the Chairman and as that has not been done the learned Single Judge is justified in granting the same. In our considered view the aforesaid submission does not deserve acceptance inasmuch as the Chairman modified the punishment and in that context issued a direction how the period of absence would be treated. It is not a case where the Chairman found it a fit case to allow on merits by exonerating the delinquent officer. Hence, we are obligated to express the opinion that the interference by the learned Single Judge with the order passed by the Chairman is not sound and accordingly we set aside the same. In view of our preceding analysis L.P.A. No. 25/2002 is allowed and L.P.A. No. 26/2002 is dismissed. However, in the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case there shall be no order as to costs. Order accordingly. Final Result : Allowed