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2002 DIGILAW 195 (HP)

ARVIND KUMAR v. STATE OF HP

2002-07-11

NARINDER SINGH THAKUR, V.K.BHATNAGAR

body2002
ORDER NARINDER THAKUR, MEMBER (JUDICIAL) - In this application under section 19 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, the applicant seeks, inter-alia, the following relief (s): (i) That the impugned order/notification dated 19.3.2002, at Annexure A-11 may be quashed and set aside and applicant may be held entitled to continue on the post of Superintendent, Model Central Jail, Nahan, with all consequential benefits. (ii) That if during the pendency of Original application, the applicant is not allowed to continue on the post in question pursuant to the impugned order, in that event he may be directed to be re-instated on the said post with continuity of service and all consequential benefit. (iii) That if during the pendency of original application, any further promotion is made to the post of Superintendent or DIG, or any appointment by absorption is made to the post of Superintendent or DIG, or any appointment by absorption is made to the post of DIG, in such event the said appointment/Promotion may also be quashed and set aside and applicant may be held entitled to consideration for further promotion from the date of such promotion/appointment, with all consequential benefits. 2. The facts giving rise to this litigation may be narrated at this state. The applicant was working as Store Purchase Officer in REC Hamirpur since February 1987. In June, 1998, interview was held for} the post of Superintendent District Jail Dharamsala Central Jail Nahan and Shimla As a result of selection in the interview, vide notification dated 2.12.1998, Annexure A-1 with the O.A., the services of the applicant were placed at the disposal of Prisons Department for his appointment as Superintendent District Jail, Dharamsala on deputation basis for a period of two years from the date of his joining. Vide another notification dated 21.5.1999, Annexure A-2 with the O.A., the earlier notification was modified and the services of the applicant were placed at the disposal of Prisons Department for his posting as Superintendent (Gazetted Class-1) Central Jail, Nahan on deputation basis with immediate effect for a period of two years from the date of his joining. Consequently, he joined at Nahan on 14.6.1999. 3. It appears that sometime in September, 2000 the applicant applied for his permanent absorption in Prisons Department. Consequently, he joined at Nahan on 14.6.1999. 3. It appears that sometime in September, 2000 the applicant applied for his permanent absorption in Prisons Department. Vide letter issued in September, 2000 Annexure A-3, by the Additional Director General of Prisons to FC-cum-Secretary (Home to the Government of Himachal Pradesh, with reference to application dated 7.9.2000 of the applicant, it was stated that the work and conduct of the applicant against the post of Superintendent Model Central Jail, Nahan had been very good. It was further stated that fresh initiatives had been taken by him in re-habilitation of the prisoners in Nahan Jail and that he was taking keen interest in controlling total jail activities as well as jail administration. The absorption of the applicant permanently against the post of Superintendent, in the Prisons Department was, therefore recommended. Vide another letter dated 27.1.2001, Annexure A-4 with the O.A. from the Additional Director General of Prisons, Himachal Pradesh to FC-Cum-Secretary (Home) to the Government of Himachal Pradesh, similar recommendation was again made. 4. The Recruitment and Promotion Rules for the post of Superintendent, Model Central Jail, Nahan/Superintendent District Jail, Dharamsala were notified on 4.5.1970, which are Annexure A-5 with the O.A. Under these rules, method of recruitment is by promotion failing which by transfer on-deputation and failing both by direct recruitment. The respondent department adopted the method of appointment by transfer on deputation because no departmental candidate was eligible for promotion at that time. 5. It is the case of the applicant that keeping in view the work and conduct of the applicant during his deputation of nearly two years, vide notification dated 27.4.2001, Annexure A-6 with the O.A, the applicant was permanently absorbed as Superintendent, Central Jail, Nahan but allegedly on temporary basis, on probation for two years with a stipulation that in case his work and conduct was not found satisfactory during probation, he could be repatriated back to his parent department. 6. Vide letter dated 19.9.2001, Annexure A-7, with the O.A., the Registrar, REC Hamirpur, wrote to the Additional Director of Prisons, Himachal Pradesh with a copy to the applicant asking him either to apply for retention or vacation of lien. This was followed by another dated 19.12.2001 Annexure A-8. 6. Vide letter dated 19.9.2001, Annexure A-7, with the O.A., the Registrar, REC Hamirpur, wrote to the Additional Director of Prisons, Himachal Pradesh with a copy to the applicant asking him either to apply for retention or vacation of lien. This was followed by another dated 19.12.2001 Annexure A-8. Vide^ letter dated 21.1.2002, Annexure A-9, the applicant was again asked either to join back in the institution by 31.3.2002 or get permanently absorbed in Prisons Department by vacating the lien so as to enable the REC to fill up the resultant vacancy as per Recruitment and Promotion Rules. Vide letter dated 7.2.2002. Annexure A-10, the applicant informed respondent No.2 that he had already been permanently absorbed against the post of Superintendent, Model Central Jail, vide HP. Government notification dated 27.4.2001 and as per instructions of H.P. Government, the lien of the individual got automatically vacated on permanent absorption against the post from autonomous bodies, \ hence, there was no need for issuing fresh instruction. However, he I tendered formal resignation from the post of Store Purchase Officer of REC. 7. Vide notification dated 19.3.2002, Annexure A-11 with the O.A. the applicant was repatriated from the post of Superintendent, Model Central Jail, Nahan to his parent department,. Allegedly on the ground that his conduct and work had not been found satisfactory. Feeling aggrieved, the applicant filed the present original application. 8. The applicant has assailed the impugned order dated 19.3.2002 mainly on the grounds that: (i) He had been permanently absorbed in the respondent department hence he could not have been repatriated to his previous department. (ii) The impugned order though couched in innocuous words, is in substance stigmatic in as much as the applicant has been punished for his alleged misconduct, in gross violation of provisions of Article 311 of the Constitution and doctrine of audi-alteram partem, hence the order of repatriation is in substance order of his removal from the civil post, as such liable to be quashed and set aside. 9. The respondent department has filed reply vehemently opposing the claim of applicant. It has been asserted by the respondent department that though the applicant was absorbed permanently, but temporarily, on probation for two year, hence, his work and conduct not being proper, he was rightly repatriated to his parent department. 9. The respondent department has filed reply vehemently opposing the claim of applicant. It has been asserted by the respondent department that though the applicant was absorbed permanently, but temporarily, on probation for two year, hence, his work and conduct not being proper, he was rightly repatriated to his parent department. It has also been stated that the applicant indulged in various acts of alleged omission and commission, hence, his continuance in the respondent department was not found desirable in the interest of jail administration, hence his repatriation can not be faulted. 10. The respondent No.2 has also filed a separate reply, but the material facts stated in the application have not been controverted in the reply. 11. Rejoinder to the reply of the respondent No. 1 has been filed by the applicant reasserting his original claim and contradicting the submissions made in the reply. 12. We have heard the Ld. Counsel for the applicant, Ld. Additional Advocate General for respondent No.1 and Shri B.N. Gupta, Ld. Counsel for respondent No.2 and gone through the pleadings carefully. 13. In paras 6.11.1 to 6.11.4) of the original application the applicant has reproduced the provisions in support of his claim of permanent absorption. F.R. 13 (e)(1) may be reproduced at this state for ready reference: "F.R.13. A Government servant who has acquired lien on a permanent post retains the lien on that post; (a) to (e) xxxx Provided that no lien of a Government servant shall be retained: (i) Where a Government servant has proceeded on immediate absorption basis to a post or service out side his service/ cadre/ post in the Government from the date of absorption; and (ii) xxxxx" Thus a bare perusal of the above provision makes it clear that where a Government servant proceeds on immediate absorption basis to a post or service outside his service/ cadre/ post in Government does not retain lien from the date of such absorption. A copy of relevant part (Sic-of) this rule is at Annexure A-12 with the OA. As per Recruitment and Promotion Rules at Annexure A-5, the method of recruitment for the post in question is by promotion failing which by transfer or on deputation. As per Swamis Complete manual on Establishment and Administration. Page 182: "Transfer means permanent absorption in the post" From these instructions it is clear that appointment on deputation by transfer is in substance permanent absorption. As per Swamis Complete manual on Establishment and Administration. Page 182: "Transfer means permanent absorption in the post" From these instructions it is clear that appointment on deputation by transfer is in substance permanent absorption. A copy of these I instructions is available herein at Annexure A-13 with the OA As per Swamis Complete Manual on Establishment and Administration for Central Government Offices, there will be no probation in case of official appointed to various posts, on permanent transfer. A copy of relevant part of these instructions is Annexure A-14 with the OA These provisions relied upon by the applicant in paras (6.11.1 to 6.11.3) have not been controverted in corresponding paras of reply. From these provisions it would be clear that as a result of initial selection of applicant for appointment by transfer on deputation for the b post in question and his subsequent absorption on the basis of his work and conduct is tantamount to his permanent I appointment/substantive appointment against the post in question. The respondent No. 1 in two paras 6.11.1 to 6.11.3 has stated that: "the absorption of the applicant though permanent was conditional." Thus respondent No. 1 also admits that absorption of the applicant was permanent. As per FR 13, on such absorption, the applicant lost his lien in the parent department.Once it has held that on his appointment on the post in question the applicant lost his lien in the previous department, the inevitable conclusion is that he could not have been repatriated to an organization in which he had already lost I his lien. 14. The plea of the respondent No. 1 that " the absorption of the applicant though permanent was conditional " is also legally not sustainable. It is settled law that the origin of Government services is contractual, there being an officer and acceptance in every case, yet once appointed to his post or office the Government Servant acquires a status and his rights and obligations are no longer determined by consent of the parties but by statute or statutory rules which might be altered unilaterally by the Government (See AIR 1967 SC 1889, Roshan Lal Vs Union of India). 15. 15. The alternative plea of the applicant is that assuming, without conceding that the applicant was on probation, even then the impugned order is legally unsustainable in as much as under the garb of impugned order, the applicant has been punished for his alleged misconduct and he has been removed from service, in violation of guarantee enshrined in Article 311 of the Constitution of India. 16. The applicant has alleged in the original application in para 6.11.6) that under the garb of impugned order the applicant has been removed from service. From para 6.11.7) onwards he has maintained that he has been punished for discharging his duties diligently and honestly and that he had pointed out irregularities being committed by Dr. L.P. Mathur, which have not been properly inquired into. Similarly, he has alleged that one Sh. Chet Ram carpenter in connivance with Dr. L.P. Mathur, allegedly prepared forged documents to implicate the applicant, which fact, according to the applicant has been prima-facie proved from the documents placed on recoFd with the original application. There are many such allegations made by the applicant in the original application and it is his contention that without holding proper inquiry and without giving the applicant a fair opportunity of putting forth his case, he has allegedly been thrown out of the present post on the ground of his alleged misconduct. 17. On the contrary in para 6.11) of the reply filed by respondent No.1 the said respondent maintain that there are numerous complaints against the applicant from prisoners as well as staff, and various other authorities. A reference has also been made to the report of Additional Director General of Prisons, Annexure R-3 with the reply which refers to some alleged inquiry conducted by the Deputy Inspector General of Prisons according to which allegations of miss-appropriation/ misuse of timber and financial irregularities have been reported and prima-facie made out, on the basis of which it has been recommended that the applicant should be repatriated to his parent department. It has also been alleged that some administrative problems arose in the jail due to some misunderstanding between the two responsible officers of the jail and reference has also been made to an anonymous complaint on behalf of all the staff of Model Central Jail, Nahan relating to alleged dictatorship, misuse of powers and various alleged corruption being caused by the applicant. A reference has also been made in the reply to the preliminary inquiry report dated 21.2.2002, Annexure A-13, conducted by Deputy Inspector General of Prisons making reference to the alleged misconduct of the applicant. In para 6..121.1) to 6.11.3) of the reply it has been stated that the work and conduct of the applicant was not found satisfactory and he failed to perform his duties with integrity, therefore, he has no right to claim his permanent absorption in the prisons department against the post of Superintendent, Model Central Jail. In reply to para 6.11.4) to 6.11.6) it has been alleged that the applicant has neither been dismissed/ removed nor terminated from service, he has been simply repatriated to his parent department after giving him sufficient time to improve his work and conduct The sum and substance of the stand of the respondent No 1 is that though there are numerous complaints about the work and conduct of the applicant and even preliminary inquiry has established his alleged misconduct, but the Respondent No. 1 has not punished the applicant but has simply repatriated him to his parent department. 18. The point is issue in the present original application is not as to whether the applicant infect committed certain misconduct or not, and it is not the scope of this litigation to go into the allegations made by the applicant regarding non-holding of a proper inquiry to the complaints made by him. This Tribunal is also not required to go into the counter allegations made by respondent No. 1 regarding alleged misconduct of the applicant. If the applicant has allegedly committed certain irregularities, the respondent No. 1 is not without a remedy and it is settled law that inquiry in accordance with law can be held into the alleged misconduct of even a probationer. The point ,for consideration is whether the impugned repatriation is on the basis of alleged misconduct of the applicant. If that be so, such action is liable to be struck down being violative of Article-311 of the Constitution of India as no inquiry in accordance with law has been held to hold the applicant guilty of alleged misconduct and thus, the impugned action is in gross violation of principle of audi-alteram partem. 19. If that be so, such action is liable to be struck down being violative of Article-311 of the Constitution of India as no inquiry in accordance with law has been held to hold the applicant guilty of alleged misconduct and thus, the impugned action is in gross violation of principle of audi-alteram partem. 19. A bare perusal of the reply of the respondent No.1 leaves one in no doubt that the foundation and the basis of the impugned repatriation of the applicant is his alleged misconduct. It is also clear from the reply that the respondent No. 1 did not hold any regular inquiry into the alleged misconduct of the applicant, not to talk of associating him with such inquiry. 20. In the above mentioned factual back ground, the legal, position may now be diseased. In AIR 1958 SC 36, Parshotam Lal Dhingra Versus Union of India, the Honble Supreme Court made following pertinent observation: "Article 311 does not, in terms, say that the protection of that article extend only to persons who are permanent members of the services or who hold permanent civil posts. To limit the operation of the protective provisions of this article to these classes of persons will be to add qualifying words to the article which will be contrary to sound principles of interpretation of a Constitution or a statute. In the next place, cl (2) of Article 311 refers to "such person as aforesaid" and this reference takes us back to cl.(1) of that article which speaks of a "person who is a member of a civil service of the Union or an all India Service or a civil service of a State or holds a civil post under the Union or a State." These persons also come within Article 310 (1) which, besides them, also includes persons who are members of a defence service or who hold any post connected with defence. Article 310 also is not, in terms, confined to persons who are permanent members of the specified services or who hold permanent posts connected with the services therein mentioned. Article 310 also is not, in terms, confined to persons who are permanent members of the specified services or who hold permanent posts connected with the services therein mentioned. To hold that article covers only those persons who are permanent members of the specified services or who hold posts connected with the services therein mentioned will be to say that persons, who are not permanent members of those services or who do not hold permanent posts therein, do not hold their respective offices during the pleasure of the President or the Governor, as the case may be - a proposition which obviously cannot stand scrutiny. The matter, .however, does not rest here. Coming to Art. 311, it is obvious that if that article is limited to persons who are permanent members of the services or who hold permanent civil posts, then the constitutional protection given by cls(1) and d(2) will not extend to person who officiate in a permanent post or in a temporary post and consequently such persons will be liable to be dismissed or removed by an authority subordinate to that by which they were appointed or be liable to be dismissed, removed or reduced in rank without being given any opportunity to defend themselves. The latter classes of servants require the constitutional protections as much as the other classes do and there is no apparent reason for such distinction. It is said that persons who are merely officiating in the posts cannot be said to "hold" the post, for they only perform the duties of those posts. The word "hold" is also used in Arts. 58 and 66 of the Constitution. There is no reason to think that our Constitution makers intended that the disqualification referred to in cl. (2) of the former and cl.(4) of the latter should extend only to persons who substantively hold permanent posts and not to those who held temporary posts and that persons officiating in permanent or temporary posts would be eligible for election as President or Vice-President of India. There could be no rational basis for any such distinction. (2) of the former and cl.(4) of the latter should extend only to persons who substantively hold permanent posts and not to those who held temporary posts and that persons officiating in permanent or temporary posts would be eligible for election as President or Vice-President of India. There could be no rational basis for any such distinction. In our judgement, just as Art. 310, in terms, makes no distinction between permanent and temporary members of the services or between persons holding permanent and temporary post in the matter of their tenure being dependent upon the pleasure of the President or the Governor, so does Art. 311, in our view, make no distinction between the two classes, both of which are, therefore, within its protections and the decisions holding the contrary view cannot be supported as correct." 21. In AIR 1971 SC 998, K.H. Phadnis Vs State of Maharashtra, the Honble Supreme Court made following pertinent observations in para 17, with reference to reversion of a temporary Government servant to his substantive post: "Therefore, though the Government has right to revert a Government servant from the temporary post to a substantive post, the matter has to be viewed as one of substance and all relevant factors are to be considered in ascertaining whether the order is a genuine one of "incident of service" in which a . person sent from the substantive post to a temporary post has to go back to the parent post without an aspersion against his. character or integrity or whether the order amounts to a reduction in rank by way of punishment. Reversion by itself will not be a stigma. On the other hand, if there is evidence that the order of reversion is not" a pure accident of service" but an order in the nature of punishment/Article 311 will be attracted." 22. character or integrity or whether the order amounts to a reduction in rank by way of punishment. Reversion by itself will not be a stigma. On the other hand, if there is evidence that the order of reversion is not" a pure accident of service" but an order in the nature of punishment/Article 311 will be attracted." 22. In (1986) 3 SSC 277, Jarnail Singh Vs State of Punjab, the Honble Supreme Court dealt with the point under consideration in para 4, which reads as under; "The crucial question required to be decided in the instant appeals is whether the impugned order of termination of services of the petitioner can be deemed to be an innocuous order of termination simpliciter according to the terms and conditions of the services without attaching any stigma to any of the petitioners or it is one in substance and in fact an order of termination by way of punishment based on misconduct and made in violation of the procedure prescribed by Article 311 (2) of the Constitution of India. In other words when the order of termination is challenged as casting stigma on the service career, the court can lift the veil in order to find out the real basis of the impugned order even though on the face of it the order in question appears to be innocuous." 23. Thereafter, in para 20 of the judgement the Honble Supreme Court observed as under:- "it thus appears on a consideration of the averments made in the affidavit verified on behalf of the petitioners as well as on behalf of the respondents. That the impugned order of termination of service of the petitioners had been made on the ground that there were adverse remarks in the service records of the petitioners as well as there were serious allegations of embezzlement of funds against some of the petitioners. It is quite clear that on consideration of all these adverse entries in the service record as well as serious allegations relating to misconduct, the petitioners were not considered fit by the Departmental Selection Committee to recommend the petitioners for regularization of their services as Surveyors. It is quite clear that on consideration of all these adverse entries in the service record as well as serious allegations relating to misconduct, the petitioners were not considered fit by the Departmental Selection Committee to recommend the petitioners for regularization of their services as Surveyors. The impugned orders of termination of services of the Petitioners are really made by way of punishment and they are not termination simpliciter according to terms of the appointment without any stigma as wrongly stated It is undisputed that the respondents 2 and 3 did not follow the mandatory procedure prescribed by Article 311 (2) of the Constitution in making the purported orders of termination of services of the petitioners on the ground of misconduct and thus there has been a patent violation of the rights of the petitioners as provided in Article 311(2) of the Constitution. There is no room for any doubt that the impugned orders of termination of services of the petitioners had been made by way of punishment as the allegations of embezzlement of funds as well as adverse remarks in the service record of these petitioners were the basis and the foundation for not considering the petitioners to be fit for being regularized in their services in accordance with the Govt. circular dated October 28.1980.therefore, it is clear and evident in the context of these facts and circumstances of the case that the impugned order of termination though couched in the innocuous terms as being made in accordance with the terms and conditions of the appointment yet the impugned order of termination of services of the petitioners were in fact made by way of punishment being based on misconduct." 24. Thereafter, in para 31 and 32 the Honble Supreme Court held as under: "31, In the instant case as we have stated already herein before that though the impugned order was made under the camouflage or cloak of an order of termination simpliciter according to the terms of the employment, yet considering the attendant circumstances which are the basis of the said order of termination, there is no iota of doubt in inferring that the order of termination had been made by way of punishment on the ground of misconduct and adverse entry in service record without affording any reasonable opportunity of hearing to the petitioners whose services are terminated and without complying with the mandatory procedure laid down in Article 311 (2) of the Constitution of India. 32. The position is now well settled on a conspectus of the decision referred to herein before that the mere form of the order is not sufficient to hold that the order of termination was innocuous and the order of termination of the services of a probationer or of an adhoc apointee is a termination simpliciter in accordance with the terms of the appointment without attaching any stigma to the employee concerned. It is the substance of the order i.e. the attending circumstances as well as the basis of the order that have to be taken into consideration. In other words, when an allegation is made by the employees assailing the order of termination as one based on misconduct, though couched in innocuous terms, it is incumbent on the court of lift the veil and to see the real circumstances as well as the basis and foundation of the order complained of. In other words, the court in such case, will lift the veil and will see whether the order was made on the ground of misconduct, inefficiency, or not. In other words, the court in such case, will lift the veil and will see whether the order was made on the ground of misconduct, inefficiency, or not. In the instant case we have already referred to as well as quoted the relevant portions of the averments made on behalf of the State respondent in their several affidavits alleging serious misconduct against the petitioners and also the adverse entries in the service records of the petitioners, which were taken into consideration by the Departmental Selection Committee without giving them any opportunity of hearing and without following the procedure provided in Article 311 (2) of the Constitution of India, while considering the fitness and suitability of the appellants for the purpose of regularizing their services their services in accordance with the government circular made in October, 1980. Thus the impugned orders terminating the services of the appellants on the ground that" the posts are no longer required" are made by way of punishment." 24. In 2000(5) SCC 152, Chanddra Prakash Shahi Vs State of U.P. the Honble Supreme Court re-iterated in para 12 that it is well settled that the temporary government servants or probationers are as much entitled to the protection of Article 311 (2) of the Constitution as the permanent employees despite the fact that temporary Government servants have no right to hold the post and that the courts can lift veil of an innocuously worded order to look at the real face of the order and to find out whether it is as innocent as worded. 25. The Latest HLJ 2002 (1)(HP) 322, a Single Member Bench of this Tribunal has quashed the termination of services of the applicant therein without holding proper inquiry. The State in that case has contended that the impugned order had been issued under Rule-5 (1) of CCS(Temporary Service) rule 1965 and that the said order was legal and valid. This Tribunal after considering a long line of judgements of Honble Supreme Court, held that the impugned termination was stigmatic in nature and have been made in violation of the principle of natural justice, and was illegal. The position is now well settled. This Tribunal after considering a long line of judgements of Honble Supreme Court, held that the impugned termination was stigmatic in nature and have been made in violation of the principle of natural justice, and was illegal. The position is now well settled. In view of the judgement of Honble Apex Court referred herein before that mere form of order is not sufficient to hold that the order of termination was innocuous and the order of termination of services of a probationer or a temporary employee is a termination simpliciter in accordance with the terms of appointment. It is the substance of the order that is to be taken into consideration. To Put it differently, when an allegation is made by the employee challenging the order of termination as being stigmatic and based on misconduct though worded innocuously, it is incumbent on the court to lift the veil and to find out the real circumstances on the basis of foundation of the impugned order. The court in such cases will lift the veil and see, whether the order was made on the ground of misconduct, inefficiency or not. In the present case, the applicant was initially taken on deputation on the basis of selection, was ultimately permanently absorbed against the post of Superintendent Jail at Model Central Jail, Nahan. Before this appointment he was working with respondent No.2, which is an autonomous body. Thus, his permanent absorption) in the present post was in the nature of fresh appointment to a civil post under the respondent state. Consequently, the impugned repatriation is in substance termination from the civil post held by the applicant under the respondent Government. As already pointed out, the respondent department in its reply has alleged serious allegation of misconduct against the applicant, and there has not been any proper inquiry in consonance with the procedure provided under article 311 (2) of the Constitution of India. Thus, the impugned order is clearly by way of punishment and is legally unsustainable being against the constitutional protection provided to a civil servant. 26. The plea of the respondent department that the applicant was a deputationist and hence can be repatriated to his parent, department is factually incorrect. The applicant had already been permanently absorbed before his impugned repatriation, hence, he was no longer on deputation. 26. The plea of the respondent department that the applicant was a deputationist and hence can be repatriated to his parent, department is factually incorrect. The applicant had already been permanently absorbed before his impugned repatriation, hence, he was no longer on deputation. Thus, the impugned order can not be sustained on the ground that this is a case of repatriation of a deputationist. 27. It is a settled law by the Honble Apex Court of India that a person holding civil post can not be removed from service in violation j of Article 311 of the Constitution and principle of natural justice. 28. In view of the above mentioned factual background and also the undisputed legal position, the impugned order is legally unsustainable. Therefore, the impugned notification dated 19.3.2002 Annexure A-11 and office order dated 2.4.2002 Annexure A-36 is quashed and set-aside with all consequential benefits. With these observations the OA is finally disposed of with no orders as to cost. -