JUDGMENT B. Bhattacharya, J.: This revisional application under Article 227 of the Constitution of India is at the instance of Calcutta Municipal Corporation and is directed against an order dated November 7, 2000 passed by the learned Municipal Assessment Tribunal, Calcutta Municipal Corporation Bench No.1 in M. A. Appeal No. 412 of 2000 thereby setting aside the order of the Hearing Officer and determining fresh annual valuation in respect of the property in question. 2. Being dissatisfied with the order passed by the Hearing Officer thereby determining fresh annual valuation of the disputed property, the respondent preferred an appeal under section 189 of the Calcutta Municipal Corporation Act, 1980 ("Act"). 3. By the order impugned herein, the said Tribunal has reduced the annual valuation assessed by the Hearing Officer and has re-fixed the same on the basis of the materials placed before the Tribunal below. 4. Being dissatisfied, the Calcutta Municipal Corporation authority has preferred the instant revisional application under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. 5. Mr. Das Adhikary, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner has made twofold submissions before this Court. 6. First, Mr. Das Adhikary has contended that the learned Tribunal below acted illegally and with material irregularity in reversing the finding of the Hearing Officer on the basis of materials placed by the respondent before the Tribunal for the first time. Mr. Das Adhikary contends that admission of those additional evidence in course of hearing of such appeal was not in conformity with the Calcutta Municipal Corporation (Taxation) Rules, 1987. Mr. Das Adhikary thus contends that the procedure adopted by the learned Tribunal below was illegal and against the provisions contained in the Rule and on that ground alone, the order passed by the Tribunal below should be set aside. 7. Secondly, Mr. Das Adhikary contends that while reducing the annual valuation fixed by the Hearing Officer, the Tribunal below adopted "comparable method" which is not permissible under law. Mr. Das Adhikary contends that annual valuation should be fixed on the basis of the directions given in section 174 of the Act. The said provision, Mr. 7. Secondly, Mr. Das Adhikary contends that while reducing the annual valuation fixed by the Hearing Officer, the Tribunal below adopted "comparable method" which is not permissible under law. Mr. Das Adhikary contends that annual valuation should be fixed on the basis of the directions given in section 174 of the Act. The said provision, Mr. Das Adhikary proceeds, enjoins that for the purpose of assessment, the annual value of land or building should be deemed to be the gross annual rent including service charges, if any, at which such land or building might at the time of assessment be reasonably expected to let from year to year less the amount of allowance mentioned therein. He contends that actual amount of rent received is not the decisive factor in view of the fact that the said provisions demand that such amount may be fixed notwithstanding anything contained in West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act or any other law for the time being in force. He submits that Hearing Officer should assess such valuation on the basis of materials placed before him although under different provisions contain in any other statute a different amount has been fixed as fair rent. According to him, if such gross annual rent cannot be easily estimated, the same should be deemed to be seven and half per cent of the value of the building obtained by adding the estimated present cost of erecting the building at the time of assessment less a reasonable amount to be deducted on account of depreciation, if any, to the estimated present market value of the property as mentioned in 174(4A) of the Act. Mr. Das Adhikary thus contends that the Tribunal below acted illegally in arriving at a conclusion on the basis of "comparative method" by comparing it with the valuation fixed in respect of other premises. 8. The aforesaid contentions of Mr. Das Adhikary has been seriously disputed by Mr. Mitra appearing on behalf of the assessee. According to Mr. Mitra, so far as the first contention of Mr. 8. The aforesaid contentions of Mr. Das Adhikary has been seriously disputed by Mr. Mitra appearing on behalf of the assessee. According to Mr. Mitra, so far as the first contention of Mr. Das Adhikary is concerned, although there is some force in his contention but in the present case the Municipal Authority could also apply before the Tribunal for giving additional evidence but having refused to give such evidence, the Municipal Authority has accepted the procedure followed by the Tribunal and as such now cannot contend before this court that the provision contained in the Calcutta Municipal Corporation (Taxation) Rules have not been complied with. Mr. Mitra contends that the Tribunal is no doubt vested with authority to accept additional evidence at the appellate stage and in this case having admitted such additional evidence, the Municipal authority cannot complain of irregularity on the part of the Tribunal below. In this connection Mr. Mitra relies upon a decision of this Court in the case of Jupiter General Insurance Company Limited vs. Corporation of Calcutta, reported in AIR 1956 Calcutta page 470, which is approved by the Apex Court in the case of Prasun Roy vs. CMDA, reported in AIR 1988 SC page 205. 9. After hearing the learned counsel for the parties and after going through the materials on record including the provisions contained in the Act as well as the Calcutta Municipal Corporation (Taxation) Rules, I find that general annual valuation should be fixed by the Hearing Officer after hearing objection from the assessee. Mr. Das Adhikary is right in his contention that such valuation can be assessed in accordance with the provision contained in section 174 of the Act and the initial onus is upon the assessee to show what is the actual gross annual rent including service charges which could be reasonably expected from the premises in question by letting it out. Once such initial onus is discharged, the onus shifts upon the Municipal Authority to place other materials showing that the claim of the assessee placed before the Hearing Officer was wrong. After considering the materials on record placed by both the parties, the Hearing Officer should arrive at a conclusion. Once such initial onus is discharged, the onus shifts upon the Municipal Authority to place other materials showing that the claim of the assessee placed before the Hearing Officer was wrong. After considering the materials on record placed by both the parties, the Hearing Officer should arrive at a conclusion. As pointed out in sub-section (4A) of section 174 of the Act, if gross annual rent of land or building cannot be easily estimated, in such a case, such amount should be deemed to be seven and half per cent of the value of the building obtained by adding the estimated present cost of erecting the building at the time of assessment less a reasonable amount to be deducted on account of depreciation, if any, from the estimated present market value of the property. The parties are also free to lead evidence on such question and the Hearing Officer is to assess the valuation on consideration of such evidence. 10. If any of the parties is aggrieved by the decision of the Hearing Officer, such party can prefer appeal before the Tribunal. Ordinarily, the Tribunal will decide such appeal on the basis of materials those were placed before Hearing Officer. But as pointed out in Rule 19(6) of the Taxation Rules, if the Hearing Officer refused to admit any evidence which in the opinion of the Tribunal ought to have been admitted or if the Tribunal considers that the production of any additional evidence is essential to enable the Tribunal to pronounce appropriate judgment, the Tribunal can after recording reason thereof allow such evidence to be produced. Therefore, additional evidence can be admitted before Appellate Tribunal only if the conditions laid down in Rule 19(6) are satisfied with and the Tribunal records reasons for acceptance of such additional evidence. The principles of natural justice demands that once a party is permitted to adduce additional evidence, the other party should also be given opportunity to give evidence in rebuttal so far the additional evidence is concerned. 11. In the present case, it appears that no formal application was filed thereby praying for adducing additional evidence; nor has the Tribunal recorded any reason in terms of Rule 19(6) of the Rules. 11. In the present case, it appears that no formal application was filed thereby praying for adducing additional evidence; nor has the Tribunal recorded any reason in terms of Rule 19(6) of the Rules. It further appears that the judgment passed by Tribunal in a different case has been produced at the time of hearing and the Tribunal has relied on such judgment as a yardstick in arriving at the assessed valuation. Whether the situation of the property, facilities therein and other relevant factors involved in the cited judgment in assessing expected rental value are similar to those concerned with the present one should also be clearly proved by evidence. If such evidence is produced, the other party should also be given opportunity to produce counter evidence showing that the claim of the other party is not correct. It appears from Rule 10 of the Calcutta Municipal Corporation (Taxation) Rules that at the time of presentation of Memorandum of Appeal, copies of the documents including additional evidence which the appellant intends to rely upon must be filed along with the Memorandum of Appeal. In the present case, after filing of appeal, the judgment given by the Tribunal in a different case was produced for acceptance as additional evidence and the Tribunal without giving opportunity of hearing to the other side relied upon such judgment. I thus find that the procedure adopted by the Tribunal below has vitiated the process of hearing of the appeal and thus the order impugned cannot be sustained. 12. As regards the other contention of Mr. Das Adhikary, I however find no substance in such contention. The Tribunal below has not arrived at any finding on the basis of "comparable method" as argued by Mr. Das Adhikary. The Tribunal below has really arrived at a conclusion as regards expected annual rent and in arriving at such decision has relied upon the decision of the Tribunal in respect of other premises by treating such decision as an evidence of the expected annual rent prevailing in that locality in respect of a building of a similar nature. Whether the said decision is applicable or not is a different question, but a Tribunal is entitled to rely upon such decision provided sufficient materials are placed before court showing that the situation, facility and locality of the two premises are substantially same. 13. Whether the said decision is applicable or not is a different question, but a Tribunal is entitled to rely upon such decision provided sufficient materials are placed before court showing that the situation, facility and locality of the two premises are substantially same. 13. I now propose to deal with the decisions relied upon by Mr. Mitra. 14. In the case of Jupiter General Insurance Company Limited vs. Corporation of Calcutta, reported in AIR 1956 Calcutta page 470, a party participated in arbitration proceedings without protest and fully availed of the entire arbitration proceedings but finally complained that the whole of the arbitration proceedings were without jurisdiction on the ground of a known disability of one of the parties and prayer was made for setting aside the award. A learned Single Judge of this Court did not permit such a party to raise such question for setting aside the award. It was held that in such a situation, the court should not at all go into question of statutory disability and when the statute creates disability, there was no difference between a person and a Corporation. The Court was quite conscious of the position that there was no estoppel against statute but nevertheless did not permit the party to raise such question for the purpose of setting aside the award on the ground that the arbitration proceedings were void. The aforesaid decision was approved by the Apex Court in the case of Prasun Roy vs. Calcutta Metropolitan Development Authority and Anr. (supra) in a similar situation. In the present case, this Court is not concerned with a question whether a party after suffering an award can dispute the correctness of the award on the allegation that the arbitration proceedings were void. This court is faced with a situation where law requires that additional evidence should be taken only after recording reason by the Appellate Authority in a case where the conditions mentioned in the statute for acceptance of additional evidence are fulfilled. In such a position, in my view, absence of reason may not make the admission of the additional evidence a nullity but that does not mean that the provisions for recording reason are incorporated in the Rules for the purpose of ignoring. In such a position, in my view, absence of reason may not make the admission of the additional evidence a nullity but that does not mean that the provisions for recording reason are incorporated in the Rules for the purpose of ignoring. The object of the provisions is to keep a clear record of what weighed with the appellate tribunal in allowing the additional evidence to be Produced so that this court can scrutinize whether the discretion has been judicially exercised by the tribunal in the event the decision of the tribunal is impugned by any aggrieved party. The omission to record the reason must therefore be treated as a "serious defect", even though the provision is not "mandatory" (See the observation of the Supreme Court in the case of K. Venkataramiah vs. Seetharama Reddy, reported in AIR 1963 SC page 1526, while commenting on a similar provision contained in Order 41 Rule 27 of the Code of Civil Procedure). In this connection, reference may be made to the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of the Land Acquisition Officer vs. H. Narayanaiah, reported in AIR 1976 SC 2403 , where a High Court in an appeal against a land acquisition case admitted a judgement passed in a different case as additional evidence for the purpose of assessing valuation without recording any reason why such evidence should be necessary and without giving opportunity to the party affected to produce evidence in rebuttal. The Supreme Court set aside the order of the High Court and remanded the matter for fresh decision. 15. In my opinion; the aforesaid decision applies equally to the facts of the present case. It was the duty of the Appellate Tribunal to record reason for admission of additional evidence and having failed to record such reason or even any formal order accepting such additional evidence, the provisions of the Rules have been ignored. I have already indicated that the Municipal Authority should have been given opportunity to produce evidence in rebuttal at the time of accepting the additional evidence. Thus, the principle laid down in the decision cited by Mr. Mitra cannot have any application to the facts of the present case. 16. I have already indicated that the Municipal Authority should have been given opportunity to produce evidence in rebuttal at the time of accepting the additional evidence. Thus, the principle laid down in the decision cited by Mr. Mitra cannot have any application to the facts of the present case. 16. On consideration of all the aforesaid submissions of the learned counsel for the parties I am of the view that the Tribunal acted illegally and with material irregularity in disposing of the appeal by not following the statutory Rules framed in this regard and such illegality has occasioned failure of justice. I thus set aside the order impugned and remand the matter back to the Tribunal for re-hearing of the appeal on the basis of materials on record which were placed before Hearing Officer. If, however, any application is made for acceptance of additional evidence, the Tribunal will consider such application and will first dispose of the same by giving reason. If the Tribunal is of the view that additional evidence is required to betaken, opportunity must be given to other side to controvert the veracity and relevancy of the additional evidence so produced and thereafter will decide the valuation in accordance with the provisions contained in section 174 of the Act. 17. I thus set aside the order impugned and remand the matter back to the Tribunal in the light of the observation made in the body of this order. 18. In the facts and circumstances there will be however no order as to costs. Impugned order set aside. Matter back to lower court.