JUDGMENT The judgment of the Court was as follows:- This second appeal has been preferred challenging the judgment and decree dated 4.8.94 and 12.8.94 respectively passed by the learned Assistant District Judge at Alipore in Title Appeal No. 213/1993 affirming the judgment and decree dated 31.3.93 and 19.4.93 respectively passed by Shri G. Ghosh Mullick, learned Munsif First Court at Alipore in Title Suit No. 162/1990. 2. The instant suit being Title Suit No. 162/1990 is a suit for declaration and for permanent injunction. 3. The plaint contains the following prayers:- (a) A decree for declaration that the plaintiffs are the absolute owners, of the suit property by virtue of their possession and occupation of the suit property. But, the law of adverse possession and occupation more than 12 years without anybody's obstruction, objection and interruption. (b) A decree for declaration that the defendants have got no right to obstruct and also to interfere in respect of the plaintiff's peaceful possession and occupation in connection with the suit property. (c) A decree for permanent injunction restraining the defendants and its members and their men and agents from disturbing and interfering for the possession of the plaintiff in the suit property in any manner whatsoever. (d) Costs. (e) Any other or for relief or reliefs, the plaintiffs may be found entitled to in law and in equity. 4. The case as has been made out in the plaint is as follows:- Originally, the recorded owners of the suit property were (1) Debprasanna Ghosh, (2) Shuvaprasanna Ghosh and (3) Taraprasanna Ghosh who were the joint owners of the property. Thereafter, by virtue of a decree of a partition amongst the above named three co-sharers the suit property was allotted in the share of said Taraprasanna. 5. One Sreenath Mondal the father of the plaintiffs Nos. 2 and 3 and the husband of the plaintiff No.1 migrated to West Bengal in the year 1946 along with his family members as refugees. 5. One Sreenath Mondal the father of the plaintiffs Nos. 2 and 3 and the husband of the plaintiff No.1 migrated to West Bengal in the year 1946 along with his family members as refugees. At that time, the suit property was lying as a fallow land as well as vacant and the friends and relatives of Sreenath Mondal who were living in the adjoining squatters colony of the suit property brought Sreenath Mondal in the property and the said Sreenath Mondal occupied the entire suit property including the pucca structure standing and lying therein and settled himself there with is family members and continue to live there, within the knowledge openly or everybody including the Landlord of the property. 6. As has been made out in the plaint Sreenath Mondal started business of a milk man by keeping and maintaining cows and buffaloes as the owners of the suit property and also inducted several tenants in the suit property and used to collect rent from them peacefully without any hindrance from anybody including the areas of heirs of said Taraprasanna Ghosh. Said Sreenath Mondal being in occupation of the property died intestate on 29.7.79 living behind him surviving alone his heirs that is the plaintiffs and the plaintiffs started enjoying the property as before and at last in the year 1990 Durgagati Bhattacharya and Others filed suit for eviction as owner of the suit property being title suit No. 159/80 in the Court of the learned First Munsif at Alipore against the plaintiffs alleging as trespassers which is still pending. According to the plaintiff said Durgagati Bhattacharya and Others admitted occupation of the suit property by Sreenath Mondal since 1968 though Sreenath Mondal and his family was in occupation of the suit property since 1956. 7. Said Durgagati Bhattacharya and Others claimed that they had purchased 11 bighas of land from the heirs of late Taraprasanna Ghosh in the year 1963 along with the land occupied by Sreenath Mondal, thereafter, occupied by his heirs. 8. It has also been averred in the plaint that the said title suit No. 159/80 filed by Durgagati Bhattacharya and Others was not in respect of the entire suit property but only in respect of one room though the plaintiffs were in actual occupation of 11 bighas of land which is the suit property in the instant suit. 9. 8. It has also been averred in the plaint that the said title suit No. 159/80 filed by Durgagati Bhattacharya and Others was not in respect of the entire suit property but only in respect of one room though the plaintiffs were in actual occupation of 11 bighas of land which is the suit property in the instant suit. 9. The plaintiffs in the plaint has further averred that the defendant No.1 M/s. Shyamashree Land Development Society is trying to oust the plaintiff from the possession of the suit property claiming that the said society has purchased the suit property from Durgagati Bhattacharya and Others and are therefore, the owners of the suit property. On 23.3.90, the respondent No. 1 M/s. Shyamashree Land Development Society (hereinafter turned as the "said society") accompanied by outsiders tried to take forcible possession of the suit property, the appellants reported the incident with Regent Park Police Station in writing on 31.3.90 through registered post. Hence, the appellants being the plaintiffs filed the instant suit for declaration and permanent injunction claiming ownership by way of adverse possession. 10. The defendant No. 1/respondent contested the suit by filing written statement. In Paragraph-8 of the written statement the defendant No. 1 (respondent No.1 herein) stated that one Shibaprasanna Ghosh, Taraprasanna Ghosh and Debprasanna Ghosh were the recorded owners of the suit property and after the demise of Taraprasanna Ghosh the suit for partition was filed by the daughter in law of the said deceased Taraprasanna Ghosh and the share of the parties were declared and practically the suit for partition was disposed of. In fact, after the demise of Taraprasanna Ghosh, the suit property was partitioned amongst the real owners which went up to the Hon'ble High Court at Calcutta and a receiver was appointed by the Hon'ble Court. One Durgagati Bhattacharya, Smt. Smrity Sen, Smt. Sunanda Bose and one Subhadra Roy Chowdhury purchased about 11 bighas of land by the same title more or less from the receiver appointed by the Hon'ble Court and he remained in possession in the aforesaid property in exclusion of others. 11. In the written statement the allegation of occupying the entire suit property by Sreenath Mondal including the pucca structure standing and lying therein was denied. 11. In the written statement the allegation of occupying the entire suit property by Sreenath Mondal including the pucca structure standing and lying therein was denied. In the said written statement it was also stated that 104 kathas of land was sold to the defendant No.1 that is the said society under the order of the Hon'ble High Court by receiver appointed by the Hon'ble Court and peaceful khas possession was delivered accordingly. The claim of Sreenath Mondal regarding his starting business of milk man by keeping and maintaining cows and buffaloes as the owners of the suit property or inducting of several tenants for collection of rent by Sreenath Mondal was also denied. 12. In the said written statement in Paragraph-10 it was averred that respondent No. 1 society had no knowledge about the death of Sreenath Mondal. It was also stated that Durgagati Bhattacharya, Sunanda Ghosh, Smrity Sen and Subhadra Roy Chowdhury while in possession of about of 11 bighas of land sold, transferred and conveyed 104 kathas of land out of premises Nos. 27E and 28 Baburam Ghosh Road to the said society against valuable consideration in the year 1982. Since, then the respondent No. 1 society is in possession of the said property and in fact allotted the land to its 33 members making the said land in several small plots leaving aside the space for the road as was approved by the Calcutta Municipal Corporation and the members allottee of the said society have already obtained sanction for their residential building. It was also stated that as soon as the said society came to know about title suit No. 159/80 the said society filed an application under Order 1 Rule 10(2) of the C.P.C. for being added as party defendant in the said suit. In the written statement, it was further stated that Sreenath Mondal was a squatter and squatter cannot claim adverse possession in view of the settled principles of law. 13. In the written statement it has also been averred by the respondent No.1/defendant No. 1 that after purchase they have obtained a scheme plan approved by the Calcutta Municipal Corporation for development in the year 1987 and they have spent more than 7 lakhs as development cost and after receiving the development cost Calcutta Municipal Corporation has constructed a private road. The respondent No. 1 being the defendant No. 1 claimed dismissal of the suit. The learned Trial Judge dismissed the suit on contest. Appeal was preferred by the plaintiff and the learned Appellate Court below affirmed the judgment and decree passed by the learned Trial Judge and dismissed the appeal being title appeal No. 213/93. The appellants hence preferred the instant appeal. 14. In view of the provisions of Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure (as amended) before interfering with the concurrent judgment of two Courts it is to be ascertained first by the Second Appellate Court that is, this Court, as to whether there is any substantial question of law involved in this second appeal or what are those substantial questions of law on which decision is to be given by this Court. In this regard the learned Counsel for the respondent No.1 relied on several decisions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court including the decision reported in (1) 2000(8) SCC 565 , Basappa v. Puttapa, (2) 1999(7) SCC 288 , Hari Singh v. Kanhaiya Lal in which it has been observed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court that the existence of substantial question of law is the sine-qua-non for the exercise of power by the High Court under Section 100. Apart from the decisions cited by the learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1 it can be safely said that it is now a settled principle of law that when hearing Second Appeal Court is to formulate substantial questions of law and deliver judgment in the Second Appeal or in concurrent finding of facts the Second Appeal Court will not normally interfere unless the judgment under challenge is perverse or the judgment is based on surmise and conjectures or non-consideration of evidence is there or even if there is glaring inconsistencies in the judgment under challenge. In my opinion this judgment should not be encumbered by quoting all those decisions since these are numerous. 15. In my opinion this judgment should not be encumbered by quoting all those decisions since these are numerous. 15. Now let us first see as to what are the submissions of the appellants as to existence of or formulation of substantial question of law or as to the scope of interference by this Court of second appeal under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure or in summary, let us consider the submissions of the appellants in whole this Court can come to a conclusion or decision as to whether this Court in second appeal will interfere. The learned Counsel for the appellants Mr. Bhattacharya made his submissions on the following formulations which according to him can be taken into consideration by this Court for the purpose of formulating substantial question of law or for the purpose of hearing on the said basis and he advanced his arguments on those points. 16. The whole crux of submission of Mr. Bhattacharya made his submissions on the following formulations which according to him can be taken into consideration by this Court for the purpose of formulating substantial question of law or for the purpose of hearing on the said basis and he advanced his arguments on those points. 16. The whole crux of submission of Mr. Bhattacharya the learned Counsel for the appellants is (i) appellants are claiming title by way of adverse possession and Courts below went on wrong by not declaring the appellant as the owner of the suit property or by not granting permanent injunction and not by properly appreciating evidence adduced in this regard, (ii) The respondent No.1 as has no legal right and they have purchased a land which is hit by the doctrine of lis pendence under Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act inasmuch as the said respondent No. 1 purchased the land during the pendency of the suit field by Durgagati Bhattacharya and Others being title suit No. 159/1980 both the Courts below erred in law by not considering the said legal aspect, (iii) in the absence of any proof of title of the defendant No.1/respondent No.1 both the Courts below went on wrong in refusing the plaintiff in granting permanent injunction, (iv) no issue was framed regarding the question as to whether the defendant No.1 respondent No. 1 has got any title over the property, (v) the Courts below want wrong by not considering that the property was hit by Urban land Ceiling (Ceiling & Regulation) Act, (vi) two suits that is the earlier suit filed by Durgagati Bhattacharya being title suit No. 159/1980 and the present suit filed by the plaintiff (appellant herein) being title suit No. 162/1990 should have been heard by the Trial Court analogously. 17. Mr. Bhattacharya at the out set submitted that it is not the universal law that the Second Appeal Court in no circumstances can interfere with the finding of both the Courts below and in support of his contention, Mr. Bhattacharya relied on a decision reported in (3) 2001 (3) SCC 179 , Santosh Hazari v. Purusattam Tiwari, relying on the said decision Mr. Bhattacharya submitted that in this decision Hon'ble Supreme Court has decided as to what would be the substantial questions of law. Mr. Bhattacharya relied on a decision reported in (3) 2001 (3) SCC 179 , Santosh Hazari v. Purusattam Tiwari, relying on the said decision Mr. Bhattacharya submitted that in this decision Hon'ble Supreme Court has decided as to what would be the substantial questions of law. Mr. Bhattacharya also submitted that in this decision Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed that the High Court is not bound to confine itself to deal with only in the questions initially framed by it. High Court may hear the appeal on any other such question so long it is satisfied that the case involves substantial questions of law and record its reasons for such satisfaction and the substantial question of law is to be debatable one and the points raised should be accepted by this Court and this Court should formulate substantial question of law relying on those points and then can interfere in the judgments of the Court below. Mr. Bhattacharya also submitted that in this decision Hon'ble Supreme Court further observed that whether a question is a substantial of law or not depends on facts and circumstances of each case and as observed by Hon'ble Supreme Court, the essential overall consideration is the need to strike a judicious balance between the duty to Judge at every stage and the pressing necessity of preventing delay in the final disposal of the case. 18. In support of his contention, Mr. Bhattacharya the learned Counsel for the appellants also placed reliance on the decision reported in (4) 2001 (5) SCC 705 . Dinanath v. Puranlal. 19. Mr. Bhattacharya when asked by this Court as to whether in the second appeal a new point can be taken for the first time he submitted that if it is a point of law it can be taken and he relied on a decision reported in (5) AIR 1989 Bombay page 1, Damodar v. Shahajadibi in which Hon'ble High Court at Bombay observed :- "The second question which, no doubt has been raised on behalf of the defendant for the first time in this second appeal can also be disposed of by us since it is a question of law and the matter is at large before us on all points of law." 20. In support of his contention the learned Counsel also relied on the decision reported in (6) AIR 1969 SC 204 , Ramkristo v. Dhankristo the learned Counsel submits that both the Courts below did not consider the claim of the appellant regarding ownership by way of adverse possession. 21. Now Mr. Bhattacharya, the learned Counsel for the appellants made concentration on his point of submission regarding the claim of the appellants of deriving title by way of adverse possession. It is submitted by the learned Counsel for the appellants that as would appear from the judgment of the Appellate Court below, it was argued on behalf of the appellants that the defendant in Paragraph-10 of the written statement has not denied the plaintiff's case as made out in Paragraphs-8 to 11 of the plaint. 22. Mr. Bhattacharya, the learned Counsel for the appellants submits that because of doctrine of non-traverse or since there was no specific denial the factum of possession of the plaintiffs have been admitted. In this regard, the learned Counsel placed reliance on the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court reported in (7) AIR 1967 SC 109 , Jahuri Sah v. Dwarika Prasad Junjunwala & Ors. and relied on observation made by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in this case which is to the following extent:- "Bearing in mind that Order VIII, Rule 5 C.P.C. provides that every allegation of fact in the plaint if not denied specifically or by necessary implication or stated not to be admitted in the pleading of the defendant shall be taken to be admitted, to say that a defendant has no knowledge of a fact pleaded by the plaintiff is not tantamount to a denial of the existence of that fact, not even an implied deny." 23. Mr. Bhattacharya also placed reliance on the decision reported in (8) AIR 1934 Madras 274, Ramalinga Pandaram & Ors. v. Anthoni Muthuvathiar & Ors. where it has been observed:- "Where the only question is the possession of the plaintiff as against the defendant. No question as to who the real owner of the land is, arises and the plaintiffs are entitled to a declaration that they are lawfully entitled to possession of the land. The question of length of possession does not arise." 24. According to the learned Counsel for the appellants firstly there is no specific denial on the part of the defendant. The question of length of possession does not arise." 24. According to the learned Counsel for the appellants firstly there is no specific denial on the part of the defendant. Secondly, since it is a question of possessory title the plaintiff being in possession need not have to think as to who the real owner is. 25. The next submission of the learned Counsel for the appellants is that the purchase of the land by the respondent No.1 is hit by the provisions of Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act and as such the respondent No. 1 has no legal right and both the Courts below erred in law by not considering the said aspect and the third submission is that in the absence of any proof of title of the defendant No. 1 (respondent No. 1 herein) both the Courts below went wrong in refusing the plaintiff in granting permanent injunction. The fourth submission is that no issue was framed regarding the question as to whether the defendant No. 1/respondent No.1 has got any title over the property. The learned Counsel submits that when the respondent No. 1 purchased the property at that time the earlier suit being title suit No. 159/1980 filed by Durgagati Bhattacharya & Ors. was pending and naturally, the provisions of Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act is attracted. 26. The learned Counsel submits that though this case was not advanced before the Courts below still then he can take this plea before the High Court inasmuch as this is a question of law. The learned Counsel placed reliance on the decision reported in AIR 1969 SC 204 , Ramkristo v. Dhankisto in which the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed :– "Therefore, even assuming that the contention as to the invalidity of the said exchange under Section 27 was raised for the first time before the High Court, the language of sub-section (2) being absolute and clear the High Court had to take notice of such a contention and was bound to hold such an exchange as invalid if it was shown that sub-section (1) of Section 27 applied to the transaction." 27. Therefore, according to the learned Counsel in view of this observation though the case was not made out before the Court below regarding attraction of the provisions of the Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act still then he can raise this point before the High Court under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure which is a point of law. 28. The learned Counsel for the appellant submitted that applicability of Section 52 does not depend on matters of proof or strength or weakness of case on one side or other and in this regard the learned Counsel placed reliance on the decision reported in (9) AIR 1948 Privy Council 147, Gouri Dutt Maharaj v. Shukur Maharaj where it has been observed :– "The broad purpose of Section 52 is to maintain the status quo unaffected by the act of any party to the litigation pending its determination. The applicability of the section cannot be dependant on matters of proof or strength or weakness of the case on one side or the other in bona fide proceedings. To apply any such test is to misconceive the object of the enactment and the Court is in error where it lays stress on the fact that the agreement on which the suit is based has not been registered." 29. The learned Counsel submits that from the facts it is not disputed that the suit land had been purchased by the defendant No.1 during the pendency of the earlier suit filed by Shir Durgagati Bhattacharya and Others against the plaintiff and as such no further proof or evidence is required that this purchase is hit by Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act and as such the defendant No. 1 has no legal right to claim the property as owners. 30. The learned Counsel also submits that since the defendant No. 1 (respondent No. 1 herein) has no title in an over the suit property either this way or other or no issue was framed regarding the question as to whether the defendant No. 1/respondent No.1 has got any title over the property. Naturally, both the Courts erred in law by not granting permanent injunction in favour of the plaintiff. Mr. Naturally, both the Courts erred in law by not granting permanent injunction in favour of the plaintiff. Mr. Bhattacharya in support of his contentions also placed reliance in the decision reported in (10) 1991 (2) Rent Control Report Act, 609, Purusattam Das Verma v. Second Additional District Judge, Allahabad & Ors. which is a judgment delivered by Hon'ble High Court at Allahabad. 31. Lastly, Mr. Bhattacharya has submitted that in view of the facts the Trial Court should have heard two suits being title suit No. 159/1980 field by Durgagati Bhattacharya and Others and title suit No. 162/1990 (instant suit) analogously since it concerns the same property. 32. The learned Counsel Mr. Bachawat appearing on behalf of the respondent No. 1 submits that scope of Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure is very limited and according to him for interference in a second appeal against concurrent finding of facts two conditions must be satisfied and there are (i) the case involves a substantial question of law and (ii) the memorandum of appeal must precisely state the substantial question involved in the appeal. 33. The learned Counsel submits that in the instant case, there is no substantial question of law involved and naturally, this Court in the second appeal should not interfere with the decisions of both the Courts below which are concurrent findings of the trial Court as well as appellate Court. 34. Mr. Bachawat relies on the decision reported in (11) AIR 1989 SC 1509 , Maniar Ismail Sab & Ors. v. Maniar Fakruddin & Ors., where it has been observed that in concurrent finding of fact interference by High Court under Section 100 is not permissible. Mr. Bachawat relied on the decision reported in (12) 1999(3) SCC 733 , Md. Amirulla Khan & Ors. v. Md. Hakumulla Khan & Ors., where it has been observed that in second appeal High Court ought not to have re-appreciated the evidence and reverse finding of fact arrived at by the first appellate Court. The learned Counsel for the respondent No.1 also relied on the decision reported in (13) AIR 1999 SC 2213 , Kondiba Dagadu Kadam v. Sabitribhai Sopan Gujar & Ors., where it has been clarified as to what can be termed as substantial question of law and Mr. The learned Counsel for the respondent No.1 also relied on the decision reported in (13) AIR 1999 SC 2213 , Kondiba Dagadu Kadam v. Sabitribhai Sopan Gujar & Ors., where it has been clarified as to what can be termed as substantial question of law and Mr. Bachawat submits that in this decision Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed that in a second appeal after the Amendment of 1976 relief cannot be granted merely on equitable grounds and concurrent finding of facts, howsoever erroneous cannot be interfered with. 35. Lastly, on this score, Mr. Bachawat placed reliance on the decision reported in (14) AIR 1999 SC 864 and submits that in this case also the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed that the High Court can exercise its jurisdiction under Section 100 C.P.C. only on the basis of the substantial question of law which are to be framed at the time of admission of the second appeal and the second appeal has to be heard and decided only on the basis of such duly framed substantial question of law. 36. Mr. Bachawat strongly relied on observation of the Hon'ble Supreme Court made in this judgment which is as follows :– "Whether a finding of fact reached by Courts below is the weight of evidence or not is a question what will remain in the realm of appreciation of evidence and does not project any question of law much less, any substantial question of law which can enable the High Court in second appeal to upset such a finding of fact." 37. Nextly, on the question of claim of the adverse possession by the appellant plaintiffs which according to Mr. Bachawat was the only case made out by the plaintiff in both the Courts below, Mr. Bachawat relies on the decision of a Division Bench of this Court reported in (15) AIR 1976 Calcutta 55, Premendu Bhushan Mondal v. Sripati Ranjan Chakraborty wherein it has been observed :– "A squatter or trespasser, who does not set up a claim of right cannot plead adverse possession and no length of mere squatting possession is a good defence in a suit for possession by the true owner." 38. Mr. Mr. Bachawat submits that in the said case the Hon'ble Division Bench also observed :– "The learned Sub-Ordinate Judge seems to have been influenced by the facts that the defendant had been in the disputed house for more than 12 years and that he had taken electric connection and had been paying tax of the disputed premises to the Municipality. Those facts as stated above do not at all support the defendant's case of adverse possession." 39. The learned Counsel appearing for the respondent No. 1 placed reliance on another decision of the Hon'ble Division Bench of this Court reported in (16) AIR 1991 Calcutta 132, Jahurul Islam v. Abul Kalam & Ors. in which it has been observed :– "It is true, as noted by the learned Trial Judge, that the appellant has exhibited a large number of documents to establish that he has been living and carrying on business in the suit land since 1966. We have already mentioned previously what these documents are. But, then as pointed out by the learned Trial Judge––in such a case as the present, mere possession even of a trespasser will not constitute adverse possession unless accompanied by open assertion of hostile title." 40. The learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1 submits that if the entire evidence is examined it will appear that nowhere the plaintiffs could establish the hostility. Mr. Bachawat submits that in the above view of the matter since the case of adverse possession would not be proved by the plaintiffs through oral or documentary evidence as has been found by both the Courts below, the plaintiffs cannot claim title or injunction to be granted in favour of the plaintiffs. 41. Insofar as the question of attraction of the provisions of Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act as concerned the said points was never advanced by the plaintiffs either before the trial Court or before appellate Court below and as such the appellants are not entitled to raise that question as substantial question of law in the second appeal. In this regard, Mr. In this regard, Mr. Bachawat relies on the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Kondiba Dagadu Kadam (supra), wherein it has been observed that where a point of law has not been pleaded or is found to be arisen between the parties in the absence of any factual format a litigant should not be allowed to raise that question as substantial question of law in the second appeal. 42. Insofar as the claim of the appellant that the purchase of the suit land is hit by the provisions of the Urban Land Ceiling Act, Mr. Bachawat submits that those claims are totally irrelevant to the context and these points were never agitated before the Trial Court or the Lower Appellate Court and as would appear from the plaint/pleading of the plaintiffs their whole case is based on the claim for adverse possession and the other pleas which the plaintiffs are taking afresh before this Court in the second appeal cannot be permitted. 43. Mr. Bhattacharya in his reply again reiterated his stand taken earlier that the plaintiffs are the owners by way of adverse possession and the respondent No. 1/defendant No.1 has no locus standi or legal right inasmuch as their purchase of the suit property is hit by the provisions of Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act as also the provisions of Urban Land Ceiling Act and findings of both the Courts below are perverse and the findings suffer from non-consideration of material evidence on record. 44. Heard and considered the submissions of the learned Counsel for both the parties and considered of submissions, on perusal of the averments made in the plaint, the averments made in the written statement and the evidence on record along with the findings of the trial Court and the appellate Court below. The first submission on behalf of the plaintiffs regarding the claim of adverse possession in and over the suit property is possibly the only case which, was advanced before the trial Court as well as the appellate Court below. Now let us see as to how far this claim is sustainable. The claim for adverse possession is not a pure and simple claim of occupation for more than 12 years. Now let us see as to how far this claim is sustainable. The claim for adverse possession is not a pure and simple claim of occupation for more than 12 years. The persons claiming adverse possession have to establish either oral or through documentary evidence that they have been possessing the suit property for more than 12 years exclusively and in holding and in ouster of the real owner. 45. As has been pointed out by the Division Bench of this Hon'ble Court in the decisions of Premendra Bhushan Mondal (supra) and Jahurul Islam (supra), the person claiming adverse possession must have to prove assertion of hostile title and merely length of possession does not confer any right or title by way of adverse possession. In the instant case both the Courts below came to a concurrent finding on consideration of the evidence on record that the plaintiffs could not prove the claim for adverse possession. Needless to mention, that now it has become a settled proposition of law that in second appeal the High Court has to come to the conclusion first that there are substantial questions of law and on formulation of such substantial questions of law (if no formulation is there during admission of the appeal). Only the Court can interfere. In the instant case the main claim and rather the only claim of the plaintiffs before the trial Court as well as the appellate Court below was of adverse possession and it has been found by both the Courts below that adverse possession could not be proved. That apart in a recent decision reported in (17) 2001 (8) SCC 584 , Mohanlal v. Nihal Singh the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed :–– "The question of possession of the suit land is essentially one of fact. The trial Court recorded a positive finding based on the revenue records and the oral evidence led by the plaintiff that he had come into possession of the land under lease deed and continued to possess the same all along. The lower appellate Court which is the final Court of fact, confirmed the finding of the trial Court regarding the plaintiff's possession of the suit land and upheld the judgment of the trial Court decreeing the suit. The lower appellate Court which is the final Court of fact, confirmed the finding of the trial Court regarding the plaintiff's possession of the suit land and upheld the judgment of the trial Court decreeing the suit. Under such circumstances there was hardly any scope for High Court to interfere with the finding of possession concurrently recorded by the Courts below within the limited parameters of Section 100 C.P.C." 46. In another recent decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court reported in (18) 2001 (9) SCC 521 , Pakeerappa Rai v. Seethammahenjsu & Ors., the Apex Court observed to the extent even :–– "The position would be different if the High Court have the jurisdiction to re-apprise the evidence. In such situation, the High Court might have come to a different conclusion. But, the High Court in exercise of power under Section 100 C.P.C. cannot even interfere with the erroneous finding of fact, howsoever gross the error seems to be." 47. In view of the above discussion, I am of the opinion that since the plaintiffs could not prove their claim, of adverse possession and both the Courts below found concurrently in this regard against the plaintiffs this Court cannot interfere with the findings arrived at by the Courts below. The entire evidence has been considered in this regard by both the Courts below and there is no perversity in the judgment and as has been observed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in different decisions quoted above that unless there is perversity in the judgment or there is non-consideration of materials-on-record or there is glaring inconsistency the High Court should not interfere with the concurrent finding of the Courts below and insofar as the perversity points are concerned, the judgment of the Apex Court reported in (19) 2002 SCC 213, M.G. Hegde v. Vasudev D. Hegde is clear on the point when the Apex Court observes :–– "Jurisdiction is limited words 'prima facie perverse and error apparent on the face of the record' are not a "Mantra" and cannot be employed to permit High Court to do in second appeal what the law enjoins not to do." 48. The claim for adverse possession by the appellant/plaintiff therefore goes and is rejected. 49. The claim for adverse possession by the appellant/plaintiff therefore goes and is rejected. 49. Now let us come to the next submission of attractability of Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act relating to the purchase of the suit property by the respondent No. 1. It more or less a settled position that a transfer pendentilite is not prohibited. The doctrine upon which the section is based is that it would plainly be impossible that any action or suit could be brought to a successful termination if alienation pendentilite were permitted to prevail. The doctrine of lis pendense does not by itself makes a transaction illegal and the effect of Section 52 is not to wipe out a sale pendentilite altogether but to subordinate it to the rights based on the decree of suit. As between the parties to the transaction it is perfectly valid as has been decided by the Apex Court in the decision reported in (20) AIR 1956 SC 593 , Nagubai v. B. Sharma Rao. That apart, in the instant case, the purchase of the suit property has not been made by the respondent No. 1 during the pendency of the instant suit which admittedly during the pendency of the earlier suit which has been filed by Durgagati Bhattacharya and Others against the plaintiff concerning only a small house in the suit property over there but in the instant suit, the suit property is the entire land including the said premises. Now decree in favour of either of the litigants in that suit consequently will be binding upon the parties to that suit. But in any event that does not concern the instant suit where the claim of the plaintiff is of adverse possession which they could not prove. 50. Insofar as the submission of the learned Counsel for the appellants that the property is hit by the provisions of Urban Land Ceiling Act is concerned there also the same question arises as to how the plaintiffs are concerned. If assumingly the property is hit by the provisions of Urban Land Ceiling Act and the area beyond the ceiling has vested in the State then also it is not the case of the plaintiff that the plaintiffs are going to claim adverse possession against the Government. It is the suit filed by the plaintiff for declaration and permanent injunction. If assumingly the property is hit by the provisions of Urban Land Ceiling Act and the area beyond the ceiling has vested in the State then also it is not the case of the plaintiff that the plaintiffs are going to claim adverse possession against the Government. It is the suit filed by the plaintiff for declaration and permanent injunction. Had it been a case of the plaintiff that the property has vested in the State the plaintiff would have made the State Government a party and the pleadings should have been there. But, no such pleading and no such evidence are there all along either before the trial Court or before the appellate Court below. This contention of the learned Counsel for the appellant also therefore fails. 51. The last contention which has been made by the learned Counsel for the appellant that both the suits that is the earlier suit being No. T.S.159/1980 filed by Durgagati Bhattacharya and Others against the plaintiff and the present suit being No. T.S.162/1990 filed by the plaintiffs/appellants herein against the respondent No.1 herein should have been heard analogously. 52. In my opinion, neither there was prayer for analogous hearing of the two suits before the trial Court or the appellate Court below nor there was any such pleading in the instant suit and the trial Court cannot gives suo moto direction for hearing of two suits analogously. This is absolutely a new plea and an irrelevant plea taken by the appellant before this Court and this contention of the learned Counsel for the appellant also therefore fails. In view of the above discussion, no points which appear to be substantial question of law is there to be decided and all the contentions of the learned Counsel for the appellants are rejected. The instant appeal, is, therefore dismissed and the judgment of the trial Court and the appellate Court below are affirmed. The parties are to bear their costs respectively.