L. NARASIMHA REDDY, J. ( 1 ) IN this Second Appeal, the appellants challenged the concurrent judgments of the trial Court as well as the first appellate Court. The appellants are defendant Nos. 3,4,5, and 11 to 13 in O. S. No. 34 of 1979 on the file of the Principal District Munsif, Srikakulam. The suit was filed by the sole respondent for the relief of recovery of possession of the suit schedule properties. It was averred in the plaint that one late A. Venkataramana, a widower, and who was the cousin of the husband of the plaintiff, was living with them for several years since his wife died and they had no children. It was their case that during his lifetime, the said Venkataramana executed a registered settlement deed on 25. 3. 1975 (E. A-1) settling the suit schedule properties upon the plaintiff and ultimately he died on 16. 3. 1976. Though the plaintiff was entitled to the ownership and enjoyment of the said properties by virtue of the settlement deed, the first defendant had trespassed into Item No. 1 and defendants 2 to 6 trespassed into Item No. 2 of the suit schedule properties in the year 1976. She made attempts to recover the possession and also approached the police. Since she could not recover the possession, she filed the suit. The defendants 1,6,7, and 9 remained ex parte. Defendants 4 and 5 filed written statement and the same was adopted by defendants 2 and 3. ( 2 ) THE claim of the defendants was that Mr. Venkataramana, who executed Ex. A-1 and defendant No. 2 by name Mr. A. Lakshminarayana, who is also the husband of defendant No. 3, were brothers, and the properties between them remained undivided. The suit schedule properties, being the joint family properties, could not have been settled by one of the co-parceners. They have also pleaded that the document Ex. A-1 was forged and brought into existence to lay false claim on the suit schedule properties. ( 3 ) THE trial Court framed necessary issues mainly touching upon two important aspects i. e. whether late Venkataramana and his brother-defendant No. 2 constituted the joint family and whether Ex. A-1 was forged. On behalf of plaintiff, PWs 1 to 5 were examined and documents Exs. A-1 to A-35 were marked. On behalf of the defendants DWs. ( 3 ) THE trial Court framed necessary issues mainly touching upon two important aspects i. e. whether late Venkataramana and his brother-defendant No. 2 constituted the joint family and whether Ex. A-1 was forged. On behalf of plaintiff, PWs 1 to 5 were examined and documents Exs. A-1 to A-35 were marked. On behalf of the defendants DWs. 1 to 6 were examined and documents B-1 to B-48 were marked. ( 4 ) ON an appreciation of both oral and documentary evidence, the trial Court found that there did not exist any joint family status between Venkataramana and his brother by the time Ex. A-1 came to be executed and the document Ex. A-1 is not vitiated in any manner. Accordingly, the trial Court decreed the suit through judgment dated 17. 4. 1985. The appellants herein preferred an appeal to the Court of Additional Subordinate Judge, Srikakulam, being A. S. No. 2 of 1986. The first appellate Court confirmed the judgment and decree of the trial Court through its judgment dated 27. 10. 1989. Thus, arises the second appeal. ( 5 ) MR. Y. Srinivasa Murthy, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of Mr. T. Veerabhadrayya, submits that both the trial Court as well as the first appellate Court have erred in placing the burden upon the defendants to show that the family remained joint by the date of Ex. A-1. It is his further contention that the first appellate Court did not formulate the necessary points for consideration and the same is contrary to the provisions of Order 41 Rule 31 of CPC. ( 6 ) MR. P. Veera Reddy, the learned counsel for the respondent, on the other hand, submits that both the courts below have not only placed the burden upon the plaintiffs but they discussed the matter strictly in accordance with law and they arrived at proper conclusions. ( 7 ) AS regards the second submission, he states that though the lower appellate Court did not assign separate numbers to the points before it, it did refer to the points that fall for consideration before it and, at any rate, in view of the recent judgments of this Court, failure to formulate points by the appellate Court is not fatal to the judgment. ( 8 ) THE first submission made by Mr. ( 8 ) THE first submission made by Mr. Y. Srinivasa Murthy, relates to the placing of burden to prove the question as to whether the family remained joint or not. It is his contention that the presumption in law is in favour of the properties of a family being joint and whenever any party pleads to the contrary, the burden lies upon him. He submits that inasmuch as the relationship between Venkataramana and the second defendant-Lakshminarayana was not disputed and since the plaintiff pleaded that the suit schedule property was the exclusive property of late Venkataramana, the burden was upon the plaintiff to prove that the properties ceased to be joint between the co-parceners. ( 9 ) THERE cannot be any second opinion as to the proposition of law put forward by Mr. Y. Srinivasa Murthy. Having regard to the pleadings in the suit, it was for the plaintiff to prove that the status of joint family ceased to exist by the time Mr. Venkataramana executed Ex. A-1. What remains to be seen, however, is that whether the courts below placed the burden upon the appellants herein or the respondent. It needs to be observed that it was only to meet the plea of the appellants herein that there existed the joint family status between Mr. Venkataramana and Defendant-2, by the time Ex. A-1 was executed, the respondent examined several witnesses and particularly marked documents Exs. A-7 to A-9 and Ex. X-1. Ex. A-8 is the document under which the second defendant i. e. the brother of Venkataramana sold an item of property in favour of one Mr. Sunder Rao as long back as on 8. 7. 1940. That very item of property was repurchased by the second defendant under Ex. A-9 executed on 23. 6. 1955. The second defendant mortgaged that item of the property with the plaintiff on 13. 7. 1968 under Ex. A-7. In none of these documents, there is any recital to the effect that the second defendant is either selling, purchasing, or mortgaging the property on behalf of the joint family. There is clear indication in all these documents that he was doing it only on his behalf. Ex. X-1 is another document, under which D-3 i. e. wife of Defendant-2 sold another item of property in favour of PW-4. There is clear indication in all these documents that he was doing it only on his behalf. Ex. X-1 is another document, under which D-3 i. e. wife of Defendant-2 sold another item of property in favour of PW-4. ( 10 ) THE purpose for which these documents were filed by the respondent was only to discharge her burden to show that the said co-parceners were dealing with their properties as their exclusive and there is nothing to show that they remained joint. Once this attempt is done by the respondent, the onus shifted to the appellants to dispel the impression that can be gathered from a reading of the said documents. Nothing was forthcoming from the appellants as to how the documents Exs. A-7 and A-8 cannot be taken on their face value. Therefore, it was not a case where the trial Court placed the burden upon the defendants to show that the family remained joint. Though the discussion of the courts below does not appear to be proceeding in a proper scheme, the fact remains that both the courts below did treat that it was for the respondent to prove that the family did not remain joint and they were satisfied that the said burden was properly discharged by the respondent. I do not see any reason to differ with the said finding. ( 11 ) THE next submission is as to the consequences of non-framing of the points by the lower appellate Court. Mr. Y. Srinivasa Murthy, learned counsel, invited the attention of this Court to paragraph 7 of the judgment of the lower appellate Court, which reads as under: "the point for consideration is: Whether this appeal can be allowed?" and submits that this did not constitute a compliance with Order 41 Rule 31of CPC. A reading of paragraph 7 in isolation may indicate that the lower appellate Court did not formulate the points before it. However, it needs to be noticed that in the very next paragraph, before undertaking the discussion of the case on merits, the Court made the following observation. "therefore, we have to see whether late Venkataramana is entitled to execute any deed and whether the properties of late Venkataramana will devolve upon Defendant-2 to Defendant-5 after the death of late Venkataramana. " ( 12 ) THIS indicates that the lower appellate Court was conscious of the parameters of discussion. "therefore, we have to see whether late Venkataramana is entitled to execute any deed and whether the properties of late Venkataramana will devolve upon Defendant-2 to Defendant-5 after the death of late Venkataramana. " ( 12 ) THIS indicates that the lower appellate Court was conscious of the parameters of discussion. Failure of reference to the validity or otherwise of Ex. A-1 is attributable to the non-seriousness of the parties about it and not the reluctance on the part of the Court. Be that as it may, in a series of judgments, this Court took the view that failure of formulation of individual points by the first appellate Court is not detrimental, as long as it can be gathered from the judgment that the Court has addressed to the relevant issues that fall for consideration. In this case, not only did the lower appellate Court indicate the points that fall for consideration before it, though not numbered separately, but it had also gone into all aspects of the matter and did not leave anything undiscussed. As such, I do not see any merit in the contention of the learned counsel for the appellants in this regard. ( 13 ) I do not see any reason to interfere with the concurrent findings of the courts below. The Second Appeal is accordingly dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs.