A. ROY, J. - The instant writ application presented in a constitutional attire, records a challenge to the validity of Section 70 A of the Assam Panchayat Act, 1994 (as amended by the Assam Act No.XVI of 2000) and Rule 61 of the Assam Panchayat (Constitution) Rules, 1995 (as amended in 2002) as well as to the legality and validity of the Notifications dated 8.3.2002 and 14.3.2002 Annexure-A and Annexure-B to the writ petition respectively. 2. I have heard Mr. A.M. Mazumdar, learned senior counsel assisted by Mr. R.P. Sarma, counsel for the petitioner as well as Mr. A.K. Phukan, learned Advocate General, Assam and Mr. M. Bhuyan, learned counsel for the respondents 1, 2 and 4 and Mr. S. Ali, learned senior counsel assisted by Ms. B. Seal, counsel for the respondent No. 3. 3. The factual foundation as provided in the writ petition can be set out as hereunder. 4. The petitioner, an agriculturist and sufferer of the State Government's negligence for the rural development, in the interest of the rural masses as well as his own interest and in order to ensure that the highest offices of the Zilla Parishads and other Panchayat bodies are filled up by educated, experienced and knowledgable persons with dedication and dynamism has approached this court with the present application so that the avowed purpose of the schemes for rural development do not suffer a set back for the reasons of inexperienced rusticity, corruption and lethargy of the people manning the said offices. His case is that Article 243 D of the Constitution of India provides for reservation of seats for Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes and Women and all levels of every Panchayat, 243D(2) thereof provides, that not less then one third of total number of seats reserved, shall be reserved for women belonging to Scheduled Castes or as the case may be, the Scheduled Tribes. Further Article 243 D(3) mandates that not less then one third (including the number of seats reserved for women belonging to Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes) of the total number of seats to be filled by direct election in every Panchayat shall be reserved for women and such seats be allotted by rotation to different constituencies in a Panchayat. Further Article 243 D(3) mandates that not less then one third (including the number of seats reserved for women belonging to Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes) of the total number of seats to be filled by direct election in every Panchayat shall be reserved for women and such seats be allotted by rotation to different constituencies in a Panchayat. Under Article 243D (4) the offices of Chairpersons in the Panchayats at the village or any other level should be reserved for Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes and Women in such manner as the Legislature of a State may, by law, provide. The extent or reservation has to be proportionate to the population of the Scheduled Castes or the Scheduled Tribes as is prescribed therein. The said sub-article further provides that not less then one third of the total number of offices of the Chairpersons in the Panchayat at each level should be reserved for women and the number of offices reserved would be allotted by rotation to different Panchayats at each level 5. The case of the petitioner is that the Assam Panchayat Act 1994 was amended by Assam Panchayat (Amendment Act 2001) (Assam Act No. XVI of 2001) incorporating Section 7QA therein providing for reservation in the offices of President and Vice President of Zilla Parishads for the persons belonging to Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes to the extent as mentioned therein. The said provision of the Act however further mentions that the manner in which the reservation is to be effected would be as prescribed. Sub-Section (2) and (3) thereof provide for reservation of women in the said offices. 6. Following the above amendment, Rule 61 of the Assam Panchayat (Constitution) Rules 1995 was amended providing for notification of the names of Zilla Parishads reserved for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes on the basis of the number of the offices of President/ Vice President of Zilla Parishads to be reserved for Scheduled Castes or Scheduled Tribes as the case may be as provided in Section 70 A (1) of the Assam Panchayat Act 1994 (as amended). The said Rule also provided for reservation of the offices of President/Vice President for women belonging to Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes. The said Rule also provided for reservation of the offices of President/Vice President for women belonging to Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes. The said rule also require that the notice for reservation should be published just after declaration of the result of the election of the Zilla Parishad and the copies of such notice be published in the official gazette/State Election Commission Office and Deputy Commissioner Offices/Zilla Parishad Offices and in local newspapers for wide publicity. With regard to the reservation of the office of the Vice President of the Zilla Parishad the said Rule provided that the office of the Vice President of the Zilla Parishad shall not be reserved for the person belonging to Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes in which the office of the President of Zilla Parishad has already been reserved for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes community and such reservation of the offices of Vice President of Zilla Parishad shall be done with the highest number of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes population as the case may be in the descending order after excluding Zilla Parishads in which the office of the President has already been reserved on the basis of the highest number of Scheduled Castes or Scheduled Tribes population. 7. The petitioner's case is that the Government of Assam by a Notification dated 8.3.2002, Annexure-A to the writ petition and published in the issue dated 15.3.2002 of the official gazette appointed the respondent No. 4 as the Officer authorised for reservation of offices of the President and Vice President of Zilla Parishads for women purportedly under Section 70A(1) of the Assam Panchayat Act 1994 and Rule 61 of the Assam Panchayat (Constitution Rules) 1995. 8. The petitioner alleges that in purported exercise of power conferred by the aforesaid Notification, the respondent No. 4 proceeded to allot the offices of the President and Vice President of Zilla Parishads allegedly on 13.3.2002 without inviting any member of the registered and recognised political parties of the State and eventually by various Notifications dated 14.3.2002 published in the issue dated 15.3.2002 of the official Gazette, the respondent No. 4 allotted such offices at his whims and caprices acting under the pressure and influence of the interested circles in the State Government. The petitioner has annexed a copy of the said Notification collectively marked as Annexure-B to the writ petition. 9. The petitioner has annexed a copy of the said Notification collectively marked as Annexure-B to the writ petition. 9. The grievance of the petitioner is that the State respondents approached the matter of reservation very casually and allotted the offices of Zilla Parishad without any application of mind inasmuch as Article 243 D(4) do not permit reservation of offices of the Vice President of Zilla Parishad. His further grievance is that out of 23 administrative districts in Assam, Panchayat Election were held in 20 districts and the respondent No. 4 without any basis approached the vital issue of allotment of offices of the president and Vice President in the Zilla Parishad of the State. The petitioner alleged non-application of the mind of respondent No. 4 in the matter of declaration of the Zilla Parishads to be reserved for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes and allotment of offices of the President and Vice President of such Zilla Parishad for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes and Women as mentioned in the Notification, Annexure-B. 10. The petitioner in the writ petition contends that - i) Section 70 A of the Assam Panchayat Act 1994 (as amended) (hereinafter referred to as the Act) and Rules 61 of the Assam Panchayat (Constitution Rules 1995 (as amended) (hereinafter referred to as the Rules) are ultra-vires Article 243 D of the Constitution of India as the same do not permit reservation of the office of the Vice President of the Zilla Parishad for any category of communities. ii) Section 70A of the Act and Rules 61 of the Rules and the impugned Notification dated 8.3.2002 and 14.3.2002 suffer from excessive and multiple delegation of power as the power to make laws to give effect to the provision for reservation as contained in Article 243 D so delegated to the State Legislature had been further delegated by it to the Rule making authority which in turn had delegated the same to the authorised officer. iii) The respondent No. 4 as a lone officer could not have determined the composition of population of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes in the areas mentioned in the Notification dated 14.3.2002 in absence of collective participation of the representative of registered and recognised political parties of the State and that his said findings being not based on any report of census operation, the Notifications dated 14.3.2002 are illegal. iv) In absence of the involvement of registered and recognised political parties of the State in the exercise of determination and fixation of the offices of the President and Vice President in the Zilla Parishad, there was every possibility of the respondent No. 4 as the lone officer of the State Government to be under pressure and influence of the political bosses so as to ensure election of the candidates of their choice as President and Vice Presidents of different Zilla Parishads taking advantage of the reservation schemes. v) The State Government and the Election Commission ought to have undertaken the exercise of determining and declaring the offices of Zilla Parishad and^ other offices at all levels of the Panchayat to be reserved prior to the holding of Panchayat Elections in the State so as to ensure participation of highly qualified and competent candidates to contest for the offices of the President of all Panchayats in direct elections. vi) The impugned Notifications dated 8.3.2002 and 14.3.2002 were published with undue haste without providing any opportunity to the people in general and the political parties interested in the matter to put forward their suggestions and objections on the issue. vii) The total number of offices of the President and Vice President for the Zilla Parishad in the State as reserved fair exceeds, the quota for reservation as outlined under Article 243 D of the Constitution of India. viii) Section 70A and Rule 61 are unconstitutional and void inasmuch as those militate against the provision of Article 14, 15, 16 and 243 D of the Constitution of India. 11. The respondent Nos. 1 and 2 and the respondent No. 4 have filed separate affidavit-in-opposition though substantially in the same lines. Their stand as disclosed in their affidavits is that the government by Notification dated 8.3.2002 authorised the respondent No. 4 to undertake the exercise of reservation of the offices of President and Vice President of Zilla Parishads for Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes and Women in terms of Section 70A of the Act and Rule 61 of the Rules. They have further contended that the said provisions of the Act and the Rules do not provide for inviting any member of any-registered and recognised political party of the State to participate at the time of drawing of lots. They have further contended that the said provisions of the Act and the Rules do not provide for inviting any member of any-registered and recognised political party of the State to participate at the time of drawing of lots. They have denied the allegation that the respondent No. 4 had allotted the offices on whims or under pressure of interested circles of the State. They have averred that the records clearly demonstrate that the allotment of offices in case of women was undertaken with utmost transparency and openness by drawal of lots in presence of responsible officers of the State Government including a representative from the Assam State Election Commission, in a meeting held on 13.3.2002 in the office Chamber of the Secretary of the Government of Assam, Panchayat and Rural Development Department. They asserted that the notifications dated 14.3.2002 were also issued in compliance of the relevant provisions of the aforesaid Act and the Rules and that consequent upon the issuance of the aforesaid Notifications, a W.T. Message dated 16.3.2002 had been issued, addressed to all Deputy Commissioners (except Karbi Anglong & N.C. Hills and Kokrajhar) informing them about the reservation of offices with a request to constitute the Zilla Parishads, Anchalik Panchayat and Gaon Panchayats by holding the first meeting as per provisions of the Act and the Rules preferably within 25.3.2002. 12. While denying the allegation made in the writ petition, that the entire matter of allotting the offices of the Zilla Parishads has been taken in a casual manner, the answering respondents maintained that on a harmonious reading of clause (4) read with clause (6) of Article 243D of the Constitution of India, reservation of office of the Vice President of Zilla Parishads was clearly permissible. They denied the allegation that the respondent No. 4 made the allotment of offices under the influence of political parties and had declared the reservation at his sweet will without any basis and instead asserted that as empowered under Rule 61(3) of the Rules the respondent No. 4 had undertaken the exercise of reservation on the basis of population according to the 1991 Census. They referred to a population chart in support of their statement that the Districts of Dhemaji, Kokrajhar, Lakhimpur, Nalbari, Bongaigaon etc. are 1st, 2nd and 3rd and 4th respectively in terms of Scheduled Tribes population. They referred to a population chart in support of their statement that the Districts of Dhemaji, Kokrajhar, Lakhimpur, Nalbari, Bongaigaon etc. are 1st, 2nd and 3rd and 4th respectively in terms of Scheduled Tribes population. They further maintained that the office of the President of Zilla Parishad, Dhemaji District was reserved for Scheduled Tribes as it has the highest number of Scheduled Tribes population. As because, election to Zilla Parishad in Kokrajhar District has been deferred, office of the President of Zilla Parishad of Lakhimpur District was reserved being second in terms of the Scheduled Tribes population in the descending order. They similarly cited instances of the districts of Cachar and Karimganj being reserved for Scheduled Castes for having the highest number of Scheduled Castes population. The reservation of the office of President/Vice President for Women belonging to Scheduled Tribes and Scheduled Castes to the extent prescribed was also done strictly in accordance with the provisions of the Act and the Rules, they contended. Denying the allegation that the impugned actions of the State respondents were violative of the Constitution of India, the answering respondents maintained that the same were in furtherance of greater public interest and justice. They asserted that the Act do not provide any role for the Assam State Election Commission or any political parties to participate in the process of determination, of the said offices. It was further stated in the affidavit that the Constitution of the Panchayat Bodies at all levels had already been inordinately delayed due to the massive exercise undertaken by the Assam State Election Commission in publishing the names of the returned candidates at all levels of the Panchayat in the Official Gazette and as soon as the said exercise was completed the State Government, keeping in mind the public interest involved, issued the notification dated 8.3.2002 and 14.3.2002 pertaining to reservation of offices of the President/Vice President of Zilla Parishads for persons belonging to Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes and Women. They contended that Section 70A and Rule 61 of the Rules are in absolute conformity with the mandates of Article 243D of the Constitution of India and that the said provisions of the Act and the Rules do not in any way infringe the fundamental rights of the petitioner under Part-Ill of the Constitution of India. They contended that Section 70A and Rule 61 of the Rules are in absolute conformity with the mandates of Article 243D of the Constitution of India and that the said provisions of the Act and the Rules do not in any way infringe the fundamental rights of the petitioner under Part-Ill of the Constitution of India. They have further stated that the statements made in the writ petition are not based on facts and that the purpose of filling the same is only to bring about a total dislocation in the process of devolution of powers to the people on the principles of self-governance. They further pointed out that if there is any delay in making the Panchayat Institutions' to function, the Central Grants sanctioned and released for the rural development would be withheld resulting in serious set-back to the welfare measures earmarked for the upliftment of the rural masses. The respondents challenged the maintainability of the writ petition contending that as the writ petitioner has assailed the actions of the State Government in filling up the vacancies in the office of the president and Vice President of the Zilla Parishads, the said dispute was required under the Act, to be agitated before the Election Tribunal constituted by the State Government for that purpose and that not having been done, the writ petition was liable to be dismissed. 13. Respondent No. 5, Md. Sonabar Ali who was impleaded by order dated 2.4.2002 of this Court, while generally supporting the stand of the official respondents has contended the intention of the writ petitioner in filing the writ petition is not bona fide and that it is really to hamper the development works in the rural areas. He has contended that the impugned actions of the State respondents and the respondent No. 4 had been in accordance with the Act and the Rules and that several Zilla Parishads have already been constituted in terms of the relevant notifications and have started functioning and that, therefore, the question of quashing the impugned notifications did not arise. 14. The learned Advocate General, Assam, at the very outset, has raised preliminary objections with regard to the maintainability of the writ petition. 14. The learned Advocate General, Assam, at the very outset, has raised preliminary objections with regard to the maintainability of the writ petition. He had emphatically argued that the impugned provisions of law, namely, Section 70A and Rule 61 having been enacted/framed in exercise of the powers conferred under Article 243 K(4) of the Constitution of India, empowering the State to make laws making provision with respect to all matters relating to, or in connection with, elections to the Panchayats, Article 243 O was a total bar to the interference by this court in the matter in issue. Developing his said argument, the learned Advocate General further submitted that Section 70A, the validity whereof has been impugned in the present proceeding, empowers reservation for offices of President and Vice President of Zilla Parishads and also lays down the extent of such reservation as mentioned in subsection (1) thereof. Sub sections (2) and (3) relate to reservation for women in such offices. Keeping in view the fact that the State has power to make laws in respect of all matters relating to, or in connection with the elections to the Panchayats which includes the Zilla Parishads and that Section 70A undisputedly relates to allotment of seats to the constituencies, the validity of Section 70A cannot be challenged in view of the bar contained in Clause (a) of Article 243 O of the Constitution of India. He has further urged that considering the fact that Rule 61 provides for notification of the names of the reserved constituencies, besides laying down the manner of such reservation and authorisation of an officer to determine the reservation for women by drawing of lots, it is a provision of law providing for matters relating to, or in connection with election to Panchayats which is within the competence of State Legislature and therefore, as it provides for allotment of different constituencies to the reserved classes and the methodology and the machinery for such allotment, the same is immune for any challenge in any court of law in view of the bar engrafted in Article 243 O(a) of the Constitution of India. According to him, the expression 'delimitation' appearing in clause (a) of Article 243 O comprehends reservation as well and the exercise of making reservation has an inextricable nexus with the allotment of seats. According to him, the expression 'delimitation' appearing in clause (a) of Article 243 O comprehends reservation as well and the exercise of making reservation has an inextricable nexus with the allotment of seats. He has further strongly urged that as Section 70A and Rule 61 impugned in the present writ petition are laws relating to delimitation of constituencies and allotment of seats to such reserved constituencies relating to election to the Zilla Parishads, the validity thereof could not be challenged in face of the prohibition contained in Article 243 O of the Constitution of India. In support of his submission that delimitation of constituencies encompasses the exercise of reservation for the same, the learned Advocate General has drawn the attention of this court to Rule 8 of the Rules pointing out that though the said Rule deals with delimitation of constituencies of Zilla Parishads, it also provides for reservation in such constituencies. 15. Referring to Section 129 of the Act which prescribes a bar to interference by courts in electoral matters, the learned Advocate General has further argued that under the law, an alternative remedy is available to the writ petitioner as contemplated u/s. 127 of the Act and, therefore, in view of the bar contained in Section 129 of the Act, the present writ petition is, on the face of records not maintainable in law and is liable to be dismissed in limine. He further argued that as the validity of the constitutional provisions, namely, Article 243 K(4) and Article 243 O had not been challenged in the writ petition, the validity of the law made by the State in exercise of powers under Article 243 K(4) cannot be permitted to be assailed and, therefore. Section 70A and Rule 61 are immune from challenge. 16. Refuting the submissions made by the learned Advocate General as above, on the issue of maintainability of the writ petition, Mr. Majumdar, the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner has argued that the bar of Article 243 O of the Constitution of India is not attracted in the present case keeping in view the issues involved. The learned senior counsel, with reference to various provisions of the Act dealing with the establishment, constitution and election to the Gaon Panchayats, Anchalik Panchayats and the Zilla Parishads, submitted that delimitation of constituencies can be correlated only to a corresponding geographical area and the population thereof. The learned senior counsel, with reference to various provisions of the Act dealing with the establishment, constitution and election to the Gaon Panchayats, Anchalik Panchayats and the Zilla Parishads, submitted that delimitation of constituencies can be correlated only to a corresponding geographical area and the population thereof. The reservation of such a constituency for Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes or Women and earmarking of the offices of the President of such reserved constituencies cannot be brought within the concept of delimitation of constituency or allotment of seats as envisaged under Article 243 O of the Constitution of India. He further argued that the writ petitioner in the instant case has not in any manner challenged the delimitation of constituencies or allotment of seats and, therefore, the question of bar contained in Clause (a) of Article 243 O of the Constitution of India being attracted does not arise at all. Further, in the instant case, as no election to the office of the President of the Zilla Parishads in the State has yet been held, it is not a case where any election to any Panchayat has been called in question in the instant proceedings and, therefore, the bar contained in clause (b) of Article 243 O of the Constitution of India is also not attracted, he argued. The learned senior counsel urged that as the subject matter of the writ petition do not form part of the election process concerning the Panchayats neither Article 243 O nor Section 129 of the Act bars interference of this court in the matter in issue in the present proceeding. He further argued that in the instant case, the process of delimitation has been purportedly completed and the election to the office of the President of the Zilla Parishads is yet to be held and no election to any Panchayat as such has been called in question. With reference to the reliefs claimed for in the writ petition he argued that in the instant case, the petitioner has nothing to do with the delimitation of constituencies, allotment of seats or election to Panchayats and, therefore Article 243 O of the Constitution and Section 129 of the Act do not stand in the way of this court to examine and decide the issues involved in the instant proceeding. Referring to Section 127 of the Act, the learned senior counsel argued that as the said provision of law provides for filing an election petition before the Election Tribunal only challenging direct election i.e. election of members to the Panchayat bodies from the respective constituencies it does not contemplate an election petition challenging election to the office of President or Vice President of the Zilla Parishads and, therefore, considering the issues involved in the present petition, the said provision of law cannot be construed to be either a bar to the exercise of writ jurisdiction of this court by way of alternative remedy or providing an adequate and efficacious remedy to the grievances registered in the present case. He argued that there cannot be a wrong without a remedy and as in the instant case, the impugned provisions of the Act and the Rules and the notifications purportedly issued under the cover of the said provisions are grossly illegal and unconstitutional, this court would fail to exercise its jurisdiction vested by the constitution in case the writ petition is thrown out at the threshold without examining the merits of the contentions raised therein. 17. As the learned counsels for the parties insisted that keeping open the question of maintainability of the writ petition, arguments on merits be also heard., this court in the interest of expeditious hearing of the whole matter allowed the parties to make their submissions on the other issues as well. 18. The learned senior counsel for the petitioner, referring to the statements made in the writ petition, argued that the writ petitioner has filed the same in the interest of rural masses so as to ensure that the highest offices of the Zilla Parishads and other Panchayat bodies are manned by people with education, experience, knowledge and expertise and that the constitutional aspiration of rural development does not suffer a set-back due to the illegalities committed in the matter of reservation of the offices of the president and Vice President in the Zilla Parishads. Pointing out the fact that u/s. 81 of the Representative of the Peoples Act, 1951 even an elector can challenge the validity of an election thereunder, the learned senior counsel argued that under Article 51 A of the Constitution of India, it is the fundamental duty of every citizen to bring to the notice of the court any illegality in State action which has the potential of negating the process towards excellence in all spheres of individual and collective activity. He submitted that the framers of the Constitution had introduced Part-IX to the Constitution of India with the avowed purpose of setting up Panchayats so as to enable those to function as institutions of self Government for taking the democracy to the grass-root level and, therefore, as the writ petitioner has a bona fide interest in the adjudication of the issues raised for the public interest in general, the instant petition should not be rejected on the ground of locus standi as put-forward by the respondents. The learned senior counsel has next drawn the attention of the court to the definition of the expressions President, Vice President and Chairperson as contained in Section 2(34), (35) & (36) of the Act. He submitted that a cursory glance at the definition of the expression "Chairperson" indicates that he/she would be the elected non-official head of Gaon Panchayat or Anchalik Panchayat or Zilla Parishad or District Planning Committee. He emphasised that as the expression "Chairperson" clearly denotes an elected head, it follows that there cannot be two heads either in the Gaon Panchayat or Anchalik Panchayat or Zilla Parishad, as the case may be. Having thus laid the foundation as above, the learned senior counsel turned towards Article 243 D of the Constitution of India and emphatically urged that reservation to the office of Chairperson in the Panchayats can, therefore, be only with regard to the office of the President. He, therefore, argued that the State had no authority or competence to make any law providing for reservation for the office of Vice President in such bodies. He, therefore, argued that the State had no authority or competence to make any law providing for reservation for the office of Vice President in such bodies. He further argued that clause (6) of Article 243 D which authorises the legislature of a State to make provision for reservation of scats in any Panchayat or offices of Chairperson in the Panchayats in favour of backward classes of citizen cannot be construed to empower the State to provide for reservation in the office of Vice President in the Panchayat bodies. He, therefore, submitted that Section 70A and Rule 61 which provide for reservation in office of the Vice President in the Zilla Parishads are ex-facie ultra vires Article 243 D(4) of the Constitution inasmuch as the State legislature/State had no legislative competence to enact/frame the said provisions of law. 19. The next argument of the learned senior counsel for the petitioner is that the Article 243 D(4) of the Constitution requires the Legislature of a State to provide by law the manner in which the office of the Chairperson in the Panchayat at the village or any other level should be reserved for the Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes and Women. He argued that on a plain reading of Section 70 A and Rule 61 would make it clear that those have only reproduced the language appearing in the different clauses of Article 243 D without, however, laying down the manner in which the reservation as envisaged in that Article of the Constitution is to be effected. He, therefore, submitted that the impugned provisions of law are, thus violative of the Constitutional directives contained in Article 243 D(4) and on that ground alone the same should be adjudged illegal and unconstitutional. 20. The learned senior counsel, maintaining his challenge to the constitutionality of Section 70A and Rule 61, further argued that the said provisions of law also suffer from the vice of excessive and multiple delegation of power inasmuch as under Article 243 D, the power to make law to provide the manner in which the reservation is to be effected had been delegated to the State Government. The State Government further delegated the said power/authority to the respondent No. 4 who ultimately issued the impugned notifications. The State Government further delegated the said power/authority to the respondent No. 4 who ultimately issued the impugned notifications. The learned senior counsel argued that this is wholly impermissible in law and, therefore, Section 70A and Rule 61 along with the impugned notifications are patently illegal and unconstitutional and are liable to be declared as such. 21. The learned senior counsel, without prejudice to his above submission, has argued in the alternative, that assuming Section 70 A and Rule 61 are constitutionally valid even then the impugned notifications, Annexure-A and Annexure-B are not sustainable in law as the same have been issued in violation thereof and the other provisions of the Act and Rules. He argued that considering the very purpose of setting up the Panchayat bodies as the Institutions of Self Government is to ensure participation of all concerned as well as to rouse the awareness for rural development and advance the prospect of participation of the masses at the grass-root level, it was incumbent and indeed obligatory on the part of the official respondents to publish the notice of reservation just after declaration of the results of the election of the Zilla Parishads in the official Gazette/ State Election Commission Office, Deputy Commissioners' Office/Zilla Parishads Offices and local newspapers for wide publicity. He submitted that if such notice would have been published as prescribed under proviso to Rule 61, it would have provided a scope to all concerned to offer their opinion in the matter so that the wholesome purpose of providing for reservation in the Panchayat bodies could have been achieved. The learned senior counsel pointed out that the official respondents by notification dated 8.3.2002 authorised the respondent No. 4 to undertake the process of reservation of the offices of President, Vice President of Zilla Parishad and the said Notification was published in the issue dated 15.3.2002 of the Assam Gazette and the notifications declaring the reservation of such offices dated 14.3.2002 were also published in the issue dated 15.3.2002 of the same gazette. He, therefore, argued that the whole exercise was done mechanically with undue haste without any proper publication so as to deliberately keep away genuinely interested persons from the exercise and to ensure reservation in favour of a chosen few. He, therefore, argued that the whole exercise was done mechanically with undue haste without any proper publication so as to deliberately keep away genuinely interested persons from the exercise and to ensure reservation in favour of a chosen few. The learned senior counsel argued that inspite of a specific provision in the Rules, namely, Rule 8(2) (d) to consult representatives of recognised regional and national political parties in the matter of lottery of seats for women reservation, the same was not done as the time of reservation of the office of the President and Vice President. Moreover, by the notification dated 8.3.2002 absolute power has been conferred on an office, in this case, the respondent No. 4, to undertake the process of reservation which is not permissible in the present Constitutional set up. The impugned notification, Annexure-B also does not indicate as to in what manner the offices of the President and Vice President for women were identified by lots. No notice whatsoever thereof was published. The learned senior counsel argued that Part-IX to the Constitution of India was introduced to remedy the mischief of insulation of the representatives of the Society at the grassroot level from participation in the process of formation of institutions of self government but Section 70A and Rule 61 instead of espousing the cause indicated in the related provisions of the Constitution under Part-IX have advanced the mischief and, therefore, on that ground as well as the said provision of the Act and the Rules and the notifications Annexure-A and Annexure-B are liable to be struck down as illegal and unconstitutional. 22. The learned Advocate General, Assam in reply argued that in the facts and circumstances of the case, Section 70A and Rule 61 besides being immune from any challenge against their constitutionality are in tune with the Constitutional precepts enshrined in Article 243 D of the Constitution of India. He argued that in order to judge the legality and/or validity of Section 70 A and Rule 61, the underlying purpose of providing for reservation for Scheduled Castes , Scheduled Tribes and Women in every Panchayat and that of leaving the manner in which such reservation is to be effected to the State legislature to provide by law, has to be appreciated. According to him, the framers of the Constitution were aware that every State has its own distinctive features and characteristics and that, therefore, it was considered appropriate to leave to the State legislature the responsibility of providing the manner of reservation of the offices of the Chairpersons in the Panchayats by law to be enacted by it. Referring to Sections 66,67,70 and 70 A of the Act, the learned Advocate General has argued that the said provisions of the Act, have accordingly been enacted inconsonance with the constitutional edicts contained in Part-IX of the Constitution of India. He submitted that Panchayat election in the State had not been held for over five years as a result of which the constitutional mandate as above was flouted and the State was deprived of its legitimate central grants for rural development. According to him, the action taken by the State respondents in enacting Section 70A and Rule 61, holding the election and providing for reservation in terms of the dictates of Part-IX of the Constitution of India has to be understood and appreciated in that background. He submitted that the State respondents cannot be said to have acted mala fide and there appears to be legal and justifiable basis of the impugned action. There is no trace of malice in fact, and, therefore, the bona fide of the State action cannot be doubted. He argued that in any view of the matter, there cannot be two opinions that the State-respondents in enacting Section 70A and Rule 61 and in holding the Panchayat elections and providing for reservation as required under Part-IX of the Constitution of India have acted in substantial compliance of the Constitutional mandates as above and, therefore, the impugned actions are beyond constitutional reproach. Attacking the bona fide of the writ petitioner, the learned Advocate General submitted that the writ petition does not disclose sufficient materials to inspire confidence that any enforceable right of the petitioner has been infringed by the impugned actions of the State and that his approach to stall the entire election process for filing up the offices of President and Vice President of the Zilla Parishads in the State does not appear to be bonafide and in public interest. He argued that the present petition is not in the nature of Public Interest Litigation and, therefore unless the petitioner satisfied the court that he has an existing enforceable right and that the same has been violated by the impugned actions of the State he has no locus standi to maintain the present writ petition. He further submitted that the impugned provisions of the Act and the Rules do not suffer from the vice of excessive and multiple delegation of power as contended on behalf of the petitioner inasmuch as Article 243 D(4) only empowers the legislature of a State to make law providing the manner in which the offices of the Chairpersons in the Panchayats should be reserved for Scheduled Castes , Scheduled Tribes and Women. Article 243 D(4) cannot be construed to be a provision delegating the legislative power to the State legislature to make such a law and it has to be construed to be only an enabling provision, he argued. The learned Advocate General urged that the State legislature has in turn enacted Section 70A providing the manner in which such reservation has to be effected. Rule 61 framed by the government only lays down the other working details in order to achieve the reservation as provided for. According to him, the State legislature continued to be the repository of power, to make the law to prescribe the manner in which reservation in the offices of the Chairpersons in the Panchayats should be effected and, therefore, Section 70A and Rule 61 cannot be said to be vitiated by excessive and multiple delegation of power as alleged. There has been no delegation of essential legislative functions by the State legislature to the Government and the authority granted to the respondent No. 4 in terms of Rule 61 cannot be construed to be a sub-delegation of any legislative function. 23. The learned Advocate General further argued that on a reading on Article 243 D(4) which provides for reservation of the offices of the Chairpersons, it is clear that the makers of the Constitution contemplated the office of Vice President of the Panchayats to be included in the office of Chairpersons in view of the use of the expression "Chairpersons" i.e. in plural number. Alternatively, he argued that keeping in view Article 243D(6), it was permissible for the State Legislature to make provision for reservation of the office of the Vice President as well, inasmuch as it was permissible thereunder to make provision for reservation of seats in any Panchayat or offices of the Chairpersons in the Panchayats at any level in favour of "backward class of citizens." He argued that as the expression used is "backward class" and not "other backward class" it authorised the State Legislature to make provision for reservation in the offices of Vice Presidents in the Panchayats. Further, there is nothing on records to even suggest that if the offices of which Vice President in the Panchayats at all levels are reserved, the extent of reservation would exceed the permissible limit of 50% and, therefore, there is no question of efficiency of the Panchayats being sacrificed at the alter of reservation as alleged. 24. Countering the argument advanced on behalf of the petitioner, that no notice of reservation as provided in Rule 61 was published and that it was necessary to involve the political parties in the matter of reservation in the offices of the Chairpersons in the Panchayats, the learned Advocate General has argued that no such obligation was cast under the Act or the Rules and, therefore, it was not permissible on the part of the petitioner to make any grievance in that regard. He submitted that in compliance of the prescription of Rule 61, reservation was done in the offices of the Presidents and Vice Presidents of Zilla Parishads in respect of Scheduled Castes , Scheduled Tribes and Women strictly in the manner prescribed and thereafter by the impugned notifications dated 14.3.2002, the reserved constituencies were notified and a Wireless Message dated 16.3.2002 (Annexure-1 to the affidavit) to the said effect was addressed to all the Deputy Commissioners of the concerned districts. The allegation that the whole exercise was undertaken hurriedly and in a hush hush manner was stoutly refuted by the learned Advocate General. He has argued that keeping in view the nature of the issues involved in the present proceedings, this court should approach the problem bearing in mind, the self imposed restraint exercised by a High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. He has argued that keeping in view the nature of the issues involved in the present proceedings, this court should approach the problem bearing in mind, the self imposed restraint exercised by a High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. He contended that for the purpose of adjudication the issues, the court has to consider whether the necessary material facts are contained in the writ petition. He argued that it has to be borne in mind that the impugned provisions of the Act and the Rules relate to delimitation of constituencies and allotment of seats and further the impugned actions of the State have a direct bearing on the election to the offices of the President and vice President of the Zilla Parishads, Panchayat Bodies at the District level. He submitted that the fact that any interference with the impugned action of the State would have the effect of reversing the process of election cannot also be left out of consideration. He further argued that above all, the Constitutional mandate contained in Part-IX of the Constitution together with the embargo on the challenge of such law as contemplated under Article 243 O(a) should not be lost sight of. The learned Advocate General also argued that in the meantime at least in two districts, namely, Dhemaji and Darrang, election to the offices of the President and Vice President have been completed under the impugned provisions of law and if at this stage the validity thereof is nullified, it would be a retrograde step in the on going electoral process which will be dominantly against public interest. In view of total bar under Article 243 O of the Constitution of India, the petitioner cannot successfully plead that if the bar is attracted to the facts of the present case he would be left with no remedy. If that is the Constitutional mandate, it is binding on all concerned, he argued. However, an effective remedy is provided in Section 127 of the Act, he argued. 25. The learned Advocate General in support of his submission has placed reliance on the following authorities :- 1. AIR 1967 SC 669 (Meghraj Kothari vs. Delimitation Commission and Ors.) 2.1982 Unreported judgment Supreme Court 371 (A.K.M. Hassan Uzzaman vs. Union of India) 3. 1984 Suppl. SCC 104 (Election Commission of India vs. State ofHaryana) 4. 25. The learned Advocate General in support of his submission has placed reliance on the following authorities :- 1. AIR 1967 SC 669 (Meghraj Kothari vs. Delimitation Commission and Ors.) 2.1982 Unreported judgment Supreme Court 371 (A.K.M. Hassan Uzzaman vs. Union of India) 3. 1984 Suppl. SCC 104 (Election Commission of India vs. State ofHaryana) 4. (1974) 4 SCC 854 (Mohd. Yunus Salem vs. Shiv Kumar Shastri) 5. AIR 1996SCI595 (Boddula Krishnaiah vs. State Election Commission) 6. (2000) 8 SCC 46 (Shyam Deo PD Singh vs. Nawal Kishore Yadav) 26. He has, in course of his submissions, produced before the court a notification indicating the constitution of the Dhemaji Zilla Parishad, the minutes of the proceedings of the meeting for reservation of the office of the President and Vice President of the Zilla Parishads for women by drawing of lots. He also produced an extract of the District-wise Scheduled Tribes and Scheduled Castes population on the basis of 1991 census to indicate the percentage of Scheduled Tribes and Scheduled Castes population in the different districts in the State of Assam. 27. Mr. Majumdar, the learned senior counsel for the petitioner in his reply, submitted that the offices of the President of Zilla Parishads cannot be construed to be a seat and, therefore, Section 70A and Rule 61 cannot be said to be a law relating to allotment of seats and, therefore, the bar of Article 243 O(a) is not attracted in the present case. He argued that Article 243 D(b) does not contemplate reservation in the office of the vice President in the Panchayats and the expression "backward class" means a class other than the Scheduled Tribes and Scheduled Castes. He further argued that if the offices of the President and Vice President in the Zilla Parishads of the State are reserved, then the extent of reservation would be about 66% which is clearly beyond the permissible limit. He referred to a judgment of the Bihar High Court striking down the reservation made under the Bihar Panchayati Raj Act on the ground of excessive reservation. He relied on a decision of the Supreme Court reported in (1999) 9 SCC, 700 (B.R. Enterprises vs. State of U.P. and Ors.) in support of his contention that Section 70A and Rule 61 to sustain the attack of constitutionality should be read down suitably to quell the mischief which these seek to advance. He relied on a decision of the Supreme Court reported in (1999) 9 SCC, 700 (B.R. Enterprises vs. State of U.P. and Ors.) in support of his contention that Section 70A and Rule 61 to sustain the attack of constitutionality should be read down suitably to quell the mischief which these seek to advance. Taking the cue from the submission made by the learned Advocate General, that in course of the Present proceedings election had already been held to the offices of the president and Vice President of Zilla Parishads in the Dhemaji and Darrang districts, the learned senior counsel for the petitioner has arged that the same has been conducted in the face of an interim order passed by this court on 25.3.2002 and, therefore, on that ground alone such elections are to be treated as nonest in law and appropriate orders be passed against the State respondents for holding such elections in contravention of the order of this court. 28. In view of the preliminary objections raised on behalf of the respondents with regard to the maintainability of the writ petition and as the same if upheld would have a vital bearing on the issues involved. I consider it fit and proper to first examine the issue of maintainability of the writ petition before embarking upon the process of adjudication of other issues on merits. 29. As has been already noticed, the objection with regard to the maintainability of the writ petition is on two counts. Firstly as the impugned provisions of the Act and the Rules are laws relating to the delimitation of the constituencies made in exercise of power under Article 243 K(4), the validity thereof cannot be challenged in view of the bar engrafted in Article 243 O of the Constitution and Section 129 of the Act and secondly in view of Section 127 of the Act which provides for a forum to assail any election under the Act, the challenge to the constitutionality of Section 70A and Rule 61 ought not to be entertained by this court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 30. In order to examine the tenability of the preliminary objection so raised, it is advisable to have a closure look of the scheme envisaged under Part-IX of the Constitution. 30. In order to examine the tenability of the preliminary objection so raised, it is advisable to have a closure look of the scheme envisaged under Part-IX of the Constitution. The said part had been inserted by the Constitution (Seventy Third Amendment) Act, 1992 and has been devoted for making provisions for the constitution and composition of Panchayats providing also for the duration thereof prescribing the powers, authority and responsibilities of the said institutions of self Government. Part-IX also deals with elections to the said bodies and incorporates a bar to interference by courts in electoral matters in the form of Article 243 O, Article 243 B requires in categorical terms that there shall be constituted in every State, Panchayats at the village, intermediate and district levels in accordance with the provisions of that Part. Article 243 C which prescribes the composition of Panchayats, empowers the Legislature of a State to provide for such composition by making law in that regard, adding a rider that the ratio between the population of the territorial area of a Panchayat at any level and the number of seats in such Panchayat to be filled by election, should so far as practicable, be the same throughout the State. Clause (2) of the said Article requires that all the seats in a Panchayat shall be filled by persons chosen by direct election from territorial constituencies in the Panchayat area and, for this purpose, each Panchayat area shall be devided into territorial Constituencies in such manner that the ratio between the population of each constituency and the number of seats allotted to it shall, so far as practicable, be the same throughout the Panchayat area. Clause (4) of the said Article makes available to the Chairperson of a Panchayat and other members of a Panchayat, the right to vote in the meetings of the Panchayats. Clause (5) of Article 243 C requires that the Chairperson of a Panchayat at the village level should be elected in such manner as the Legislature of a State may, by law, provide; and that of a Panchayat at the intermediate level or districUevel shall be elected by, and from amongst, the elected members thereof. Article 243 D which is the centre of debate provides for reservation of seats in the Panchayats. Article 243 D which is the centre of debate provides for reservation of seats in the Panchayats. It lays down that in every Panchayat seats shall be reserved for Scheduled Tribes and Scheduled Castes and the number of such seats shall bear, as nearly as may be, the same proportion to the total number of seats to be filled by direct election in that Panchayat as the population of the Scheduled Castes in that Panchayat area or of the Scheduled Tribes in that Panchayat area bears to the total population of that area and such seats may be allotted by rotation to different constituencies in a Panchayat. It further lays down that not less than one-third of the total number of seats so reserved shall be reserved for women belonging to the Scheduled Castes or, as the case may be, the Scheduled Tribes and further not less than one-third (including the number of seats reserved for women belonging to the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes) of the total number of seats to be filled by direct election in every Panchayat should be reserved for women and that such seats may be allotted by rotation to different constituencies in a Panchayat. Article 243 D(4) empowers the Legislature of a State to provide by law, the manner in which the offices of the Chairpersons in the Panchayats at the village or any other level be reserved for the Scheduled Castes, the Scheduled Tribes and women. Proviso thereto, however, requires that number of officers of Chairpersons reserved for the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes in the Panchayats at each level in any State should bears as nearly as may be, the same proportion to the total number of such offices in the Panchayats at each level as the population of the Scheduled Castes in the State or of the Scheduled Tribes in the State bears to the total population of the State. It is further provided that not less than one-third of the total number of offices of Chairpersons in the Panchayats at each level should be reserved for women and that the number of offices of Chairpersons reserved under that clause should be allotted by rotation to different Panchayats at each level. It is further provided that not less than one-third of the total number of offices of Chairpersons in the Panchayats at each level should be reserved for women and that the number of offices of Chairpersons reserved under that clause should be allotted by rotation to different Panchayats at each level. Clause (6) of Article 243 D is an enabling provision permitting the Legislature of a State to make any provision for reservation of seats in any Panchayat or offices of Chairpersons in the Panchayat at any level in favour of backward class of citizens. 31. Article 243 K deals with election to the Panchayats and lays down that the superintendence, direction and control of the preparation of electoral rolls for, and the conduct of, all elections to the Panchayats be vested in a State Election Commission consisting of a State Election Commissioner to be appointed by the Governor. Clause (4) of the said Article provides that subject to the provisions of the Constitution, the Legislature of a State may, by law, make provision with respect to all matters relating to, or in connection with, elections to the Panchayats. Bar to the interference by courts in electoral matters is located in Article 243 O. It lays down in clear and emphatic terms that notwithstanding anything in the Constitution, the validity of any law relating to the delimitation of constituencies or the allotment of seats to such constituencies, made or purported to be made under Article 243 K, shall not be called in question in any Court. It further lays down that no election to any Panchayat shall be called in question except by an election petition presented to such authority and in such manner as is provided for by or under any law made by the Legislature of a State. 32. A survey of the provisions under Part-IX of the Constitution of India as above, makes the constitutional mandates with regard to the constitution and composition of Panchayat at the village, intermediate and district levels abundantly clear. 32. A survey of the provisions under Part-IX of the Constitution of India as above, makes the constitutional mandates with regard to the constitution and composition of Panchayat at the village, intermediate and district levels abundantly clear. Though Article 243 C and 243 D deal with the fundamental essential aspects regarding the composition of the Panchayats like the filling up of seats by persons chosen by direct election from territorial constituencies in the Panchayats area and the ratio between the population of each constituency and the number of seats to be allotted, reservation of seats for Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes and Women etc., the Legislature of a State has been entrusted with the responsibility providing by law, the details with regard to the composition of Panchayat and the manner in which the offices of the Chairpersons in the Panchayats at the village or any other level should be reserved for the Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes and Women. In other words, on the one hand the constitution furnishes the fundamentals with regard to the composition of Panchayats and records the directives with regard to the elementary features thereof and on the other, leaving it to the Legislature of a State by law to provide the details by which said directives are to be implemented in an effective and meaningful manner. This is further apparent from Clause (4) of Article 243 K, which empowers the Legislature of a State to make law for making provision with respect to all matters relating to or in connection with the elections to the Panchayats. Considering the directives contained in clause (2) of Article 243 C, that all the seats in a Panchayat should be filled by persons chosen by direct election and that the reservation of seats as envisaged under Article 243 D also relates to those to be filled by direct election, the legislative power of the State made available to it by clause (4) of Article 243 K assumes great importance. One cannot lose sight also of sub clause (5) of Article 243 C which directs that the Chairpersons of a Panchayat at the village level should be elected in a manner as the Legislature may by law provide but the Chairpersons of a Panchayat at the intermediate level or the district level shall be elected by and from amongst the elected members thereof. Closing in, on the office of the Chairpersons of a Panchayat at the intermediate level or the District level, it is noticeable that the office of the Chairpersons at those levels are also to be filled by election, by and from amongst the members elected by direct election from the respective territorial constituencies. Therefore, visibly, an election is a must for filling up the office of a Chairperson of a Zilla Parishad. The only difference is that the Chairpersons of a Panchayat at the village level has to be elected in terms of the provisions of law made by the State Legislature but in case of Chairperson of a Panchayat at the other levels, he/she has to be elected by and from amongst the already elected members of the said Panchayat. In the opinion of this court, considering the fact that the election to the office of Chairperson at the intermediate level or the district level has to be made by and from amongst the elected members of the Panchayat at that level, there rs a live nexus between the process of election by which members are directly elected to the Panchayat at that level and the process of election to fill up the office of Chairperson thereof. I feel reinforced in my view, reading the language of clause (2) of Article 243 C which lays down that all the seats in a Panchayat shall be filled by persons chosen by direct election from territorial constituencies. In the case of 'election to thex)ffice of the Chairperson of a Panchayat at the village level, intermediate level or district level, the aforesaid directive is complied with inasmuch as in all the cases the office of the Chairperson at all the levels are filled up by persons chosen by direct election. I have not been able to read in clause (2) of Article 243 C, the requirement that all seats in the Panchayat have to be filled by persons by direct election. The word "chosen" appearing in between, in my opinion is of considerable significance. Had the framers of the Constitution desired that all seats in a Panchayat be filled by persons by direct election from the territorial constituencies, nothing prevented them to lay down the said requirement. But the same has not been done. The word "chosen" appearing in between, in my opinion is of considerable significance. Had the framers of the Constitution desired that all seats in a Panchayat be filled by persons by direct election from the territorial constituencies, nothing prevented them to lay down the said requirement. But the same has not been done. In my opinion, therefore, on a conjoint reading of clause (2) and (5) of Article 243 C, the office of the Chairperson of a Panchayat at the village level, intermediate level or the district level has to be construed to be a "seat" to be filled up by persons chosen by direct election. The question now is whether the impugned provisions of the Act and the Rules i.e. Section 70A and Rule 61 can be deemed to be law made in exercise of power under Article 243 K and relating to the delimitation of constituencies or allotment of seats to such constituencies. Further, whether by filing the writ application with the challenge incorporated therein, any election to the Panchayat has been called in question. 33. Keeping in mind the requirements embodied in Article 243 C and 243 D with regard to the composition of Panchayats and the provisions for reservation therein and more particularly, the mandate that all seats in a Panchayat shall be filled by persons chosen by direct election from territorial constituencies in the Panchayat area, there can be no manner of doubt that the Assam Panchayat Act, 1994 and the Assam Panchayat (Constitution) Rules, 1995 are laws made in exercise of power under Article 243 K (4) of the Constitution of India making provision with regard to matters relating to or in connection with election to Panchayats. 34. A brief reference to the relevant provisions of the Act is considered necessary. Under Section 5 of the Act, the State Government is required to declare any local area comprising a revenue village or a group of revenue village etc. to be a Gaon Panchayat with population of its territory not less than six thousand and not more than ten thousand. Section 6 provides for the constitution of Gaon Panchayat to consist of ten members to be directly elected by the voters of the territorial constituencies of the Gaon Panchayat area - one from each constituency in the manner prescribed. to be a Gaon Panchayat with population of its territory not less than six thousand and not more than ten thousand. Section 6 provides for the constitution of Gaon Panchayat to consist of ten members to be directly elected by the voters of the territorial constituencies of the Gaon Panchayat area - one from each constituency in the manner prescribed. There would be one president of the Gaon Panchayat who shall be elected directly by the voters of the territorial constituencies of the Gaon Panchayat area. For the election of the members, the Gaon Panchayat area is to be divided into ten territorial constituencies and one seat is to be allotted for each constituency. Section 9 provides for reservation of seats of Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes and Women in every Gaon Panchayat. The number of seats so reserved shall bear the same proportion of the total number of seats to be filled up by direct election as the population of reserved classes bears to the total population of that area. Section 31 provides that there would be an Anchalik Panchayat for each development Block. Section 32 which deals with the constitution of Anchalik Panchayat provides that every Anchalik Panchayat would consist of one member from each Gaon Panchayat to be directly elected from the territorial constituencies of the Gaon Panchayat under the jurisdiction of the Anchalik Panchayat. Further the President of the Gaon Panchayat falling within the jurisdiction of the Anchalik Panchayat and the members of the House of People and the members of the Legislative Assembly of the State representing the constituencies which comprise wholly or partly, the Anchalik Panchayat would also be inclined in the constitution of the Anchalik Panchayat. Section 34 provides for reservation of seats in Anchalik Panchayat for Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes and Women and the number* of seats so reserved for the reserved classes should bear the same proportion to the total number of seats to be filled up by direct election in that Anchalik Panchayat as the population of the said reserved classes bears to the total population of the area. The election of President and Vice President of Anchalik Panchayat is to be in the manner prescribed u/s. 37 of the Act. The directly elected members of the Anchalik Panchayat would elect from amongst them (directly elected members) two members as President and Vice President of the Anchalik Panchayat. The election of President and Vice President of Anchalik Panchayat is to be in the manner prescribed u/s. 37 of the Act. The directly elected members of the Anchalik Panchayat would elect from amongst them (directly elected members) two members as President and Vice President of the Anchalik Panchayat. Section 38 provides for reservation of the offices of President and Vice President of the Anchalik Panchayat. The provision for establishment of a Zilla Parishad has been made under Section 64 of the Act. For every district there would be a Zilla Parishad having jurisdiction for the entire district excluding areas as mentioned therein. The constitution of Zilla Parishad in Section 65 requires that it would consist of members directly elected from territorial constituencies of the district, Presidents of Anchalik Panchayats and members of the House of People and the members of the State Legislative Assembly representing a part or whole of the district whose constituencies lie within the district. Reservation of seats for Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes and Women is ensured under Section 66 of the Act. The number of seats so reserved for the said reserved classes has to bear the same proportion to the total number of seats to be filled up from amongst the directly elected members in that Zilla Parishad as the population of the reserved classes in that area. Section 67 prescribes the extent of reservation of seats for women. Section 70 lays down the manner in which the President and Vice President of the Zilla Parishad would be elected. It provides that when the Zilla Parishad is constituted under Section 64, the Deputy Commissioner would call a meeting of the Zilla Parishad for the election of a President and a Vice President by and from amongst the members directly elected under Section 65 (1) (i). Section 70 A, the provision of law impugned in the present proceedings, deals with reservation of the offices of the President and Vice President of the Zilla Parishads and lays down that the number of such offices would bear the same proportion to the total number of offices in the State as the population of the said reserved classes in the State bears to the total population of the State. The Section also provides the extent of reservation for women to such offices. The Section also provides the extent of reservation for women to such offices. Section 127 of the Act provides for constitution of Panchayat Election Tribunal to entertain direct election petition challenging election under the Act. Section 129 incorporates the bar to interference by courts in electoral matters. The bar is in the same lines as contained in Article 243 O of the Constitution of India. Section 141 empowers the State Government to make Rules for carrying out the purposes and objects of the Act. 35. In exercise of the power under Section 141 of the Act, the Government of Assam has framed the Assam Panchayat (Constitution) Rules, 1995. Rule 6 and 7 deal with delimitation of the Constituencies in a Gaon Panchayat and Anchalik Panchayat. Rule 8 deals with delimitation of constituencies of a Zilla Parishad. Though Rules 6, 7 and 8 provide for reservation, considering the fact that the aspect of delimitation of constituencies of a Zilla Parishad has a direct bearing on the decision on the preliminary objections, it is deemed necessary to deal in details the provision of Rule 8. The said Rule provides that the State Government would declare a Zilla Parishad by notification under Section 64 (1) of the Act and immediately would delimit the constituencies as per Section 65 (1) of the Act. The Deputy Commissioner would also determine the number of seats to be reserved for the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes for being members in the Zilla Parishad in the proportion as provided under Section 66 (1) of the Act and in determining the number of seats to be so reserved if the result bears a fraction which is 5 or more, it shall be founded off to the next higher integer and if it is less than 5, then it shall be ignored. It further provides that in selecting constituencies for reservation, the constituencies with highest number of Scheduled Castes or Scheduled Tribes population shall be reserved first and so on in the descending order of such population. It further provides that in selecting constituencies for reservation, the constituencies with highest number of Scheduled Castes or Scheduled Tribes population shall be reserved first and so on in the descending order of such population. Out of the total seats reserved, not less than one-third would be reserved for women belonging to Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes and not less than one-third, including the number of seats reserved for women belonging to the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes as the case may be, for the members of the zilla Parishad, shall be reserved for women in the manner as provided under Section 67(1) of the Act. The seats to be reserved for women shall be determined by drawing of lots. The said Rule also provides that the notice of reservation would be published by the Deputy Commissioner on or before seven clear days from the date of submission of nominations. Rule 61, impugned in the present proceedings is with regard to reservation of the offices of the President and Vice President of the Zilla Parishad for Scheduled Castes , Scheduled Tribes and Women. It provides that the number of said offices to be reserved for Scheduled Castes or Scheduled Tribes would bear the same proportion to the total number of such offices in the Zilla Parishad of the State as the population of the Scheduled Castes or Scheduled Tribes in the State bears to the total population of the State and while calculating the number of offices to be so reserved, if the result bears any fraction which is 5 or more, it would be rounded off to the next higher integer and if it is less than 5, then it would be ignored. For the purpose of selecting the Zilla Parishad for reservation of the office of President and Vice President as above, the Zilla Parishad with the highest number of Scheduled Castes or Scheduled Tribes population would be first reserved and so on in the descending order. The said Rule also makes provision for reservation of not less then 33% of such offices for women belonging to Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes and further lays down that the Zilla Parishad to be so reserved for women would be determined by drawing of lots by an officer authorised by the State Government in that behalf. The said Rule also makes provision for reservation of not less then 33% of such offices for women belonging to Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes and further lays down that the Zilla Parishad to be so reserved for women would be determined by drawing of lots by an officer authorised by the State Government in that behalf. It is further provided by the said Rule, that notice for reservation would be published just after the declaration of the result of the election of the Zilla Parishad and the copies of such notice be published in the Official Gazette/State Election Commission Office, Deputy Commissioner's Office/ Zilla Parishad office and in the local newspaper for wide publicity. In the matter of reservation of the office of the Vice President, the Rule lays down that in the Zilla Parishad in which the office of the President had been reserved, the office of the Vice President would not be reserved and the reservation of the office of the Vice President will also be based on the population of the Scheduled Castes/ Scheduled Tribes in descending order after excluding the Zilla Parishad in which the office of the President had already been reserved. 36. An analysis of the provisions of the Act and the Rules as set out above, would go to show that the State Legislature by enacting the Act has laid down the broad infrastructure for implementing the directives contained in Part-IX of the Constitution of India providing the manner of composition of Panchayats as well as reservation of seats therein including the offices of the Chairpersons of the Panchayats. The Rules, more particularly Rule 6,7 and 8 provide for delimitation of constituencies of the Panchayats including reservation of seats therein and Rule 61 deals with reservation of the offices of the President and Vice President in the Zilla Parishad. 37. A conjoint reading of Rule 8 and Rule 61 discloses that working details have been provided thereby for the purpose of reservation of seats in the Zilla Parishads for the Scheduled Castes , Scheduled Tribes and Women and also for reservation in the offices of President and Vice President of the Zilla Parishads to effectuate and implement the precepts in that regard preserved in Article 243 C and 243 D of the Constitution of India. As noticed earlier the broad manner in whicK such reservation is to be effected had been laid down in Sections 65, 66, 67 and 70A of the Act. 38. It is now time to examine, in the background of the relevant provisions of the Act and the Rules, as to whether the Act and the Rules so far as these deal with the reservation of seats in the Zilla Parishads and the offices of the president and Vice President are laws relating to delimitation of constituencies or the allotment of seats to such constituencies. As observed earlier, the Act, without any doubt is a law enacted by the State Legislature in exercise of the power under Article 243 K(4) of the Constitution of India so far as it relates to election to the Panchayats. Section 70A being an integral part of the Act, if the same can be construed to be a law relating to delimitation of constituencies or allotment of seats to such constituencies, the bar under Article 243 O would definitely be attracted. Similarly Rule 61 having been framed by the State Government in exercise of its power under Section 141 of the Act, it is a law relating to the delimitation of constituencies or the allotment of seats to such constituencies, the challenge to the constitutionality thereof would be under the aforesaid Article of the Constitution. 39. To judge the said issue, it would be appropriate to look into the meaning/ definition of the words/expressions namely, "seat", "office", "election", "delimitation" "reservation" and "relating". In Corpus Juris Secundum, Volume-29, the meaning of the word "seat" has been provided as "site", "a situation"; "the privilege or right of sitting". In Corpus Juris Secundum, Volume-67 the word "office" has been shown to denote a duty or charge, a place of trust, or a right to exercise a public or private employment and to take the fees and emoluments thereof.... "an office" has been defined as a duty, charge, or trust, or a place of trust... a post, the possession of which imposes certain duties on the possessor, and confers authority for their performance. The synonyms of the expression "office" are "post", "appointment", "situation", "place" and "position". Black's Law Dictionary defines "office" as "assigned duty" or "function" ...... "office" commonly suggests a position of trust or authority. a post, the possession of which imposes certain duties on the possessor, and confers authority for their performance. The synonyms of the expression "office" are "post", "appointment", "situation", "place" and "position". Black's Law Dictionary defines "office" as "assigned duty" or "function" ...... "office" commonly suggests a position of trust or authority. In Corpus Juris Secundum, Volume-29, the word "election" has been defined as the embodiment of the popular will, the expression of the sovereign power of the people and in ordinary usage denotes the act of casting and receiving the ballots, counting them, and making the return. Black's Law Dictionary defines the expression "election" as the act of choosing or selecting one or more from a greater number of persons, things, courses or rights, the choice of an alternative, the selection of,one person from a specified class to discharge certain duties in a State, Corporation, or society. In Corpus Juris Secundum, Volume-26 E, the expression "delimitation" has been shown to mean the act of fixing, marking off, or describing the limits or boundary line of a territory or country. Black's Law Dictionary, defines the same expression as the act of fixing, marking off or describing the limits or boundary line of a territory, country, authority, right, statutory exception or the like. The expression "delimit" has been defined in the Black's Law Dictionary, as to fix or to mark the limits of; to demarcate; to limit; bound. In Volume 77 of Corpus Juris Secundum, the expression "reservation" has been defined as meaning that which is reserved, kept back, withheld, a keeping aside or providing. The expression "reserved" has been defined in the Black's Law Dictionary as retained, kept or set apart, for a purpose or a person. In volume 76 of the Corpus Juris Secundum, the expression "relating" has been shown to mean, in reference to; in regard to; in respect to. The word "related" appearing therein is shown to mean standing in relation; connected; allied; akin. 40. A comparison of the meaning of the two expressions "seat" and "office" as furnished herein above discloses that the two expressions are synonymous and the interchangeable, more particularly if the context in which they appear permit the same. The word "related" appearing therein is shown to mean standing in relation; connected; allied; akin. 40. A comparison of the meaning of the two expressions "seat" and "office" as furnished herein above discloses that the two expressions are synonymous and the interchangeable, more particularly if the context in which they appear permit the same. Having regard to the requirements contained in Article 243 C(2) that all seats in a Panchayat should be filled by persons chosen by direct election from territorial constituencies and also remembering that the offices of the Chairperson of Anchalik Panchayat and Zilla Parishad are to be filled up by and from amongst the members directly elected from the concerned constituencies. I am of the opinion that the office of the Chairperson would be a seat in the Panchayat. Here the language used in Article 243 C(2) is also noticeable. Had the framers of the Constitution intended to exclude the office of the Chairperson from the concept of seat in the Panchayat, they would have provided that the seats in a Panchayat excluding the office of the Chairpersons should be filled by direct election from territorial constituencies. However, it has not been done. All that is required is that all seats are to be filled by persons chosen by direct election. The filling of the seat or office of the Chairperson of a Panchayat by members to be elected by and from amongst the directly elected members, in my opinion satisfies the requirement. Article 243 C(5) also throws some light on this aspect of the matter. Whereas the Chairperson of the Panchayat at the village level shall have to be elected in such manner as the Legislature of the State may by law provide and we find from the provisions of the Act that the same has to be by direct election from the territorial constituencies, but in case of Chairpersons in a Panchayat at the intermediate level or district level, he/she has to be elected by and from amongst the elected members thereof. As the filling up of the said offices has also to be by way of election and as the office of the Chairperson is an inseparable part of the Panchayat, the said office has to be construed to be a seat in the Panchayat. As the filling up of the said offices has also to be by way of election and as the office of the Chairperson is an inseparable part of the Panchayat, the said office has to be construed to be a seat in the Panchayat. No distinction between a seat in the Panchayat and an office of the Chairperson has been made by the framers of the Constitution. 41. The expression "delimitation" has been defined to mean the act of fixing, marking off or describing the limits or boundary line of a territory or country or right or authority etc... The meaning of the said expression, therefore, cannot be limited only to the act of delineating or marking the territorial limits of an area. But if the context in which it appears so, permits, may be extended to fixing and/or describing a right and/or authority. Delimitation of constituency, therefore, in my opinion, cannot be confined to a mechanical demarcation of the territorial boundaries of an area, more particularly when the said exercise is to be undertaken for the purpose of earmarking a constituencies to elect a representative thereof to a democratic body or institution. For a correct interpretation of the expression delimitation of constituency one has to keep in mind the context in which the same appears. There cannot be any manner of doubt that the Assam Panchayat Act, 1994 has been enacted having regard to the directives contained in Part-IX of the Constitution of India, which provides for allocation of seats in the Panchayat on the basis of population as well as reservation of such seats for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes. It, therefore, follows that any provision in the said Act with regard to delimitation of constituencies for the purpose of election to the Panchayat, cannot be viewed dehors the essential aspect of reservation. The exercise to be undertaken for the delimitation of constituencies would have to include in its fold, the aspect of reservation in order to fulfil the requirements of Article 243 D. In other words, in effecting delimitation of a constituency for the purpose of the Act, the requirements of reservation has to be borne in mind and in fact, it would be an essential feature or characteristic of the delimitation of a constituency. Keeping in view the mandates of Part-IX of the Constitution one, therefore, cannot conceive of delimitation of a Constituency, by overlooking the aspect of reservation. Reservation, therefore, is an integral part of delimitation of a Constituency. 42. The word "reservation" as seen from the above has been defined to mean "that which is reserved", "kept back." "withheld", a keeping aside" or "providing"v The word "allot" is defined to mean, inter alia "allocate', "apportion", "assign", "earmark", "set aside", "shareout". On a comparison of the meaning assigned to these two expressions, I am inclined to conclude that allotment of seats would signify and include reservation of seats. Therefore, any exercise of reserving a seat would imply allotment of seat. 43. The word "relating" as seen above means "in reference to ". "in regard to", "in respect to" and is an expression of comprehensiveness with direct and indirect significance. The word "related" means "connected", "allied", "akin". The expression "law relating to delimitation of constituencies or the allotment of seats to such constituencies" used in Article 243 O(a) thus would mean any law in the comprehensive sense which touches directly or indirectly the aspect of delimitation of constituencies or -the allotment of seats to such constituencies. It has already been held, that the Act and the Rules are laws made/framed in exercise of power under Article 243 K(4) of the Constitution of India with respect to matters relating to or in connection with election to the Panchayats. As a corollary, therefore, if Section 70A and Rule 61 can be said to be a law relating to delimitation of constituencies or the allotment of seats to such constituencies, the absolute and unqualified bar engrafted in Article 243 O(a) would be attracted. 44. For the said purpose, the entire scheme of Part-IX of the Constitution of India and the Act and the Rules will have to be borne in mind. As stated above, Part-IX of the Constitution of India provides for composition of the Panchayat making it mandatory for reservation of seats therein as well as the office of Chairperson to the extent indicated. The Legislature of a State has been empowered to provide for the manner in which such directives are to be implemented. As stated above, Part-IX of the Constitution of India provides for composition of the Panchayat making it mandatory for reservation of seats therein as well as the office of Chairperson to the extent indicated. The Legislature of a State has been empowered to provide for the manner in which such directives are to be implemented. The Act so enacted, discloses the manner in which the delimitation of constituencies is to be carried out for elections to be held at different levels and reservations to be made upto the level of President and Vice President of the Zilla Parishads. The Rules lay down, further working details for implementing the provisions of the Act. Conjing to stage of election to the Zilla Parishads, it is apparent that the same would be composed, inter alia, of directly elected members of the territorial constituencies under the Zilla Parishad. Provisions for reservation of those constituencies based on population have been made in the Act. The members elected from such reserved Constituencies would represent that particular reserved class i.e. Scheduled Castes or Scheduled Tribes. The act provides that for the purpose of filling up the office of the President and Vice President election would be held and the already elected members from the territorial constituencies would elect two of them to fill up the post of President and Vice President of Zilla Parishad. It, therefore, follows that the election of the embers to the Zilla Parishad from the territorial constituencies has a subsisting nexus with the election of two of them to the office of the President and Vice President. If, in case, therefore, the office of the president of a Zilla Parishad is reserved for a particular class i.e. Scheduled Castes or Schedule Tribes, such office can be filled up only by a directly elected member belonging to that class. The reservation of the office of the President of a Zilla Parishads is therefore, directly relatable to the reservation of the territorial constituency represented by the member who is entitled to be considered for election to the said office of the president. The reservation of the office of the President of a Zilla Parishads is therefore, directly relatable to the reservation of the territorial constituency represented by the member who is entitled to be considered for election to the said office of the president. If that be so, then any provision of law providing for reservation of the office of the President can be construed to be a law relating to the delimitation of constituency or constituencies presented by the directly elected members(s) who would be eligible for election to the said reserved office of the Chairperson of the Zilla Parishads. Section 70A and Rule 61, if tested on this trouchstone, reveal that those are laws relating to delimitation of constituencies as contemplated under Article 243 O(a) of the Constitution. 45. Further in view of the finding, recorded, that expression "seat" and "office" are synonymous and are interchangeable in the present context, it has to be decided whether Section 70 A and Rule 61 can be accepted as laws relating to allotment of seats to the delimited constituencies attracting the bar. The word "allotted" as noticed above, inter alia, means "apportion" and "set aside". The word "reservation" is shown to mean "kept back" "withheld", "keeping aside". In the opinion of this court reservation of a seat can be legitimately construed to mean allotment of a seat. The process of allotment of a seat, include the exercise of distribution and sharing of seats, having regard to the directives contained in Part-IX of the Constitution of India with regard to reservation of seats in the Panchayat and in the office of the Chairperson. Therefore, reservation of the office of the Chairperson of a Panchayat which, as indicated earlier is an inseparable segment of the Panchayat, has to be taken as allotment of a seat in the Panchayat. This is again with reference to the language used in Article 243 C(2) which requires that all seats in the Panchayat are to be filled up by persons chosen by direct election from territorial constituencies. As already noticed, the office of the Chairperson of a Panchayat, is to be filled up by election by and from amongst the directly elected members of the concerned territorial constituencies. As already noticed, the office of the Chairperson of a Panchayat, is to be filled up by election by and from amongst the directly elected members of the concerned territorial constituencies. In view of the above, I am inclined to hold that Section 70A and Rule 61 which deal with reservation of the office of the President and Vice President of the Zilla Parishad are laws relating to allotment of seats to the delimited constituencies reserved for the Scheduled Castes and Schedule Tribes, as the case may be, depending upon the category for which that particular office of the President and Vice President of the Zilla Parishad is reserved. There can be no manner of doubt that delimitation of constituencies and allotment of seats to such constituencies can be safely said to be electoral matters within the meaning of Article 243 C of the Constitution. 46. Having arrived at-the above findings, I am of the considered view that the bar to interference by courts as imposed by Article 243 O(a) of the Constitution of India is squarely attracted to the facts of the present case. The challenge made in the writ petition to the validity of Section 70A and Rule 61, accordingly, cannot be entertained by this court in exercise of its power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 47. It is now time to consider the authorities cited at the Bar on the preliminary objections raised. 48. In AIR 1967 SC 669 (Meghraj Kothari, appellant vrs. Delimitation Commission and others, respondents) the Apex Court was seized with a question as to whether a notification issued by the Delimitation Commission u/s. 10 of the Act was a law to which the bar of Article 329 (a) of the Constitution of India was attracted. 48. In AIR 1967 SC 669 (Meghraj Kothari, appellant vrs. Delimitation Commission and others, respondents) the Apex Court was seized with a question as to whether a notification issued by the Delimitation Commission u/s. 10 of the Act was a law to which the bar of Article 329 (a) of the Constitution of India was attracted. The Apex Court while noticing the preamble to the said Act that it was to provide for re-adjustment of allocation of seats in the House of the people of the State, division of each State to the territorial constituencies for election to the House of the People and Legislative Assembly of the States and for matters connected therewith and that the Commission u/s. 9 of the said Act is entrusted with the duty of delimitation of constituencies identifying in the process, amongst others constituencies in which seats are reserved for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes on the basis of population, held that the notification u/s. 10 of the Act was a law and, therefore, any objection to the delimitation of consituencies after the publication of the notification u/s. could not be agitated in a court of law keeping in view the bar u/s. 329 (a) of the Constitution of India. It further observed that if the orders u/s. 8 and 9 of the Act were not to be treated as final, the effect would be that any voter, if he so wishes could hold up an election indefinitely, questioning the delimitation of constituencies from court to court. It went on further to observe, that Section 10(2) of the Act clearly demonstrated the intention of the legislature that the orders u/s. 8 and 9 published u/s. 10(1) of the Act were to be treated as law which was not to be questioned in any court. 49. The decision reported in (1974) 4 SCC 854 (Md. Unus Salem vrs. Shib Kumar Shastri) in the opinion of this court does not throw much light on the issue in hand and, therefore, it is permissible to skip a discussion thereon. 50. In AIR 1996 SC 1595 the issue which engaged the attention of the Apex Court was whether the High Court of Andhra Pradesh was justified in giving the direction for allowing participation of 20 persons found eligible to vote, for exercising their franchise separately when the poll to the Gaon Panchayat, Nalgonda District. 50. In AIR 1996 SC 1595 the issue which engaged the attention of the Apex Court was whether the High Court of Andhra Pradesh was justified in giving the direction for allowing participation of 20 persons found eligible to vote, for exercising their franchise separately when the poll to the Gaon Panchayat, Nalgonda District. Andhra Pradesh was already over. The argument advanced on behalf of the appellants before the Apex Court was, that once the election process had been set in motion, by operation of Article 243 O of the Constitution of India, the High Court was not justified in directing the said persons to participate in the election. It was high-lighted that the object of the Andhra Pradesh Panchayat Raj Act, 1994, the Rules made thereunder and Article 243 O was to see that the election process to the Gaon Panchayat once set in motion, the process should culminate in the declaration of the result of election and any dispute in relation to the conduct of the election should be the subject matter of an election dispute to be dealt with by the appropriate Tribunal in accordance with law. The Apex Court observed in the said background, that Article 243 O of the Constitution envisaged a bar on interference by courts in election matters. It referred to its earlier decision reported in AIR 1952 SC 64 , N.P. Punnuswami v. Returning Officer, Namakkal Constituency and the observations made therein, inter alia, that all disputes arising out of election should be postponed till after the elections are over so that the election proceedings may not be unduly retarded or protracted and that if irregularities are committed while it is in progress and they belong to the category or class which under the law by which elections are governed, would have the effect of vitiating the "election" and enable the person effected to call it in question, they should be brought up before a Special Tribunal by means of an election petition and not be made the subject of a dispute before any court while the election is in progress. The Apex Court also relied on the observation made by it in the decision reported in AIR 1985 SC 1233 , Lakshmi Char an Sen and others vrs. The Apex Court also relied on the observation made by it in the decision reported in AIR 1985 SC 1233 , Lakshmi Char an Sen and others vrs. A.K.M. Hassan Uzzaman and others and more particularly those relating to the power of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India in such matters. It referred to the observations therein, that the High Courts must observe a self-imposed limitation on their power to act under Article 226 , by refusing to pass orders or giving directions which would inevitably result in an indefinite postponement of elections to legislative bodies, which are the very essence of the democratic foundation and function of the Constitution. The Apex Court also referred to another decision reported in (1995) Suppl. (2) SCC 305, State ofU.P. v. Pradhan, Sangh Kshettra Samiti wherein the High Court of U.P. in an application under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, ventured to examine the validity of the delimitation of constituencies and allotment of seats to them. The Apex Court disapproved in strong terms, the approach of the High Court in view of the bar contained in Article 243 O of the Constitution. While doing so, the Apex Court referred to its decision in Meghraj Kothari (Supra). The Apex Court finally held that the High Court of Andhra Pradesh was not correct in directing as above. 51. The decision reported in (2000) 8 SCC 46 , Shyamdeo Pd. Singh, Appellant versus Na\val Kishore Yadav is primarily one dealing with the question as to whether inclusion of a person or persons in the electoral roll, though they were not qualified to be so enrolled can be a ground for setting aside the election of a returned candidate u/s. 100 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951. In the said decision, the Apex Court while emphasising the significance and importance of Houses or Institutions responsible for functioning of a democracy observed, that a breach of any statutory right or obligation should not come in the way of the process directed towards fulfilling the high objectives of bringing into existence of a house or institution contemplated by the Constitution for enabling democratic functioning of the country. Referring to Article 329(b) of the Constitution, the Apex Court observed that one of the principles underlying the plenary bar on judicial proceeding in election matters is, the pre-emptory urgency of prompt engineering of the whole election process without intermediate interruptions by way of legal proceedings challenging the steps and stages in between commencement and conclusion thereof. 52. In AIR 1952 SC 64 , N.P. Punnuswami v. Returning Officer, Namakkal Constituency, the Apex Court was considering the meaning and import of the expression "election" in Article 329 (b) of the Constitution of India. It held, that in the narrow sense, it is used to mean the final selection of a candidate whi9h may embrace the result of the poll when there is polling or a particular candidate being returned unopposed when there is no poll. It further held that in the wide sense, the word is used to connote the entire process culminating in a candidate being declared elected. Repelling the argument, that since the Representation of the Peoples Act was enacted subject to the provisions of the constitution, it cannot bar the jurisdiction of the High Court to issue writs under Article 226 of the Constitution, the Apex Court observed that such an argument was completely shut out by reading the Act along with Article 329 (b), in view of the words "notwithstanding anything in this Constitution" appearing in Article 329. It held that Article 329 (b) must be read as complimentary to clause (a) of that Article which bars the jurisdiction of the Court with regard to law as may be made under Article 327 and 328 relating to the delimitation of Constituencies or allotment of seats to such constituencies. It went on further to add, that if Part-XV of the Constitution is a code, by itself i.e. it creates rights and provides for their enforcement by a Special Tribunal to the Exclusion of all courts including the High Court there can be no reason for assuming that the Constitution left one small part of the election to be made the subject matter to contest before the High Court and thereby upset the time schedule of the election. It observed that more reasonable view seemed to be that Article 329 covered all "electoral matters." 53. It observed that more reasonable view seemed to be that Article 329 covered all "electoral matters." 53. The Apex Court summed up its conclusions as follows :- "The conclusions which I have arrived at may be summed up briefly as follows : 1) Having regard to the important functions which the legislatures have to perform in democratic countries, it has always been recognised to be a matter of first importance that elections should be concluded as early as possible according to time scheduled and all controversial matters and all disputes arising out of elections should be postponed till after the elections are over, so that the election proceedings may not be unduly retarted or protracted. 2) In conformity with this principle, the scheme of the election law in this country as well as in England is that no significance should be attached to anything which does not affect the 'election' and if any irregularities are committed while it is in progress and they belong to the category or class which, under the law by which elections are governed, would have the effect of vitiating the "election and enable the person affected to call it in question, they should be brought up before a special tribunal by means of an election petition and not be made the subject of a dispute before any Court while the election is in progress." 54. In the decision of the Apex Court in 1982 U.J. (SC) 371 (A.K.M. Hassan Uzzaman and others Vs. Union of India and others), the Apex Court was considering the challenge to the various directives issued by the Election Commission in the matter of election to the West Bengal Legislative Assembly, being violative of the relevant provisions of the Constitution, the Representative of the People's Act 1950 and 1951 and the Registration of Electors Rules 1960. The Apex Court while dismissing the writ application presenting the challenge, inter alia observed that no High Court in the exercise of its power under Article 226 of the Constitution should pass any order, interim or otherwise which has the tendency or effect of postponing an election which is reasonably imminent and in relation to which, its writ jurisdiction is involved. It further observed that the imminence of the electoral process is a factor which must guide and govern the passing of orders in the exercise of High Court's writ jurisdiction. It further observed that the imminence of the electoral process is a factor which must guide and govern the passing of orders in the exercise of High Court's writ jurisdiction. The mere imminent such process is, the greater ought to be the reluctance of the High Court to do anything or direct anything to be done which will postpone that process indefinitely by creating a situation where the Government of a State cannot be carried on in-accordance with the provision of the Constitution. It held that the High Court must observe self imposed restrain, in the exercise of its power to act under Article 226, by refusing to pass orders or give directions which would inevitably result in an indefinite postponement of election to Legislative Bodies, which are the very essence of the democratic foundation and functioning of our Constitution. 55. The Apex Court in the decision reported in (1988) 1 SCC 277 (Election Commission of India Vs. Shivaji and others, was dealing with a situation where the High Court of Bombay (Aurangabad Bench) had stayed the election to the Legislative Council of the State of Maharastra from the Osmanabad-cum-Latur-cum-Beed Local Authorities Constituency. Referring to Part-XV of the Constitution, containing the provision relating to the election and more particularly to the bar preserved in Article 329 thereof, the Apex Court observed that in view of the non-obstante clause contained in Article 329 of the Constitution, the power of the High Court to entertain a petition questioning an election on whatever grounds under Article 226 of the Constitution, is taken away. The Apex Court while reiterating its view in N.P. Ponnuswami (supra) on the issue that the scheme of Part-XV of the Constitution and the Act seemed to be that any matter which has the effect of vitiating the election should be brought only at the appropriate stage in an appropriate manner before a special Tribunal and should not be brought at an intermediate stage before any Court, further observed that any other meaning ascribed to the words used in the article would lead to anomalies which the Constitution could not have contemplated, one of them being any dispute relating to the pre-polling stage. In support of its view, the Apex Court referred to the observations in N.P. Ponnuswami (supra) that all controversial matters and disputes arising out of election should be postponed till after the elections were over so that the election proceedings might not be unduly retarded or protracted. Criticising the order of the High Court of Bombay staying the election, the Apex Court observed that the High Court was in an error in thinking that it alone had exclusive power to protect the democracy. The success of democracy is dependant upon the co-operation of the Legislature, Executive, Judiciary, the Election Commission, the Press, the Political Parties and above all the citizenry and each of them discharging the duties assigned to it. Sometimes the success of democracy also depends upon observance of restraint on the part of the Constitutional functionaries, it observed. 56. A Constitutional Bench of the Apex Court in Mohinder Singh Gill and another Vs. the Chief Election Commissioner, New Delhi and others, reported in (1978) 1SCC 405, while dealing with the scope and ambit of the expression "election" and the bar to interference by the Court in electoral matters as engrafted in Article 329 (b) of the Constitution, held authoritatively, that every step from start to finish of total process constitute election, not merely the conclusion or culmination. It held that the rainbow of operations covered by the compendious expression "election" commence from the initial Notification and culminates in declaration of the returned candidate. It held that Article 329 (b) is a blanket ban on litigative challenges to electoral steps taken by the Election Commission and its officers for carrying forward the process of election to its culmination in the formal declaration of the result and that the conspectus of the provisions appearing on the subject of elections in the Constitution and Representative of the People Act clearly express the rule that there is a remedy for every wrong done during the election in progress although it is postponed to the post election stage and procedure as predicated in Article 329 (b) and the 1951 Act. It further held that under Article 329(b), the sole remedy for an aggrieved party, if he wants to challenge any election is by way of Election Petition and this exclusion of all other remedies includes Constitutional remedies like Article 226 because of the non-obstante clause. It further held that under Article 329(b), the sole remedy for an aggrieved party, if he wants to challenge any election is by way of Election Petition and this exclusion of all other remedies includes Constitutional remedies like Article 226 because of the non-obstante clause. The reason for postponement of election litigation to the post election stage is that election shall not be unduly protracted or 11 obstructed. 57. As already referred to in Boddula Krishnaiah (supra) the Apex Court in its decision reported in 1995 Supp (2) SCC 305, State ofU.P. and others Vs. Pradhan Sangh Kshettra Samity and others had disapproved the approach of the High Court of Allahabad in examining the question of the validity of the delimitation of Constituencies and allotment of seats to them undertaken under the provision of U.P. Panchayat Raj (Amendment Act) 1994 in face of the bar under Article 243 O(a) of the Constitution of India. The Apex Court referred to the Constitution (Seventythird Amendment) Act 1992 and Part-IX of the Constitution and upon a survey of the provisions preserved thereunder held that neither the delimitation of the Panchayat area nor the Constituencies in the said areas and the allotment of seats to the Constituencies could have been challenged nor the Court could have entertained such challenge except on the ground that before the delimitation no objections were invited and no hearing was given. It added further that even this challenge could not have been entertained after the Notification for holding the elections was issued. 58. The overwhelming and consistent judicial opinion that is discernible from the aforementioned decisions is that interference by Courts in electoral matters is totally barred, if the process of election has been initiated and the election is imminent. Though most of the authorities discussed above are with reference to the bar under Article 329 (b) of the Constitution, considering that the contents of Article 243 O and 329 are in substance the same, the principle enunciated with reference to the bar under Article 329 can very well, by analogy applied to cases and situations covered by Article 243 O. The aspect of validity of law relating to such Constituencies as involved in the instant case has already been dealt with as above. It is now to be tested whether the bar under Article 243 O(b) in view of the judicial pronouncements recorded above is also attracted in the present case. 59. Admittedly, the present writ application has been filed after the impugned notification Annexure-A and B had been published in exercise of power under Section 70 A and Rule 61 authorising the respondent No. 4 to take necessary steps for reservation of the offices of the President and Vice President of the Zilla Parishads for Women and declaration of reservation of such offices for Scheduled Castes, Schedule Tribes and Women. It is noticeable that Section 70A and Rule 61 impugned in the present petition had been brought on the statute book by the Assam Panchayat (Amendment) Act 2001 and Government Notification PDA 1/2002/35 dated 16.2.2002, published in the official Gazette on 18.2.2002 respectively. From the W.T. Message dated 16.3.2002, Annexure-1 to the affidavit-in-opposition of the State-respondent, it appears that consequent upon the reservation of the offices of the President and Vice President of Zilla Parishads as above, all Deputy Commissioners of the districts in the State (except where the Panchayat Election has not been held) were requested to constitute the Zilla Parishad by holding its first election as per the provision of the Act and the rules within 25.3.2002. It was at this stage, on 25.3.2002, the present \v,rit application was filed before this court. 60. It is thus to be noticed, that the process of de-limitation of Constituencies for the purpose of Panchayat Election at all levels had remain unchallenged. As recorded above, considering the Constitutional precepts for reservation as enshrined in part IX of the Constitution, the process of delimitation of Constituencies for the said purpose involved the exercise of ensuring reservation in compliance of such directives. Thereafter election was held to the Panchayats at different levels in course of which candidates were elected from respective Constituencies including Constituencies reserved for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes. No challenge to the said election was made either. Atleast nothing has been brought on record in the instant proceeding in that regard. The writ petition has been filed at the final stage of the election to constitute the Panchayats. In terms of the impugned Notification-B and the W.T. Message dated 16.3.2002, the stage was set for election of the President and Vice President of the Zilla Parishads in the State. The writ petition has been filed at the final stage of the election to constitute the Panchayats. In terms of the impugned Notification-B and the W.T. Message dated 16.3.2002, the stage was set for election of the President and Vice President of the Zilla Parishads in the State. The offices to be reserved had been identified and only the first meeting was to be held in which the elected members of the Zilla Parishads were required to elect from amongst themselves, a president and a Vice President for the body. In the above backdrop of facts, I am of the considered opinion that the process of election to the Zilla Parishads had started from delimitation of the Constitution which is to end with the election of the President and Vice President thereof. The office of the President and the Vice President being integral part of a Zilla Parishad, it is, in my opinion not permissible to compartmentalise the election of its members from the Constituencies, from the election of the President, Vice President of the Zilla Parishads so as to treat them as to distinctly separate and independent exercises to hold at this stage that the process for election to the office of the President and Vice President had not commenced. As is decipherable from the above decisions, the bar of interference by a Court in electoral matters applies even at the pre-polling stage provided the election process has been set in motion. In my opinion, the process for electing the President and Vice President of the Zilla Parishads had been set in motion with the delimitation of the territorial Constituencies for election of the members of the Zilla Parishads. In the instant case, the relevant Notifications notifying the reservation of the offices of the President and Vice President having been published and the concerned Deputy Commissioner of the Districts having been instructed to hold the first meeting for election to the said office as required under the Act and the Rules, in my opinion the writ petition has been filed in the thick of the election process and therefore the bar under Article 243 O (b) of the Constitution of India is also attracted in the present case. 61. 61. At this stage, it may also be relevant to have a glimpse of the objects and reasons for incorporating Part-IX in the Constitution of India by the Constitution (Seventy third Amendment) Act 1992. The said amendment has been brought in to give effect to one of the Directive Principles of State Policy, namely Article 40 of the Constitution of India which requires the State to organise Village Panchayats and endow them with such powers and authority as may be necessary to enable them to function as units of self Government. The impelling reason for such amendment as recorded in the statement of objects and reasons is that the Panchayat Raj Institutions and the Urban Local Bodies though in existence in the Country for a long time, had not been able to acquire the status and dignity of viable and responsive People's Bodies due to variety of reasons including absence of regular election, prolonged suppressions, in adequate representation of weaker sections like the Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes and Women, insufficient devolution of powers and lack of financial resources. A need was therefore felt to enshrine in the Constitution, certain basic and essential features of the local authorities to impart certainty, continuity and strength to them. 62. The objects and reasons for the amendment as set out above, thus underline the importance of timely election and adequate representation of Scheduled Castes , Scheduled Tribes and Women in the Panchayat Bodies. Holding of regular election in time therefore cannot brook any delay. Thus, in the opinion of this Court as well, has to be a relevant consideration for deciding the issue in hand. Any decision of this Court which would have the effect of providing a retrogate step in the process conceived and nurtured by the amendment should be carefully avoided more particularly in the face of the bar under Article 243 O. 63. The scope and extent of the embargo envisaged in Article 243 O of the Constitution has to be so construed to be in tune with the objects and reasons, promoting the framers of the Constitution to incorporate Part-IX therein. Any interpretation thereof which may be opposed to the said purpose has to be eschewed and avoided. 64. The Apex Court in AIR 1966 SC 1987 (Chandra Mohan Vs. Any interpretation thereof which may be opposed to the said purpose has to be eschewed and avoided. 64. The Apex Court in AIR 1966 SC 1987 (Chandra Mohan Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh and others while dealing with the fundamental principles of interpretation of the provision of the Constitution observed as hereunder :- "Before construing the said provisions, it should be remembered that the fundamental rule of interpretation is the same whether one construes the provisions of the Constitution or an Act of Parliament, namely, that the Court will have to find out the expressed intention from the words of the Constitution or the Act, as the case may be. But, if, however, two constructions are possible then the Court must adopt that which will ensure smooth and harmonious working of the Constitution and eschew the other which will lead to absurdity or give rise to practical inconvenience or make well established provisions of existing law nugatory." 65. In a recent decision of the Apex Court reported in (2001) 7 SCC126 (S.R. Chaudhury Vs. State of Punjab and others, their Lordships laid down the following guiding principles in interpreting a constitutional provision :- "Constitutional provisions are required to be understood and interpreted with an object - oriented approach. A Constitution must not be construed in a narrow and pedantic sense. The words used may be general in terms but, their full import and true meaning, has to be appreciated considering the true context in which the same are used and the purpose which they seek to achieve.... We must remember that a Constitution is not just a document in solemn form, but a living framework for the Government of the people exhibiting a sufficient degree of cohesion and its successful working depends upon the democratic spirit underlying it being respected in letter and in spirit." 66. That the object of all interpretations is to discover the intention of the law makers has been succinctly set out in the authoritative text by Maxwell on the Interpretation of Statutes as under:- "The rule of construction is "to intent the Legislature to have meant what they have actually expressed. That the object of all interpretations is to discover the intention of the law makers has been succinctly set out in the authoritative text by Maxwell on the Interpretation of Statutes as under:- "The rule of construction is "to intent the Legislature to have meant what they have actually expressed. The object of all interpretation is to discover the intention of .Parliament, "but the intention of Parliament must be deduced from the language used, for "it is well accepted that the beliefs and assumptions of those who frame Acts of Parliament cannot make the law." . In the same book, the author while dealing with the Mischief Rule" enunciated in the "Heydon's case" has noted as under:- "In Heydon's case in 1584, it was resolved by the Barons of the Exchequer that for the sure and true interpretation of all statutes in general (be they penal or beneficial, restrictive or enlarging of the common law) four things are to be discerned and considered; (1 sr). What was the common law before the making of the Act. (2nd). What was the mischief and defect for which the common law did not provide. (3rd) What remedy the Parliament hath resolved and appointed to cure the disease of the commonwealth. And, (4th) The true reason of the remedy'; and then the office of all the Judges is always to make such construction as shall suppress the mischief, and advance the remedy, and to suppress subtle inventions and evasions for continuance of the mischief, and pro private commodo, and to add force and life to the cure and remedy, according to the true intent of the makers of the Act, pro bono publico." In 1898, Lindley M.R. said: "In order properly to interpret any statute it is as necessary now as it was when Lord Coke reported Heydon's case to consider how the law stood when the statute to be construed was passed, what the mischief was for which the Old law did not provide, and the remedy provided by the statute to cure (hat mischief. Although judges are unlikely to propound formally in their judgments the four questions in Heydon's case, consideration of the "mischief or object of the enactment is common and will often provide the solution to a problem of interpretation." 67. The Apex Court in its decision reported (2000) 6 SCC 724 (Vishin N. Khanchandani and another, Appellants Vs. Although judges are unlikely to propound formally in their judgments the four questions in Heydon's case, consideration of the "mischief or object of the enactment is common and will often provide the solution to a problem of interpretation." 67. The Apex Court in its decision reported (2000) 6 SCC 724 (Vishin N. Khanchandani and another, Appellants Vs. Vidya Lachmandas Khanchandani and another, respondents) while dealing with the purport of a non-obstante clause appearing in a statute observed that by such a clause the legislature devises means which are usually applied to give overriding effect to certain provisions over some contrary provisions that may be found either in the same enactment or some other statute. It observed further that such a clause is used to avoid the operation and effect of all contrary provisions and the phrase is equivalent to showing that the Act shall be no impediment to the measure intended. 68. In the light of the objects and reasons as already noted, which in my opinion are amongst others to cure the malady of delayed and irregular elections and prolonged suppressions, I am inclined to construe, in the fact of the above judicial pronouncement, that the bar preserved in Article 243 O embodies the will of the Constitution makers to discountenance any interference in electoral matters pertaining to the subject covered under Part-IX. I am therefore inclined to hold that it is thus permissible to even allow some elasticity in the expressions appearing in Article 243 O to effectuate the bar in its letter and spirit. In view of the above discussions, I am thus constrained to hold that the challenge to the validity of Section 70A of the Assam Pancjiayat Act 1994 (As amended) and Rulfc (fi *df the Assam Panchayat (Constitution) Rules 1995 is barred under Article 243 O of the Constitution of India and thus cannot be entertained in the present writ petition. In view of the above, it is permissible, not to enter into any discussion of the decision cited on behalf of the petitioner namely B.R. Enterprises (supra). The learned senior counsel, in course of his argument had also drawn the attention of this court to the relevant extracts contained in the books of Constitution and Administrative Law by O. Hood Phillips, Judicial Review of Administrative Action by De. Smith and Craies of Statute law dealing with the principles of ultra-vires and delegated legislation. The learned senior counsel, in course of his argument had also drawn the attention of this court to the relevant extracts contained in the books of Constitution and Administrative Law by O. Hood Phillips, Judicial Review of Administrative Action by De. Smith and Craies of Statute law dealing with the principles of ultra-vires and delegated legislation. On the same analogy, in view of the above conclusion, it is not necessary to refer to the same. 69. Having dealt with the challenge to the Constitutionality of the provisions of the Act and the Rules referred to above, it is now to be seen whether any other submissions advanced on behalf of the petitioner survives for consideration of this Court. 70. As set out above, the learned senior counsel had in the alternative, argued that assuming that Section 70A and Rule 61 are constitutionally valid, the impugned notifications Annexure-A and B are not sustainable, having been issued in violation thereof. He had further argued that the official respondents ought to have published the notice for reservation to the office of the Chairperson as required under Rule 61 before taking any final decision in that regard. He had further argued that the process of reservation in the office of the President and Vice President for Scheduled Castes , Scheduled Tribes and Women had been completed in hot haste without consulting the representatives of recognised regional and National Political Parties in the matter of lottery of seats for women reservation. The further argument was that by the impugned Notification Annexure-A, the respondent No. 4 was conferred absolute power without any guidelines and the impugned Notification Annexure-B does not indicate in what manner the offices of the president and Vice President for women were identified by lots. 71. Having held that Section 70A and Rule 61 immune from any challenge to their validity, the above submissions are to be tested on the basis of said provisions of law, in the form in which they appear and exist in the statute book with reference to the other provisions of the Act and Rules, if necessary. 72. 71. Having held that Section 70A and Rule 61 immune from any challenge to their validity, the above submissions are to be tested on the basis of said provisions of law, in the form in which they appear and exist in the statute book with reference to the other provisions of the Act and Rules, if necessary. 72. On a reading of Section 70A and Rule 61, I am unable to locate any requirement of publication of any notice in the official Gazette/State Election Commission Office, Deputy Commissioner Offices, Zilla Parishad Offices and in the local newspaper before embarking upon the exercise of reservation in the office of the President and Vice President in the Zilla Parishads and the requirement of publication of notice as appearing in Rule 61 does not support the contention of the petitioner as above. As transpires from Rule 61(2) an officer is to be authorised by the State Government for determining the office of the President and Vice President to be reserved for women belonging to Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes by drawing of lots. Section 70A and Rule 61 provide sufficient guidelines with regard to the extent of reservation and the manner in which such reservation has to be effected. What has been left to the officer to be so authorised, is only to determine which of the offices of the President and Vice President of the Zilla Parishads reserved for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes would be allotted to women belonging to such class. The contents of the Notification dated 8.3.2002 Annexure-A to the writ are also in consonance with the prescription of Rule 61(2). The publication of the Notification dated 8.3.2002 (Annexure-A) to the writ petition discloses that the Government had made public its decision to appoint respondent No. 4 for the purpose of Rule 61(2). In the opinion of this Court, keeping in view the guidelines provided in Section 70A and Rule 61 and the limited function assigned to the respondent No. 4 in terms of the aforesaid Rule, the endorsement of such authority to the said respondent does not suffer from any vice of excessive delegation of power as alleged. In the opinion of this Court, keeping in view the guidelines provided in Section 70A and Rule 61 and the limited function assigned to the respondent No. 4 in terms of the aforesaid Rule, the endorsement of such authority to the said respondent does not suffer from any vice of excessive delegation of power as alleged. The argument advanced on behalf of the petitioner that the whole exercise has been undertaken in a hush hush manner and in hot haste also does not appeal to this court in view of the fact that firstly there is no requirement in the Act or the Rules to publish the Notification appointing the officer under Rule 61(2) in the official gazette and secondly as it transpires from the records, the meeting for the purpose of drawal of lots was held on 13.3.2002 whereafter the impugned Notifications Annexure-B were published in the official Gazette. The urgency felt by the official respondents to complete the election process is manifested in the W.T. Message 16.3.2002 directing the Deputy Commissioners of the concerned Districts to hold the first meeting of the election of the Zilla Parishad for electing the President and Vice President thereto. There is nothing on record to suggest any malafide exercise of power in this regard. The contentions of the learned senior counsel for the petitioner that it was incumbent on the part of the official respondents to consult representatives of recognized Regional and National Political parties in the matter of Lottery of seats for women reservation in terms of Rule 8(2) (d) is not tenable in view of the fact that such requirement is relevant at the stage of delimitation of Constituencies for holding election to the Zilla Parishad. Such requirement cannot be, in absence of any specific provision in that regard, extended to the stage of reservation of the office of the President and Vice President for women belonging to the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes. 73. The contours of judicial review of administrative action are more or less clearly delineated by now. The Apex Court in its decision reported in (1994) 6 SCC 651 Tata Cellular Vs. 73. The contours of judicial review of administrative action are more or less clearly delineated by now. The Apex Court in its decision reported in (1994) 6 SCC 651 Tata Cellular Vs. Union of India, held that the grounds upon which an administrative action is subject to control by judicial review could be classified as under :- (i) Illegality: This means the decision-maker must understand correctly the law that regulates his decision-making power and must give effect to it. (ii) Irrationality, namely, Wednesbury unreasonableness. (iii) Procedural impropriety. The relevant extracts of the said decision having a bearing on he subject are set out below for ready reference :- "Judicial review is concerned with reviewing not the merits of the decision in support of which the application for judicial review is made, but the decision-making process itself. In Chief Constable of the North Wales Police vs. Evans Lord Brightman said ; Judicial review, as the words imply, is not an appeal from a decision, but a review of the manner in which the decision was made. Judicial review is concerned, not with the decision, but with the decision-making process. Unless that restriction on the power of the Court is observed, the court will in my view, under the guise of preventing the abuse of power, be itself guilty of unsurping power." In the same case Lord Hailsham commented on the purpose of the remedy by way of judicial review under RSC, Ord, 53 in the following terms : "This remedy, vastly increased in extent, and rendered, over a long period in recent years of infinitely more convenient access than that provided by the old prerogative writs and actions for a declaration, is intended to protect the individual against the abuse of power by a wide range of authorities, judicial, qasi-judicial, and as originally have been thought when I first practiced at the Bar, administrative. It is not intended to take away from those authorities the powers and discretions properly vested in them by law and to substitute the courts as the bodies making the decisions. It is intended to see that the relevant authorities use their powers in a proper manner. It is not intended to take away from those authorities the powers and discretions properly vested in them by law and to substitute the courts as the bodies making the decisions. It is intended to see that the relevant authorities use their powers in a proper manner. In R.V. Panel on Take-overs and Mergers, ex p Datafin pic 24, Sir John Denaldson, M.R. commented : An application for judicial review is not an appeal." In Lonrho pic v. Secretary of State for Trade and Industry, Lord Keith said : Judicial review is a protection and not a weapon. It is thus different from an appeal. When hearing an appeal the Court is concerned with the merits of the decision under appeal. In Amin Re, Lord Fraser observed that: "Judicial review is concerned not with the merits of a decision but with the manner in which the decision was made ...... Judicial review is entirely different from an ordinary appeal. It is made effective by the Court quashing the administrative decision without substituting its own decision, and is to be contrasted with an appeal where the appellate tribunal substitutes its own decision on the merits for that of the administrative officer." 74. The above view has be reiterated by the Apex Court in its several decisions time out of number and I do not propose to further burden this judgment by referring to those. Suffice it to say, that Article 226 of the Constitution permits judicial review of administrative action to keep the authorities within the bounds of law. Judicial review is meant for upholding the rule of law and the Constitution. A decision that is absurd and perverse is unreasonable and therefore arbitrary. The administrative authority is authorised to have a free play within the joints a margin of appreciation is to be allowed to the maker of the decision. This court in exercise of its power of judicial review is concerned only with legality of the decision making process and not with the merits of the judgment. It is in this legal background that the contentions raised on behalf of the petitioner will have to be judged. 75. As mentioned herein above, there is no sufficient pleading in support of the allegation of malafide against the official respondents. It is in this legal background that the contentions raised on behalf of the petitioner will have to be judged. 75. As mentioned herein above, there is no sufficient pleading in support of the allegation of malafide against the official respondents. The contents of the writ petition, in the opinion of this court do not provide any evidence in support of a concrete plea of malafide. No foundation as such, of malice in fact has been laid in the writ application. In view of the above, it is not possible for this Court to hold that the impugned actions suffer from the vice of malafide exercise of power. On the other hand, the impugned actions being official Acts, there is an available presumption in favour of their validity unless the contrary is proved - Omnia Praesumuntur rite et solemniter acta esse". The contents of the writ application are not sufficient to disprove such presumption of validity of the impugned State action. The learned Advocate General had produced before this Court, extracts from the official records in support of his submissions that the meeting held on 13.3.2002 for drawal of lots for reservation of the office of the president and Vice President in the Zilla Parishad for women was held in the presence of the Secretary Assam State Election Commission, Secretary Panchayat and Rural Development Department and other responsible officers of the Government and that election to the office of the President and Vice President in Dhemaji Zilla Parishad had already taken place. That no election to the Panchayat had been held for the last five years is not in dispute. It is an admitted position that election to the Gaon Panchayat, Anchalik Panchayat and the Zilla Parishad upto this stage has been held and the writ petitioner herein did not challenge the process at any stage herein before. The process is at the culminating stage. The official respondents have apparently taken steps to hold the election, to the Panchayat and substantial progress has been made, may, the process is almost completed. As recorded earlier, ~~": malafide or illegalities of fatal nature" is discernible in the process of vitiate it to such an extent that an interference by this court is called for at this stage even at the cost of further postponement of the election. An alternative remedy is available to the petitioner under Section 127 of the Act. As recorded earlier, ~~": malafide or illegalities of fatal nature" is discernible in the process of vitiate it to such an extent that an interference by this court is called for at this stage even at the cost of further postponement of the election. An alternative remedy is available to the petitioner under Section 127 of the Act. In view of the unequivocal words of restraint used by the Apex Court in its decisions dealing with the scope of Court to interfere with electoral matters, I am not inclined, in the exercise of the power of judicial review under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, to interfere with the present process of election to the office of the President and Vice President of Zilla Parishad as contemplated by the official respondents. The contentions raised on behalf of the petitioner besides those relating to the validity of Section 70A and Rule 61 therefore also fail. 76. Before parting, it is to be observed that this court by order dated 25.3.2002 while entertaining the writ application had permitted the State respondents to proceed with the election process but not to fix any date of election before 2.4.2002. From the submissions made by the learned Advocate General and the Notifications in support thereof, it appears that election to the Dhemaji Zilla Parishad had been held and by Notification dated 30.3.2002 the Dhemaji Zilla Parishad had been fully constituted. This Court is constrained to observe that if the above named Zilla Parishad has been constituted on the basis of election to the office of the President and Vice President thereof held after 25.3.2002, the same has been in violation of the order dated 25.3.2002 passed by this Court. This Court therefore would not countenance such a move on the part of official respondents being in contravention of the order of this court. As it is not clear from the said Notification as to when the election to the office of the president to the Zilla Parishad had been held, this Court, is not in a position to pass orders declaring the election as invalid. In case however the same is brought to the notice of this Court by any appropriate application, necessary and appropriate orders under the law may follow as, deemed fit and proper. In case however the same is brought to the notice of this Court by any appropriate application, necessary and appropriate orders under the law may follow as, deemed fit and proper. In the light of the conclusions recorded above I am of the view that the writ petition is devoid of merits. It is accordingly dismissed. However, there would be no order as to costs.