JUDGMENT R.L. Khurana, J.—The present revision petition under Section 24(5), H.P. Urban Rent Control Act, 1987 (for short: the Act), has been preferred by the tenant against the order dated 1.5.1998 of the learned Appellate Authority, Shimla, affirming the ejectment order dated 16.7.1993 passed against the tenant by the learned Rent Controller (4), Shimla. 2. The respondent before this court is the successor in interest of the original landlord and is being hereinafter referred to as the landlord. The original owner/landlord of the tenanted premises was a trust known as Mehar Chand Karol Sud Trust. The same came to be purchased by the present respondent who came to be impleaded/substituted as a party in place of original landlord on 2.8.1995 during the pendency of the appeal before the learned Appellate Authority under Order 22 Rule 10, Code of Civil Procedure. 3. The landlord on 5.8.1986 filed a petition under Section 14 of the Rent Act seeking ejectment of the tenant on the ground that the tenant was guilty of having committed such acts so as to materially impair the value or utility of the tenanted premises. According to the landlord the tenant without his consent had carried out additions and alterations in the tenanted premises as under:— (i) The dividing Dhajji walls marked as A, B, C and D in plan marked A have been completely demolished and removed and in its places three cabins, a waiting hall with a lobby and a passage to balcony have been constructed. (ii) After removing the spiral stairs which existed originally, a slab has been placed on the opening and one W.C. and one urinal have been constructed and the passage from below has been put an end to for good. (iii) (A) The length of the small room marked as number 5 in plan A has been enlarged from 9 ft. to 12 ft. (b) One more room 5.9 ft. x 8.9 ft. has been constructed over the common stairs portion and a small room (a sort of store) has been added to this newly built room. It has been marked as number 6, in the plan marked A;. (iv) The common corridor has illegally been encroached upon and usurped by constructing a wall marked E with a door as shown in plan marked B\ The second door to the adjoining residential flat has thus been blocked completely. It has been marked as number 6, in the plan marked A;. (iv) The common corridor has illegally been encroached upon and usurped by constructing a wall marked E with a door as shown in plan marked B\ The second door to the adjoining residential flat has thus been blocked completely. (v) A new cabin has been constructed in the Hall marked as number 4 in plan A and in it new stairs have been constructed which lead to the attic portion above this hall and underneath the stairs a store has been provided. (vi) Attic portion over the Hall (i.e. No. 4) has been made into an (a) office containing four cabins and a corridor in between. (b) Two sky lights have been newly made in the C.G.I, sheet. Original roof has thus been damaged. (vii) The near portion of the attic over rooms marked as 1, 2 and 3 previously let out to Messrs. A.C. Butail and sons, Shirnla in 1983 has illegally been encroached upon and thus steps leading to the portion of the attic have also been occupied by the respondent. In the attic two new rooms have been constructed and in the rooms two new sky lights have been provided. (viii)One room of the size of 5.9 ft. x 24 ft. with store 5.9 ft. x 6.2 ft. have been newly built over the area of the common stairs for the residence of (presently of the Chowkidar) of the respondent. Sky light has also been provided where none existed before. (ix) A small porch (entry gate to the upper portion from the Mall) with a gable roof standing on two pillars has been constructed. The frontage and shape of the building has been changed/affected. (x) All wooden structures of walls have been covered with wooden ply wood and/or planking. False ceiling of wood have been provided and thus fire hazard to the building has greatly increased. 4. The tenant while resisting the petition denied having carried out the additions/alterations in the tenanted premises so as to materially impair the value or utility of the tenanted premises. It was pleaded that no structural additions/alterations have been carried out. Objections as to maintainability of the eviction petition, absence of locus standi and estoppel were also raised. 5. On the pleadings of the parties, following issues were framed by the learned Rent Controller:— 1. It was pleaded that no structural additions/alterations have been carried out. Objections as to maintainability of the eviction petition, absence of locus standi and estoppel were also raised. 5. On the pleadings of the parties, following issues were framed by the learned Rent Controller:— 1. Whether the respondent has made additions and alterations in the rented premises after the commencement of H.P. Urban Rent Control Act, 1971 and impaired the value and utility of the premises as alleged? OPP 2. Whether the petition is not maintainable in the present form as alleged? OPR. 3. Whether petitioner have no locus standi to file the petition as alleged? OPR. 4. Whether petitioner is estopped from filing the petition by his own acts and deeds as alleged? OPR. 5. Relief. 6. Issues No. 2 to 4 were found against the tenant since the same were not pressed by the tenant before the learned Rent Controller. While deciding issue No. 1 in favour of the landlord, the learned Rent Controller came to the conclusion that additions and alterations were carried out by the tenant which materially impaired the value and utility of the tenanted premises. In view of such findings, the learned Rent Controller on 16.7.1993 allowed the eviction petition and passed an order of ejectment against the tenant. 7. The appeal preferred by the tenant before the learned Appellate Authority was dismissed on 1.5.1998. The learned Appellate Authority concurred with the findings of the learned Appellate Authority holding the tenant to have carried out additions and alterations in the tenanted premises as to materially impairing the value or utility thereof. 8. Aggrieved by the concurrent findings of the two forums below, the tenant is before this court by way of the present revision petition. 9. At the very out set a contention was raised on behalf of the tenant that the two forums below have wrongly placed reliance on the documents Ex. P 1 to P. 8, Ex. PW1/A, PW 1/B, PW 1/C, PW 6/A, PW 6/B, PW 6/ C, PW 6/D, PW 5/A, PW 5/ B and PW 5/ C. It was contended that such documents could not have been read in evidence inasmuch as such documents do not contain the requisite endorsement under Order 13 Rule 4, Code of Civil Procedure, under the signatures of the Presiding Officer. 10. 10. Rule 4 of Order 13, Code of Civil Procedure, provides:— "Endorsement on documents admitted in evidence.—(1) Subject to the provisions of the next following sub-rule, there shall be endorsed on every document which has been admitted in evidence in the suit the following particulars, namely:— (a) the number and title of the suit, (b) the name of the person producing the document, (c) the date on which it was produced, and (d) a statement of its having been so admitted; and the endorsement shall be signed or initialled by the Judge. 2. Where a document so admitted is an entry in a book, account or record, and a copy thereof has been substituted for the original under the next following rule, the particulars aforesaid shall be endorsed on the copy and the endorsement thereon shall be signed or initialled by the Judge.” 11. The learned Counsel for the tenant in support of his contention that failure to observe and comply with the provisions of Order 13 Rule 4, Code of Civil Procedure can lead to serious consequences and the merits of the case may also be affected if the consequences of non-observance by the trial Court of these provisions were not to be strictly enforced by the appellate Courts, has placed reliance on the decision of a learned Single Judge of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Risal Singh v. Jhandu Singh and others, 1971 P.L.J. 831. 12. A similar question came up for consideration before a learned Single Judge of this Court in Shiv Ram v. Thakar Datt, I.L.R. 1972 H.P. 400. It was held:— "It is not correct to say that the endorsement by the Judge brings about the admission of the documents. On the contrary, as is plain from order 13, rule 4, the endorsement pre-supposes that the document has already been admitted in evidence. The document must first be admitted in evidence and then follows the endorsement under Order 13, Rule 4." 13. In view of the ratio laid down by this Court, omission to make the endorsement as required under Order 13, Rule 4, Code of Civil Procedure, is only an irregularity and such omission cannot be regarded as precluding the consideration of the documents from evidence. In view of the ratio laid down by this Court, omission to make the endorsement as required under Order 13, Rule 4, Code of Civil Procedure, is only an irregularity and such omission cannot be regarded as precluding the consideration of the documents from evidence. Once a document has been proved in evidence in accordance with law, the same has to be read and considered as evidence even in the absence of the requisite endorsement under Order 13, Rule 4, Code of Civil Procedure. 14. It was next contended on behalf of the tenant that the two forums below have erred in reading the statement of PW 6 in evidence since such statement, has not been signed by the Presiding Officer of the Court. A statement of a witness which is not signed by the Presiding Officer cannot be read in evidence. 15. There is no force in the contention of the learned Counsel for the tenant. Order 18, Rule 5, Code of Civil Procedure, provides:— "How evidence shall be taken in appealable cases.—In cases in which an appeal is allowed, the evidence of each witness shall be,— (a) taken down in the language of the court,— (i) in writing by, or in the presence and under the personal direction and superintendence of, the Judge, or (ii) from the dictation of the Judge directly on a typewriter; or (b) if the Judge, for reasons to be recorded, so directs, recorded mechanically in the language of the Court in the presence of the Judge." 16. The above rule has been substituted by the Code of Civil Procedure (Amendment) Act, 1976 in place of the old rule. Under the old rule the evidence could be taken down in the language of the court by the Judge or in the presence and under the personal direction and superintendence of the Judge, it was further provided that the evidence was to be recorded in the form of narrative and after completion was to be read over in the presence of the Judge and the witness and was to be signed by the Judge. Under the present amended provision the evidence can be taken down in writing in the language of the Court by or in the presence and under the personal direction and superintendence of the Judge. It can also be taken down from the dictation of the Judge directly on a typewriter. Under the present amended provision the evidence can be taken down in writing in the language of the Court by or in the presence and under the personal direction and superintendence of the Judge. It can also be taken down from the dictation of the Judge directly on a typewriter. If the Judge, for reasons to be recorded, so directs, the evidence can also be recorded mechanically in the language of the court in the presence of the Judge. In the present amended provision, there is no requirement for reading over of the evidence and for signing by the Judge. By omitting the provision of reading over the deposition in the presence of the witness and of its being signed by the Judge the legislature seems to think that when a deposition is recorded in the language of the Court before the witness and Court, it is not necessary for the purposes of this rule that it should be read over to the witness and signed by the Judge. 17. A Division Bench of Madras High Court in Indian Overseas Bank v. A Vimalan and others, AIR 1987 Madras 90, has held that under Order 18, Rule 5, Code of Civil procedure, as it stood prior to its amendment by Act 104 of 1976, it was obligatory to read the evidence in the presence of the Judge and the witnesses and the Judge was also obliged to correct the same and sign it. However, under the amended provisions of Order 18, Rule 5, Code of Civil Procedure, this does not appear to be necessary. 18. Therefore, in view of the present provisions contained in Order 18, Rule 5, Code of Civil Procedure, it is obligatory for the Judge to sign the statement of the witness. The mere non-signing the statement of PW 6 by the Presiding Officer in the present case is, as such, of no consequence. The statement of PW 6 could not be ignored from consideration on this ground and no error has been committed by the two forums below in reading and considering the deposition of PW 6 in evidence. 19. The mere non-signing the statement of PW 6 by the Presiding Officer in the present case is, as such, of no consequence. The statement of PW 6 could not be ignored from consideration on this ground and no error has been committed by the two forums below in reading and considering the deposition of PW 6 in evidence. 19. Coming to the merits of the case, as stated above, the two forums below on consideration of the evidence coming on record have concurrently held that the tenant has committed acts of having carried out additions and alterations in the tenanted premises and that such acts amounts to materially impairing the value and utility of the tenanted premises. 20. The Honble Supreme Court in Om Parkash v. Amar Singh and another, AIR 1987 SC 617, has held that the findings of the court regarding construction would be finding of fact, but the question whether such construction by the tenant has materially impaired the value or utility of the building is a mixed question of fact and law, which must be determined on the application of correct principles. 21. In the present case the findings of the two forums below that the tenant has carried out material additions and alterations in the tenanted premises are purely on a question of fact, which findings cannot be interfered with by this Court by re-appreciation of evidence in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction under Section 24(3) of the Rent Act. 22. The Apex Court in M/s. Shalimar Tar Products Ltd. v. H.C. Sharma and others, 1988 (1) SCC 70, while dealing with the extent of revisional jurisdiction of the High Court under the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 (the provisions of which are similar to the provisions contained in Section 24(5) of the Rent Act in the present case) has held that the questions whether there was a sub-tenant and whether the written consent of the landlord had been obtained, were questions of fact. Concurrent findings on such questions cannot be interfered with by the High Court in exercise of its revisional powers. 23. Concurrent findings on such questions cannot be interfered with by the High Court in exercise of its revisional powers. 23. Again in Fatima Bee (Smt.) v. Mahmood Siddiqui, (1996) 9 SCC 450, it has been held by the Apex Court that the High Courts power to interfere with concurrent findings of fact under the Rent Act would be limited and if there is no misreading of evidence by the two courts below, it is not open to the High Court to reappreciate the evidence and reverse the findings recorded by the Courts below in exercise of revisional jurisdiction. 24. In Patel Valrnik Himatlal and others v. Patel Mohan Lai Muljibhai, (1998) 7 SCC 383, the trial Court as well as the appellate court had concurrently found sub-letting as proved. The High Court, in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction, after re-appreciating the evidence, held that it was not a case of sub-letting but a case of partnership. The Honble Supreme Court observed that the High Court exceeded its jurisdiction in re-appreciating the evidence, which it could not do. It was held that mere fact that a different, view was possible on reappreciation of evidence was no ground for the High Court to substitute its own finding in exercise of revisional jurisdiction. 25. In Chaman Prakash Puri v. Ishwar Dass Rajput and another 1995 Supp. (4) SCC 445, and in Sarla Ahuja v. United India Insurance Company Ltd., 1999 (1) RCJ 158, it has been held that it is not permissible for the High Court in exercise of revisional jurisdiction to come to a different fact finding unless the finding arrived at by the two courts below, on the facts of the case, are so unreasonable that no Court could have reached such a finding on the material available. 26. Dealing with the similar provision contained in Section 21(5) of the H.P. Urban Rent Control Act, 1971 (as then in force) which provision is pari materia to Section 24(5) of the present Rent Act, the Honble Supreme Court in Dr. Cyan Parkash v. Som Nath and others, 1996 (1) RCR 342 (SC), has held that on questions of fact, the findings recorded by the authorities below must be accepted and the High Court has no jurisdiction to interfere with such finding in exercise of limited scope and ambit of revisional jurisdiction under the Rent Act. Cyan Parkash v. Som Nath and others, 1996 (1) RCR 342 (SC), has held that on questions of fact, the findings recorded by the authorities below must be accepted and the High Court has no jurisdiction to interfere with such finding in exercise of limited scope and ambit of revisional jurisdiction under the Rent Act. The High Court is not exercising the powers of a Court of Appeal and, as such, is not expected to re-appreciate the entire evidence coming on record and to come to a contrary finding. 27. In Lachhman Dass v. Santokh Singh, (1995) 4 SCC 201, the Honble Supreme Court considered the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court under the Haryana Urban (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1973. It was held that where a statute provides for a right of appeal as well as revision, discretionary jurisdiction of revision can be invoked only when appellate order suffers from illegality, impropriety or perversity. The two jurisdictions (appellate and revisionai) are different from each other in scope and content. The use of the expression "legality or propriety of such orders or proceedings" makes the revisional powers of the High Court wider than powers under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, nonetheless it is not so wide as to embrace within its fold all the attributes and characteristics of an appeal and disturb findings of fact arrived at by the courts below without recording a finding that the conclusions arrived at were perverse or based on "no evidence" or were arrived at on a superficial or perfunctory approach. It was further observed:— "If the High Court proceeds to interfere with such concurrent findings of fact ignoring the above mentioned well recognized principles, it would amount to equating the revisional powers of the High Court as powers of a regular appeal frustrating the fine distinction between an appeal and a revision." 28. The concurrent findings of the two forums below that the tenant has carried out the additions and alterations in the tenanted premises, as alleged by the landlord, are based on proper appreciation and assessment of the evidence led by the parties. There has been no mis-reading or mis-appreciation of evidence by the two forums below. Nor it can be said that such concurrent findings are based on no evidence. There has been no mis-reading or mis-appreciation of evidence by the two forums below. Nor it can be said that such concurrent findings are based on no evidence. It is in the evidence of the tenant, that is, the statement of RW 2 A.N. Bajwaria, the General Secretary of the tenant Committee that repairs/renovations to the tune of Rs. 2,29,000 were carried out by the tenant in the tenanted premises in the year 1984. Though it is claimed that all such repairs and renovations were carried out with the consent of the landlord. 29. The question which primarily arises for consideration in the present case, is whether the additions/alterations carried out by the tenant has materially impaired the value or utility of the tenanted premises: Section 14(2)(iii) of the Rent Act provides:— "A landlord who seeks to evict his tenant shall apply to the Controller for a direction in that behalf. If the Controller, after giving the tenant a reasonable opportunity of showing cause against the application is satisfied:— (i)................................................................................................................ (ii)................................................................................................................. (iii) that the tenant has committed such acts as are likely to impair materially the value or utility of the building or rented land; or (iv) ............................................................................................................;or (v)...............................................................................................................; the Controller may make an order directing the tenant to put the landlord in possession of the building or rented land and if the Controller is not so satisfied he shall make an order rejecting the application." In Vipin Kumar v. Roshan Lai Anand and others, (1993) 2 SCC 614, the provisions contained in Section 13(2)(iii) of the East Punjab Urban Rent Control Act, 1949, which provisions are pari materia to the provisions contained in Section 14(2)(iii) of the Rent Act (quoted above) came up for consideration before the Honble Supreme Court. In the said case landlord had sought the ejectment of the tenant from the demised premises consisting of a shop on the ground that the tenant had constructed a wall in the verandah of the demised premises and put up a door which materially impaired the value or utility of the building. The Rent Controller as well as the Appellate Authority came to the conclusion that the tenant had constructed a wall in the verandah and put up a door and that such act on the part of the tenant had materially impaired the value or utility of the building. The Rent Controller as well as the Appellate Authority came to the conclusion that the tenant had constructed a wall in the verandah and put up a door and that such act on the part of the tenant had materially impaired the value or utility of the building. Such findings were upheld in revision by the Punjab and Haryana High Court. In appeal before the Honble Supreme Court it was contended that the tenant had not constructed the offending construction and that even if the tenant was found to have raised such construction, there was no proof adduced by the landlord that by such construction the value or utility of the building had been materially impaired. 30. It was held that the findings on the question that the tenant had constructed a wall in the verandah and put up a door were purely on a question of fact which cannot be interfered with by evaluating the evidence, it was further held:— "Clause (iii) of sub-section (2) of Section 13 provides that if the tenant has committed such acts as are likely to impair materially the value or utility of the building or rented land, the Rent Controller may make an order directing the tenant to put the landlord in possession of the building or rented land, if the Controller is not so satisfied, he shall make an order rejecting the application. It is, therefore, clear that if the tenant had committed such acts as are likely to impair materially the value or utility of the building, he is liable to ejectment. The finding recorded by the Controller is that on account of the construction of the wall and putting up a door the flow of light and air had been stopped. He removed the fixtures. So the value of the demised shop has been impaired and utility of the building also is impaired. The impairment of the value or utility of the building is from the point of the landlord and not of the tenant. The first limb of Clause (iii) of sub-section (2) of Section 13 is impairment of the building due to acts committed by the tenant and the second limb is of the utility or value of the building has (sic having) been materially impaired. The first limb of Clause (iii) of sub-section (2) of Section 13 is impairment of the building due to acts committed by the tenant and the second limb is of the utility or value of the building has (sic having) been materially impaired. The acts of the tenant must be such that by erecting the wall he had materially impaired the value or utility of the demised premises, it is contended by Mr. Prem Malhotra that the landlord should prove as to how it is materially affected and that there is no evidence adduced by the landlord. We find no force in the contention. By constructing the wall, whether the value or utility of the building has materially been impaired is an inferential fact to be deduced from proved facts. The proved facts are that the appellant without the consent of the landlord had constructed the wall and put up a door therein as found by the Rent Controller, the flow of air and light has been stopped. He removed the fixtures. From these facts it was inferred that the value or utility of the building has been materially affected." 31. Again in Gurbachan Singh and another v. Shivalak Rubber Industries and others, (1996) 2 SCC 626, dealing with the same provisions following the ratio in Vipin Kumar v. Roshan Lai Anand (supra) it was held by the Honble Supreme Court:— "A plain reading will go to show that it contemplates that a tenant is liable to eviction who has committed such acts as are likely to impair materially the value or utility of the building or rented land. The meaning of the expression to impair materially in common parlance would mean to diminish in quality, strength or value substantially. In other words to make a thing or substance worse and deteriorate. The word impair cannot be said to have a fixed meaning. It is a relative term affording different meaning in different context and situations. Here in the context the term impair materially has been used to mean, considerable decrease in quality which may be measured with reference to the antecedent state of things as it existed earlier in point of time as compared to a later stage after the alleged change is made or effected suggesting impairment. Further the use of the word value means intrinsic worth of a thing. Further the use of the word value means intrinsic worth of a thing. In other words utility of an object satisfying, directly or indirectly, the needs or desires of a person. Thus, the ground for eviction of a tenant would be available to a landlord against the tenant under Section 13(2)(iii) of the Act, if it is established that the tenant has committed such acts as are likely to diminish the quality, strength or value of the building or rented land to such an extent that the intrinsic worth or fitness of the building or the rented land has considerably affected its use for some desirable practical purpose. The decrease or deterioration, in other words the impairment of the worth and usefulness or the value and utility of the building or rented land has to be judged and determined from the point of view of the landlord and not of the tenant or any one else...." 32. It was further held that the nature of construction is a relevant consideration in determining the question of material impairment in the value or utility of the building or demised premises. 33. A Division Bench of the Punjab and Haryana High Court while dealing with the scope and ambit of the provisions contained in Section 13(2)(iii) of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949, in Narain Singh v. Bakson Laboratories and another, 1982 (1) Rent Law Reporter 391, has held:— "Inevitably one must first turn to the language of the aforesaid provision which is in the following terms— Section 13(1) xx xx xx xx (2) A landlord who seeks to evict his tenant shall apply to the Controller for a direction in that behalf. If the Controller, after giving the tenant a reasonable opportunity of showing cause against the applicant is satisfied: (i); * :.. *: *: *: (ii) * :.. *: (iii) that the tenant has committed such acts as are likely to impaii materially the value or utility of the building or rented land or (iv) * * * (v) * * * The Controller may take (sic make) an order directing the tenant to put the landlord in possession of the building or rented land and if the Controller is not so satisfied he shall make an order rejecting the application. Provided. Provided. Herein what first meets the eye and perhaps deserves highlighting (because it seems to.have missed notice earlier) is the designed use of the word likely in the aforesaid provision. The statute has not used pre-emptory or categoric language. Therefore it is not that the impugned acts must have conclusively diminished the value or utility of the building, but it would be within the mischief of the statute if they are likely to do so. A closer look at the provision would therefore, indicate that it is tiled in favour of the landlord because even if the acts may not conclusively impair the value or utility but merely have a tendency to the same effect they may well come within the wider net of the language employed by the legislature. What next calls for notice is that the statute talks not merely about the impairment and the diminishing of the financial value of the building but equally of the diminishing of its utility. Whilst undoubtedly the true anvil for determining these factors would ultimately be the objective finding of the Court, there is a large body of judicial opinion that the impairment of value or utility has to be examined from the point of view of the landlord. In particular it is not whether the utility is diminished qua the tenant because the acts complained of would be those committed by him and would obviously not diminish the utility of building for his purpose. Therefore, the impairment of the utility is particularly relevant to either the needs of the owner of the building or in the larger prospect of its utility to an intending purchaser in the market. Equally well settled it is that the words value or utility in the aforesaid provision have to be read disjunctively. It is not that the impugned act must impair both the value and utility of the building but it suffices if the material impairment is either of the financial value of the building or similarly of the utility of the building. It consequently suffices for the purposes of the landlord if he is able to establish either of the two requirements. It consequently suffices for the purposes of the landlord if he is able to establish either of the two requirements. It is with the aforesaid approach towards Section 13(2)(iii) of the Act that one must notice that broadly there is a consensus of judicial opinion in this particular context and also in the context of corresponding provisions of other rent statutes that any material structural alterations which tend to change the nature and the character of the building would come within the mischief of the statute. The use of the word material in the provision only effectuates the hallowed rule of the law that it does not take account of trifles and consequently both the impairing of its value or its utility must be of a substantial and not inconsequential nature." 34. Reliance was sought to be placed by the tenant on the ratio laid down by the Honble Supreme Court in Om Prakash v. Amar Singh and another, AIR 1987 SC 617. In this case, the tenant had constructed a partition wall in a hall and tin shed in the open courtyard adjacent to the building. It was held that the partition wall was made without digging any foundation of the floor of the room nor it touched the ceiling. It was a temporary wall of six feet height converting the big hall into two portions for its convenient use. It could be removed at any time without causing any damage to the building. The partition wall did not make any structural change of substantial character either in the form or structure of accommodation. It was further held that taking into consideration the nature of the construction of the tin shed, it could not be said to have altered the accommodation. The Honble Supreme Court in this case was dealing with the case arising under Section 14(8) of the U.P. Cantonments (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1952, which reads:— "No suit shall, without the permission of the District Magistrate, be filed in any Civil Court against a tenant for his eviction from any accommodation except on one or more of the following grounds, namely : (a)................................................................................................................. (b)................................................................................................................. (c) that the tenant has without the permission of the landlord, made or permitted to be made any such construction as in the opinion of the Court has materially altered the accommodation or is likely substantially to diminish its value. (b)................................................................................................................. (c) that the tenant has without the permission of the landlord, made or permitted to be made any such construction as in the opinion of the Court has materially altered the accommodation or is likely substantially to diminish its value. (Emphasis supplied) 35. The Honble Supreme Court was, thus considering the meaning of the words "materially altered" appearing in Section 14(c) of the U.P. Cantonments (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1952. The said ratio was distinguished by the Honble Supreme Court in Vipin Kumar v. Roshan Lai Anand (supra) while dealing with the provisions contained in Section 13(2)(ii) of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949, which provisions are pari materia to the provisions contained in Section 14(2)(iii) of the Rent Act. 36. In Atthar Mai (died) through LRs. v. Satish Kumar Aggarwal, 2000 (1) Rent Law Reporter 640 and in Samitri Devi v. Karam Singh, 1996 (2) Rent Law Reporter 677, and also in M/s. Shiv Char an Dass and another v. Shh C. Baljees, Civil Revision No. 118 of 1988, decided on 29.4.1997, by a learned Single Judge of this Court, reliance on which has been placed by the learned Counsel for the tenant, the ratio laid down by the Honble Supreme Court in Vipin Kumar v. Roshan Lai Anand (supra) and in Gurcharan Singh v. Shivalak Rubber Industries (supra) was not noticed. Besides, the principle of law laid down therein depended upon the fact situation involved therein. 37. In the present case, considering the nature of the additions /alterations, as detailed in para 18 of the eviction petition as well as in para 2 of the order of the Appellate Authority, proved and held by the two forum below to have been carried out by the tenant, certainly converted the tenanted premises altogether, giving a new look and different shape and complexion to the tenanted premises affecting its fitness for use for desirable practical purpose and intrinsic worth of the tenanted premises from the point of view of the landlord within the meaning of Section 14(2)(iii) of the Rent Act. The two forums below, therefore, has rightly held that the additions/ alterations carried out by the tenant has materially impaired the value or utility of the tenanted premises. The present case falls squarely within the mischief of the provisions contained in Section 14(2)(iii) of the Rent Act which makes the tenant liable for eviction. The two forums below, therefore, has rightly held that the additions/ alterations carried out by the tenant has materially impaired the value or utility of the tenanted premises. The present case falls squarely within the mischief of the provisions contained in Section 14(2)(iii) of the Rent Act which makes the tenant liable for eviction. The findings on the question by the two forums below call for no interference. 38. A contention was sought to be raised, not earlier raised either before the learned Appellate Authority or in the grounds of revision before this Court, that the transfer made by the original landlord, that is, the Trust, in favour of the present landlord respondent was not valid and as such, no ejectment order in favour of the present landlord respondent can be sustained. The contention raised is to be rejected. Firstly, such a question could not have been agitated before a Rent Controller. Secondly, the tenant himself having conceded to the title of the present landlord-respondent had agreed to the substitution of the present landlord respondent as a party in place of the original landlord during the pendency of the appeal before the learned Appellate Authority. 39. As a result, the present revision petition fails and the same is dismissed. Parties are, however, left to bear their own costs. Revision dismissed.-