MANJULA CHELLUR, J. ( 1 ) THIS revision petition is filed challenging the order of the learned judge in execution petition on the file of the Civil Judge (Junior Division), hirekerur ( 2 ) IN brief the facts that lead to the filing of the revision petition are as under: one Husainsab Goususab Ellapur filed a suit for specific performance of agreement of sale in respect of land bearing Sy. No. 194 measuring 11 acres 15 guntas situate at Chikkounte Village of Hirekerur Taluk against Krishnarao Sheshagirirao Sarathi. It was decreed on 24-9-1973 directing the said Krishnarao to execute the registered sale deed after receiving the balance of consideration. Subsequent to the said decree karnataka Land Reforms Act came into force. The land in question was enanted land, therefore, the Tahsildar, Hirekerur, passed an order vesting the land with the Government. The entries in the record of rights also came to be changed accordingly in the name of the Government. By that time the revision petitioner Husainsab Goususab died. The L. Rs of said Husainsab Goususab filed Form No. 7 seeking occupancy rights. The decree-holder informed the Land Tribunal that they are the purchasers of the land in question. The matter went up to the High Court and was remanded back to the Tribunal for fresh enquiry. The Land tribunal, Hirekerur, on 15-4-1989 held that the present revision petitioners/decree-holders are not the tenants of the land in question and they are the only purehasers of the land. Therefore, occupancy rights were not conferred on them. Subsequently, the revision petitioners/decree-holders filed the present execution petition after tracing the L. Rs of the deceased defendant/judgment-debtor. They also noticed that the names of the respondents herein were entered in the records of the suit land. On 23-10-1996 a notice was issued to the respondents herein calling upon them to execute a sale deed as per the decree in O. S. No. 84 of 1972 after receiving the balance of consideration of Rs. 1,000/ -. According to the revision petitioners when the respondents failed to execute the sale deed the cause of action for filing the execution petition arose, filed the execution petition before the Court seeking a direction for the execution of a conveyance document. 1,000/ -. According to the revision petitioners when the respondents failed to execute the sale deed the cause of action for filing the execution petition arose, filed the execution petition before the Court seeking a direction for the execution of a conveyance document. It is further contended on their behalf that by virtue of coming into force of the Land Reforms Act on 1-3-1974 they did not execute the decree in O. S. No. 84 of 1972 and they were making efforts to delete the name of the Government appearing in the land records. The date on which the judgment-debtors/respondents denied to execute the registered sale deed the right has accrued to the decree-holder to execute the decree i. e. , with effect from 23-10-1996. Therefore, the present revision petition is filed within twelve years from 23-10-1996 and is not barred by time. ( 3 ) WHEN the execution petition came to be registered, the office raised objection that the date of decree is dated 24-9-1973 and the execution filed in 1999 is barred by limitation and it is filed beyond twelve years from that date. The decree-holders were heard by the Court and the point that came up for consideration was whether the execution petition was barred by limitation. The only contention of the decree-holder was that from the date of denial to execute the sale deed by judgment-debtors the cause of action arose to execute the decree. It was also contended that the time taken for proceedings before the Land Tribunal, Hirekerur has to be excluded. But the learned Judge relying on Article 136 of the limitation Act held that the application under Order 21, Rule 11 of the cpc was hopelessly barred by time and the application filed under section 148 of the CPC seeking enlargement of time to deposit balance of consideration of Rs. 1,000/- do not survive for consideration. Aggrieved by the said order the present revision petition is filed. ( 4 ) ADMITTEDLY, the decree was passed for specific performance of agreement of sale on 24-9-1973. In the normal course within twelve years as per Article 136 of the Limitation Act the execution of any decree or order has to be filed. In this case admittedly the execution petition is filed somewhere in 1999 much beyond the period of limitation. In the normal course within twelve years as per Article 136 of the Limitation Act the execution of any decree or order has to be filed. In this case admittedly the execution petition is filed somewhere in 1999 much beyond the period of limitation. The first contention is that the cause of action arose from the date of denial to execute the sale deed i. e. , 23-10-1996 is not at all tenable by virtue of special provision under Article 136 of the Limitation Act prescribing the period for filing an execution petition. The denial to execute the sale deed may only give cause of action to file the suit for specific performance and not for the execution of the decree or order. ( 5 ) THE next question is that they were pursuing the matter before the land Tribunal, Hirekerur and finally the Land Tribunal, Hirekerur passed an order on 15-4-1989 holding that the revision petitioners are not the tenants of the land and therefore the said period i. e. , from the date of decree to 15-4-1989 ought to be excluded and in that case the execution petition would be within 12 years. Section 14 of the Limitation act reads as under:"section 14. Exclusion of time of proceeding bona fide in court without jurisdiction. (1) In computing the period of limitation for any suit the time during which the plaintiff has been prosecuting with due diligence another civil proceeding, whether in a Court of first instance or of appeal or revision, against the defendant shall be excluded, where the proceeding relates to the same matter in issue and is prosecuted in good faith in a Court which, from defect of jurisdiction or other cause of a like nature, is unable to entertain it. (2) In computing the period of limitation for any application, the time during which the applicant has been prosecuting with due diligence another civil proceeding, whether in a Court of first instance or of appeal or revision, against the same party for the same relief shall be excluded, where such proceeding is prosecuted in good faith in a Court which, from defect of jurisdiction or other cause of a like nature, is unable to entertain it. (3) Notwithstanding anything contained in Rule 2, Order 23 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908), the provisions of sub-section (1) shall apply in relation to a fresh suit instituted on permission granted by the Court under Rule 1 of that Order, where such permission is granted on the ground that the first suit must fail by reason of a defect in the jurisdiction of the Court or other cause of a like nature. Explanation. For the purposes of this section: (a) in excluding the time during which a former civil proceeding was pending, the day on which that proceeding was instituted and the day on which it ended shall both be counted; (b) a plaintiff or an applicant resisting an appeal shall be deemed to be prosecuting a proceeding; (c) misjoinder of parties or of cause of action shall be deemed to be a cause of a like nature with defect of jurisdiction". ( 6 ) THE learned Counsel for the revision petitioners relied upon the following decisions: (1) Vishwanath v Smt. Kadamma; (2) Deputy Collector, Northern Sub-Division, Panaji v Comunidade of Bambolim. In the case of Vishwanath, supra, it is held as under:"limitation Act (Central Act No. 36 of 1963), Section 14 Scope of In a suit for declaration of title, parties to the suit entered into a compromise under which, on depositing a sum of rs. 2,000/- by the plaintiff the defendant was to execute a sale deed in respect of the suit property. When the defendant failed to execute the sale deed as per the terms of the compromise decree the plaintiff filed an execution petition, which was allowed by the executing Court. But on appeal the Appellate Court held that the terms of compromise cannot be taken to be part of the dispute between the parties in view of the scope of the suit and as such this part of the decree was not executable. The plaintiff filed a suit for specific performance of this term of the compromise decree contending that the cause of action has arisen only after the execution appeal filed by the defendant was allowed. The defendant contended that the suit is barred by time. When this matter reached the High Court in second appeal the following substantial question of law was raised". The defendant contended that the suit is barred by time. When this matter reached the High Court in second appeal the following substantial question of law was raised". ( 7 ) IN the case of Comunidade of Bambolim, supra, their Lordships7 have at paragraph 2 held as under:"2. The crucial question is whether the appeal was presented bona fide within limitation. It is true that if the appeal is filed under "recurso de Apelacao" it is well-within time. If appeal is entertained under Section 96 of the CPC read with Section 54 of the Act, it is beyond limitation. The question is whether the appellant was pursuing the remedy bona fide. It is contended for the respondent that there are no bona fides on the part of the state and, therefore, Section 14 of the Limitation Act cannot be applied to the facts in this appeal. We are unable to agree with the counsel. The State is acting through its authorised representative and the Counsel was in two minds, as to whether the appeal should be pursued under the Portuguese Code or under the CPC. Since the CPC stood extended to G. D. D. on September 15, 1966, by which date there was a decree passed by the Reference Court, obviously, the proceedings should be pursued under the CPC as per Section 53 of the Act. Therefore, the Counsel was pursuing the remedy wrongly under the Portuguese Code. In consequence, the appeal came to be filed beyond limitation. Accordingly, there are bona fides in pursuing the remedy. The State was represented by the Counsel and the Counsel was in two minds as to whether the appeal should be pursued under the Portuguese Code or under the code of Civil Procedure. There is a bona fide mistake on the part of the Counsel in pursuing the remedy. Since the State acts through the Counsel for the State and he is entitled to represent the State in all the proceedings initiated in the Court, there was no need to file Vakalatnama but memo of appearance would be sufficient. Accordingly, the order of the Judicial Commissioner is set aside". ( 8 ) IN both the citations the contention of the party taking protection under Section 14 of the Limitation Act was that on the advice of their advocate they were prosecuting the proceedings diligently in a wrong court. Accordingly, the order of the Judicial Commissioner is set aside". ( 8 ) IN both the citations the contention of the party taking protection under Section 14 of the Limitation Act was that on the advice of their advocate they were prosecuting the proceedings diligently in a wrong court. ( 9 ) IT is not the case of the revision petitioners herein that on the advice of their Advocate they were wrongly pursuing the remedy in a different forum. The facts in the above two decisions do not apply to the facts of the present case. ( 10 ) THE earliest judgment of the Apex Court in Yeshwant Deorao v walchand Ramchand , wherein their Lordships at para 5 held as under:"civil Procedure Code, 1908, Section 48 Date of decree plaintiff ordered to pay deficit Court fee Decree not conditional or non-executable. Where a decree provides that the decree-holder should pay the deficit Court fee on the decretal amount before its execution the decree is not a conditional one in the sense that some extraneous event is to happen on the fulfilment of which alone it can be executed. The payment of Court fees on the amount found due is entirely in the power of the decree-holder and there is nothing to prevent him from paying it then and there. Thus it is a decree capable of execution from the very date it is passed". ( 11 ) IN the case of Commissioner of Sales Tax, Uttar Pradesh, lucknow v M/s. Parson Tools and Plants, Kanpur, at headnote (B) it is held as under:" (B) Interpretation of Statutes Special and general statute Provision prescribing period of limitation in special statutes principles of general statute cannot be imported into special statute. If the legislature in a special statute prescribes a certain period of limitation for filing a particular application thereunder and provides in clear terms that such period on sufficient cause being shown, may be extended, in the maximum, only upto a specified time-limit and no further, then the Tribunal concerned has no jurisdiction to treat within limitation, an application filed before it beyond such maximum time-limit specified in the statute, by excluding the time spent in prosecuting in good faith and with due diligence any prior proceeding on the analogy of Section 14 (2) of the Limitation Act. Where the legislature clearly declares its intent in the scheme and language of a statute, it is the duty of the Court to give effect to the same without scanning its wisdom or policy, and without engrafting, adding or implying anything which is not congenial to or consistent with such expressed intent of the law-giver; more so if the statute is a taxing statute". ( 12 ) IN the case of Ram Bhawan Singh and Others v Jagdish and others , wherein their Lordships at paragraphs 4 and 7 held as under:"4. The appellants did not challenge the order of the High court dated October 3. 1972 by taking any further steps of filing any special leave petition before this Court. On the contrary, on some mistaken and totally wrong advice of some Counsel the appellants again initiated fresh proceedings by moving an application on July 6, 1973 before the Settlement Officer (Consolidation ). That application was rejected on October 30, 1974. A revision was filed against that order before the Deputy director of Consolidation which was also rejected by order dated july 21, 1975. Thereafter the appellants filed C. M. W. P. No. 9943 of 1975 before the High Court on August 7, 1975 against the order of the Deputy Director (Consolidation ). This writ petition came to be dismissed by order dated September 18, 1975. This judgment of the High Court is challenged in Civil Appeal No. 1003 of 1976. When the High Court in the earlier Writ Petition No. 2726 of 1970 on the same subject-matter had finally decided the matter in favour of the respondents by order dated October 3, 1972, there was no question of giving any advice by any Counsel in good faith to start proceedings afresh by moving a fresh application before the consolidation authorities. No Counsel could have given such advice in good faith to start proceedings afresh before the consolidation authorities and then to claim benefit of such period under Section 14 of the Limitation Act. It was elementary for any counsel of whatever standing to have known that none of the authorities of the Settlement or Consolidation Department could have any right or jurisdiction to set aside the order of the High court dated October 3, 1972. It was elementary for any counsel of whatever standing to have known that none of the authorities of the Settlement or Consolidation Department could have any right or jurisdiction to set aside the order of the High court dated October 3, 1972. The Settlement Officer (Consolidation) as such was justified in dismissing the application by his order dated October 30, 1974, and thereafter the revision by the Deputy Director (Consolidation) by order dated July 21, 1975. The appellants then under the same mistaken advice not in good faith filed C. M. W. P. No. 9943 of 1975, which came to be dismissed by the High Court on September 18, 1975. The second judgment of the High Court is now challenged in Civil Appeal No. 1003 of 1976. 7. The first question that we have to decide is that of limitation. The delay of 1,198 days according to the appellants had occurred unwillingly and the appellants had been prosecuting with due diligence the earlier proceedings before the appellate and the revisional authorities and on the basis of the advice given by their Counsel. There is no proper affidavit of either the appellants or the Counsel in support of the application for condonation of delay. There is also no other material to indicate that the appellants had exercised due diligence in working out their remedies and sought proper advice in the matter. When the party had no right of appeal, the proceedings instituted before the High court challenging the judgment in the writ petition cannot be considered to be one in good faith. The subsequent proceedings are also not legal or valid. When the decision of the High Court in the writ petition was one quashing the orders of the appellate and the revisional authorities, the party could not proceed on the basis that the matter was restored to the lower authorities for fresh decision. We are therefore not satisfied that there is any merit in the ground urged by the appellants for getting over the bar of limitation. The appeals are liable to be dismissed as time barred". ( 13 ) IN the case of Annu alias Kallappa v Sheshu Gundappa , at paragraphs 10, 11 and 12, His Lordship has held as under:"10. We are therefore not satisfied that there is any merit in the ground urged by the appellants for getting over the bar of limitation. The appeals are liable to be dismissed as time barred". ( 13 ) IN the case of Annu alias Kallappa v Sheshu Gundappa , at paragraphs 10, 11 and 12, His Lordship has held as under:"10. Apart from the fact that the Court was dealing exclusively with proceedings in a Civil Court, the further reference to the fact that proceedings dealt with in the section are referred to as those taken in the Court of first instance or appeal or revision, leave no room, in my opinion, for any doubt that the proceedings referred to are proceedings dealt with under the Code of Civil Procedure in a Court exercising general civil jurisdiction to which alone, it may be remembered, the provisions of the Limitation Act apply. 11. Another ingredient of this section which must be borne in mind is that the other proceedings referred to therein must be proceedings which relate to the same matter in issue, which justice Varadachariar has understood to mean the proceedings by taking which the party bona fide believes that he might secure the relief which is under consideration. 12. If these principles are applied, there can be no doubt that the proceedings taken by the appellant before the B. A. D. R. Court are wholly beyond the scope of Section 14 of the Limitation Act. Firstly, they are not proceedings taken under the Code of Civil procedure in a Civil Court and secondly, they are not proceedings taken for the relief sought in the present suit, namely, recovering of possession of the property. The only relief sought in the b. A. D. R. Court was the adjustment of the debt, as the only relief the appellant could have sought and which that Court was competent to give was the adjustment of the debt and not recovery of possession of the property as an ordinary Civil Court can do". ( 14 ) IN order to get exclusion of time spent in prosecuting other proceedings under bona fide faith in Court without jurisdiction, the matters in issue that is, relief sought in both the suits must be identical. ( 14 ) IN order to get exclusion of time spent in prosecuting other proceedings under bona fide faith in Court without jurisdiction, the matters in issue that is, relief sought in both the suits must be identical. In the present case, it is nobody's case that specific performance suit was wrongly filed and they did not file the execution petition as the party had no right to file the execution petition. According to them, as the land stood resumed to the Government on the date of coming into force of the karnataka Land Reforms Act they filed Form No. 7 seeking occupancy rights. However, the said matter went up to this Court and ultimately it was held against the revision petitioner that he cannot be considered as a tenant. When once the revision petitioner obtained an order in his favour, which he could have executed and got the document of conveyance, did not pursue that right. He went in pursuit of an altogether different right, The cause of action in a suit for specific performance of agreement of sale and the execution of that decree is quite different from the cause of action to seek occupancy rights as a tenant. Even if he were to be a tenant the moment he entered into an agreement of sale with the landlord the said right would get merged with the right as an agreement holder. In the present case the said right of the revision petitioner was crystallized in the form of a decree which was very much executable in the execution proceedings. The denial of the respondent to execute document cannot be the cause of action to file the execution proceedings. The moment he obtains decree, which has reached finality the party gets a right to execute the said decree. The said decree ought to have been executed within twelve years from the date of decree as provided under article 136 of the Limitation Act. Having spent time pursuing different cause of action altogether before the concerned authority under Karnataka land Reforms Act the party cannot seek protection under Section 14 saying he was prosecuting tenancy right in the wrong forum in spite of holding executable order in his hand. The execution proceedings cannot be considered as the later proceedings. Having spent time pursuing different cause of action altogether before the concerned authority under Karnataka land Reforms Act the party cannot seek protection under Section 14 saying he was prosecuting tenancy right in the wrong forum in spite of holding executable order in his hand. The execution proceedings cannot be considered as the later proceedings. Under these circumstances, i do not find any good ground to interfere with the order of the executing Court in rejecting the execution petition. ( 15 ) ACCORDINGLY, the revision petition is dismissed --- *** --- .