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2002 DIGILAW 201 (CAL)

Shaktipada Mahato v. District Magistrate, Purulia

2002-03-21

ASIT KUMAR BISI

body2002
JUDGMENT The judgment of the Court was as follows :–– The instant application under Article 227 of the Constitution of India preferred by the petitioner Shaktipada Mahato is directed against the order dated 30.7.2001 passed by the District Magistrate, Purulia and the Appellate Authority in District Purulia Case No.1 of 2001 under Section 213A (12) of the West Bengal Panchayat Act, 1973, whereby the order dated 11.5.2001 passed by the Sub-Divisional Officer, Sadar (West) Purulia and the Ex-Officio Prescribed Authority retaining the membership of Shri Bharat Singh presently O.P. No. 3 in Joypur Panchayad Samity has been confirmed. The facts of the case leading to the instant revision may briefly be stated thus. On 21.3.01 the applicant Shaktipada Mahato filed an application for disqualification of membership of Shri Bharat Singh, a member of Joypur Panchayat Samity. It has been alleged in the said application that Shri Shaktipada Mahato was elected leader of INC of Panchayat Samity members of Joypur Panchayat Samity on 5.8.98 and he is holding the power to recommend the name of any elected member of INC to the Prescribed Authority to disqualify him from membership for disobeying the party whip and for tendering resignation from membership of the party. It has been further alleged by the petitioner that Shri Bharat Singh was elected member of Panchayat Samity with Hand symbol from Ropo-IV Constituency under Joypur Panchayat Samity. Shri Singh was present in the meeting which was held on 5.8.98 for election of leader of I.N.C. Subsequently on 16.3.2001 Shri Bharat Singh sent a letter addressed to the Block Congress President, Joypur, with copy thereof to the Prescribed Authority and also to the present petitioner Shaktipada Mahato being the leader of I.N.C. Joypur Panchayat Samity and had voluntarily given up his membership of the said party. 2. On receipt of the said letter dated 16.3.2001 issued by Shri Bharat Singh the present petitioner as leader of I.N.C. convened a meeting on 20.3.2001 and it was unanimously decided in the said meeting that the leader of the Panchayat Samity would take step for disqualification of membership of Shri Bharat Singh as per the provisions of the West Bengal Panchayat Act, 1973 hereinafter referred to as the Act. 3. 3. As already stated, on 21.3.2001 the present petitioner made an application to the Prescribed Authority under Section 213A of the Act praying for disqualification of the membership of Shri Bharat Singh along with endorsement by the Joint Secretary, District Congress Committee, Purulia. 4. By Memo No. 146/SC (W) dated 6.4.2001 the Prescribed Authority and SDO Sadar (West), Purulia, requested the petitioner to attend the office with all necessary documents and witnesses. The petitioner was duly present in the office at the scheduled hours on 12.4.2001 and submitted all the relevant documents. Shri Bharat Singh presently O.P. No. 3 was asked to appear before the Prescribed Authority on 19.4.2001 at 10 A.M. for hearing on that date. He was present along with his lawyer and prayed for time. The hearing was adjourned to 2.5.2001 on which date Shri Bharat Singh along with his lawyer was present and submitted that the proceeding under Section 213A of the Act was not maintainable as Shri Bharat Singh, Thakurdas Mahato, Chabi Rani Chowdhury and Dilip Soren constituted a group representing a faction of 1/3rd of the total number of members of I.N.C., Joypur Panchayat Samity. The said group representing the faction was formed on 5.3.2001 and Shri Bharat Singh brought the three members Thakurdas Mahato, Chabi Rani Chowdhury and Dilip Soren as witnesses and submitted before the Prescribed Authority that all of them including himself were not present in the meeting on 20.3.2001 since they already formed Upadal or group representing the faction on 5.3.2001. The said members submitted an affidavit and copy of the resolution of the meeting dated 5.3.2001 regarding formation of a separate group and a letter declaring voluntarily giving up of their membership from I.N.C. to substantiate their claim before the Prescribed Authority. 5. On perusal of all the relevant records produced before him the Prescribed Authority and SDO Sadar (West), Purulia found that Shri Bharat Singh, Thakurdas Mahato, Chabi Rani Chowdhury and Dilip Soren have formed a group representing a faction of 1/3rd of the total number of members of I.N.C. in Joypur Panchayat Samity which consist of twelve I.N.C. members. 5. On perusal of all the relevant records produced before him the Prescribed Authority and SDO Sadar (West), Purulia found that Shri Bharat Singh, Thakurdas Mahato, Chabi Rani Chowdhury and Dilip Soren have formed a group representing a faction of 1/3rd of the total number of members of I.N.C. in Joypur Panchayat Samity which consist of twelve I.N.C. members. On consideration of all the materials placed before him the Prescribed Authority and SDO Sadar (West), Purulia, arrived at the finding that Shri Bharat Singh, Thakurdas Mahato, Chabi Rani Chowdhury and Dilip Soren formed a separate group of four members representing a faction consisting of 1/3rd of the total number of members of I.N.C. on 5.3.2001 and they voluntarily gave up their membership of I.N.C. since that date. The Prescribed Authority has ultimately arrived at the conclusion that the petition of Shri Shaktipada Mahato regarding recommendation of disqualification of Shri Bharat Singh from membership of Joypur Panchayat Samity fails to attract sub-section (1) (a) of Section 213A of the Act. Consequently the Prescribed Authority rejected the petition of Shri Shaktipada Mahato against Shri Bharat Singh for disqualifying the latter from membership of Joypur Panchayat Samity. 6. Being aggrieved by the aforesaid decision of the Prescribed Authority file present petitioner preferred an appeal before the District Magistrate, Purulia and the Appellate Authority who ultimately confirmed the order passed by the Prescribed Authority. The decision of the District Magistrate, Purulia and the Appellate Authority is as follows:– "Both the parties were heard. On perusal of all the documents/records and on hearing it appears that Shri Bharat Singh with other three members claimed to have formed a Upadal on 5.3.2001 though they were elected with the symbol "Hand" as member of I.N.C. This means inter alia that they are not less than 1/3rd of the total members belonging to the I.N.C. members were 12 in number. As per proviso (b) of sub-section (1) of Section 213A if any member claims that he and any other members of a recognized political party in the Panchayat Constitute a group representing a faction consisting of not less than 1/3rd of the total number of members set up by such recognized political party in the Panchayat and that all the members of such group have voluntarily given up their membership of such recognized political party, an elected member referred to in sub clause (ii) of Clause (a) shall not on the prescribed authority being satisfied in this behalf, be declared to be disqualified. The claim is sufficient enough and not restricted within any time limit as per the Act. The communication of forming a upadal was made to the S.D.O. Purulia Sadar (West) and Ex-Officio the Prescribed Authority on 9.4.2001. The Prescribed Authority in his judgment rightly ordered that the petition for disqualification of membership of Shri Sharat Singh filed by Shri Shaktipada Mahato has been set aside. Hence, the undersigned being the District Magistrate, Purulia and the Appellate Authority under sub-section (12) of Section 213A hereby orders that the order dated 11.5.2001 passed by the Sub-Divisional Officer, Sadar (West) Purulia and Ex-Officio Prescribed Authority retaining the membership of Shri Sharat Singh in the Joypur Panchayat Samity is hereby confirmed." 7. The petitioner has preferred the instant application under Article 227 of the Constitution of India assailing the impugned order passed by the District Magistrate and the Appellate Authority, which is quoted above. 8. The sole point arising for decision in the instant case is whether or not the findings of the Appellate Authority as well as the Prescribed Authority resulting in rejection of the petition filed by the petitioner for disqualification of membership of the present O.P.No.3 Sharaf Singh are legally sustainable on the face of the materials-on-record. 9. 8. The sole point arising for decision in the instant case is whether or not the findings of the Appellate Authority as well as the Prescribed Authority resulting in rejection of the petition filed by the petitioner for disqualification of membership of the present O.P.No.3 Sharaf Singh are legally sustainable on the face of the materials-on-record. 9. Section 213A (1) of the Act empowers the Prescribed Authority to disqualify a member of the Panchayat provided the Prescribed Authority concerned is satisfied that if such member of the Panchayat who is an elected member set up by a recognized political party has voluntarily given up his membership of such recognized political party or exercised the voting right contrary to the manner of voting of the majority members set up by such recognized political party in such Panchayat or he is an elected member not set up by any recognized political party and he has joined a recognized political party on the expiry of six months from the date of election. Proviso to Section 213A (1) of the Act lays down that the Prescribed Authority shall not declare any member to be disqualified under this section without giving to such member a reasonable opportunity to represent his case and to be heard in person. There is further proviso to the effect that an elected member referred to in sub-clause (ii) of Clause (a) shall not, on the prescribed authority being satisfied in this behalf, be declared to be disqualified in any of the conditions enumerated in (a) or (b) or (c) is fulfilled. One of such conditions as enumerated in (b) of the said further proviso to Section 213A (1) of the Act is that such elected member shall not be declared to be disqualified if the prescribed authority is satisfied that such member claims that he and any other members of such recognized political party in the Panchayat constitute a group representing a faction consisting of not less than 1/3rd of the total number of members set up by such recognized political party in the Panchayat and that all the members of such group have voluntarily given up their membership of such recognized political party. 10. 10. In the given case I find that the Prescribed Authority on consideration of the materials-on-record has come to a finding that Shri Bharat Singh, Thakurdas Mahato, Chabi Rani Chowdhury and Dilip Soren have formed a group representing a faction of 1/3rd of the total number of members of I.N.C. in Joypur Panchayat Samity which consists of 12 members and as such those four members constitute a group representing a faction of 1/3rd of the total number of members set up by the said recognized political party in Joypur Panchayat Samity and the aforesaid four members of the group have voluntarily given up their membership of the said recognized political party. Under the aforesaid circumstances the Prescribed Authority has held that the petition filed by the petitioner Shaktipada Mahato regarding recommendation of disqualification of Shri Bharat Singh from membership of Joypur Panchayat Samity fails to attract sub-section (1) (a) of Section 213A of the Act and the said petition has accordingly been rejected. 11. On appeal preferred by the petitioner the Appellate Authority has concurred with the findings of the Prescribed Authority and upheld the decision of the Prescribed Authority. 12. Mr. Jayanta Mitra the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioner has drawn my attention to sub-sections (7), (8), (9), (10) and (11) of Section 213A of the Act which read as follows:–– "(7) The Leader of any recognized political party referred to in subsection (3) may at any time file a petition endorsed by the General Secretary, or, if there is no General Secretary, of the district unit of such recognized political party of the prescribed authority referred to in sub-section (1), stating that–– (a) one or more members of such recognized political party have–– (i) voluntarily given up his or their membership of such recognized political party, or (ii) have exercised the voting right contrary to the manner of voting of the majority members set up by such recognized political party in the Panchayat, or (b) the member referred to in sub-section (4) has voluntarily given up his membership of the recognized political party that set him up, or (c) the member referred to in sub-section (5) has joined a recognized political party on the expiry of six months from the date of election, and that such member or members should be declared to be disqualified under sub-section (1) and should be removed from the Panchayat. (8) Every petition referred to in sub-section (7)–– (a) shall contain a concise statement of the material facts on which the petitioner relies, and (b) shall be accompanied by copies of the documentary evidence, if any, on which the petitioner relies and, where the petitioner relies on any information furnished to him by any person or persons, a statement containing the names and addresses of such person or persons and the gist of such information as furnished by such person or each of such persons. (9) On receipt of the petition referred to in sub-section (7), the prescribed authority referred to in sub-section (1) shall, as soon as possible within six weeks from the date of the receipt of such petition, proceed to make an enquiry to satisfy himself, among others, as to–– (a) the common decision in regard to the manner of voting to be exercised by the majority members set up by the recognized political party, and (b) whether the member or members against whom such petition is filed, exercised the voting right, in a meeting of the Panchayat contrary to such manner of voting. (10) For the purpose of enquiry under sub-section (9), the prescribed authority may summon such members of the recognized political party or other persons, and require such signed statements from, and production of such documents and records by, the members or other persons as aforesaid as he may deem necessary. (11) As soon as possible within eight weeks from the date of receipt of the petition referred to in sub-section (7), the prescribed authority shall, in consideration of the facts and the documents and the records before it–– (a) reject the petition, or (b) admit the petition wholly or in part and declare any member or members to be disqualified under sub-section (1) for being members of the Panchayat." 13. Mr. Mitra has further drawn my attention to Rule 6 of the West Bengal Panchayat (Members Disqualification) Rules, 1994 which prescribes procedure required to be followed by the Prescribed Authority for determining any question and for the purpose of making any enquiry under sub-section (9) of Section 213A of the Act. Mr. Mitra has further drawn my attention to Rule 6 of the West Bengal Panchayat (Members Disqualification) Rules, 1994 which prescribes procedure required to be followed by the Prescribed Authority for determining any question and for the purpose of making any enquiry under sub-section (9) of Section 213A of the Act. As per sub-rule (1) of Rule 6 of the West Bengal Panchayat (Members Disqualification) Rules, 1994 the procedure to be followed by the prescribed authority shall be, so far as may be, the same as the procedure followed by the Committee of Privileges of the West Bengal Legislative Assembly. 14. Relying on the aforesaid provisions of the Act and the rules Mr. Mitra has submitted that in the given case the Prescribed Authority did not follow the procedure prescribed for making an enquiry as contemplated under sub-section (9) of Section 213A of the Act. He has further contended that the Prescribed Authority examined Shri Bharat Singh and his witnesses in absence of the petitioner during enquiry. He has further pointed out that no copies of the documents submitted by Bharat Singh, Thakurdas Mahato, Chabi Rani Chowdhury and Dilip Soren in the course of enquiry to substantiate their claim of formation of separate group were served on the petitioner and in fact the Prescribed Authority made the enquiry in absence of the petitioner. As contended by Mr. Mitra, such procedure of making of enquiry by the Prescribed Authority in absence of the petitioner violates the principles of natural Justice, which are required to be followed in case of such enquiry which is a quasi-judicial proceeding. 15. To refute the above contentions raised by Mr. Mitra, Mr. Sadhan Roychowdhury the learned Advocate appearing for O.P. No.3 has argued that as per the requirements of sub-section (9) of Section 213A of the Act the Prescribed Authority shall proceed to make the enquiry only to satisfy himself, among others, as to the matter enumerated in Clauses (a) and (b) thereof and the relevant statutory provisions of the Act and the relevant rule cast duty on the Prescribed Authority to give reasonable opportunity of hearing to the member whose disqualification is sought. Mr. Mr. Roychowdhury has further argued that in the instant case O.P. No.3 Bharat Singh whose disqualification of membership has been sought by the petitioner as leader of I.N.C. of Panchayat Samity members of Joypur Panchayat Samity has been given reasonable opportunity by the Prescribed Authority to represent his case and he along with his witnesses attended the enquiry proceeding and they were heard in person by the Prescribed Authority. In such circumstances Mr. Roychowdhury has contended that there is no procedural irregularity or illegality in the matter of conducting the enquiry by the Prescribed Authority. 16. On going through the materials-on-record and considering the rival contentions raised by Mr. Mitra and Mr. Roychowdhury I find that as per the mandatory requirements of the statutory provisions and the rules the member of the Panchayat whose disqualification is sought by the leader of the recognized political party is to be heard in person by the Prescribed Authority and reasonable opportunity must be afforded by the Prescribed Authority to such member to represent his case. 17. It has been contended by Mr. Mitra that as per sub-section (6) of Section 213A of the Act in the event of any change of the information furnished under sub-section (3), sub-section (4) or sub-section (5), the leader or the member, as the case may be, shall, as soon as may be within 15 days from the date of such change, furnish in writing such change of information to the prescribed authority and in the instant case the present O.P. No.3 Bharat Singh did not intimate any change alleged to have taken place due to formation of a group representing the fact on within the stipulated period either to the parent party or to the prescribed authority and as such O.P. No.3 Bharat Singh incurred disqualification according to law. Mr. Roychowdhury on the other hand has submitted that it is incumbent upon the leader of the recognized political party to furnish in writing such change of information to the prescribed authority. Mr. Mr. Roychowdhury on the other hand has submitted that it is incumbent upon the leader of the recognized political party to furnish in writing such change of information to the prescribed authority. Mr. Roychowdhury has drawn my attention to the proviso to sub-section (3) of Section 213A of the Act and argued that such proviso lays down that the prescribed authority shall not refuse to accept, or to rely on, the documents furnished by the leader merely on the ground that the resolution selecting the leader was not adopted within one month from the date of the first meeting of the Panchayat or within one month from the date on which this section comes into force, as the case may be, or that the documents were not furnished to him within fifteen day's from the date of such selection. Relying on the aforesaid proviso Mr. Roychowdhury has submitted that even if the statutory period of fifteen days as prescribed in sub-section (6) of Section 213 A of the Act expires, the intent of the legislature is quite clear from the aforesaid proviso and viewed in this perspective it can well be held that the prescribed authority can accept any change of information referred to in sub-section (6) of Section 213A of the Act even on expiry of the statutory period of fifteen days prescribed for the purpose. 18. On plain reading of the relevant provisions of Section 213A of the Act I find that three conditions are the sine quo non for avoiding the disqualification when any elected member of a Panchayat voluntarily gives up membership of his original political party. First is that the member concerned should have made a claim that he along with other members of such recognized political party in the Panchayat constitute a group representing a faction thereof. Second is that such group representing a faction consists of not less than 1/3rd of the total number of members set up by such recognized political party in the Panchayat. Third is that all the members of such group have voluntarily given up their membership of such recognized political party. It has been argued by Mr. Second is that such group representing a faction consists of not less than 1/3rd of the total number of members set up by such recognized political party in the Panchayat. Third is that all the members of such group have voluntarily given up their membership of such recognized political party. It has been argued by Mr. Roychowdhury that when a member of the Panchayat has voluntarily given up his membership of the recognized political party, such voluntary Act of giving up his membership of the party is unilateral Act and the same cannot be treated as bilateral act of resignation which is to be accepted by the authority concerned. Mr. Mitra on the other hand has submitted that there in no difference between the expression "voluntarily giving up" and the term 'resignation'. True, etymologically the expression 'voluntarily giving up' is synonymous with the term 'resignation'. However each word or expression used in legal parlance is to be judged in the light of the context in which the same is used. In (1) Motiram v. Param Dev and Another reported in AIR 1993 Supreme Court 1662 at page 1668 (Para 15) the Supreme Court observed as follows:–– "As pointed out by this Court, 'resignation' means the spontaneous relinquishment of one's own right and in relation to an office, it connotes the act of giving up or relinquishing the office. It has been held that in the general juristic sense, in order to constitute a complete and operative resignation there must be the intention to give up or relinquish the office and the concomitant act of its relinquishment. It has also been observed that the act of relinquishment may take different forms or assume a unilateral or bilateral character, depending on the nature of the office and the conditions governing it. See: (2) Union of India v. Gopal Chandra Misra, 1978 (3) SCR 12 at p. 21 : AIR 1978 SC 694 at pp. 699-700. If the act of relinquishment is of unilateral character, it comes into effect when such act indicating the intention to relinquish the office is communicated to the competent authority. The authority to whom the act of relinquishment is communicated is not required to take any action and the relinquishment takes effect from the date of such communication where the resignation is intended to operate in praesenti. The authority to whom the act of relinquishment is communicated is not required to take any action and the relinquishment takes effect from the date of such communication where the resignation is intended to operate in praesenti. A resignation may also be prospective to be operative from a future date and in that event it would take effect from the date indicated therein and not from the date of communication. In cases where the act of relinquishment is of a bilateral character, the communication of the intention to relinquish, by itself, would not be sufficient to result in relinquishment of the office and some action is required to be taken on such communication of the intention to relinquish, e.g., acceptance of the said request to relinquish the office, and in such a case the relinquishment does not become effective or operative till such action is taken. As to whether the act of relinquishment of an office is unilateral or bilateral in character would depend upon the nature of the office and the conditions governing it." 19. If we analyze the expression 'voluntarily giving up' used in Section 213 A (1) of the Act and examine the context in which the same is used in the light of the principles enunciated by the Supreme Court in the case of Moti Ram (supra), the conclusion which can safely be arrived at is that such act of voluntarily giving up his membership of the recognized political party by a member thereof must be unilateral act and cannot at be a bilateral one. 20. From the materials-on-record I find that the present O.P. No.3 Bharat Singh who was an elected member of Joypur Panchayat Samity had voluntarily given up his membership from I.N.C. and he along with other three members Thakurdas Mahato, Chabi Rani Chowdhury and Dilip Soren constituted a group representing a faction of 1/3rd of the total number of members of I.N.C. in Joypur Panchayat Samity. The materials-on-record further denote that the documents including the affidavit were tiled by those four members in the course of enquiry proceeding before the prescribed Authority and the Prescribed Authority having been satisfied that those four members including Bharat Singh voluntarily gave up their membership of I.N.C. and constituted a group representing a faction of 1/3rd of the total number of members set up by I.N.C. in Joypur Panchayat Samity on 5.3.01 came to the finding that the petition of the petitioner Shaktipada Mahato regarding recommendation of disqualification of Shri Bharat Singh from membership of Joypur Panchayat Samity failed to attract sub-section (1) (a) of Section 213 A of the Act. It is quite evident from the facts and circumstances of the case emerging from the materials-on-record that there is clear proof of the unilateral act of voluntarily giving up of membership by all the aforesaid four members and forming of a separate group representing a faction of 1/3rd of the total number of members of I.N.C. in Joypur Panchayat Samity. So the essential requirements as envisaged in clause (b) of proviso to Section 213A of the Act have duly been complied with and as such in terms of the said proviso Shri Bharat Singh cannot be declared to be disqualified from membership of Joypur Panchayat Samity. The findings of fact arrived at by the Prescribed Authority on this score and affirmed by the Appellate Authority on appeal can hardly be interfered with by this Court in revision. 21. Mr. Mitra has cited some decisions to buttress up his contention that the enquiry proceeding conducted by the Prescribed Authority is a quasi-judicial proceeding and the Prescribed Authority has conducted the proceeding in violation of the principles of natural Justice since no reasonable opportunity was given to the petitioner to disprove the case put forward by O.P. No.3 Bharat Singh. He has cited the case of (3) Mayawati v. Markandeya Chand and Ors. reported in 1998 (7) SCC 517 where at page 534-535 (Para 30) the Supreme Court observed as follows:–– "Parameters for scrutinizing what is unreasonable are, of course, nebulous. What appears to be reasonable to one man may be unreasonable to another and vice versa. He has cited the case of (3) Mayawati v. Markandeya Chand and Ors. reported in 1998 (7) SCC 517 where at page 534-535 (Para 30) the Supreme Court observed as follows:–– "Parameters for scrutinizing what is unreasonable are, of course, nebulous. What appears to be reasonable to one man may be unreasonable to another and vice versa. It was perhaps that approach which made Lord Hailsham to make his quaint comment that two reasonable persons can reach diametrically opposite conclusions on the same set of facts without either of them forfeiting the credential to be reasonable. However, the test of perversity has now bogged down to this; no conclusion can be dubbed as perverse unless the unreasonableness is of such a dimension that no authority vested with the jurisdiction would have come to such a conclusion." 22. Mr. Mitra has also cited the case of (4) Kihoto Hollohan v. Zachillhu and Ors., 1992 Supp (2) Supreme Court Cases 651, (5) S. L. Kapoor v. Jagmohan and Ors., AIR 1981 Supreme Court 136, (6) Debendra Bandhu Lahiri v. State of West Bengal and Ors., AIR 1952 Calcutta 808 and the case of (7) R. v. Bodmin Justices, (1947) 1 All England Law Reports 109. 23. On careful perusal of the aforesaid decisions cited by Mr. Mitra I find that none of them renders any assistance to the petitioner. 24. On the facts emerging from the materials-on-record I find absolutely no reason to hold that the impugned order passed by the Appellate Authority confirming the order of the Prescribed Authority suffers from any amount of perversity. The ratio of the case of Kihoto Hollohan (supra), does not apply to the facts and circumstances of the present case. 25. In the case of S. L. Kapoor (supra), at page 145 (para 16) it has been specifically laid down by the Supreme Court that the requirements of natural Justice are met only if opportunity to represent is given in view of proposed action. It has further been held that the person proceeded against must know that he is being required to meet the allegations which might lead to a certain action being taken against him. If that is made known the requirements are met. It has further been held that the person proceeded against must know that he is being required to meet the allegations which might lead to a certain action being taken against him. If that is made known the requirements are met. In the given case such requirements are fully met since present O.P. No.3 Bharat Singh whose disqualification of membership from Joypur Panchayat Samity is sought by the petitioner has been given full opportunity to represent his case. 26. In the case of R. v. Bodmin Justices (supra), the justices interviewed a witness in absence of the accused and, it is in such context Lord Goddard, C.J. presiding over the King's Bench Division observed that if justices interview a witness in the absence of the accused, justice is not seen to be done, because the accused does not and cannot know what was said and the consequence of this unfortunate incident is that this conviction must be quashed. The ratio of the case of R. v. Bodmin Justices (supra), has got no manner of application whatsoever in the facts and circumstances of the present case. 27. The relevant statutory provision of Section 213A of the Act and the relevant Rule as pointed out earlier provide opportunity of hearing to the member concerned whose disqualification of membership is sought. If such requirement is met, no question of violation of the principles of natural Justice can arise, natural Justice cannot be unnecessarily expanded. Rigid formula and technicalities which do not and cannot serve the purpose of law fall outside its admit. 28. For the foregoing reasons I find no reason to interfere with the order impugned. There is no merit in the instant application under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. The same is bound to fail. The application under Article 227 of the Constitution of India preferred by the petitioner is accordingly dismissed. 29. There will be no order as to costs. Xerox certified copy of this judgment, if applied for, be given to the parties as expeditiously as possible.