JUDGMENT P. K. MOHANTY, J. — The petitioners, two in number have chal¬lenged the order of the Chief General Manager (T & A) rejecting their representations to designate them as Deputy Manager and allow them the revised scale of pay as allowed to the other contemporaries in service with effect from the date of such persons have been given the benefit. 2. The short fact of the case is that petitioner No. 1 Ashok Kumar Mishra was first appointed as Trainee Junior Engineer on consolidated salary of Rs. 750/- per month and joined in the Industrial Infrastructure Development Corporation (hereinafter called “I.D.C.O.”) on 24.11.1986. He was regularised in the post of Junior Engineer (Civil) at a starting pay of Rs. 565/- per month in the scale of pay Rs. 490-840/- with effect from 1.1.1987. Petitioner No. 2 Dipak Ranjan Tripathy joined the I.D.C.O. on 10.7.1987 as Assistant Manager (Civil) on probation on a consoli¬dated salary Rs. 750/- per month. Subsequently, petitioner No. 1 Sri Mishra was designated as Assistant Manager (Civil) and al¬lowed the scale of pay of Rs. 1350-2975/-with effect from 24.11.1987 in letter dated 22.12.1987, copy whereof is Annexure-D to the counter. Sri D. K. Tripathy, petitioner No. 2 was desig¬nated as Assistant Manger (Civil) in the pay scale of Rs. 1350-2975/- with effect from 15.4.1988 by letter dated 21.4.1988, copy of which is Annexure-E. According to the petitioner No.2, he was given appointment on probation as Assistant Manager (Civil) at a time when there was no such post but only the post of Assistant Manager (Technical) was available. He being a Graduate Engineer, it is claimed that he ought to have been appointed as Assistant Manager (Technical). However, both the petitioners were subse¬quently designated as Assistant Manager (Civil) in the pay scale of Rs. 1350-2975/-, which according to them was not existing prior to and after the 18th meeting of the Board of Directors. The promotions were to be given according to the 9th and 10th Board meetings on the recommendation of the Selection Committee, constituted by the order of the Chairman or Managing Director of the Corporation but the same was not done. The petitioners assert that they could not be placed in the category of Junior Engineer (Selection Grade) in the pay scale of Rs. 1350-2975/-, since it was meant for Junior Engineers having Diploma qualification, with five years experience. The petitioners assert that they could not be placed in the category of Junior Engineer (Selection Grade) in the pay scale of Rs. 1350-2975/-, since it was meant for Junior Engineers having Diploma qualification, with five years experience. The petitioners allege that though unified scale of pay and redesignated post of Graduate Engineers were introduced in the 18th Meeting of the Board of Directors of the I.D.C.O. on 2.6.1987 and the petitioners had joined the service with effect from 1.1.1987 and 10.7.1987, they have been discrimi¬nated against other such Engineers appointed prior to them in 1985-86. Petitioner’s representation to the authorities having been rejected, they have approached this Court for relief. 3. The opposite party-I.D.C.O. has filed its returns denying the claims and allegations made by the petitioners. It is the specific case of the opposite party-Corporation that the Board of Directors of the Corporation in its 18th Meeting dated 2.7.1987 resolved that there will be an intermediate post in between the post carrying the old scale of Rs. 525-1150/- pre¬scribed for Assistant Manager (non-technical) and the post carry¬ing the old scale of Rs. 1600-1585/- prescribed for Deputy Man¬gers. The intermediate post carrying the old scale of Rs. 750-1100/- would be designated as Deputy Managers. The new scale of pay suggested for that post was Rs. 1845-3100/-. A copy of proceeding of the 18th Meeting of the Board has been annexed as Annexure-F. It is therefore, the stand of the Corporation that in terms of the decision of the Board, intermediate post carrying old scale of Rs. 750-1150/- was designated as Deputy Manager and revised scale of pay suggested for the post was Rs. 1845-3100/-. The petitioners were brought to the cadre of Assistant Manager in the pay scale of Rs. 1350-2975/- after the decision was taken by the Board on 2.6.1987 i.e. by Notification dated 24.11.1987 and 15.4.1988 respectively. By the time the decision of the Board was taken on 2.6.1987, creating a new cadre of Deputy Manager, both the petitioners did not become eligible to get the scale of pay as prior to this decision or on the date it was taken they were not continuing in the pre-revised scale of pay of Rs. 750-1150/- prescribed for Assistant Manager (Technical) or in the revised scale of Rs. 1845-3100/-, which has been adopted for the interme¬diate post of Deputy Manager. 750-1150/- prescribed for Assistant Manager (Technical) or in the revised scale of Rs. 1845-3100/-, which has been adopted for the interme¬diate post of Deputy Manager. It is specifically asserted that Sri A.K. Misra was continuing as Junior Engineer (Civil) in the scale of Rs. 490-840/- with effect from 1.1.1987 and Sri D. R. Tripathy was continuing as Assistant Manager on a consolidated pay of Rs. 750/- per month with effect from 10.7.1987 and accordingly, their representations were rightly rejected. It is further stated that the Junior Engineer as shown in Annexure-3 got the pre-revised scale of pay of Rs. 750-1150/- before 2.6.1987 and as such in terms of the Board Resolution, they were designated as Deputy Manager, whereas the present petitioners were brought into the cadre of Assistant Manager (Civil) in revised scale of Rs. 1350-2975/- of the Corporation after 2.6.1987 and did not enjoy the pre-revised pay scale of Rs. 750-1150/- by the time the decision of the Board was taken. However, the petitioners have been promoted to the post of Assistant Manager. 4. In view of the pleadings of the parties and the materials placed on record, it is clear that the petitioners were not con¬tinuing in a post carrying a pre-revised pay scale of Rs. 750-1150/- as on or before 2.6.1987, the date on which the Board of Directors of I.D.C.O. took the decision to create the intermedi¬ary post of Deputy Manager. The contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners that they being Graduate Engineers and Gradu¬ate Engineers holding the scale of pay of Rs. 750-1150/- having been designated as Deputy Manager, they should have been given the same benefit, is misconceived in law. The question of dis¬crimination arises only where equals are treated unequally with¬out any justifiable cause. Admittedly, the Graduate Engineers, who have been re-designated as Deputy Manager in terms of the Board’s Resolution were appointed prior to the petitioners were enjoying a scale of Rs. 750-1150/- higher to that of the peti¬tioners. The question of dis¬crimination arises only where equals are treated unequally with¬out any justifiable cause. Admittedly, the Graduate Engineers, who have been re-designated as Deputy Manager in terms of the Board’s Resolution were appointed prior to the petitioners were enjoying a scale of Rs. 750-1150/- higher to that of the peti¬tioners. The petitioners being juniors to such persons and hold¬ing a post with lesser salary cannot laim equality with those persons.It is not a case where the petitioners were equally situated with their contemporaries as claimed, having the same qualification, experience, scale of pay and seniority, but were denied the benefits of the Resolution and as such, the expecta¬tion of the petitioners cannot be legitimate in the facts and circumstances of the case. Only because, the petitioners were Graduate Engineers and some such Graduate Engineers were allowed the benefit of re-designation as Deputy Manager earlier, the petitioners would not ipso facto become eligible or entitled to have the same benefit or privilege. Person similarly situated can only claim equality and not otherwise. In such view of the matter, we do not find any merit in the writ application, which is accordingly dismissed. However, in the facts and circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs. P. C. NAIK, J. I agree. Petition dismissed. 21 A. Is it at all necessary to have limitation bars terminating trials and proceedings? Is there no effective mechanism available for achieving the same end? The Criminal Procedure Code, as it stands, incorporates of few provisions to which resort can be had for protecting the interest of the accused and saving him from unreasonable prolixity or laxity at the trial amounting to oppression. Section 309, dealing with power to postpone or adjourn proceedings, provides generally for every inquiry or trial, being proceeded with as expeditiously as possible, and in particular, when the examination of witnesses has once begun, the same to be continued from day to day until all the witnesses in attendance have been examined, unless the Court finds the adjournment of the same beyond the following day to be necessary for reasons to be recorded. Explanation - 2 to Section 309 confers power on the Court to impose costs to be paid by the prosecution or the accused, in appropriate cases, and putting the parties on terms while granting an adjournment or postponing of proceedings. Explanation - 2 to Section 309 confers power on the Court to impose costs to be paid by the prosecution or the accused, in appropriate cases, and putting the parties on terms while granting an adjournment or postponing of proceedings. This power to impose costs is rarely exercised by the Courts. Section 258, in Chapter XX of Cr. P.C. on Trial of Summons- cases, empowers the Magistrate trying summons cases instituted otherwise than upon complaint, for reasons to be recorded by him, to stop the proceedings at any stage without pronouncing any judgment and where such stoppage of proceedings is made after the evidence of the principal witnesses has been recorded, to pronounce judgment of acquittal, and in any other case, release the accused, having effect of discharge. This provision is almost never ended by the Courts. In appropriate cases, inherent power of the High Court, under Section 482 can be invoked to make such orders, as may be necessary, to give effect to any order under the Code of Criminal Procedure or to prevent abuse of the process of any Court, or otherwise, to secure the ends of justice. The power is wide and, if judiciously and consciously exercised, can take care of almost all the situations where interference by the High Court becomes necessary on account of delay in proceedings or for any other reasons amounting to oppression or harassment in any trial, inquiry or proceedings. In appropriate cases, the High Courts have exercised their jurisdiction under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. for quashing of first information report and investigation, and terminating criminal proceeding if the case of abuse of process of law was clearly made out. Such power can certainly be exercised on a case being made out of breach of fundamental right conferred by Article 21 of the Constitution. The Constitution Bench in A.R. Antulay’s case referred to such power, vesting in the High Court (vide paras 62 and 65 of its judgment) and held that it was clear that even apart from Article 21, the Court can take care of undue or inordinate delays in criminal matters or proceedings if they remain pending for too long and putting an end, by making appropriate orders, to further proceedings when they are found too oppressive and unwarranted. 22. Legislation is that source of law which consists in the declaration of legal rules by a competent authority. 22. Legislation is that source of law which consists in the declaration of legal rules by a competent authority. When Judges by judicial decisions lay down a new principle of general application of the nature specifically reserved for legislature, they may be said to have legislated, and not merely declared the law. Salmond on Principles of Jurisprudence (12th Edition) goes on to say - “We must distinguish law-making by legislators from law-making by the Courts. Legislators can lay down rules purely for the future and without reference to any actual dispute; the Courts, in so far as they create law, can do so only in application to the cases before them and only in so far as is necessary for their solution. Judicial law-making is incidental to the solving of legal disputes; legislative law-making is the central function of the legislator” (page 115). It is not difficult to perceive the dividing line between permissible legislation by judicial directives and enacting law the field exclusively reserved for legislature. We are concerned here to determine whether in prescribing various periods of limitations, adverted to above, the Court transgressed the limit of judicial legislation. 23. Bars of limitation, judicially engrafted, are, no doubt, meant to provide a solution to the aforementioned problems. But a solution of this nature gives rise to greater problems like scuttling a trial without adjudication, stultifying access to justice and giving easy exit from the portals of justice. Such general remedial measures cannot be said to be apt solutions. For two reasons we hold such bars of limitation uncalled for and impermissible; first, because it tantamounts to impermissible legislation - an activity beyond the power which the Constitution confers on judiciary, and secondly, because such bars of limitation fly in the face of law laid down by Constitution Bench in A.R. Antulay’s case and, therefore, run counter to the doctrine of precedents and their binding efficacy. 24. In a monograph “Judicial Activism and Constitutional Democracy in India”, commended by Professor Sir William Wade, Q.C. as a “small book devoted to a big subject”, the learned author, while recording appreciation of judicial activism, sounds a note of caution — “it is plain that the judiciary is the least competent to function as a legislative or the administrative agency. For one thing, Courts lack the facilities to gather detailed data or to make probing enquiries. For one thing, Courts lack the facilities to gather detailed data or to make probing enquiries. Reliance on advocates who appear before them for data is likely to give them partisan or inadequate information. On the other hand, if Courts have to rely on their own knowledge or research it is bound to be selective and subjective. Courts also have no means for effectively supervising and implementing the aftermath of their orders schemes and mandates. Moreover, since Courts mandate for isolated cases, their decrees make no allowance for the differing and varying situations which administrators will encounter in applying the mandates to other cases. Courts have also no method to reverse their orders if they are found unworkable or requiring modification”. Highlighting the difficulties which the Courts are likely to encounter if embarking in the fields of legislation or administration, the learned author advises “the Supreme Court could have well left the decision making to the other branches of government after directing their attention to the problems rather than itself entering the remedial field.” 25. The primary function of judiciary is to interpret the law. It may lay down principles, guidelines and exhibit creativity in the field left open and unoccupied by Legislation. Patrick Devlin in ‘The Judge’ (1979) refers to the role of the Judge as law-maker and states that there is no doubt that historically Judges did make law, at least in the sense of formulating it. Even now when they are against innovation, they have never formally abrogated their powers; their attitude is : “We could if we would but we think it better not. ‘But as a matter of history did the English Judges of the golden age make law ? They decided cases which worked up into principles. The Judges, as Lord Wright once put it in all unexpectedly picturesque phrase, proceeded ‘from case to case, like the ancient Mediterranean mariners, hugging the coast from point to point and avoiding the dangers of the open sea of system and science’. The golden age Judges were not rationalisers and, except in the devising of procedures, they were not innovators. They did not design a new machine capable of speeding ahead; they struggled with the aid of fictions and bits of procedural string to keep the machine on the road. 26. The golden age Judges were not rationalisers and, except in the devising of procedures, they were not innovators. They did not design a new machine capable of speeding ahead; they struggled with the aid of fictions and bits of procedural string to keep the machine on the road. 26. Professor S.P. Sathe, in his recent work (Year 2002) “Judicial Activism in India-Transgressing Borders and Enforcing Limits”, touches the topic “Directions : A New Form of Judicial Legislation”. Evaluating legitimacy of judicial activism, the learned author has cautioned against Court “legislating” exactly in the way in which a Legislature legislates and he observes by reference to a few cases that the guidelines laid down by Court, at times, cross the border of judicial law-making in the realist sense and trench upon legislating like a Legislature. “Directions are either issued to fill in the gaps in the legislation or to provide for matters that have not been provided by any legislation. The Court has taken over the legislative function not in the traditional interstitial sense but in an overt manner and has justified it as being an essential component of its role as a constitutional Court.” (P. 242). “In a strict sense these are instances of judicial excessiveness that fly in the face of the doctrine of separation of powers. The doctrine of separation of powers envisages that the legislature should make law, the executive should execute it, and the judiciary should settle disputes in accordance with the existing law. In reality, such watertight separation exists nowhere and is impracticable. Broadly, it means that one organ of the State should not perform a function that essentially belongs to another organ. While law-making through interpretation and expansion of the meanings of open-textured expressions such as ‘due process of law’, ‘equal protection of law’, or ‘freedom of speech and expression’ is a legitimate judicial function, the making of an entirely new law ... through directions ... is not a legitimate judicial function.” (p. 250) 27. While law-making through interpretation and expansion of the meanings of open-textured expressions such as ‘due process of law’, ‘equal protection of law’, or ‘freedom of speech and expression’ is a legitimate judicial function, the making of an entirely new law ... through directions ... is not a legitimate judicial function.” (p. 250) 27. Prescribing periods of limitation at the end of which the trial Court would be obliged to terminate the proceedings and necessarily acquit or discharge the accused, and further, making such directions applicable to all the cases in the present and for the future amounts to legislation, which, in our opinion, cannot be done by judicial directives and within the arena of the judicial law-making power available to constitutional Courts, howsoever liberally we may interpret Articles 32, 21, 141 and 142 of the Constitution. The dividing line is fine but perceptible. Courts can declare the law, they can interpret the law, they can remove obvious lacunae and fill the gaps but they cannot entrench upon in the field of legislation properly meant for the legislature. Binding directions can be issued for enforcing the law and appropriate directions- may issue, including laying down of time limits or chalking out a calendar for proceedings to follow, to redeem the injustice done or for taking care of rights violated, in a given case or set of cases, depending on facts brought to the notice of Court. This is permissible for judiciary to do. But it may not, like legislature, enact a provision akin to or on the lines of Chapter XXXVI of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. 28. The other reason why the bars of limitation enacted in Common Cause (I), Common Cause (II) and Raj Deo Sharma (I) and Raj Deo Sharma (II) cannot be sustained is that these decisions though two or three-Judge Bench decisions run counter to that extent of the dictum of Constitution Bench in A.R. Antulay’s case and therefore cannot be said to be good law to the extent they are in breach of the doctrine of precedents. The well-settled principle of precedents which has crystallised into a rule of law is that a Bench of lesser strength is bound by the view expressed by a Bench of larger strength and cannot take a view in departure or in conflict therefrom. The well-settled principle of precedents which has crystallised into a rule of law is that a Bench of lesser strength is bound by the view expressed by a Bench of larger strength and cannot take a view in departure or in conflict therefrom. We have in the earlier part of this judgment extracted and reproduced passages from A.R.Antulay's case. The Constitution Bench turned down the fervent plea of proponents of right to speedy trial for laying down time limits as bar beyond which a criminal proceeding or trial shall not proceed and expressly ruled that it was neither advisable nor practical (and hence not judicially feasible) to fix any time-limit for trial of offences. Having placed on record the exposition of law as to right to speedy trial flowing from Article 21 of the Constitution, this Court held that it was necessary to leave the rule as elastic and not to fix it in the frame of defined and rigid rules. It must be left to the judicious discretion of the Court seized of an individual case to find out from the totality of circumstances of a given case if the quantum of time consumed upto a given point of time amounted to violation of Article 21, and if so, then to terminate the particular proceeding, and if not then to proceed ahead. The test is whether the proceedings or trial has remained pending for such a length of time that the inordinate delay can legitimately be called oppressive and unwarranted, as suggested in A.R. Antulay. In Kartar Singh’s case (supra), the Constitution Bench while recognising the principle that the denial of an accused’s right of speedy trial may result in a decision to dismiss the indictment or in reversing of a conviction, went on to state, “Of course, no length of time is per se too long to pass scrutiny under this principle nor the accused is called upon to show the actual prejudice by delay of disposal of cases. On the other hand, the Court has to adopt a balancing approach by taking note of the possible prejudices and disadvantages to be suffered by the accused by avoidable delay and to determine whether the accused in a criminal proceeding has been deprived of his right of having speedy trial with unreasonable delay which could be identified by the factors - (I) length of delay, (2) the justification for the delay, (3) the accused’s assertion of his right to speedy trial, and (4) prejudice caused to the accused by such delay” (para 92). 29. For all the foregoing reasons, we are of the opinion that in Common Cause Case (I) as modified on Common Cause (II) and Raj Deo Sharma (I) and (II), the Court could not have prescribed periods of limitation beyond which the trial of a criminal case or a criminal proceeding cannot continue and must mandatorily be closed followed by an order acquitting or discharging the accused. In conclusion we hold : (1) The dictum in A.R. Antulay’s case is correct and still holds the field. (2) The propositions emerging from Article 21 of the Constitution and expounding the right to speedy trial laid down as guidelines in A.R. Antulay’s case, adequately take care of right to speedy trial. We uphold and re-affirm the said propositions. (3) The guidelines laid down in A.R. Antulay’s case are not exhaustive but only illustrative. They are not intended to operate as’ hard and fast rules or to be applied like a strait-jacket formula. Their applicability would depend on the fact situation of each case. It is difficult to foresee all situations and no generalization can be made. (4) It is neither advisable, nor feasible, nor judicially permissible to draw or prescribe an outer limit for conclusion of all criminal proceedings. The time-limits or bars of limitation prescribed in the several directions made in Common Cause (I) Raj Deo Sharma (I) and Raj Deo Sharma (II) could not have been so prescribed or drawn and are not good law. The Criminal Courts are not obliged to terminate trial or criminal proceedings merely on account of lapse of time, as prescribed by the directions made in Common Cause Case (I), Raj Deo Sharma case (I) and (II). The Criminal Courts are not obliged to terminate trial or criminal proceedings merely on account of lapse of time, as prescribed by the directions made in Common Cause Case (I), Raj Deo Sharma case (I) and (II). At the most, the periods of time prescribed in those decisions can be taken by the Courts seized of the trial or proceedings to act as reminders when they may be persuaded to apply their judicial mind to the facts and circumstances of the case before them and determine by taking into consideration the several relevant factors as pointed out in A.R. Antulay’s case and decide whether the trial or proceedings have become so inordinately delayed as to be called oppressive and unwarranted. Such time-limits cannot and will not by themselves be treated by any Court as a bar to further continuance of the trial or proceedings and as mandatorily obliging the court to terminate the same and acquit or discharge the accused. (5) The Criminal Courts should exercise their available powers, such as those under Sections 309, 311 and 258 of Code of Criminal Procedure to effectuate the right to speedy trial. A watchful and diligent trial Judge can prove to be better protector of such right than any guidelines. In appropriate cases, jurisdiction of High Court under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. and Articles 226 and 227 of Constitution can be invoked seeking appropriate relief or suitable directions. (6) This is an appropriate occasion to remind the Union of India and the State Governments of their constitutional obligation to strengthen the judiciary-quantitatively and qualitatively -by providing requisite funds, manpower and infrastructure. We hope and trust that the Government shall act. 30. We answer the questions posed in the orders of reference dated September 19, 2000 and April 26, 2001 in the above said terms. 31. The appeals are allowed. The impugned judgments of the High Court are set aside. As the High Court could not have condoned the delay in filing of the appeals and then allowed the appeals without noticing the respective accused-respondents before the High Court, now the High Court shall hear and decide the appeals afresh after noticing the accused-respondents before it in each of the appeals and consistently with the principles of law laid down hereinabove. 32. 32. Before we may part, we would like to make certain observations ex abundanti cautela : Firstly, we have dealt with the directions made by this Court in Common Cause case-I and II and Raj Deo Sharma Case I and II regarding trial of cases. The directions made in those cases regarding enlargement of accused persons on bail are not subject matter of this reference or these appeals and we have consciously abstained from dealing with legality, propriety or otherwise of directions in regard to bail. This is because different considerations arise before the Criminal Courts while dealing with termination of a trial or proceedings and while dealing with right of accused to be enlarged on bail. Secondly, though we are deleting the directions made respectively by two and three-Judge Benches of this Court in the cases under reference, for reasons which we have already stated, we should not, even for a moment, be considered as having made a departure from the law as to speedy trial and speedy conclusion of criminal proceedings of whatever nature and at whichever stage before any authority or the Court. It is the constitutional obligation of the State to dispense speedy justice, more so in the field of criminal law, and paucity of funds or resources is no defence to denial of right to justice emanating from Articles 21, 19 and 14 and the Preamble of the Constitution as also from the Directive Principles of State Policy. It is high time that the Union of India and the various States realize their constitutional obligation and do something concrete in the direction of strengthening the justice delivery system. We need to remind all concerned of what was said by this Court in Hussainara Khatoon (IV) - 1980 (I) SCC 98 , “The State cannot be permitted to deny the constitutional right of speedy trial to the accused on the ground that the State has no adequate financial resources to incur the necessary expenditure needed for improving the administrative and judicial apparatus with a view to ensuring speedy trial. The State may have its financial constraints and its priorities in expenditure, but, ‘the law does not permit any government to deprive its citizens of constitutional rights on a plea of poverty’, or administrative inability.” Thirdly, we are deleting the bars of limitation on the twin grounds that it amounts to judicial legislation, which is not permissible, and because they run counter to the doctrine of binding precedents. The larger question of powers of this Court to pass orders and issue directions in public interest or in social action litigations, specially by reference to Articles 32, 141, 142 and 144 of the Constitution, is not the subject matter of reference before us and this judgment should not be read as an interpretation of those Articles of the Constitution and laying down, defining or limiting the scope of the powers exercisable thereunder by this Court. And lastly, it is clarified that this decision shall not be a ground for reopening a case or proceeding by setting aside any such acquittal or discharge as is based on the authority of 'Common Cause’ and ‘Raj Deo Sharma’ cases and which has already achieved finality and reopen the trial against the accused therein. RAJU, J. 33. I have had the privilege of going through the judgment of esteemed and learned brother R.C. Lahoti, J. While I am in respectful agreement that the appeals are to be allowed and remitted to the High Court to be heard and decided afresh, I feel compelled to express my reservation and inability to subscribe to some of the observations contained therein relating to the powers and jurisdiction of this Court. 34. The declaration of law made by the Constitution Bench of five learned Judges of this Court in the decision reported in A.R.Antulay’s case [1992 (l) SCC 225] still holds the field and its binding force and authority has not been undermined or whittled down or altered in any matter by any other decision of a larger Bench, consequently, the Benches of lesser number of Constitution of Judges which dealt with the case reported in “Common Cause” A Regd. Society through its Director v. Union of India & Ors. [1996(4) SCC 331; “Common Cause” A Regd. Society through its Director v. Union of India & Ors. Society through its Director v. Union of India & Ors. [1996(4) SCC 331; “Common Cause” A Regd. Society through its Director v. Union of India & Ors. [ 1996(6) SCC 775 ]; Raj Deo Sharma v. State of Bihar [ 1998 (7) SCC 507 ) and Raj Deo Sharma (II) v. State of Bihar, [ 1999(7) SCC 604 ] could not have laid down any principles in derogation of the ratio laid down in A.R. Antulay’s case (supra) either by way of elaboration, expansion, clarification or in the process of trying to distinguish the same with reference to either the nature of cause considered therein or the consequences which are likely of follow and which, in their view, deserve to be averted. Even where necessities or justification, if any, were found therefor, there could not have been scope for such liberties being taken to transgress the doctrine of binding precedents, which has come to stay firmly in our method of Administration of Justice and what is permissible even under such circumstances being only to have had the matter referred to for reconsideration by a larger Bench of this Court and not to deviate by no other means. This solitary reason would suffice by itself to overrule the above decisions, the correctness of which stand referred to for consideration by this Bench. All the more so, when, there is no reason to doubt the correctness of the decision in A.R. AntuIay’ case (supra) and this Bench concurs with the principles laid down therein. 35. Though this Court does not consider itself to be an imperium in imperio or would function as a despotic branch of ‘The State’, the fact that the founding fathers of our Constitution designedly and deliberately, perhaps, did not envisage the imposition of any jurisdictional embargo on this Court, except in Article 363 of the Constitution of India is significant and sufficient enough, in my view, to identify the depth and width or extent of its powers. The other fetters devised or perceived on its exercise of powers or jurisdiction to entertain/deal with a matter were merely self-imposed for one or the other reason assigned therefor and they could not stand in the way of or deter this Court in any manner from rising up to respond in a given situation as and when necessitated and effectively play its role in accommodating the Constitution to changing circumstances and enduring values as a ‘Sentinel on the qui vive’ to preserve and safeguard the Constitution, protect and enforce the fundamental rights and other constitutional mandates which constitute the inviolable rights of the people as well as those features, which formed its basic structure too and considered to be even beyond the reach of any subsequent constitutional amendment. In substance, the Court, in my view, is the ultimate repository of all judicial powers at national level by virtue of it being the Summit Court at the pyramidal height Administration of Justice in the country and as the upholder and final interpreter of the Constitution of India and defender of the fundamentals of ‘Rule of Law’. 36. It is not only difficult but impossible to foresee and enumerate all possible situations arising, to provide in advance solutions with any hard and fast rules of universal application for all times to come. It is well known that where there is right, there should be a remedy. In what exceptional cases, not normally visualized or anticipated by law, what type of an extraordinary remedy must be devised or designed to solve the issue arising would invariably depend upon the gravity of the situation, nature of violation and efficacy as well as utility of the existing machinery and the imperative need or necessity to find a solution even outside the ordinary framework or avenue of remedies to avert any resultant damage beyond repair or redemption to any person. Apparently in my view, alive to such possibilities only, even this Court in A.R. Antulay’s case (supra) has chosen to decline the request for fixation of any period of time limit for trial of offences not on any total want or lack of jurisdiction in the Court but for the reason that it is “neither advisable nor practicable” to fix any such time limit and that the non-fixation does not ineffectuate the guarantee of right to speedy trial. The prospects and scope to achieve the desired object of a speedy trial even within the available procedural safeguards and avenues provided for obtaining relief, have also been indicated in the said decision as well as in the judgment prepared by learned brother R.C. Lahoti, J. I am of the firm opinion that this Court should never venture to disown its own jurisdiction on any area or in respect of any matter or over any one authority or person. When the Constitution is found to be at stake and the fundamental rights of citizen/persons are under fire, to restore them to their position and uphold the Constitution and the Rule of Law for which this Court has been established and constituted with due primacy and necessary powers, authority and jurisdiction, both express and implied. 37. Except dissociating myself from certain observations made expressing doubts about the jurisdiction of the Court, for the reasons stated above, I am in entire agreement with the other reasons and conclusions in the judgment. Appeals allowed unanimously. Questions answered accordingly. Appeal allowed unanimously and questions raised answered.