JUDGMENT : 1. The instant writ petition has been filed challenging the impugned order dated 7-5-2001 (Annex. 1), by which petitioner stood discharged/removed from service. 2. The facts and circumstances giving rise to this case are that petitioner was appointed vide order dated 5-1-94 (Annex. 1) by respondent No. 4 on the post of Artist-cum-Projectionist and his services were confirmed vide order dated 4-3-95 (Annex. 2). He was asked, vide order dated 9-11-95, to work as Assistant Programmer Officer (APO) also. As there had been rampant corruption and appointments/promotions were made with nepotism and favouritism and petitioner could not tolerate it being an honest citizen, he challenged several orders before various Authorities pointing out that the appointments/ promotions were made only on extraneous considerations without following any procedure and without advertising the vacancies. He had also filed writ petitions Nos. 2893/1999 and 472/2001 before this Court challenging the promotions of Smt. Manju Goyal etc. praying that her promotion be quashed and petitioner be promoted on her place. This annoyed the Management. Petitioner was served with notice dated 29-3-2001 to show cause within a period of one month as (to) why he should not be discharged from services w.e.f. 1-5-2001 on the grounds mentioned therein. Petitioner filed the reply to the said notice on 4-5-2001 (Annex. 5). However, the services of the petitioner stood discharged vide impugned order dated 7-5-2001 (Annex. 8). Hence this petition. 3. Mr. P.P. Chaudhary, learned counsel for petitioner, has raised large number of issues emphasising that once petitioner stood confirmed on the said post and the notice to show cause had only three allegations, i.e. indiscipline, non-co-operation and filing complaints/cases, he could not have been discharged without holding a full-fledged inquiry and as he had submitted the reply to the said show cause, though at a belated stage, the discharge order could not have been passed without considering the same. 4. Mr. M.C. Bhoot, learned counsel for the Society, has submitted that the petitioner is guilty of suppressing the material fact as he had been appointed as an Artist cum Projectionist vide order dated 5-1-94 (Annex. 1) : in fact, he had worked on ad hoc basis with the Society earlier. He suo moto, without any notice/advertisement etc. for seeking appointment, filed an application on 4-9-91 on the vacant post of Stenographer (Hindi) in the Society. 1) : in fact, he had worked on ad hoc basis with the Society earlier. He suo moto, without any notice/advertisement etc. for seeking appointment, filed an application on 4-9-91 on the vacant post of Stenographer (Hindi) in the Society. Petitioner's case was recommended by the Honorary Director on the same day, i.e. 4-9-91 to the Chairman and he was given appointment as a Stenographer (Hindi) vide order dated 5-9-91 (Annex. R.5/2), without advertising the vacancy and following any procedure of law on his application. The respondent Society had favoured him again by appointing as an Artist-cum-Projectionist vide order dated 5-1-94 without following any procedure whatsoever and he had been confirmed on that post illegally; his appointment shows that the post of Artist-cum-Projectionist, was vacant and considering his past services, he was offered the appointment, all the writ petitions have been filed by the petitioner contending that the respondent Society is an instrumentality/agency of the Central Government and, thus, "State" within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution and is amenable to writ jurisdiction hence he must show as what is his legal right to be retained in service, for the enforcement of which he has resorted to writ jurisdiction as he had been appointed without following any procedure and his appointment was void ab initial being violative of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. Mr. N.M. Lodha and Mr. M.L. Kala, learned counsel for other respondents, have supported Mr. Bhoot on these submissions. 5. I have considered the submissions made by learned counsel for the parties. 6. Writ Petition Nos. 2893/99 and 472/2001, filed by the petitioner challenging the appointments/promotions of private respondents therein, have been dismissed as having become infructous, vide order dated 22-1-2002 for the reason that the society, later on, realised that no appointment/promotion could be made without following procedure consonance with the Constitutional mandate, even, in absence of any Statutory rules, and withdrew the orders impugned therein and posts were later on filled up by advertising the vacancies and following the Selection Process. Thus, the instant petition remains to be decided considering the submissions made by Mr. Bhoot that as Society has rectified the mistake in other cases withdrawing the promotions etc., why petitioner be retained in service even if his termination is on other grounds. 7. There may be some force in the submission made by Mr. Thus, the instant petition remains to be decided considering the submissions made by Mr. Bhoot that as Society has rectified the mistake in other cases withdrawing the promotions etc., why petitioner be retained in service even if his termination is on other grounds. 7. There may be some force in the submission made by Mr. Chaudhary that a confirmed employee cannot be removed/discharged without holding an inquiry on misconduct but the question does arise : whether a person can claim any right to continue in service if he had been appointed in flagrant violation of provisions of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution as respondent Society is admittedly an agency of the Central Government. Moreso, when petitioner himself had been agitating the issue of favouritism and nepotism and challenged the appointment/promotion of some persons even by filing writ petitions on those grounds and claimed that those persons had been appointed/promoted without issuing any advertisement and following any procedure, whether he can escape the liability under the same provisions which he wants to enforce against others? 8. Public employment has always been considered to be a public property and it has consistently been held by the Courts that every eligible person has a right to share it, but its enjoyment is subject to the recruitment rules which must be in consonance with the Scheme of the Constitution of India. 9. In State of Haryana v. Piara Singh, AIR 1992 SC 2130 : 1992 LabIC 2168 , the Apex Court held that even for a short term vacancy, ad hoc appointment should be made by adopting a procedure consonance with the provisions of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India. Similar view has been reiterated in Prabhat Kumar Sharma v. State of U.P. AIR 1996 SC 2638 : 1996 LabIC 226 ; JAS Inter College, Khurja v. State of U.P. (1996) 10 SCC 71 : 1996 LabIC 2064 and Delhi Development Horticulture Employees Union v. Delhi Administration, 1992 AIR SCW 616 : 1992 LabIC 847. 10. In Excise Superintendent v. K.B.N. Visweshwara Rao, (1996) 6 SCC 216 : 1996 AIR SCW 3979 , the Supreme Court impliedly overruled its earlier judgment in Union of India v. N. Hargopal, (1987) 3 SCC 308 : 1987 LabIC 915 , wherein it had been held that appointment by calling the names from Employment Exchange was valid. 10. In Excise Superintendent v. K.B.N. Visweshwara Rao, (1996) 6 SCC 216 : 1996 AIR SCW 3979 , the Supreme Court impliedly overruled its earlier judgment in Union of India v. N. Hargopal, (1987) 3 SCC 308 : 1987 LabIC 915 , wherein it had been held that appointment by calling the names from Employment Exchange was valid. The Court took the view that in addition to calling the names from the Employment Exchange, vacancy has to be advertised in the local newspapers and the appointment only by calling the names from the Employment Exchange will be hit by the provisions of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India for the reason that those persons who could not get their names registered with the Employment Exchange cannot be discriminated merely on that ground. An exception to the same had been carved out subsequently in Arun Tewari v. Zilla Mansavi Shishak Sangh, AIR 1998 SC 331 : 1998 LabIC 414 , to the extent that advertising the vacancy in local news-papers can be dispensed with only in exceptional circumstances where for grave urgency there is no time to advertise the vacancy and only in such an event appointments can be made by calling the names from the Employment Exchange only. 11. The question of appointment de hors the Rules has been considered by the Supreme Court from time and again and the Court held that such appointment are unenforceable and un-executable. It is settled legal proposition that any appointment made de hors the Rules violates the Public Policy enshrines the rules and thus being void, cannot be enforced. (Vide Smt. Ravindra Sharma v. State of Punjab, (1995) 1 SCC 138 : AIR 1995 SC 277 ; Harpal Kaur Chahal v. Director, Punjab Instructions, 1995 (Supp1) 4 SCC 706; State of Madhya Pradesh v. Shyama Pardhi, (1996) 7 SCC 118 : AIR 1996 SC 2219 ; State of Rajasthan v. Hitendra Kumar Bhatt, (1997) 6 SCC 574 : 1998 LabIC 378; Patna University v. Dr. Amita Tiwari, AIR 1997 SC 3456 : 1997 LabIC 3364; Madhya Pradesh Electricity Board v. S.S. Modh, AIR 1997 SC 3464 : 1997 LabIC 3369; Bhagwan Singh v. State of Punjab, (1999) 9 SCC 573 and Chancellor v. Shankar Rao, (1999) 6 SCC 253 : 1999 AIR SCW 4921). 12. In Dr. Amita Tiwari, AIR 1997 SC 3456 : 1997 LabIC 3364; Madhya Pradesh Electricity Board v. S.S. Modh, AIR 1997 SC 3464 : 1997 LabIC 3369; Bhagwan Singh v. State of Punjab, (1999) 9 SCC 573 and Chancellor v. Shankar Rao, (1999) 6 SCC 253 : 1999 AIR SCW 4921). 12. In Dr. Amita Tiwari (supra), it has been held that the appointment has to be made only in consonance with the recruitment rules. Similarly, in Union Territory of Chandigarh Administration v. Managing Society, Goswami G.D.S.D.C., 1996 (1) R.R.R. 649 : AIR 1996 SC 1759 and V. Karnal Durai v. District Collector, (1999) 1 SCC 475 , it has been held that the terms of contract must be read and enforced in consonance with the statute and not otherwise even if the contract contains the terms contrary to the statutory provisions. Similarly, in A. Mahudeswaran v. Government of Tamil Nadu, (1996) 8 SCC 617 , it has been held that a person can have a legitimate expectation only in consonance with the statute and the rules framed there under and not in contravention of the same. 13. In Delhi Transport Corporation v. D.T.C. Mazdoor Congress, AIR 1991 SC 101 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court recognised the public employment as public property and all persons similarly situated have a right to share In it. 14. In Sita Ram Mali v. State of Rajasthan, 1994 (2) WLC 177 : 1995 LabIC 902 , this Court deprecated the practice to appoint even on daily wages without advertising the temporary/ad hoc vacancies, observing as under (at Page 905, of LabIC) : "Making appointment on daily wages without the availability of the post and without following the provisions of Articles 14 and 16 suffers from patent illegality. Apparently for the reasons which are only extraneous, the Officers of the department have given appointments on daily wages to few favoured. Those who have waited in queue at the employment exchange have been altogether ignored. In fact, while the length of the queue continuously increase, the back door entrants got the entry in service as daily wages employee and got the order of appointment on salary in the regular pay scale and ultimately the order of regularisation on the service." 15. Dr. In fact, while the length of the queue continuously increase, the back door entrants got the entry in service as daily wages employee and got the order of appointment on salary in the regular pay scale and ultimately the order of regularisation on the service." 15. Dr. M.A. Haque v. Union of India, (1993) 2 SCC 213 : 1993 LabIC 996 , the Supreme Court observed as under (at Page 999-1000 of LabIC) : "We cannot lose sight of the fact that the recruitment rules made under Article 309 of the Constitution have to be followed strictly and not in breach. If a disregard of the rules and by passing of the Public Service Commissions are permitted, it will open a back door for illegal recruitment without limit. In fact this Court has, of late, been witnessing a constant violation of the recruitment rules and a scant respect to the constitutional provisions requiring recruitment to the services through the Public Service Commissions. It appears that since this Court has in some cases permitted regularisation of the irregularly recruited employees. Some governments and authorities have been increasingly resorted to irregular recruitments. The result had been that the recruitment rules and the Public Service Commissions have been kept in cold storage and candidate dictated by various considerations are being recruited as a matter of course." 16. Deprecating the practice of making appointment de hors the rules by the State and other State instrumentalities in Dr. Arundhati A. Pargaonkar v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1995 SC 962 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court rejected the claim of the petitioner therein for regularisation on the ground of long continuous service observing as under (at Page 965) : "Nor the claim of the appellant, that she having worked as Lecturer without break for 9 years on the date the advertisement was issued, she should be deemed to have been regularised appears to be well found. Eligibility and continuous working for howsoever long period should not be permitted to over reach the law. Requirement of rules of selection cannot be substituted by humans considerations. Law must take its course." 17. Eligibility and continuous working for howsoever long period should not be permitted to over reach the law. Requirement of rules of selection cannot be substituted by humans considerations. Law must take its course." 17. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in State of U.P. v. U.P. State Law Officers Assocn., AIR 1994 SC 1654 has observed as under (at Page 1662):- "This being so those who come to be appointed by such arbitrary procedure can hardly complain if the termination of their appointment is equally arbitrary. Those who come by the backdoor have to go by the same door. ...The fact that they are made by public bodies cannot vest them with additional sanctity. Every appointment made, to a public office, howsoever made, is not necessarily vested with public sanctity. There is, therefore, no public interest involved in saving all appointments irrespective of their mode. From the inception in some engagements and contracts may be the product of the operation of the spoils system. There need be no legal anxiety to save them." 18. In absence of Statutory Rules or By-laws providing a mode for appointment, the Executive Instructions/Policy adopted by the authority must be adhered to. Even if no such Executive Instructions/Policy/Guidelines/Circular etc., is in existence then a fair procedure for appointment has to be adopted in consonance with the provisions of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. [vide Nagpur Improvement Trust v. Yadaorao Jagannath Kumbheru, AIR 1999 SC 3084 : 1999 LabIC 3086. In Ramesh Kumar Sharma v. Rajasthan Civil Services Appellate Tribunal, 2000 AIR SCW 4206 : AIR 2001 SC 362 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that "expression 'Service Rules' cannot be given a restrictive meaning in the absence of the definition of the said term and, therefore, it would include within its sweep, the necessary Government order providing the method of recruitment." 19. In Meghalaya State Electricity Board v. Jagadindra Arjun, 2001 AIR SCW 2823 : AIR 2001 SC 2440 , the Apex Court held that an Authority or State Agency, where Service Rules have not yet been framed, should lay down service conditions in exercise of its administrative power by passing resolution. But appointments should not be made arbitrarily. 20. Therefore, in view of the above, it is abundantly clear that in absence of Service Rules, a fair procedure can be adopted for recruitment. 21. But appointments should not be made arbitrarily. 20. Therefore, in view of the above, it is abundantly clear that in absence of Service Rules, a fair procedure can be adopted for recruitment. 21. In a recent judgment in Suresh Kumar v. State of Haryana, 2001 AIR SCW 2545 , the Supreme Court up-held the judgment of Full Bench of Punjab & Haryana High Court quashing the appointments of 1600 Police Constables made without advertising the vacancies. The High Court had reached the conclusion that the process of selection stood vitiated because there had been no advertisement and no due publicity inviting application from the eligible candidates at large. Similarly, in Surinder Singh v. State of Haryana, (2001) 5 JT (SC) 461 , the Apex Court quashed the appointments made over and above the number of vacancies duly advertised being violative of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution as candidates who possessed eligibility subsequent to the advertisement had no chance to be considered for recruitment. 22. A Constitution Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, in a recent Judgment in B.R. Kapoor v. State of Tamil Nadu, (2001)7 SCC 231 : AIR 2001 SC 3435 (Jayalalitha case), has declared that the appointment of the Chief Minister made by the Governor did not give the appointee any right to hold the appointment for the reason that the appointment was found to be contrary to the Constitutional provisions and further declared that any order unsupported by any authority of law must be rejected. The Court further held that in every such case, the Courts, while exercising their power of judicial review, must examine "whether the incumbent possesses qualification for appointment and the manner in which the appointment came to be made or the procedure adopted was fair, just and reasonable."The Supreme Court further declared as under : "It is the essence of the rule of law that the exercise of the power by the State, whether it be the Legislature or the Executive or any other Authority, should be within the Constitutional limitations and if any practice is adopted by the executive which is in violation of its Constitutional Limitations, then the same could be examined by the courts." 23. It is settled legal proposition that invalidity of an appointment may arise not only for want of qualification as per required eligibility but also from the violation of such legal conditions or procedure for appointment as mandatorily required and as a result of which the appointment becomes void. (Vide Constitution Bench judgments in M. Pantiah v. Muddala Veeramallappa, AIR 1961 SC 1107 ; University of Mysore v. C.D. Govinda Rao, AIR 1965 SC 491 and P.N. Lakhanpal v. A.N. Roy, AIR 1975 Delhi 66 ). 24. The appointment made without following the procedure violates the mandatory requirement of State Policy framed under Article 16 of the Constitution, which enables the Authority for providing reservation to candidates of Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes and Other Backward Classes, State/Authorities are bound to adhere to the said Policy. As per the law, Roster System is to be provided and, thus, appointment made without following the procedure by the State Agency amounts to fraud upon the Constitution itself. 25. In M.P. Hasta Silpa Vikas Nigam Ltd. v. Devendra Kumar Jain, (1995)1 SCC 638 : 1995 LabIC 1365 , the Supreme Court examined a case where a person had been given employment in undue haste without following the procedure in a company. The Court held that where the person had been appointed by an officer of a Government Company fully financed by the State Government, in undue haste, his termination order should not have been interfered by the High Court and, thus, the High Court's order was found to be unsustainable. 26. A Constitution Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, in Ajit Singh (II) v. State of Punjab, (1999) 7 SCC 209 : 1999 LabIC 3128 , observed as under (at Page 3136, of LabIC) : "Article 14 and Article 16(1) are closely connected. They deal with the individual rights of the persons. Article 14 demands that State shall not deny to any person equality before the law or the equal protection of law. Article 16(1) issues a positive command that there shall be equality of opportunity for all citizens in matters relating to employment or appointment to any office under the State. It has been held repeatedly by this Court that Clause (1) of Article 16 is a facet of Article 14 that it takes its roots from Article 14. Article 16(1) issues a positive command that there shall be equality of opportunity for all citizens in matters relating to employment or appointment to any office under the State. It has been held repeatedly by this Court that Clause (1) of Article 16 is a facet of Article 14 that it takes its roots from Article 14. The said Clause particularizes the generality in Article 14 and identifies in a Constitutional Sense equality of opportunity in matter of employment and appointment to any office under the State. The right to equal opportunity in the matter of promotion in the sense of right to be considered for promotion is, indeed, a fundamental right guaranteed under Article 16(1) and this has never been doubted in any case before Ashok Kumar Gupta v. State of U.P. (1997) 5 SCC 201 right from 1950." 27. Thus, the right of consideration for appointment/promotion is not merely statutory right but is a fundamental right. 28. In Indra Sawhney v. Union of India, (2000) 1 SCC 168 : 2000 LabIC 277 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court reiterated the law laid down by it time and again that Articles 14 and 16(1) of the Constitution of India provide for rule of equality which is the basic feature of the Constitution and, therefore, there can be no deviation from the principles enshrined therein while making the appointment. Rule of equality is an antithesis of any kind of arbitrariness of private gain, whim or caprice of any individual. Even if the State has the discretionary power to issue executive instructions, such discretion is coupled with the duty to act in a manner which will promote the object for which the power is conferred and also satisfy the mandatory requirement of the Statute. (Vide A.P. Aggarwal v. Government (of NCT) of Delhi, (2000) 1 SCC 600 . In Kumari Shrilekha Vidyarthi etc. v. State of U.P. AIR 1991 SC 537 , the Apex Court held that every State Act, in order to survive, must not be susceptible to vice of arbitrariness which is a crux of Article 14 of the Constitution and basis to the rule of law. 29. In Lokmat Newspapers Pvt. Ltd. v. Shankarprasad, AIR 1999 SC 2423 : 1999 LabIC 2826 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court deprecated the practice of proceeding in undue haste by a Statutory Authority as it would be tantamount to arbitrariness. 30. 29. In Lokmat Newspapers Pvt. Ltd. v. Shankarprasad, AIR 1999 SC 2423 : 1999 LabIC 2826 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court deprecated the practice of proceeding in undue haste by a Statutory Authority as it would be tantamount to arbitrariness. 30. In the instant case, petitioner had submitted the application on 4-9-91 and it was considered and approved by the Secretary on the same date and appointment letter had been issued on the next date. i.e. 5-9-91. Even the appointment on the post of Artist-cum-Projectionist, vide order dated 5-9-94, had been made without considering any other person for the post or inviting applications and even without examining whether petitioner was eligible for the post or not. 31. Plea that though the incumbent had been appointed without following any procedure of law or without advertising the vacancy, but he had not made any misrepresentation or played fraud, thus, he cannot, be non-suited on such a ground as employer cannot be permitted to take the benefit of his own wrong, cannot be entertained by the Court for the reason that illegality should not be perpetuated. Courts are meant to prevent preparation of legal fraud and to promote justice and good faith. "Equity is also known to prevent the law from the crafty evasion and (sic) sub-lettie invented to evade law." 32. Refuting the similar plea, Supreme Court in Krishna Yadav v. State of Haryana, AIR 1994 SC 2166 observed as under (at Page 2172):- "The only proper course open to us is to set aside the entire selection. The plea was made that innocent candidates should not be penalised for the misdeeds of others. We are unable to accept this argument. When the entire selection is stinking, conceived in fraud and delivered in deceit, individual innocence has no place as Fraud unravels everything. To put it in other words, the entire selections are arbitrary. It is that which is faulted and not the individual candidates. Accordingly, we hereby set aside the selection." 33. In a case like this, the Supreme Court, in U.P. Junior Doctors Action Committee v. Dr. To put it in other words, the entire selections are arbitrary. It is that which is faulted and not the individual candidates. Accordingly, we hereby set aside the selection." 33. In a case like this, the Supreme Court, in U.P. Junior Doctors Action Committee v. Dr. B. Sheetal Nandwani, AIR 1991 SC 909 , held that "where the order itself is arbitrary, not in consonance with law it is the order being non-existent, has to be declared to be a bogus one" and the circumstances in which such benefit has been granted to the applicants concerned did not justify attraction of application of the rules of natural justice of being provided an opportunity of hearing. 34. In view of the above, it is evident that petitioner does not have any legal right to continue in office and if it is so, what is the right which he wants to enforce through writ jurisdiction. 35. It is settled law that writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution is maintainable for enforcing the statutory or legal right or when there is a complaint by the petitioner that there is a breach of the statutory duty on the part of the respondents. Therefore there must be judicially enforceable right for the enforcement of which the writ jurisdiction can be resorted to. The Court can enforce the performance of a statutory duty by public bodies through its writ jurisdiction at the behest of a person, provided such person satisfies the Court that he has a legal right to insist on such performance. The existence of the said right is the condition precedent to invoke the Writ jurisdiction. 36. A Constitution Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Calcutta Gas Co. (Proprietary) Ltd. v. State of West Bengal, AIR 1962 SC 1044 held that a person can resort to the writ proceedings provided he satisfies the Court that he has a legal right to enforce. Therefore, existence of a legal right is the condition precedent for approaching the Writ Court. For deciding the same, the Supreme Court placed reliance upon its earlier judgments in Charanjit Lal Chowdhury v. Union of India, AIR 1951 SC 41 and State of Orissa v. Madan Gopal, AIR 1952 SC 12 , wherein it had categorically been held that existence of legal right was the foundation of exercise of the jurisdiction of the Writ Court. 37. 37. In Mani Subrat Jain etc. v. State of Haryana, AIR 1977 SC 276 : 1977 LabIC 52 , the Apex Court held that minimum requirement for approaching the Writ Court is that the petitioner must have a judicially enforceable right against a person who had a legal duty to do something or abstain from doing something. While deciding the said case, the Hon'ble Supreme Court placed reliance upon its earlier judgments in State of Haryana v. Subhash Chander, AIR 1973 SC 2216 : 1974 LabIC 1212; Jasbhai Motibhai Desai v. Roshan Kumar Haji Bashir Ahmed, AIR 1976 SC 578 ; State of Kerala v. K.C. Madhavan Pillai, AIR 1989 SC 49 and Ghulam Qadir v. Special Tribunal, (2002) 1 SCC 33 : 2001 AIR SCW 4022. 38. In Bihar Public Service Commission v. State of Bihar, AIR 1997 SC 2280 , the Apex Court held that no right to appointment flows from empanelment if the select list is found suffering from gross irregularities and illegalities. Such a list cannot be acted upon and, thus, no mandamus can be issued to appoint the candidates from the said list. 39. In Shankarsan Dash v. Union of India, AIR 1991 SC 1612 : 1991 LabIC 1460 , the Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court held that existence of vacancies in the department does not create any legal right in favour of the candidate whose name appears in the select list. 40. In State of Kerala v. A. Lakshmikutty, AIR 1987 SC 331 : 1987 LabIC 447 , the Apex Court rejected the contention that candidates, whose names have been recommended for appointment, must be appointed on the ground that mere empanelment does not confer any legal right to be appointed, therefore, such a direction cannot be issued. 41. In Ramniklal N. Bhutta v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1997 SC 1236 the Hon'ble Apex Court observed as under (at Page 1240):- "The power under Article 226 is discretionary. It will be exercised only in furtherance of justice and not merely on the making out of a legal point. The interest of justice and public interest coalesce. They are very often one and the same... The Courts have to weigh the public interest vis-a- vis the private interest while exercising the power under Article 226 ... indeed any of their discretionary powers." 42. The interest of justice and public interest coalesce. They are very often one and the same... The Courts have to weigh the public interest vis-a- vis the private interest while exercising the power under Article 226 ... indeed any of their discretionary powers." 42. In Upen Chandra Gogai v. State of Assam, (1998) 3 SCC 381 : 1998 LabIC 1074 , the Apex Court held that Court should not "validate an action which was not lawful at inception." Nor the Court can permit an appointment made by giving a go-bye to the required mode of recruitment. (Vide R.K. Trivedi v. Union of India, (1998) 9 SCC 58 ; Sukhdeo Singh v. Bhagatram Sardar Singh Raghuvanshi, AIR 1975 SC 1331 : 1975 LabIC 881 and Ambica Quarry Works etc. v. State of Gujarat, AIR 1987 SC 1073 . 43. In Dr. Meera Massey v. Dr. S.R. Mehrotra, AIR 1998 SC 1153 , the Apex Court observed as under : "If the laws and principles are eroded by such institutions, it not only pollutes its functioning deteriorating its standard but also exhibits ... wrong channel adopted ... If there is any erosion or descending by those who control the activities all expectations and hopes are destroyed. If the institutions perform dedicated and sincere service with the highest morality it would not only uplift many but bring back even a limping society to its normalcy." 44. The Supreme Court has taken the same view in Ram Chand v. Union of India, (1994) 1 SCC 44 and held that "the exercise of power should not be made against the spirit of the provisions of the statute, otherwise it would tend towards arbitrariness." Similar view has been reiterated by the Apex Court in Virender S. Hooda v. State of Haryana, (1999) 3 SCC 696 : 1999 Lab IC 1838 and A.P. Agarwal v. Government of N.C.T. of Delhi, (2000) 1 SCC 600 . 45. The Court should not set aside an order which revives an illegal and bad order. [Vide Gadde Venkateswara Rao v. Government of Andhra Pradesh, AIR 1966 SC 828 ; Maharaja Chintamani Sarnath Shahdeo v. State of Bihar, (1999) 8 SCC 16 : AIR 1999 SC 3609 and Mallikarjuna Muddnagal Nagappa v. State of Karnataka, (2000) 7 SCC 238 : AIR 2000 SC 2976 . 46. [Vide Gadde Venkateswara Rao v. Government of Andhra Pradesh, AIR 1966 SC 828 ; Maharaja Chintamani Sarnath Shahdeo v. State of Bihar, (1999) 8 SCC 16 : AIR 1999 SC 3609 and Mallikarjuna Muddnagal Nagappa v. State of Karnataka, (2000) 7 SCC 238 : AIR 2000 SC 2976 . 46. The Courts are not under an obligation to interfere in such matters for the reason that Common Law doctrine of public policy can be enforced wherever an action affects or offends public interest or where harmful result of permitting the injury to the public at large is evident. 47. In view of the above discussion, the Court reaches the following inescapable conclusions : (i) Respondent Society is an agency of the Central Government and, thus, "State" within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution and amenable to writ jurisdiction, therefore, appointments have to be made in accordance with Statutory Rules/Bye Laws and in absence thereof, in accordance with the Resolution adopted by the Society and even if there is no Resolution, by adopting a fair procedure which may be in consonance with the provisions of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution; (ii) Petitioner, though stood appointed in 1991 as a Stenographer (Hindi) with respondent Society, without following any procedure, on his own application but has not disclosed this fact in the writ petition. The suppression may not be material for the purpose, but he ought to have disclosed it for the reason that it could have been examined whether petitioner had earlier been appointed in accordance with law or on extraneous consideration without following any procedure; (iii) Petitioner's appointment in 1991 was made with undue haste and on the same day he filed the application. He had been appointed as Artist-cum- Projectionist without any application filled by him. It is not a post to be filled up by promotion. The order of his appointment as such had been passed without following any procedure or inviting applications from any one or calling the names from any other source; (iv) Such appointment made even without any application by the petitioner for seeking appointment on the post and without following selection procedure does not confer any legal right upon him to hold the post. Such appointment is not merely in violation of the mandate of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution but is a fraud in itself; (v) An order which is bad in inception, cannot be sanctioned at later stage by any means therefore, even petitioner's confirmation subsequently does not create any right in his favour to hold the post; (vi) Petitioner, claiming himself to be self-appointed activist, had been shouting from the roof-top that respondent Society had been making appointments/promotions on extraneous considerations and persons were being appointed/promoted only on the ground of their close relationship with the office-bearers of the Society, thus such appointments/promotions were the products of nepotism, favouritism and corruption. When petitioners voice was not heard by the Society, he filed certain writ petitions before this Court challenging such appointments/promotions; (vii) Because of filing of such petitions and considering the averments made by him in those writ petitions that appointments/promotions cannot be made without advertising the vacancies; respondent Society rectified the mistake, nullifying those appointments/promotions and those writ petitions were dismissed, as having become infructuous, by this Court vide Order dated 22-1-2002; (viii) The Writ Court, being a Court of equity and justice, should not interfere and quash the order impugned if it revives a wrong and illegal order. Thus quashing the order of termination in the instant case would revive the illegal appointment of petitioner; (ix) Existence of justifiable right capable of being enforced through Courts, is a condition precedent for entertaining a writ petition and as petitioner does not have any such right, in spite of the fact that he has been terminated without following any procedure, no interference is called for as no such right exists in his favour by his illegal appointment/confirmation; and (x) Even if petitioner's termination is bad or suffers from some illegality or irregularity, public policy and substantial justice demand no interference in such a case as there is no obligation on the part of the Court to protect a person appointed by a spoil system violating the fundamental rights of eligible candidates of being considered for the said post. 48. Thus, the instant petition does not present any special feature providing for judicial review of the impugned order in writ jurisdiction. The petition is accordingly dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs.Petition dismissed.