JUDGMENT 1. - Heard learned counsel for the parties. 2. This special appeal has arisen out of the application for grant of temporary injunction in a suit filed by the appellants. According to the appellants they had entered into an agreement on 6.3.79 with the respondent for purchase of agricultural land for a consideration of Rs. 85,000/-. Alongwith the suit for specific performance, the appellants moved an application under Order 39 Rule 1 and 2 for grant of temporary injunction, restraining the respondents/defendants from evicting them from the suit property, of which the appellants claimed to be in possession under the aforesaid agreement to sell dated 6.3.79. It is further stated that upto 4.5.81 appellants have paid Rs. 41,000/- out of Rs. 85,000/- to the defendants, but the defendants allowed the allotment of land cancelled in their favour due to non-deposit of instalments in the year 1982. The allotment has been restored in the year 1982. The allotment has been restored to defendants only in 1998. Now the vendors are trying to evict them from the suit property, which is agricultural land, by filing a Revenue suit under Section 183 of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act. The respondents are widow and children of Uttam Chand who are four sons and one daughter. The respondents No. 4 to 6 are alleged to be minors at the time of agreement to sell. Present suit has been filed in the court of Addl. District Judge, Ganganagar which was transferred to Addl. District Judge, No. 2, Sriganganagar Camp at Suratgarh. 3. Another allegation which was made in the application that a Revenue suit has been filed for evicting the plaintiffs/appellants from the suit property by denying the agreement to sell and alleging the present appellants/plaintiffs to be trespassers. 4. During hearing of application, the trial court found that suit has been filed almost 21 years after the alleged agreement to sell and that no attempt was made even after the cancellation of allotment, which took place In 1982, to get it restored nor any attempt was made to get sale deed executed in their favour by the appellants, and the suit against the respondents/defendants No. 1, 2 & 3, who were not minors, could have been filed only within three years, against whom the suit filed on 3.5.2001 appears to be barred by limitation. He also considered the report from Patwarl showing that land in question was taken into possession by the State from the appellants on 7.11.97. Cumulatively he found that no prima facie case Is made out in favour of the present plaintiffs, and the trial court dismissed the temporary injunction application by order dated 2.3.2001. 5. The appeal against the same has also been rejected vide order passed by the learned single judge on 27.3.2001 at admission stage by noticing all the facts and also considering the findings of the trial court that the plaintiffs were not found, to be in possession on the date of filing of the suit and application u/O 39 Rule 1 & 2 CPC. 6. It is true that both the courts below i.e. learned trial court as well as learned single judge has proceeded, erroneously on assumption that the present appellants-plaintiffs are not in possession of the suit land inasmuch plaintiffs possession in the present case is admitted by the respondents and on that basis present respondents have filed a revenue suit u/s. 183 of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act for evicting the appellants from the land as trespassers. Learned counsel for the appellants has placed a copy of the plaint filed by the respondent/defendants before the court for its perusal from his record which was served on him by the revenue court. Therefore, as on date of filing of the Revenue suit, which is a prior suit, by the defendants and on the date of filing the suit by the appellants the possession of present appellants cannot be doubted. Probably the courts below were referring to fact mentioned in patwari's report disclosing that present appellants were evicted from the suit land in 1997. The fact remain whether the present appellants encroached upon land after the same was allotted to defendants in 1998 and were put in possession in persuance of allotment or they are in continuous possession as alleged by them, on the date of filing of both the suits, the present appellants possession was accepted by both the parties. 7. However, this fact alone in our opinion is not sufficient to grant temporary injunction in favour of the appellants. The facts which were noticed by the learned single judge, the learned trial court and the appellants in the plaint may be noticed. 8. 7. However, this fact alone in our opinion is not sufficient to grant temporary injunction in favour of the appellants. The facts which were noticed by the learned single judge, the learned trial court and the appellants in the plaint may be noticed. 8. According to the plaintiffs/appellants they were put in possession of the land in question under an agreement dated 6.3.79, by the respondents/defendants on 20.6.79, and they are in continuance possession since then. Suit is for specific performance of said agreement dated 6.3.79, which is pending. On the other hand, defendants/respondents in their suit in the Revenue Court have alleged that land has been allotted to them on 20.1.1998 and their names have been recorded. But the present plaintiff's dispossessed them on 4.5.98 and they are in possession as trespasser since that time. It is on such allegation by the plaintiffs in Revenue suit who were dispossessed while in possession under allotment of 1998, that the decree of the eviction against the present plaintiffs, and restoration of possession of the standing crop is sought in the Revenue suit. 9. Therefore, it is apparent that while the present plaintiffs claim to have been put in possession under agreement to sell on 20.3.79 and are in continuous possession, an application for injunction has been moved along with the suit for specific performance. On the other hand defendants claim to be put in possession by the Tehsildar in pursuance of allotment made in January 1998. In support of their case the defendants have put on record, the report of Patwari dated 7.11.97, which shows that present plaintiffs were dispossessed on that date. The respondents/defendants who were alleged to be put in possession on 20.1.98 and thereafter evicted on 4.5.98 as alleged by the defendants/respondents subsequent thereto. The defendants remained present at the time of filing of present suit. The plaintiffs/appellants were in possession of the suit land. 10. However, this alone does not make the plaintiffs/appellants entitled for the temporary injunction. As a matter of fact, on plaintiff's own showing, he has filed a suit for specific performance for agreement and his possession is under the said agreement. The respondents have filed a suit for eviction on the basis of their having been put in possession on 28th Jan. 1998 and dispossession thereafter on 4.5.98. As a matter of fact, on plaintiff's own showing, he has filed a suit for specific performance for agreement and his possession is under the said agreement. The respondents have filed a suit for eviction on the basis of their having been put in possession on 28th Jan. 1998 and dispossession thereafter on 4.5.98. Obviously in the suit for eviction filed by the respondents/defendants, the plaintiffs/appellants' defence can be under doctrine of part performance to protect their possession against the executant of agreement to sell in terms of Section 53A of the Transfer of Property Act, which raises substantially and directly issue of execution of document dated 6.3.79, and putting in possession under that agreement on 20.3.79 as well as his continuous possession until the date of Bing of the suit. So also, in the subsequent suit filed by the appellants, same issues are directly and substantially Involved. In view of the Mandatory Provision of Section 10 of CPC, the suit fled by the appellants deserves to be stayed until decision of Revenue suit finding in which is likely to bind parties to suit in both the cases.Considering the application for Temporary injunction, it is apparent that appellants as such do not have any title. Their suit is for securing title. The respondents have placed material on record. From that, it is prima facie established that the appellants were dispossessed from the suit property in 1997, and thereafter the said land was allotted to the respondents only on 28.1.98 and the plaintiffs are in possession by dispossessing the respondents on 4.5.98 only. In that view of matter, the ultimate conclusion of trial court as well as learned single judge that appellants do not have prima facie case in their favour appears to be justified and does not need interference. 11. Faced with above situation it was urged that the plaintiffs cannot be evicted except in accordance with law even if their continued possession under agreement dated 6.3.79 is held to be doubtful. 12. However, this apprehension that appellants are likely to be forcibly evicted from their possession illegally by the defendants is not well founded. On their own showing, the defendants have not resorted to force to dispossess the appellants illegally but have duly instituted a suit for evicting them in the Revenue Court, which had jurisdiction to try such suit. 12. However, this apprehension that appellants are likely to be forcibly evicted from their possession illegally by the defendants is not well founded. On their own showing, the defendants have not resorted to force to dispossess the appellants illegally but have duly instituted a suit for evicting them in the Revenue Court, which had jurisdiction to try such suit. Thus, they have resorted to remedy provided under law to secure restoration of possession of agricultural land to which they claim right through procedure established by law. On the other hand, on the appellants own showing the original holder of land Uttamchand had died and sanad in his favour was cancelled, on 1.9.82 and that was restored only on 20.1.98. This prima facie supports the plea of defendants suggesting that plaintiffs who were found to be in possession of land in 1997 without any authority because on that date land was admittedly with the State, were dispossessed by State. Thereafter, fresh allotment was made in favour of respondents. 13. However, without expressing anything on the merit of the case it is apparent that the allegation of the appellants that the respondent are threatening to dispossess them from the land without due process of law is ill founded. It clearly appears that this is an attempt to obtain a temporary injunction against execution of a decree, if any, passed in favour of the respondents in the Revenue suit filed by them on the basis of temporary injunction obtained in their suit which in our opinion is not justified on any ground whatever as noticed by us. Issues substantially and directly involved in both the cases would be the existence of the earlier agreement as alleged by the plaintiffs and their continuous possession over the land under that agreement until filing of the suit by the respondents. 14. If the plaintiffs were dispossessed by order of Patwari dated 7.11.97, as per report of the Patwari and the defendants have been put in possession on allotment of the sanad on 28th Jan. 98, the appellants cannot claim their possession to be continuing under the agreement. On the other hand if the appellants are able to prove their continuous possession under agreement dated 6.7.79 until filing of the suit by the respondents, they are not likely to suffer decree for dispossession. 15. 98, the appellants cannot claim their possession to be continuing under the agreement. On the other hand if the appellants are able to prove their continuous possession under agreement dated 6.7.79 until filing of the suit by the respondents, they are not likely to suffer decree for dispossession. 15. Moreover, the temporary injunction in the suit filed for specific performance cannot be granted for the purpose of affecting the lawful proceedings which are pending in the revenue courts and interfered with. 16. Apart from above there is another important consideration which appears from pleadings & which mitigates against findings a prima facie case in favour of the plaintiffs appellants. According to appellant the agreement to sell took place in 1979. They took no steps to get a sale-deed executed in their favour at any time prior to filing of present suit after about 21 years. Not taking any steps for such a long period prima facie shows that plaintiffs were not ready and willing to perform their part of agreement throughout this period. The allotment in favour of Uttamchand was alleged cancelled in 1982. Prima facie until then also for good three years neither the plaintiffs have shown their readiness and willingness to perform their part of agreement, as full amount of consideration was neither paid or offered nor demand of executing the sale deed in their favour by showing readiness to pay balance consideration is manifest. If, thereafter, the proposed vendor lost title to paramount owner the buyer could not have kept his rights under agreement alive against State by whom the property had been resumed. The relief of specific performance of contract being an equitable relief, depends also on the conduct of parties and time intervening the date of coming into existence of such right and date on which such right Is sought to be enforced. On all these counts, it cannot be said that plaintiffs have a prima facie case in their favour. 17. Therefore, in the facts and circumstances of the case, we affirm the order passed by learned Single Judge by holding that plaintiffs/appellants are not entitled for grant of temporary injunction in the present suit. 18. Accordingly, the appeal fails and is hereby dismissed. No order as to costs.Appeal dismissed. *******