P. K. BISWAS, J. ( 1 ) THIS is an application under section 227 of the Constitution of India filed at the instance of one Balai Chandra Kar, petitioner herein against the opposite party/state seeking to set aside the impugned order dated 7. 7. 94 passed by the learned Appellate Authority being Special Secretary, Food and Supplies Department, Government of West Bengal in Essential Commodities Confiscation Appeal No. 3 of 1993 (arising out of E. C. case No. 10/s-1988) thereby rejecting the Memo of Appeal filed on behalf of the petitioner challenging the order of confiscation dated 19. 7. 93 passed by the learned Sub-Divisional Officer, Midnapore (Sadar), South (Collector under the Essential Commodities Act) in E. C. case No. 10/s-1988. The short facts leading to the filing of this application are as under :- ( 2 ) ASSAILING an order of confiscation passed by the learned Sub-Divisional Officer, Midnapore (Sadar) South (Collector under the Essential Commodities Act) in E. C. case No. 10/s-1988 dated 19. 7. 93, whereby confiscation of seized stock of 460 litres of kerosene oil and 100 kilos of sugar and 325 kilos of rapeseed oil made, the petitioner filed one Memo of Appeal on 23. 9. 93 before the learned Special Secretary, Food and Supplies Department, Government of West Bengal, being the learned Appellate Authority under section 6c of the Essential Commodities Act, and the said appeal was registered as Essential Commodities Confiscation Appeal No. 3 of 1993 and the said appeal was taken up for hearing on 7. 7. 94 by the learned Appellate Authority. ( 3 ) DURING the hearing of the aforesaid appeal, it was held by the aforesaid Appellate Authority that the concerned appeal was out of time and since only a competent Court can allow an appeal as per section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963, the State Government is not competent to do so and on that count it was held that the appeal was time barred and the same was rejected. ( 4 ) BEING aggrieved by and dissatisfaction with the aforesaid order passed by the learned Appellate Authority, the petitioner has moved this Court seeking for the reliefs as mentioned at the outset alleging, inter alia, that the learned Appellate Authority was totally in an error of law in rejecting the Memo of Appeal on the ground that the same is time barred without correctly asserting to the points in issue inasmuch as the learned Appellate Authority lost sight of the fact that as an Appellate Authority he was exercising a judicial power vested upon him under the statute. It has further been alleged that sub-section (2) of section 29 of the Limitation Act postulates that where any special or local law prescribes for any suit, appeal or application, a period of limitation different from the period prescribed by the schedule, the provisions of section 3 shall apply as if such period where the period prescribed by the schedule and for the purpose of determining any period of limitation prescribed for any suit, appeal or application by any special or local law, the provisions contained in sections 4 to 24 (inclusive) shall apply only in so far as, and to the extent which, they are not expressly excluded by such special or local law. It has further been contended that in the Essential Commodities Act as amended upto date, nothing has been proscribed or expressly prohibited that the Limitation Act has no application so far as the proceedings under the said Act is concerned and as such the provisions of Limitation Act will have its application in the proceedings under the Essential Commodities Act. It has further been contended that in the Essential Commodities Act as amended upto date, nothing has been proscribed or expressly prohibited that the Limitation Act has no application so far as the proceedings under the said Act is concerned and as such the provisions of Limitation Act will have its application in the proceedings under the Essential Commodities Act. ( 5 ) IT has been further alleged that sub-section (1) of section 6c of the Essential Commodities Act postulates that any person aggrieved by an order of confiscation under section 6a of the Act, may, within one month from the date of communication to his of such order, prefer his appeal and in the instant case, the learned Appellate Authority was of the view that as the petitioner was present when such order was passed, the period of limitation will run from the date of passing the order without considering the fact that the time to obtain the certified copy of the order must not be included while computing the period of limitation and as such grave injustice was caused to the petitioner for which he has come up with the aforesaid relief seeking to set aside the impugned order. ( 6 ) I have heard the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner as also the learned counsel appearing for the State at length. I have also looked into the impugned order itself with meticulous care, wherefrom it is seen that the Appellate Authority, at the first instance, has held that although there is a provision that as per section 6c of the Essential Commodities Act, 1955 any person aggrieved by an order of confiscation under section 6a, may, within one month from the date of communication to him of such order appeal to the State Government, yet, it was held by him that during hearing and from the record it transpired that the appellant was very much present on 19. 7. 93 when the Order appealed against was passed by the collector and as such he was duly communicated about the aforesaid order of confiscation. It has further been held by the appellate Authority that if he wanted to prefer an appeal, he should have done it within one month as per statute and instead he preferred an appeal only on 23. 9. 93 which is much beyond one month's time. It has further been held by the appellate Authority that if he wanted to prefer an appeal, he should have done it within one month as per statute and instead he preferred an appeal only on 23. 9. 93 which is much beyond one month's time. At the second place, it was also held by the aforesaid appellate Authority that since only a competent Court can allow appeal as per section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 the State Government is not competent to do so and as such it was further held that he had no Authority to go beyond his jurisdiction and he therefore held that the appeal is time barred and accordingly it was rejected. ( 7 ) HERE, in this case, the order of confiscation was passed by the learned Sub-Divisional Officer, Midnapore Sadar (South) (Collector under the Essential Commodities Act) in E. C. case No. 10/s/1988 dated 19. 7. 93 and the petitioner filed one Memo of appeal on 23. 9. 93 before the learned Special Secretary (Food and Supplies Department) Government of West Bengal. ( 8 ) UNDER the Principal Act, the forum of preferring an appeal under section 6c (1) is a judicial Authority appointed by the State Government. But the Special Provisions Act, 1981, made the State Government itself the appellate Authority and such Special Provisions Act remained in force for 15 years, and it lost its force by efflux of time with the expiry of August, 1997. ( 9 ) THE aforesaid Appellate Authority took the view that since only a competent Court can allow condonation as per section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963, the State Government is not competent to do so, and as such it was held by him that he had no jurisdiction to condone the delay and as such the appeal preferred was rejected holding that it was time barred. ( 10 ) THE applicability of section 5 of the Limitation Act came up for consideration before the Apex Court at various point of time. ( 11 ) IT was held by the Apex Court while examining the issue that the provisions of section 5 of the Limitation Act apply to proceedings before Court and not before the tribunals. ( 10 ) THE applicability of section 5 of the Limitation Act came up for consideration before the Apex Court at various point of time. ( 11 ) IT was held by the Apex Court while examining the issue that the provisions of section 5 of the Limitation Act apply to proceedings before Court and not before the tribunals. ( 12 ) SAME view was also taken by a Divisional Bench of this Court reported in AIR 1987 Calcutta 107 (Tarapada Dey v. District Registrar, Hooghly and Ors.) wherein it was held that the scheme of the Limitation Act is that it deals with application to Courts. Because of the provisions of section 29 (2), the provisions of section 5 authorising extension of the prescribed period, are available to matters governed by the special law of limitation. But even if those powers are so available, those would apply to matters in or before Courts only. ( 13 ) IN another judgment Supreme Court in Mukri Gopalan v. C. P. Aboobacker reported in AIR 1995 SC 2272 has comprehensively considered the entire case law on the subject touching upon both the aspects that is the applicability of the Limitation Act, 1963 for special statutes as also the applicability of the same not only before the Courts, but also other authorities. Ultimately, it was laid down by the Apex Court in the aforesaid judgment that as per section 29 (2) of the Limitation Act, the Courts functioning under special or local laws also shall be entitled to invoke the provisions of sections 4 to 24 of the Limitation Act, 1963 on fulfillment of certain conditions as enunciated in the aforesaid judgment. ( 14 ) IN view of the aforesaid settled position of law, here in this case, the appellate Authority being the State Government and not being the Court, the said Authority has neither any jurisdiction nor any competence under section 5 of the Limitation Act for extension of the period of one month when the appeal in question was not filed within one month from the date of communication of the order of confiscation as here in this case the petitioner was very much present at the time of passing of the order of confiscation. ( 15 ) THAT being the position, I find that no illegality or irregularity has been committed by the learned appellate Authority in passing the impugned order dated 7. 7. 94 and accordingly, I find no reason for interference by this Court by invoking the provision of Article 227 of the Constitution of India. ( 16 ) IN view of what I have stated above, I hold that the revisional application is devoid of any merit and as such the same is dismissed accordingly. Let a copy of this judgment be sent down the Court below for information and necessary compliance. Application dismissed