JUDGMENT M.L. Singhal, J. - Through this order, I propose to dispose of Civil Revision Nos. 567 of 1998 to 577 and 807 of 1998 as the same question of law and fact is arising in all these revisions. Facts have been take from C.R. No. 569 of 1998. 2. Land measuring 113 acres 6 kanals and 16 marlas situated in Mauja Bhiwani Lohar was acquired by the Haryana Government for the construction of offices of Board of School Education Haryana at Bhiwani. Sub-Divisional Officer (Civil) exercising the powers of Land Acquisition Collector, Bhiwani gave award on 24.8.1976. The land acquired belongs to Rohtash Singh etc. Not satisfied with the quantum of compensation awarded to the landowners, they came up to District Judge, Bhiwani through various references under Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (here-in-after referred to as "the Act"). 3. Shri V.K. Kaushal, District Judge, Bhiwani, allowed the references vide order dated 13.4.1982. He allowed compensation at the rate of Rs. 8.50 per sq. yard to the landowners. Some of the landowners namely Bhurji etc. approached the High Court by way of R.F.A. No. 883 of 1982 which was decided on 5.4.1983 and the amount of compensation was enhanced to Rs. 12.50 per sq.yard. An S.L.P. taken to the Honble Supreme Courtt was dismissed. 4. Some of the landowners whose land was also acquired under the same Notification under Section 4 of the Act, namely, Rohtash Singh etc. did not go in for reference under Section 18 of the Act and they accepted the award given by the Land Acquisition Collector. Thereafter, Rohtash Singh etc. filed an application under section 28-A of the Act claiming re-determination of the amount of compensation to be payable to them in view of the judgment dated 25.8.1995 passed by the Additional District Judge, Bhiwani in the case of Pardeep Kumar v. State of Haryana. Sub Divisional Officer (Civil)-cum-Land Acquisition Collector, Bhiwani allowed their applications and awarded them compensation at the same rate which had been awarded in R.F.A. No. 883 of 1992 decided on 5.4.1983, besides solatium at the rate of 15% on the aforesaid amount from the date when the Haryana School Education Board had taken possession of the land and interest at the rate of 6% per annum from the date of taking over possession i.e. 19.6.1976 till payment. While doing so, he relied upon the judgment of the Additional District Judge in the case of Pardeep Kumar v. State of Haryana where-through he was ordered to pay compensation for the acquired land at the rate of 12.50 per sq.yard, besides solatium and interest. 5. The Board of School Education Haryana has come up in revision to this Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India whereby it has been prayed that the order dated 17.12.1997 (copy of which is Annexure P-1) passed by Sub-Divisional Officer (civil)-cum-Land Acquisition Collector, Bhiwani whereby the application filed by the private respondents under Section 28-A of the Act was allowed. 6. Vide order dated 17.11.1997 Shri M.L. Sharma, Additional District Judge (1), Bhiwani, held the application of the applicants before him filed under Section 28-A of the Act maintainable and held that they are entitled to compensation, solatium and interest at the rate at which the same was awarded to Pardeep Kumar etc. decided on 25.8.1995 by Shri H.P. Singh, Additional District Judge, Bhiwani and ordered S.D.O. (Civil)-cum-land Acquisition Collector, Bhiwani, for passing award under Section 28-A of the Act. 7. It was submitted by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the learned District Judge gave the award on 13.4.1982. Against the award of the learned District Judge by some of the landowners, whereby they claimed enhancement, High Court disposed of the appeal enhancing compensation by order dated 5.4.1983 passed in R.F.A. No. 883 of 1982. 8. Land Acquisition Act was amended w.e.f. 30.4.1982. Through amendment, Section 28-A was incorporated on 24.9.1984. It was submitted that the landowners who had not even applied for enhancement under section 18 of the Act, made application that they be given the benefit of enhancement and their application was allowed. It was submitted that Section 28-A could not be made use of by the respondents at such a belated stage. They could make use of section 28-A of the Act within three months from the date of the passing of the award by the Land Acquisition Collector. It was held in Union of India and another v. Raghubir Singh (dead) by LRs. etc., AIR 1989 SC 1933 that there can be no doubt that the benefit of the enhanced solatium is intended by Section 30(2) of amendment Act in respect of an award made by the Collector between 30th April, 1982 and 24th September, 1984. It was held in Union of India and another v. Raghubir Singh (dead) by LRs. etc., AIR 1989 SC 1933 that there can be no doubt that the benefit of the enhanced solatium is intended by Section 30(2) of amendment Act in respect of an award made by the Collector between 30th April, 1982 and 24th September, 1984. Likewise the benefit of the enhanced solatium is extended by Section 30(2) to the case of an award by the Court between 30th April, 1982 and 24th September, 1984, even though it be upon reference from an award made before 30th April, 1982. The dispute is about the meaning of the words "or to any order passed by the High Court or Supreme Court on appeal against any such award" used in Section 30(2). Are they limited to appeals against an award of the Collector or the Court made between 30th April, 1982 and 24th September, 1984 or do they include also appeals disposal of between 30th April, 1982 and 24th September, 1984 even though arising out of awards of the Collector or the Court made before 30th April, 1982 ? It is significant to note that the Parliament has identified the appeal before the High Court and the appeal before the Supreme Court by describing it as an appeal against any such award. The words any such award are intended to have deeper significance, and in the context in which those words appear in Section 30(2) it is clear that they are intended to refer to awards made by the Collector or Court between 30th April, 1982 and 24th September, 1984. In other words, Section 30(2) of the Amendment Act extends the benefit of the enhanced solatium to cases where the award by the Collector or by the Court is made between 30th April, 1982 and 24th September, 1984 or to appeals against such awards decided by the High Court and the Supreme Court whether the decisions of the High Court or the Supreme Court are rendered before 24th September, 1984 or after that date. All that is material is that the award by the Collector or by the Court should have been made between 30th April, 1982 and 24th September, 1984. It cannot be said that the words any such award only mean the award made by the Collector or Court, and carry no greater limiting sense. All that is material is that the award by the Collector or by the Court should have been made between 30th April, 1982 and 24th September, 1984. It cannot be said that the words any such award only mean the award made by the Collector or Court, and carry no greater limiting sense. No such words of description by way of identifying the appellate order of the High Court or of the Supreme Court were necessary. Plainly, having regard to the existing hierarchical structure of forum contemplated in the parent Act those appellate orders could only be ordered arising in appeal against the award of the Collector or of the Court. If Parliament had intended that the benefit of enhanced solatium should be extended to all pending proceedings it would have said so in clear language. On the contrary, the terms in which Section 30(2) is couched indicate a limited extension of the benefit. The Amendment Act has not been made generally retrospective with effect from any particular date, and such retrospectivity as appears is restricted to certain areas covered by the parent Act and must be discovered from the specific terms of the provisions concerned. Similarly, it was never intended to define the scope of the enhanced solatium on the mere accident of the disposal of a case in appeal on a certain date. It is true that an appeal is a continuation of the proceedings initiated before the Court by way of reference under Section 18 but the application of a general principle must yield to the limiting terms of the statutory provision itself. The Parliament intends that the benefit of Section 30(2) will be available to an award by the Collector or the Court made between the aforesaid two dates or to an appellate order of the High Court or of the Supreme Court which arises but of an award of the Collector or the Court made between the said two dates. The word or used in Section 30(2) is used with reference to the stage at which the proceeding rests at the time when the benefit under Section 30(2) is sought to be extended. The word or used in Section 30(2) is used with reference to the stage at which the proceeding rests at the time when the benefit under Section 30(2) is sought to be extended. Word or cannot be understood as meaning that the period 30th April, 1982 to 24th September, 1984 is as much applicable to the appellate order of the High Court or of the Supreme Court as it is to the award made by the Collector or the Court. 9. It was submitted that the benefit of enhancement could not be availed of by the respondent as the award was delivered in their case by the District Judge on 13.4.1982 i.e. before the Amendment Act came into force. In Babua Ram and others v. State of U.P. and another, 1995(2) SCC 689, the Honble Supreme Court held where an award under Section 11 was made prior to 24.9.1984 but reference Court determined higher compensation on or after 24.9.1984, persons interested in other lands covered by the same notification would be entitled to apply for re-determination of compensation. A person interested becomes aggrieved when for other lands covered by the same notification under Section 4(1) of the Act, the Court awards higher compensation. Such aggrieved person who had not made an application for reference earlier, becomes entitled to invoke Section 28-A of the Act. The right to an aggrieved person under Section 28-A(1) arises only when the reference court grants compensation in excess of the amount awarded under section 11 i.e. after 24.9.1984. It is prospective in operation after the Act had come into force. It is, therefore, clear that an award made under Section 11 is final and cannot be reopened by having recourse to Section 28-A if the award was made under Section 26 on reference under Section 18 before 24.9.1984. It is prospective in operation after the Act had come into force. It is, therefore, clear that an award made under Section 11 is final and cannot be reopened by having recourse to Section 28-A if the award was made under Section 26 on reference under Section 18 before 24.9.1984. Therefore, if an owner of the land or person interested in compensation of the land acquired by the same notification under Section 4(1) had not sought reference under Section 18 in respect to an award made under Section 11 by the Collector, but if on a reference made under Section 18 prior to 24.9.1984 in respect of land covered by the same notification any award made under Section 26, prior to the Amendment Act had come into force, the award under Section 11 is not liable to be reopened for redetermination of compensation even though three months period has not expired by 24.9.1984 for to hold otherwise would amount to giving retrospective operation to Section 28-A. Any other non-protester claimant will not be entitled to get an award reopened under Section 11 though on reference at the instance of one or other of the owners or interested person he had the benefit of determination of higher compensation by an award made under section 26 before 24.9.1984 on his reference under Section 18 made prior to 24.9.1984. An award under Section 11 made prior to 24.9.1984 and a reference under Section 18 sought and secured was pending in the civil Court on 24.9.1984 and civil court determines higher compensation on or after 24.9.1984, persons interested in other land covered by the same notification under Section 4(1), would be entitled to make an application/applications in writing to the Collector to redetermine the compensation and to make an award under section 28-A(2) on the basis of the award and decree under Section 26. It would be so, for that would not amount to retrospective reopening of an award under Section 11 but drawing antecedent facts from a pending reference for giving effect to the prospective operation of the provisions in Section 28-A(1) consistent with the language as explained earlier and the object of the amendment. 10. It would be so, for that would not amount to retrospective reopening of an award under Section 11 but drawing antecedent facts from a pending reference for giving effect to the prospective operation of the provisions in Section 28-A(1) consistent with the language as explained earlier and the object of the amendment. 10. If an owner fails to avail of the right and remedy under Section 18(1), Section 28-A(1) grants an extra right and remedy for determination of the compensation payable to him for his land on the basis of an award of the Court giving to an owner of another land covered by the same notification under Section 4(1) and under the same award. The payment of higher compensation to his neighbouring landowner makes an applicant an aggrieved person entitling him to claim redetermination of the compensation payable to him for his land. The person aggrieved, therefore, in this context, would mean a person who had suffered legal injury or one who has been unjustly deprived or denied of something, which he would be interested to obtain in the usual course or similar benefits or advantage or results in wrongful affectation of his title to compensation. 11. The person aggrieved must, therefore, be one who has suffered a legal grievance because of a decision pronounced by civil court giving higher compensation for the acquired lands similar to his own while he is denied of such higher compensation for his land because of operation of Section 18 read with Section 31 of the Act resulting in affectation of his pecuniary interest in his acquired land directly and adversely by that award of the Collector made under Section 11. As such, he becomes an aggrieved person entitled to avail of the right and remedy conferred upon him under Section 28-A(1) to make good his denied right to receive compensation in excess of the amount awarded by the Collector/LAO. 12. Any interested person in the land acquired under the same notification published under Section 4(1) who failed to avail the right and remedy under Section 18(1) read with second proviso to Section 31(2) becomes a person aggrieved under Section 28-A(1) of the Act when the owner of the another land covered by the same notification is awarded higher compensation by the civil Court on a reference got made by him under Section 18. 13. 13. A bare reading of sub-section (1) of Section 28-A along with its proviso would indicate that the making of the award by the Civil Court or judicial Officer which becomes the judgment and decree under Section 26 is the starting point from which the period of limitation is allowed for making an application under section 28-A. 14. In Union of India and another v. Pradeep Kumari and others, (1995)2 SCC 736 the Honble Supreme Court held that the benefit of redetermination of the amount of compensation under section 28-A of the Act can be availed of on the basis of any one of the awards that has been made by the Court after the coming into force of Section 28-A within the prescribed period of three months from the date of making of the award on the basis of which redetermination is sought. The application for redetermination of the compensation is required to be made within three months from the date of the award of the Court. The right to make the application under section 28-A arises from the award of the Court on the basis of which the person making the application is seeking redetermination of the compensation. The application for redetermination of the compensation is required to be made within three months from the date of the award of the Court. The right to make the application under section 28-A arises from the award of the Court on the basis of which the person making the application is seeking redetermination of the compensation. There is nothing in sub-section (1) of the Section 28-A to indicate that this right is confined in respect of the earliest award that is made by the Court after the coming into force of Section 28-A. By restricting the benefit of Section 28-A to the first award that is made by the court after the coming into force of Section 28-A, the benefit of higher amount of compensation on the basis of the subsequent award made by the Court, would be denied to the persons invoking Sections 28-A and the benefit of the said provision would be conferred to redetermination of compensation on the basis of lesser amount of compensation awarded under the first award that is made after the coming into force of Section 28-A. There is nothing in the wordings of Section 28-A to indicate that the legislature intended to confer such a limited benefit under Section 28-A. Such a construction would thus result in perpetuating the inequality in the payment of compensation which the Legislature wanted to remove by enacting Section 28-A. The object underlying Section 28-A would be better achieved by giving the expression "an award" in Section 28-A its natural meaning as meaning the award that is made by the Court in part III of the Act after the coming into force of Section 28-A. 15. Since the cause of action for moving the application for redetermination of compensation under Section 28-A arises from the award on the basis of which redetermination of compensation is sought, the principle that "once the limitation begins to run, it runs its full course until its running is interdicted by an order of the court", can have no application because the limitation for moving the application under Section 28-A will begin to run only from the date of the award on the basis of which redetermination of compensation is sought. 16. 16. A person would be able to seek redetermination of the amount of compensation payable to him provided the following conditions are satisfied : (i) An award has been made by the Court under Part III after the coming into force of Section 28-A; (ii) By the said award the amount of compensation in excess of the amount awarded by the Collector under Section 11 has been allowed to the applicant in that reference; (iii) The person moving the application under Section 28-A is interested in other land covered by the same notification under section 4(1) to which the said award relates; (iv) The person moving the application did not make an application to the Collector under Section 18; (v) The application is moved within three months from the date of the award on the basis of which the redetermination of amount of compensation is sought; and (vi) Only one application can be moved under section 28-A for redetermination of compensation by an applicant. Section 28-A of the Act reads as under : (1) Where in an award under this Part, the Court allows to the applicant any amount of compensation in excess of the amount awarded by the Collector under Section 11, the persons interested in all the other land covered by the same notification under Section 4, sub-section (1) and who are also aggrieved by the award of the Collector may, notwithstanding that they had not made an application to the Collector under Section 18, by written application to the Collector within three months from the date of the award of the Court require that the amount of compensation payable to them may be redetermined on the basis of the amount of compensation awarded by the Court : Provided that in computing the period of three months within which an application to the Collector shall be made under this sub-section, the day on which the award was pronounced and the time requisite for obtaining a copy of the award shall be excluded. (2) The Collector shall, on receipt of an application under sub- section (1), conduct an inquiry after giving notice to all the persons interested and giving them a reasonable opportunity of being heard and made an award determining the amount of compensation payable to the applicants: (3) Any person who has not accepted the award under sub-section (2) may, by written application to the Collector, require that the matter be referred by the Collector for the determination of the Court and the provisions of Sections 18 to 28 shall, so far as may be, apply to such reference as they apply to a reference under Section 18". The object underlying the enactment of these provisions, as indicated in the statement of Objects and Reasons, was : "(ix) Considering that the right of reference to the civil court under Section 18 of the Act is not usually taken advantage of by inarticulate and poor people and is usually exercised by the comparatively affluent landowners and that this causes considerable inequality in the payment of compensation for the same or similar quality of land to different interested parties, it is proposed to provide an opportunity to all aggrieved parties whose land is covered under the same notification to seek redetermination of compensation, once anyone of them has obtained orders for payment of higher compensation from the reference Court under Section 18 of the Act." 17. In Babua Rams case (supra) decided by a Bench of two Judges, it has been held that the period of three months prescribed for moving an application for redetermination of compensation under Section 28-A has to be computed from the date of the making of the first award. It has been observed: (SCC page 710 para 20). Limitation begins to run from the date the award was pronounced by the Court under Section 26. It is well-settled that the law of limitation limits the time after which a suit or other preceding cannot be entertained in a court of justice or before appropriate authority, though it does not affect the substantive rights of the parties. Once the limitation begins to run, it runs in its full course until its running is interdicted by an order of the Court. Once the limitation begins to run, it runs in its full course until its running is interdicted by an order of the Court. It is true that in a given set of facts, there could be more than one reference under Section 18 at the behest of different claimants of the lands covered by Section 4(1) notification and the court may make successive awards at various times. Compensation given in the respective awards may vary and may be higher than the one given in an earliest award. In the teeth of the express language in sub-section (1) of Section 28-A, limitation of three months once expires in respect of earliest award by efflux of time, none of the later awards could prove any assistance to revive the lapsed time under Section 28-A(1) nor provide fresh cause of action or successive causes of action when multiple awards are made at different times or dates. 18. In Union of India and another v. Pradeep Kumar and others, (1995)2 SCC 736 it was observed as follows in paras 7-8 : "After giving our thoughtful consideration to the aforementioned reasons we are unable to persuade ourselves to take the view that the period of limitation for making an application under Section 28-A of the Act has to be computed from the date of the making of the first award after the coming into force of section 28-A and any subsequent award has no bearing on the right conferred by Section 28-A. We may, at the outset, state that having regard to the Statement of Objects and Reasons, referred to earlier, the object underlying the enactment of Section 28-A is to remove inequality in the payment of compensation for same or similar quality of land arising on account of inarticulate and poor people not being able to take advantage of the right of reference to the civil court under Section 18 of the Act. This is sought to be achieved by providing an opportunity to all aggrieved parties whose land is covered by the same notification to seek redetermination once any of them has obtained orders for payment of higher compensation from the reference court under Section 18 of the Act. This is sought to be achieved by providing an opportunity to all aggrieved parties whose land is covered by the same notification to seek redetermination once any of them has obtained orders for payment of higher compensation from the reference court under Section 18 of the Act. Section 28-A is, therefore, in the nature of a beneficent provision intended to remove inequality and to give relief to the inarticulate and poor people who are not able to take advantage of right of reference to the civil Court under Section 18 of the Act. In relation to beneficent legislation, the law is well-settled that while construing the provisions of such a legislation the Court should adopt a construction which advances the policy of the legislation to extend the benefit rather than a construction which has the effect of curtailing the benefit conferred by it. The provisions of Section 28-A should, therefore, be construed keeping in view the object underlying the said provision." 19. It was submitted by the learned counsel for the respondent that Shri H.P. Singh, Additional District Judge, enhanced the compensation payable to Pardeep Kumar son of Fateh Singh (L.A. Case No. 25 of 1994) and Gokal Singh and Ashok Kumar sons of Fateh Singh (L.A. Case No. 26 of 1994) at the rate of 12.50 per sq. yard along with solatium and interest. While doing so, he followed the compensation which was ordered to be paid by this Court in R.F.A. No. 883 of 1982 decided on 5.4.1983. It was submitted that in land measuring 113 acres 6 kanals and 16 marlas which was acquired through notification dated 17.6.1976 was included the land covered by L.A. Case No. 25 of 1994 and L.A. Case No. 26 of 1994, and, therefore, on this analogy the same amount of compensation was awarded to Pardeep Kumar, Gokal Singh and Ashok Kumar by Shri H.P. Singh, Additional District Judge, Bhiwani which was awarded to Rachhpal Singh by this Court on 5.4.1983 in R.F.A. No. 883 of 1982. It was submitted that after finding that Pardeep Kumar etc. had been awarded compensation at the rate of Rs. It was submitted that after finding that Pardeep Kumar etc. had been awarded compensation at the rate of Rs. 12.50 per sq.yard, along with solatium and interest by the Additional District Judge, on reference by them under Section 18 of the Act, Rohtash Singh and others who had missed the bus earlier made applications under Section 28-A to the Additional District Judge for redetermination of the amount of compensation to them for the land acquired. Their case was that they should be awarded the same amount of compensation which had been awarded to others whose land also formed part of this chunk of land measuring 113 standard acres 6 kanals and 16 marlas. As redetermination of compensation was to be made by the Collector, Shri M.L. Sharma, Additional District Judge, Bhiwani directed the Collector to re-determine the compensation awarded to Rohtash Singh and others in view of the provisions of Section 28-A of the Act and the Collector gave them the same amount of compensation which had been given to Pardeep Kumar etc. and also solatium and interest. It was further submitted by the learned counsel for the respondent that while doing so, the Land Acquisition Collector did nothing but spoke of the intention of the Parliament as reflected in Section 28-A of the Act. He had given only that amount of compensation to Rohtash Singh and others which had been given to Pardeep Kumar, Gokal Singh and Ashok Kumar by Shri Hari Puran Singh, Additional District Judge, Bhiwani vide order dated 25.8.1995 and to Rachhpal Singh etc. by this Court in R.F.A. No. 883 of 1982 decided on 5.4.1983. 20. Learned counsel for the petitioner, on the other hand, submitted that was no limitation for Pardeep Kumar etc. for going in reference under Section 18 of the Act in the year 1994 when the Collector had given award on 24.8.1976. It was submitted that they could go in for reference under Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act only within limitation and not after the lapse of 18 years. It was also submitted that the award of Shri H.P. Singh, Additional District Judge, Bhiwani was illegal and void. Rohtash Singh etc. could not make this award the basis for calculating limitation for knocking the door of the Land Acquisition Collector under Section 28-A of the Act. It was submitted that Rohtash Singh etc. It was also submitted that the award of Shri H.P. Singh, Additional District Judge, Bhiwani was illegal and void. Rohtash Singh etc. could not make this award the basis for calculating limitation for knocking the door of the Land Acquisition Collector under Section 28-A of the Act. It was submitted that Rohtash Singh etc. could make the earlier award dated 5.4.1983 of this Court as the basis of their knocking the door of the Collector for claiming the benefit under Section 28-A of the Act. 21. The learned counsel for the respondents submitted that Rohtash Singh etc. could knock the door of the Collector for claiming the benefit under Section 28-A of the Act counting limitation from the award dated 25.8.1995 in favour of the Pardeep Kumar etc. It was submitted that this award became a good and enforceable awarded when the Haryana School Education Board did not go in appeal against this award. 22. In this case, thus, there are three sets of persons whose land was acquired. One set of persons is that who are covered by the decision of R.F.A. No. 883 of the 1982 decided on 5.4.1983; second set of persons are Pardeep Kumar etc. who are awarded compensation at par with that which had been awarded to Rachhpal Singh etc. vide order dated 5.4.1983. Rohtash Singh etc. are the third set of persons who did not go in for any reference under section 18 of the Act to the District Judge. They fell content whatever was awarded to them by the land Acquisition Collector vide award dated 24.8.1976. It was submitted by the learned counsel for the respondents that it would be inequitable and unjust that Rohtash Singh etc. should be awarded compensation at a far less rate vis-a-vis those who have been awarded much higher by this Court and by the Additional District Judge. It was submitted that Section 28-A intended to obviate such disparities. In my opinion, since the award dated 25.8.1995 became good and enforceable because of the absence of appeal against it by the Haryana School Education Board, Rohtash Singh etc. were justified in claiming parity with others in the matter of the award and compensation by invoking the provisions of Section 28-A of the Act, all these revisions fail and are dismissed. No order as to costs. Revisions dismissed.