SANJEEV CHAUHAN v. H. P. STATE FOREST CORPORATION LTD.
2002-08-23
A.K.GOEL
body2002
DigiLaw.ai
JUDGMENT Arun Kumar Goel, J.—This is an application filed on behalf of respondents defendants under Section 8(1) and Section 20 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 for referring the matter to Arbitrator as per clause in the agreement deed. 2. This application has been filed by the defendants, who have been arrayed as such in Civil Suit No. 20 of 2002. Facts regarding which parties were not at variance at the time of hearing of this application are as under: 3. That vide agreement deed made on 29th November, 1999 between plaintiff and defendant No. 1, work of launching and floating of timber of lot No. 5/96 99 Chinnon for the year 1999-2000 of the work of Khad floating of timber from Foot Oder to Road Side Depot Mori Khetal (U.P.) was awarded to the plaintiff. Terms and conditions subject to which the work was allotted are contained in the said agreement deed. An attested copy of this deed is attached by the defendants alongwith the O.M.P. 4. One of the conditions, amongst others in this agreement is as under: "28. That the Contractor(s)/Labour Supply Mate(s) agrees/agree that in case of any difference/dispute, the decision of the Managing Director/Director (South) HPSFC Ltd., shall be final and binding." 5. It is in this background, that the present application has been filed by the defendants, alleging that since as per terms of agreement between the parties subject to which work was allotted to the plaintiff, there is provision for making reference in case of any difference/dispute to the Managing Director/Director (South), HPSFC Ltd., the matter needs to be referred accordingly. 6. Even when reference is made to the plaint of Civil Suit No. 20 of 2002, three fold claims have been made in it: (a) Firstly claim is for the principal that is the balance amount of work done as per agreement. Against this item, a sum of Rs. 22,13,701.10 paise is claimed; (b) Secondly additional amount tor extra work carried out is Rs. 3,15,000/ - and (c) Thirdly interest at the rate of 18% per annum on both the sums above till the date of institution of the suit is claimed. 7. It is further case of the plaintiff that as per contract he was entitled to a sum of Rs. 67,67,807.10 paise.
3,15,000/ - and (c) Thirdly interest at the rate of 18% per annum on both the sums above till the date of institution of the suit is claimed. 7. It is further case of the plaintiff that as per contract he was entitled to a sum of Rs. 67,67,807.10 paise. Against this sum, despite his having completed the entire work in terms of the agreement, he has been paid by the defendants only Rs. 45,54,106/-, thus leaving a balance of Rs. 22,13,701.10. Claim of Rs. 3,15,000/- has been made by the plaintiff as additional work was got done from him beyond original work as awarded. 8. When put to notice on this O.M.P., plaintiff has filed his reply and while not disputing the existence and execution of the agreement, has pleaded that after the work was completed. Arbitration Clause looses its significance and dispute which pertains to only remaining payment being not covered by the said clause therefore, application was liable to be dismissed. It is further pleaded on behalf of the plaintiff that there is no Arbitration Clause which may deal with the disputes which are subject matter of the present suit. And further the suit for recovery has been filed for the outstanding and due amount regarding the work as detailed in the plaint. Thus, the application is not maintainable and merits dismissal. In addition to these pleas, it is also urged in the reply that the averments made in the application are vague, cryptic and indefinite. Thus, a prayer has been made for dismissal of the application in question. 9. Mr. Neel Kamal Sood, learned counsel appearing for the defendants, submitted that since execution of agreement deed as aforesaid, is not in dispute, the matter needs to be referred for adjudication as per provisions of Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. He further submitted that Clause 28 supra is very wide in its sweep and amplitude, therefore, pleas to the contrary need to be rejected. 10. He further pointed out that almost on identical facts and circumstances as in the present case, this court in the case of Mohan Singh v. H.P. State Forest Corporation and another, 1998(2) S.L.C. 283, held on examination of the legal position that the matter was liable to be referred for arbitration. He submitted that present case is fully covered by this decision. Therefore, he has prayed for allowing this application. 11.
He submitted that present case is fully covered by this decision. Therefore, he has prayed for allowing this application. 11. All these pleas have been controverted by learned Senior Counsel appearing for the plaintiff who reiterated what has been noted herelnabove. Per him the matter which is subject matter of the suit cannot be treated as a dispute within the meaning of Clause 28 (supra) which needs to be referred for Arbitration. He placed reliance on other clauses of the agreement deed attached with the O.M.R According to him Clause 28 is invokable in a case of dispute being there about terms of agreement when the work is in progress under the agreement. 12. In Mohan Singh v. H.P. State Forest Corporation, supra, Clause 28 which came up for consideration and on the basis whereof it was held that matter is referable for arbitration was verbatim the same, as in the present case. For ready reference relevant portion from this judgment as well as stand of the petitioner plaintiff therein is extracted hereinbelow: ".....It was alleged in this application that the suit filed by the plaintiff petitioner was based on two agreements for working Lot No. 2/ 93 94 and Lot No. 3/93 94. The said agreements were alleged to have been executed between the parties, on the allotment of the said work. It was further pleaded, that Clause 28 of the said agreement(s) was as under: "that the contractor (labour supply mate) agrees/agree that in case of any difference/dispute, the decision of the Managing Director/ Director, South, Shimla, HPSFC Ltd. shall be final and binding." It was also averred that in view of the aforesaid clause, the Civil Court had no jurisdiction to try the suit and the matter was to be referred for arbitration to the person named in the clause. 2. This application was contested on behalf of the plaintiff petitioner and the trial Court after hearing the parties, accepted the application and ordered that parties shall refer the dispute to Managing Director (South), H.P. State Forest Corporation Ltd., Shimla and the parties were directed to appear before the Managing Director (South) H.P. State Forest Corporation Ltd., Shimla on 1.9.1997. The aforesaid order has been assailed in the present petition on various grounds." 13.
The aforesaid order has been assailed in the present petition on various grounds." 13. After having considered the case law on the subject as well as respective contentions urged by the parties in support of making reference as well as in opposition to the matter being referable, it was held as under: "23. Thus, in view of the foregoing reasons, this Court does not find any occasion to interfere with the order pussed by the learned District Judge, which has been assailed in the present petition. The order does not suffer from any illegality and has been passed in accordance with the agreement of the parties, as referred to above. The order passed in CMP No. 160/97 staying the operation of the order under reference and making that stay order absolute later on shall stand vacated. The arbitrator is to proceed with the arbitration in accordance with law. Accordingly, the present petition stands disposed of and the parties are left to bear their own costs in the present proceedings." 14. This view has been followed in a converse situation where Forest Corporation had filed the suit and similar application was filed by the Contractor (Clause 28 in the agreement was exactly the same as in the case in hand). In Civil Suit No. 25 of 1999, H.P. State Forest Corporation v. Ran Singh, on 3.11.1999 after following the decision in the case of Mohan Singh v. H.P.S.F.C. supra, the matter was referred while not accepting the submission that clause 28 of the agreement cannot be termed as an Arbitration agreement. To similar effect again is the decision in Civil Suit No. 84 of 1992, dated 30.12.1999, in H.P. State Forest Corporation Ltd. and another v. Sukh Ram and Company. 15. Reliance was also placed by the learned Senior Counsel on a decision of the Honble Supreme Court in Vishwanath Sood v. Union of India and another, (1989) 1 SCC 657. After having gone through this decision I find that it is wholly inapplicable to the facts of the present case. 16. In this behalf it may also be appropriate to observe that plea urged on behalf of the plaintiff that clause 28 is attractive only when work is in progress in terms of agreement cannot be accepted.
After having gone through this decision I find that it is wholly inapplicable to the facts of the present case. 16. In this behalf it may also be appropriate to observe that plea urged on behalf of the plaintiff that clause 28 is attractive only when work is in progress in terms of agreement cannot be accepted. Reason being that as per averments made in the plaint a particular sum is being claimed by the plaintiff for the work done in terms of the agreement and a further sum is being claimed for additional work done. Therefore, so far claim made regarding the amount which according to the plaintiff is payable in terms of the agreement, I have no hesitation in holding that the matter is referable for decision of the arbitrator in terms of Clause 28 supra. So far extra work is concerned, which as per averments made in the plaint is over and above the terms of the agreement supra, regarding that part the plaintiff may be able to maintain the suit. Similarly, interest needs to be bifurcated for both the claims i.e. one under the agreement and the other beyond it. No other point is urged. 17. In view of the aforesaid discussion. O.M.P. No. 253 of 2002 is allowed and as a consequence of it, it is held that claim of plaintiff regarding Rs. 22,13,701.10 paise with proportionate interest is referable to Arbitrator in terms of the aforesaid clause 28 and it is ordered accordingly. Parties will take further steps in accordance with law and to this extent proceedings in this suit will stand closed. So far claim regarding Rs. 3,15,000/ with proportionate intererst is concerned, being for extra work beyond the terms of agreement, the same is triable by the Court. Since this claim is less than Rs. 10 lacs, it is ordered that case will be transferred to the Court of learned District Judge, Shimla, for disposal in accordance with law. 18. Registry will take follow up action in the matter. Since claim of the plaintiff regarding Rs. 22,13,701.10 paise plus proportionate interest has been held to be referable to the arbitration and direction has been issued in that behalf, plaintiff will be entitled to the refund of Court fees on this part of the claim as per law. Suit disposed of.