H. K. RATHOD, J. ( 1 ) HEARDMS. K. A. MEHTALEARNEDADVOCATEFOR the petitioner. In the present petition the award passed by the Industrial Tribunal in Ref. (IT)No. 174of1982 dated 27. 4. 1993ischallengedby the petitioner. This court has issued Rule and granted interim relief in terms of para 9 (B) on 2. 9. 1994. The Rule hasbeenservedon therespondent but nobody has remained present on behalf of the respondent. Noappearancehasbeenfiledon behalf of the respondent. Therefore, the matter has been takenupforfinal hearing today in the absence of the respondent. ( 2 ) MS. K. A. MEHTA learned advocate appearing on behalf of the petitioner has submitted that the Tribunal hasno jurisdictiontopassamandatoryorderagainstthe petitioner to fill up143postsofsr. Clerksasper seniorityasmentionedinthe Schedule at item no. 11. She has submittedthattherespondentunionhasnot pointedoutanymaterialbeforethetribunal to the effect that right person has not beengrantedpromotion according toseniority. In fact no detail was produced by the respondent union and in absence of the detail, the tribunal has passed an order directing the petitionerto fill upthe143 post in the category of Sr. Clerks. She has further submitted on behalf ofthepetitionerthat the petitioner has specifically mentioned that in all the petitionerwashaving555postsand out of which 332 posts have been filledinbythepetitionerandnow remaining 223postsaretobe filled in. Even though this specific submission was made by the learned advocate for the petitioner, the Tribunal hasroughlycalculated thepost and passed an award directing the petitioner to fill up 143 post of Sr. Clerk. She also submittedthat therespondentunion has not produced any detail and in absence of the detail, the award passed bythetribunal is erroneousandthetribunalhascommittedgrave jurisdictional error in directing the petitioner tofill up the said posts. ( 3 ) I have considered the submissions made by Ms. Mehta learned advocatefor the petitioner. It is necessary to note that the dispute whichhasbeenreferredtothe tribunal hasbeenmentionedin para 9 of the award. I have also gone through the reasons given by the Tribunal on page no. 9 whichsuggests that the petitioner Board should fill up the posts in all the categoriesaccording toavailabilityofthepostsand on the basis of the seniority and promotion. Similarly if the postsareto befilledinon the basis of roster system, such posts are to be filled in after observing the rules and regulations of roster system. Thus whatever financial loss caused to the employees the same will have to be paid bytheboard. Thetribunal also suggested that permanent posts in Class-IV cadre are also required to be filled in immediately. Similarly if the postsareto befilledinon the basis of roster system, such posts are to be filled in after observing the rules and regulations of roster system. Thus whatever financial loss caused to the employees the same will have to be paid bytheboard. Thetribunal also suggested that permanent posts in Class-IV cadre are also required to be filled in immediately. The petitioner Board haspointed outtothe Tribunal that they governed by the statutory rules and therefore, under the Rules ofrecruitmentand promotion,the Board has recruited the persons and granted promotion on the basis of seniority cum merits. ( 4 ) THE Tribunal has committed an error in coming to the conclusion that all the posts are required tobefilled inbysenioritywhichiscontrarytothe statutory service regulation. The contention of theunionbefore thetribunalwasthat the posts should be filled in by seniority. However in the absence of such a relief, only relying uponscheduletoexh. 37whichhas been submittedbythe petitioner wherein the detail has been given about the total posts , the posts already filled up by the petitionerandtheremainingpostswhichare required to be filled up by the petitioner. The Schedule toexh. 37has been accepted by the Tribunal and came to the conclusion that 143 posts of Sr. Clerksarerequired tobefilledinimmediatelyby the petitioner Board. Therefore considering this aspect according to my opinion the award of the Tribunal is contrarytothestatutory service rules and regulations which governthe relationship between the employer and employee. Therefore,accordingtomyopinion,the Tribunal has committedanerrorinpassingsuchan award and therefore, the same is required to be set aside. THIS question has been examined by the apex court in caseofn. S. Giri versus The Corporation of City of mangalore and others reported in 1999 LAB IC1982. In the said decision, the apex court was examining the award of enhancingthe age of superannuation to 58 years. The apex court has held that if the award enhancingtheage ofsuperannuationto58 years is inconsistent with the statutory provisions governing the service conditionsor thelawlaiddown by the legislature or by the Supreme court, it is illegal and cannotbeobserved. Theapex courthas also observed that if the award is contrary to the statutory rules applicable to the establishment, then also, such an award is illegal and bad. Thisaspecthas beenexaminedbytheapex court in greater detail. In para 11 and 12 of the said judgment, the apexcourthas observed as under:"11. THELEARNEDCOUNSELFORTHE appellant heavily relied on the three Judges Bench decision in Life Insurance Corporation ofindiav. Thisaspecthas beenexaminedbytheapex court in greater detail. In para 11 and 12 of the said judgment, the apexcourthas observed as under:"11. THELEARNEDCOUNSELFORTHE appellant heavily relied on the three Judges Bench decision in Life Insurance Corporation ofindiav. D. J. Bahadur,air1980sc 2181 : (1980 Lab IC 1218) vide para 80, the majority view has been setout as under:in my opinion, it is difficult to resist the conclusion that theindustrial disputes Act is a speciallawandmust prevail over thecorporationacta general law, for the purpose of protectingthesanctity of transactions concluded under the former enactment. It is true that as laid down in Life insurance Corporation of Indiav. Sunil Kumarmukherjee (1964)5 SCR 528 : AIR 1964 SC 847 andreiterated in Sukhdev Singh v. Bhagat Ram (1975) 3 SCR 619 AIR 1975 SC 1331 : (1975labic881),the Regulationsframed under the Corporation Act have the force of law. But that is of littlemoment if no reference is permissible to theregulationswhen considering the validity and operation of the settlement contract. Accordingly, Regulation 58, a product of the Corporation Act, cannot supersede the contract respecting bonus between the parties resulting from the settlementof 1974. 12. THEABOVE said decision does support the proposition canvassed by the learned counselfor the appellant that an industrial settlement would operateeven by overriding a statutory provision to the contrary. However, suffice it toobserve thatthe Constitution Bench decision in the, New maneck Chowk Spinning and Weaving Co. Ltd. , Ahmedabad ( AIR 1961 SC 867 ) (supra) and also the decision of this Court in, Hindustan Times Ltd. ( AIR 1963 SC 1332 ) (supra) which is four Judges Benchdecision,werenotplacedbefore the learnedjudges deciding the LIC of Indias case. A decision by the Constitution Benchanda decisionbyabench of more strength cannot be over looked to treat a later decision by abench oflesser strength as of binding authority; more so, when the attention of the Judges deciding the latercasewasnotinvitedtothe earlier decisions available. Respectfully following the earlier two decisions referred to hereinabove, we are of the opinion that the award dated 11. 1. 1969 under section 10a of the ID Act appointingthe age of retirement as 8,contraryto the provisions of the statutory rules appointingthe age of retirement at 55, cannot be upheld and giveneffecttobyissuingawritforits implementation. Inanycase,the award stood superseded by the subsequent statutoryrules of 1974 which too appointed the age of retirement at 55andthereis nothing wrong in the appellant having been asked to superannuate at theageof 55 consistently withtheservicerulesas applicable on that day. Inanycase,the award stood superseded by the subsequent statutoryrules of 1974 which too appointed the age of retirement at 55andthereis nothing wrong in the appellant having been asked to superannuate at theageof 55 consistently withtheservicerulesas applicable on that day. " ( 5 ) IN the result, thepetitionisallowedtheaward passed by the Tribunal in Ref. (IT) NO. 174 of 1982 dated 27. 4. 1993 ishereby quashed and set aside. Rule is made absolute. No order as to costs. .