SALDANHA, J. ( 1 ) ORIGINAL accused Nos. 1 and 2 have preferred these two appeals assailing the correctness of the judgment dated 27-12-2001 in Sessions Case No. 25/1998 on the file of the learned XVth Additional City Sessions Judge, Bangalore City. The prosecution had alleged that on the night of 11-5-1996 the accused No. 1 who was the first wife of deceased-Chandrappa is alleged to have induced him to consume Whisky mixed with sleeping tablets which in turn contained barbiturates and that as a result of the same Chandrappa died. The further allegation is that the original accused Nos. 2, 3 and 4 are alleged to have abated accused No. 1 essentially as far as the disposal of the body is concerned because the corpus was found in the Rampura tank around 26/05/1996 in a relatively decomposed condition. The body was sent for post-mortem and the examination did support the theory that Chandrappa had died a homicidal death. In the meanwhile, the police had received a missing complaint on 23-5-1996 but what is relevant is that P. W. 1 Ramaiah who claims to have known the deceased and the family relatively well, lodged a complaint with the police to the effect that accused No. 1 who is the first wife is alleged to have confessed to him in confidence that the 4 accused had joined together and murdered Chandrappa. She is supposed to have also stated on enquiry from P. W. 1 as to why they had killed Chandrappa, that P. W. 1 disclosed that even though Chandrappa was her husband and was the father of 5 daughters who were born as a result of their marriage, had thereafter remarried P. W. 14-Smt. Lakshmamma. Chandrappa had a son through P. W. 14 and the apprehension expressed by P. W. 1 was to the effect that Chandrappa had virtually deserted P. W. 1 and there was every indication that he would leave all his property to the son of P. W. 14. According to the prosecution this was the reason why the wife A-1 along with the remaining accused did away with him and, they are alleged to have been instrumental in carrying the body to the tank and having thrown it there after the incident. According to the prosecution this was the reason why the wife A-1 along with the remaining accused did away with him and, they are alleged to have been instrumental in carrying the body to the tank and having thrown it there after the incident. The police arrested the 4 accused and proceeded with the investigation and it is their case that pursuant to certain statements made by the accused that the police went to the tank in question and recovered Chandrappa's body which was found between some bushes in the water. It is also their case that M. O. 2 watch belonging to the deceased was recovered from A3 who is since dead. Also, a ring which allegedly belong to the deceased was recovered from P. W. 6 with whom A-2 is alleged to have pledged the same. The learned trial Judge held that there was insufficient evidence to convict A4 and accordingly acquitted him. As far as A3 is concerned since he had died the case abated as against him, A-2 was convicted of the offence punishable under S. 201, I. P. C. and he was sentenced to undergo RI for a period of 2 years. A-1 Smt. Anasuyamma was convicted of the offence punishable under S. 302, I. P. C. and awarded R. I. for life as also of the offence punishable under S. 201, I. P. C. and was awarded a sentence of RI for two years, both sentences to run concurrently. The two convicted accused have preferred these appeals which have been admitted and directed to be heard together. ( 2 ) AT the stage of admission one of the points that was raised was that the Courts have from time to time disapproved of the manner in which some of the trial Courts have been recording the accused statement. To put it briefly, in several of the earlier decisions the Courts have upheld the technical plea that if the statement of the accused under S. 313, Cr. P. C. is not recorded individually that this is a technical error which vitiates the conviction and consequently, the Courts have been setting aside the final orders passed and have been directing a remand for the trial to go back to S. 311-statement stage. P. C. is not recorded individually that this is a technical error which vitiates the conviction and consequently, the Courts have been setting aside the final orders passed and have been directing a remand for the trial to go back to S. 311-statement stage. This has been happening in a large number of cases resulting in a virtual reopening of the proceedings before the trial Court and consequently a lot of judicial time has been expended only for purposes of virtually re-recording the accused statement. Prima facie, it appeared to us that it was necessary to settle the law on the point and to ensure that such remands are stopped and it was for this reason that the Court decided to hear the appeals immediately. There is also a subsidiary ground, namely, that the appellants' learned counsel very strongly attacked not only the quality of the judgment but the conclusions and he demonstrated to us that the medical evidence conclusively establishes asphyxia as the cause of death of Chandrappa and that this is at total variance or divergence with the prosecution case that it is the accused who decided to murder Chandrappa and that they did so by inducing him to consume whisky mixed with barbiturates, which was really the cause of death. The submission was that the conclusions arrived at by the trial Court are so highly vulnerable that the case did qualify for an early disposal insofar as A1 who is the mother of 5 daughters having been convicted for the offences of murder has been languishing in custody and if no case could be sustained against her that it was only fair that the Court dispose off the appeal at the very earliest. We have called for the records, the paper books have been prepared and we have heard the learned counsel representing the parties at considerable length. We propose to dispose off both the appeals by a common order. We need to add here that this case did throw up for decision certain interesting aspects which did require a meticulous examination of various subjects which included medical jurisprudence and toxicology. We have received a very high level of assistance from the learned counsel who represented both sides which we appreciate, during the hearings that have been spread for more than 5 days and that the appeals do qualify for being disposed off through a common order. We have received a very high level of assistance from the learned counsel who represented both sides which we appreciate, during the hearings that have been spread for more than 5 days and that the appeals do qualify for being disposed off through a common order. ( 3 ) WE shall first deal with the objection that was canvassed on behalf of the appellants on a point of law regarding the validity of the S. 313 statements. It is true that the learned trial Judge had framed a series of questions and it appears from the answers that in respect of each of the questions the answers of accused Nos. 1, 2 and 3 were taken down one after the other. If one were to go to by ultra strict procedural norms it would mean that the statements were not individually recorded but that perhaps it was a sort of joint recording. We do appreciate one aspect of the conduct of the appeal because the learned counsel Sri. Reddy submitted that he is canvassing his plea for a limited purpose insofar as the Division Bench of this Court has consistently been holding that such a procedure vitiates the trial or rather vitiates the final order passed, that consequently, the judgment would have to be technically set aside and the case remanded for re-recording of the 313 statement and a fresh decision. He submitted however that beyond raising this plea purely to a limited extent, that he is not really pressing it in all seriousness, because according to him, he preferred to deal with the merits of the appeal insofar as if the appellants are entitled to succeed on merits, there is no reason why they should go through the unnecessary procedure of re-routing the case to the Sessions Court, rearguing it and perhaps inviting another adverse decision and once again coming back to this Court. The learned counsel is perfectly justified in the approach adopted by him and in our considered view this approach is absolutely correct but at the same time, from the point of view of this and several other cases it is equally important that the law on the point requires to be settled. ( 4 ) MR. The learned counsel is perfectly justified in the approach adopted by him and in our considered view this approach is absolutely correct but at the same time, from the point of view of this and several other cases it is equally important that the law on the point requires to be settled. ( 4 ) MR. Reddy pointed out to us in the decision reported in AIR 1976 SC 2140 : (1976 Cri LJ 913) that the Supreme Court while referring to other earlier decisions had occasion to hold that the accused statement in a criminal trial is a stage of some consequence and that under the scheme of the Criminal Procedure Code the old S. 342 which is identical to the present S. 313 of the Code specifically cast a duty on the Court to put to the accused all the evidence or circumstances that were alleged or established against the accused, in order to afford the accused an opportunity of dealing with them. The section also envisaged a situation whereby the Presiding Judge of the Court was required to ascertain from the accused directly in the course of the recording of the statement as to whether the accused had any explanations to offer or whether the accused desired to make any statement that could perhaps assist the accused or more importantly as to whether the accused desired to lead defence evidence and that this procedure was sacrosanct. We do not need to recount the whole list of decisions which have laid down this principle which was amplified by the Supreme Court in this case, because, just as in writ or civil proceedings the Court invariably enforces the principles of natural justice, in a criminal trial regardless of the fact that the accused is represented by an advocate invariably the law still prescribes that the Presiding Officer must directly confront the accused with the aforesaid material and record the answers from the accused. The section also prescribes a privilege to the accused insofar as if false or incorrect answers are given the Court will not draw an adverse inference from them but if the accused offers a valid explanation, or puts forward any material that is relevant in the course of the statement or adduces evidence that all of these would be taken note of by the Court while doing the final evaluation. Undoubtedly, these are sacred principles which are required to be adhered to for good reason in criminal trials and it was because of this sentiment that whenever there was a breach even of a technical nature on the part of the trial Court as far as the recording of the accused statement was concerned, the Courts set aside the decision and sent the proceeding back to be recommenced from that stage onwards. The real question is as to whether this approach which has commenced virtually from the beginning of this century is required to be blindly followed or whether it is necessary to alter it to the extent that the law permits. ( 5 ) ONE of the situations which the Courts have frowned upon is the procedure that has often been adopted by the trial Courts where there is more than one accused and particularly in those of the cases where there are a large number of accused such as offences of unlawful assembly, rioting, etc. , that in order to conserve the time of the trial Court, that a composite set of questions are prepared, they are put to the accused and the answers are taken down. There had been instances where there has been what one may call collective recording of the 313 statements and the High Court has consistently disapproved of this procedure. We quote only two of the recent decisions of this Court reported in ILR (1993) Kant 543 and (1997) 2 Kant LJ 374, even though there are several other decisions wherein the identical view has been taken. Mr. Reddy submitted that while there can be no question of any compromises with regard to the duty of the trial Court that it is equally necessary for the High Court to take into consideration the fact that the Sessions Courts are hopelessly overburdened, that this is the reason why the trials cannot be disposed off expeditiously and his submission was that if the principles are followed by the trial Court insofar as it appears that the various requirements of Section 313, Cr. P. C. have infact been complied with but merely because from the point of view of practicality the mechanical procedure of recording the statements one after the other is altered to a situation wherein each question is put to all the accused and their answers are recorded one below the other, that it should not really be held to be a technical breach. He even went to the extent of pointing out that if the Courts were to scrutinise the set of questions that are put, that the High Court will find that there are times when specific evidence which is directed towards or touches only one or certain specified accused has been led by the prosecution and that these questions are projected only to this accused and perhaps not to others. His submission was that in the present case that was precisely the procedure followed and that according to his submission it does not offend the requirements of S. 313, Cr. P. C. even though the Courts have taken the opposite view as indicated by us earlier. As against this position, the learned Addl. S. P. P. submitted that it is impermissible to allow any short cuts as this would have dangerous consequences and that this was the reason why right through the whole of the last century the Courts have invariably interfered the moment there has been even the slightest deviation from the established procedure. His submission was that this stage of the trial is important because it is the last opportunity for the accused to explain or point out what may not have come before the Court in the course of the trial and that this is the specific reason why no compromises can be made with regard to the old established procedure irrespective of the fact that it may be cumbersome and time consuming. ( 6 ) AS far as this aspect of the law is concerned, we need to point out that it is not a question of making any departure from the well defined principles but of permitting a level of innovation that has become absolutely essential. ( 6 ) AS far as this aspect of the law is concerned, we need to point out that it is not a question of making any departure from the well defined principles but of permitting a level of innovation that has become absolutely essential. What we need to point out is that the over emphasis on the requirements of the procedure prescribed under the section is virtually working backwards in-so-far as in the larger criminal trials it has become customary to find a couple of volumes of the record that are devoted to the transcription or reproduction of the 313 statement. What cannot be overlooked is the fact that the Criminal Courts and particularly the Courts of Sessions which are essentially concerned with the more serious criminal offences such as murder, dowry death and the like are hopelessly overloaded and overburdened as a result of which the disposal of cases is well behind the number of new ones and the arrears have been piling up. There is a desperate need to simplify and innovate within the existing framework of the law without in any manner sacrificing or compromising on the principles because the time factor is the greatest casualty. Also, one needs to rationally evaluate as to what is the object behind S. 313 and to ensure that the purpose is achieved. Recently, in order to cater to the need of faster disposal of these criminal cases the Government of India has set up additional Fast Track Courts and the emphasis has been to try and make the constitutional guarantee of the right of speedy trial a reality. This is more or less the background in which we are required to review the law on the point and prescribe what in our opinion constitute feasible and practicable alternatives. We remind ourselves of the fact that in criminal trials the accused is served with the charge-sheet which outlines the gravamen of the charges and the accused is also provided with the supporting documents which set out the prosecution case. The trial commences with the framing of charge where the Court summarises the offences which the prosecution has alleged against the accused and the accused is required to personally enter the plea and consequently it is at that point that the accused is fully acquainted with the case that the prosecution has brought against the accused. The trial commences with the framing of charge where the Court summarises the offences which the prosecution has alleged against the accused and the accused is required to personally enter the plea and consequently it is at that point that the accused is fully acquainted with the case that the prosecution has brought against the accused. In the course of the trial, the evidence is unfolded and the accused is invariably represented. Even in the microscopically few cases where the accused is conducting the trial in person, it does not make any difference because the evidence is led in open Court and the accused has the full opportunity of refuting every part of the evidence. The evidence is invariably tested through cross-examination in a criminal trial and after this elaborate procedure, it can hardly be argued or alleged that there is anything which has escaped the attention of the accused. What is also of consequence is the fact that customarily the defence that is pleaded or made out is also put to the witnesses or unfolds itself in the course of the cross-examination and consequently, realistically there is very little that remains, by the time the 313-statement is recorded. Bearing this in mind, it would be perfectly legitimate and desirable for the evidence on the allegations to be very briefly or succinctly summarised or abridged and this will virtually save not only the time but the labour of the Court in reproducing the prosecution evidence. It is only the heads and the salient features that need to be summarised and put to the accused in the course of the 313-statement. If one were to do an evaluation of the answers that are routinely taken down as they emanate from the accused, they mechanically state "it is false" or "i do not know. " One cannot lose sight of the fact that this is precisely the material that has already been led in open Court and which has already been tested and that is the reason why in our considered view, a very concise summary would be in consonance with the requirements of the section. All that the Court is required to do is to ensure that no specific or important part of the prosecution evidence or heads of charge are overlooked. All that the Court is required to do is to ensure that no specific or important part of the prosecution evidence or heads of charge are overlooked. Also, on the question of whether the accused desires to put forward any explanation or lead defence evidence the question invariably comes at the end of the 313-statement and there again, in not even 0. 01% cases is any fresh explanation or material adduced nor is defence evidence led. It is equally open at this stage and probably a more practicable approach for the accused to put down very briefly anything that the accused desires the Court to take into consideration and to file it in the form of a written statement which would again save a lot of the Court's time. Again, as regards the question as to where there is a common case against multiple accused the trial Judge is obliged to go through the tedious procedure of recording the whole of the statement of each of the accused one by one or whether where the evidence is common and the questions have already been framed it is permissible to elucidate the answers from each of the accused to each question and record them one below the other, in our considered view the later procedure is perfectly permissible. We need to point out that there is only one overriding principle which the Courts have to bear in mind, namely, that the spirit of S. 313 has to be borne in mind and complied with and secondly that the ultimate test is not with regard to how the statement has been but the question is as to whether it constitutes a fair opportunity to the accused and what is the paramount test is really the issue as to whether any prejudice has resulted. Under the provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code even minor departures from the procedure or irregularities do not constitute illegalities and are either curable or are required to be ignored if they do not result in illegality. The real question is as to whether the accused has been prejudiced and if the answer to that question is in the negative, then there would be no scope for grievance or ground for the appeal Court to interfere with the procedure that has been followed. The real question is as to whether the accused has been prejudiced and if the answer to that question is in the negative, then there would be no scope for grievance or ground for the appeal Court to interfere with the procedure that has been followed. The time has come for the trial Courts to considerably innovate and shorten anything that is cumbersome and anything that does not serve any specific purpose and in our considered view, the procedure followed by the learned trial Judge in the present case meets with our total and complete approval. We, therefore, do not lend any credibility to the contention raised by Mr. Reddy that the present judgment requires to be interfered with on a technical ground that the recording of the statement was not in order. We have however pointed out that even the submission canvassed by him was not very seriously pressed because he had essentially argued the point of law as it is something that has been surfacing in several cases for the limited purpose of having the law settled rather than as a challenge in the present proceedings. ( 7 ) COMING to the merits of the present case, we propose to briefly summarise the heads of challenge to the conviction and to record our findings thereon. In the first instance, the admitted position is that the deceased Chandrappa was married at A1-Anasuyamma and that the couple had 5 daughters. According to the case projected by the prosecution, Chandrappa evinced a very strong desire to have a son and that this was the reason why he contracted a second marriage with P. W. 14 Smt. Lakshmamma. Admittedly, Chandrappa's desires were fulfilled because a son was born to this couple and that according to the prosecution, was the primary motive for the murder. It has come in the evidence of P. W. 1 that Chandrappa was not to be seen for some time and when he enquired with the first wife who is accused No. 1 about Chandrappa that she is alleged to have spoken to him in confidence telling him that she treated him like her brother and that she is alleged to have told him that she and the remaining accused had murdered Chandrappa. The reason disclosed by her allegedly is that she harboured a very serious apprehension that Chandrappa would leave all his property to the son of P. W. 14 and that A1 and her 5 daughters would get nothing. Mr. Reddy submitted that apart from the so-called extra-judicial confession which emanated through P. W. 1 that there is absolutely no material whatsoever on record to substantiate this very important head, namely, the motive. He has also very strongly attacked the evidence of P. W. 1 and gone to the extent of contending that the so-called extra-judicial confession is nothing short of fabrication. It is his contention that there was absolutely no reason or ground that A-1 should disclose such a state of affairs to P. W. 1 particularly if she was in fact instrumental in having committed a murder. His submission is that the motive itself is contrived and that it has been put forward in a weak attempt to implicate A-1. Mr. Reddy goes to the extent of pointing out that the prosecution has not led any evidence to establish that after Chandrappa lost interest in his first marriage and in his first wife that he even so much as either met them or visited them and the whole case made out that he had come to the house of accused 1 and that she was instrumental in giving him large quantities of whisky mixed with barbiturates, is a total fabrication. His contention is that merely because some traces of barbiturates have appeared in the course of the forensic examination of the viscera and the dead body that the prosecution has tried to weave out this case. Consequently, it is his contention that the prosecution has failed to establish any motive and that this finding of the trial Court is erroneous. The learned Addl. S. P. P. has strongly supported the finding in the judgment and he contends that this is a case where the facts speak for themselves because admittedly Chandrappa had as many as 5 daughters through his marriage with accused 1, that it is quite traditional and quite common for the desire to have a male offspring and that P. W. 14 Lakshmamma has admitted that Chandrappa and she were secretly married and that they have a son. He also draws our attention to the evidence of P. W. 14 who has admitted that they were residing together and separately from accused 1 and the submission is that this totally fits in with the prosecution charge that because of the fear that Chandrappa would obviously leave his property to the son of P. W. 14 that A-1 and the remaining accused joined together to murder him before he took any such steps. ( 8 ) WE do not need to deeply analyse this evidence because the record does clearly indicate that Chandrappa was the father of a son through P. W. 14 but what the learned trial Judge seems to have totally overlooked is the fact that if the prosecution desired to rely heavily on this aspect of the record that it was not half so important to establish the second marriage as they need to place before the Court the fact that Chandrappa did possess substantial property and that this was in fact the bone of contention. Chandrappa was a mere village accountant. There is not even an iota of evidence on record to indicate that he possessed substantial property or for that matter that he possessed any property at all. In the absence of this crucial evidence we see hardly any point even in examining the possible motive. Situations wherein misguided individuals like Chandrappa shift from one wife to another for whatever reason, in this case ostensibly in the hope of a male heir, are not uncommon and this has hardly any justification in the absence of better evidence to allege that this was the principal driving force for the murder in the form of motive. Even if one were to hold that there was some outer possibility or justification we still need to record that it is at the highest a very weak circumstance. ( 9 ) THE gravamen of the charge against A-1 stems from the fact that the prosecution alleges that it was she who was instrumental in getting Chandrappa to consume a combination of whisky mixed with barbiturate. ( 9 ) THE gravamen of the charge against A-1 stems from the fact that the prosecution alleges that it was she who was instrumental in getting Chandrappa to consume a combination of whisky mixed with barbiturate. Whether the deceased was in the habit of consuming alcohol or not has not been brought on record and secondly, while it may be a chemically accepted fact that barbiturates are readily soluble in alcohol even though they are not soluble in water, there is neither eye-witness evidence nor any circumstantial evidence brought on record in support of this crucial part of the charge. We have gone through the record virtually with a fine teeth comb and we find that the prosecution itself is not sure about the date of the murder. The charge as framed states that the murder took place on the night of 11th May whereas the prosecution itself has led the evidence of 2 witnesses who in terms indicate that deceased-Chandrappa was very much around till atleast the 20th of May. This is a very serious contradiction and we shall deal with that elaborately when we come to the medical evidence. It is an accepted cannon of criminal jurisprudence that the prosecution has to establish the case precisely in consonance with the charge and in the present instance the prosecution evidence does totally contradict the charge. ( 10 ) WE shall illustrate more elaborately as to how damaging the prosecution evidence itself is to the charge. The recovery panchanamas indicate that the body was found floating in the bushes of the Ramapura tank on the afternoon of 26/05/1996. The body was taken charge of under a mahazar which clearly indicates that it had been in the water for quite sometime because it was in a state of decomposition. It is very important for us to fix more or less the time frame and one has the key to that from the post-mortem notes and the evidence of the doctor both of which conclusively establish that the time of death has been fixed by the medical evidence as being between 1 to 3 days before the post-mortem was done. Moving backwards from 27th May, therefore, the prosecution case is that deceased-Chandrappa must have been murdered sometime between 24th and 26th May. Moving backwards from 27th May, therefore, the prosecution case is that deceased-Chandrappa must have been murdered sometime between 24th and 26th May. The prosecution alleges that the incident took place on the night of 11th May and it is impossible to reconcile the two. The medical evidence is undoubtedly far more reliable than the oral evidence and the medical evidence is supported by the prosecution's own evidence which establishes that Chandrappa was seen and that people had met him at different points of time till around 20th of May and if this is the position, then it is impossible to hold that the allegation against the accused that they murdered the deceased on the night of 11th May has been established. ( 11 ) WHAT is even more crucial is the fact that the medical evidence establishes something even more startling. While we have dealt with the aspect of the post-mortem notes and the decomposition levels on the basis of which the doctors have fixed the time of death, there is another tell-tale circumstance which goes totally and completely against the prosecution case. While the prosecution solemnly alleges that it was the accused who were responsible for the death of Chandrappa by making him drink the whisky mixed with barbiturates the medical evidence conclusively establishes that the cause of death was by asphyxia. There is no way of reconciling the two if the deceased had died of barbiturate poisoning then there can be no question of the doctor certifying that the cause of death was asphyxia. It is for the prosecution to be able to explain its own evidence and this is a case in which almost every head of evidence led by the prosecution runs contrary to its own case. ( 12 ) WE refer to a crucial tell-tale circumstance and what we need to record is that on a very careful scrutiny of the post-mortem notes and the evidence of the doctor P. W. 8 what we find is that even though the cause of death is given as asphyxia that there is something startling that has happened in this case, namely, the tongue of the deceased was found to have been virtually bitten into two pieces and it was hardly hanging through a piece of skin. Coupled with this fact we find that one of the teeth was broken and another one was missing. Coupled with this fact we find that one of the teeth was broken and another one was missing. This is very much in consonance with an act of violence or possibly, it would also support the asphyxia theory whereby sufficient amount of force was used in order to virtually deprive the deceased of air for long enough till he died. All of this again is contrary to the prosecution charges and we do find considerable justification in the submission canvassed by Mr. Reddy that the trial Court has totally and completely overlooked the crucial medical evidence which does not support the prosecution theory. ( 13 ) THE appellant's learned counsel relied on document Exhibit 18 which is a prescription which is alleged to have been recovered at the instance of accused 1. This prescription was given to her by P. W. 16 Dr. Jyothi Shayar. The prescription in question authorises purchase of 2 tablets of 1 mg. Larpose which is really a sedative or a sleeping tablet containing a very small quantity of barbiturate as low as 1 mg. The record indicates that the deceased-Chandrappa was a healthy well built man and the defence has in the course of cross-examination elicited from the doctor that if a person like him was required to be killed through the administration of barbiturate poisoning that it would have required a minimum of 100 tablets to be administered. Two things emerge, the first that if the accused had a prescription for 1 mg. of barbiturate and had infact secured that quantity and administered it to deceased-Chandrappa, that quite apart from killing him it would not even have put him to sleep. There is nothing on record to indicate as to how and from where such a large quantity of barbiturate had been secured but more importantly, the Court cannot lose sight of the practicalities of the case insofar as it would have required a massive quantity of whisky to dissolve as many as over a hundred tablets. In any event we do not propose to labour with this head beyond pointing out that the evidence led by the prosecution in support of the poisoning theory is too full of lacunae to even deserve any serious consideration. Moreover since the cause of death has not been established as being due to barbiturate poisoning we see no reason why we should labour with this head. Moreover since the cause of death has not been established as being due to barbiturate poisoning we see no reason why we should labour with this head. ( 14 ) THE learned Addl. S. P. P. submitted that there are two very strong circumstances to link the accused with the deceased. He points out that the watch belonging to the deceased which is MO-2 and which it is established that he was normally in the habit of wearing all the time, was recovered from the accused 3 and in keeping with the law on the point, he submits that this establishes a nexus between the offence and the accused. Accused 3 has died and he is no longer before the Court and consequently, the limited use of this argument is perhaps in order to establish that if the property was found from one of the accused since there is a charge of common intention that the evidence can be used against the co-offenders. The stronger head of evidence is with regard to the ring of the deceased which is MO-1. According to the prosecution allegation, after the murder A-2 had got hold of the ring and that he in turn had pawned it with P. W. 6 who is a pawn broker. There is some receipt which the prosecution relies on in support of this evidence but unfortunately, the person who is alleged to have issued the receipt viz. , P. W. 6 has turned hostile and, therefore, this head of evidence is hardly available. We only need to observe in passing, that before the possession of such property can be held to be a guilty circumstance that it must first be conclusively established that the property in question is very clearly identifiable without any possibility of an error. A watch or a ring particularly of the present type could have belonged to the deceased but there is no absolute certainty that MO-1 and MO-2 did belong to him. What is more important in law is that it has got to be established that these items of personal property were on the person of the deceased at the time when the offence was committed. What is more important in law is that it has got to be established that these items of personal property were on the person of the deceased at the time when the offence was committed. If the deceased had parted with these items earlier even if they had been stolen from his possession earlier, that would not be good enough to establish a nexus with the murder unless it is conclusively established that the property was on his person at the time when the offence was committed. Even as far as this head is concerned, we have absolutely zero evidence. ( 15 ) AS the judgment will indicate, we have done a total and complete review of the evidence on record in keeping with the requirements of law. We have also heard the learned counsel on both sides both as far as the factual and legal aspects of the case and after having reconsidered the findings recorded by the trial Court, in our considered judgment, none of those findings can be upheld. Consequently, the convictions recorded against appellants 1 and 2 are accordingly quashed and set aside. Accused No. 1 is in custody as she has been refused bail. We accordingly direct that she shall be set at liberty forthwith if not required in connection with any other offence. Accused No. 2 is on bail. It is accordingly directed that his bail bonds shall stand cancelled. The operative part of the judgment of the lower Court directs that the Mos. 1 and 2 viz. , the ring and watch belonging to the deceased shall be confiscated to the State. Since there is sufficient material on record to indicate that these items belong to deceased-Chandrappa, the trial Court shall return the same to accused No. 1. As regards Mos. 3 to 5 the earlier order for destruction to stand confirmed. ( 16 ) BEFORE parting with this judgment, we cannot but help observe that we are not happy with the quality of the judgment. This is a very serious case and some of the observations that have been made, the language and general tenor of the judgment certainly do not meet with our approval. As an illustration, we have reproduced paragraph 40 of the judgment which reads as follows :"40. This is a very serious case and some of the observations that have been made, the language and general tenor of the judgment certainly do not meet with our approval. As an illustration, we have reproduced paragraph 40 of the judgment which reads as follows :"40. The jail is no doubt built of bricks and mortar to imprison persons who have been found guilty, but this in the modern context of reformative theories, is one of the reformative centres, where a person could undergo a thorough change on account of active association with phylonthrophic organizations such as, Brahma Kumari Organization or Satya Sai Organisation. Further, a person would be taught the trade and avocation, which he can learn and utilize for better improvement of the society. Keeping all these factors in view, I find that imposing of fine will not serve any purpose and the punishment as indicated above, should be imposed as far as A2 Narayana is concerned. Hence, I proceed to make the following. " there are run away references to imaginary and incorrect factors which are of no consequence. There are well defined principles with regard to the doctrine and theories of sentencing and a lot has been written in recent times with regard to the approach of the Courts, concerning these aspects of the law and we would strongly recommend that the trial Courts should stick to these principles and not to extraneous hypothetical or imaginary references made in broken English. ( 17 ) THE appeals accordingly succeed and stand disposed of. Appeals allowed. --- *** --- .