ORDER Dipak Misra, J.—By this writ petition the Petitioner has prayed for issue of a writ of certiorari for quashment of the order dated 26-10-1999, Annexure P/9, and further to issue a writ or direction for restoration of the order dated 4-7-1997 contained in Annexure P/8. 2. The facts as have been uncurtained are that the Petitioner was initially as Office Assistant Grade-II and was posted in the office of the Divisional Engineer (Civil), M.P. E.B., Bhopal. The Petitioner was transferred from Bhopal to Gwalior and was posted in the office of Divisional Engineer (Civil), Gwalior. Thereafter he was transferred to Jabalpur. The seniority of the Office Assistant Grade-II was maintained region wise, and as the Petitioner was transferred from Gwalior to Jabalpur his region was changed but his seniority was neither maintained at Bhopal nor at Jabalpur. A region wise gradation list was published for Bhopal and Jabalpur regions separately to the year 1989 showing the position as on 1-4-1983, but the name of the Petitioner was not shown either of the region. The Petitioner approached the Labour Court for issue of direction to the Madhya Pradesh Electricity Board (in short 'the Board') to fix the seniority in the gradation list. 3. According to the writ Petitioner while he was working at Bhopal, he was communicated adverse ACRs and was awarded punishment of censure. He submitted a representation against the punishment and by order dated 1-5-1985 the punishment was set aside. However, adverse entries in the ACRs were not rectified and the representation in that regard was rejected. The Petitioner preferred an appeal against that order before the Review Committee seeking expunction of the adverse remarks as per rules and guidelines of the Board. It is put forth that the said representation has not yet been decided by the Board. It is set forth that correspondences, continued between the Petitioner and the authorities of the Board in that regard and eventually case of the Petitioner was recommended for promotion but the promotion was not given. Being dissatisfied the Petitioner filed an application u/s 31(3) of the M.P. Industrial Relations Act, 1960 (hereinafter referred to as "the Act") and prayed for quashment of the adverse remarks and to command the Board to hold Special Departmental Promotion Committee to consider the case of the Petitioner for promotion to the post of Office Assistant Grade-II with affect from March, 1986. The matter was contested by the Board, and the Labour Court vide order dated 4-7-1997 allowed the application and directed the Board to constitute a Special Selection Committee and consider the case of the Petitioner for promotion keeping in view the position of panel relating to the year 1986-1987. Against the said order an appeal was preferred before the State Industrial Court and the Member Judge of the Industrial Court vide order dated 16-3-1998, Annexure P/10 referred the matter to the Division Bench. The Division Bench instead of deciding the question referred to it by the Member decided the appeal on merits holding that the provisions of the Limitation Act does not apply to proceeding of this nature and hence, the order passed by the Labour Court was untenable. 4. It is averred in the Writ Petition that the application was not barred by limitation and the Industrial Court has erred in law holding that the application was barred by limitation. It is also urged when the Labour Court had not decided the issue of limitation which is a mixed question of fact and law and hence, the Industrial Court should not have decided the same. It is also put forth that the Petitioner by abundant caution had filed an application under 5 of the Limitation Act, Though as an actual fact the application was not barred by limitation. It is set forth that both the Member Judges vide Annexure P/ll decided the question which was unwarranted. 5. Assailing the aforesaid order it is submitted by Mr. N.S. Kale, learned Senior Counsel for the Petitioner that the Industrial Court has erred in law by coming to hold that the Limitation Act is not applicable to the proceeding u/s 31(3) of the Act. It is also urged by him that the Labour Court is a Court and, therefore, has power to condone delay u/s 5 of the Limitation Act. Alternatively, it was submitted by Mr. Kale that the Labour Court had not adverted to the issue of limitation and, therefore, the matter should have been remanded to deal with the factum of limitation so that, the Petitioner could have satisfied the Labour Court that the application was not barred by time as the cause of action accrued within the period of limitation. 6. Mr. Kale that the Labour Court had not adverted to the issue of limitation and, therefore, the matter should have been remanded to deal with the factum of limitation so that, the Petitioner could have satisfied the Labour Court that the application was not barred by time as the cause of action accrued within the period of limitation. 6. Mr. Rajendra Menon, Learned Counsel for the Respondent-Board has submitted that this Court in the case of Vijay Kumar Sharma and Others Vs. The Executive Engineer, Public Health and Others, has held that the Limitation Act is not applicable to the proceeding u/s 31(3) of the Act and, therefore, the question of condonation of delay does not arise. The Learned Counsel has also submitted that in the aforesaid case though this Court had held that the Labour Court is not a Court but in the said decision this Court has not taken note of the law laid down in the case of The State of Maharashtra Vs. Labour Law Practitioners' Association and Others, 7. To appreciate the rival submissions raised at the Bar, it is apposite to state here Section 31 of the Act deals with notice of change and Section 31(3) of the Act stipulates an application has to be filed before the Labour Court in such a manner as may be prescribed. Section 61 of the Act deals with powers of the Labour Court and as per the said provision the Labour Court has the power to decide the disputes regarding which an application has been made to it under Sub-section (3) of Section 31 of the Act. Section 62 of the Act deals with commencement of the proceeding. This Court in the case of Vijay Kumar (supra) scrutinising the scheme of the provisions held as under: On a bare reading of the aforesaid sections, it transpires that the proceeding before the Labour Court shall commence in relation to disputes falling under Clause (a) in Paragraph A of Sub-section (1) of Section 61 of within two years from the date of dispute. In the case at hand, as has been reflected in the order passed by the Appellate Court services of the workman were put to an end to on 30-4-1992 whereas he approached the Labour Court on 30-11-1994 which is beyond the prescribed period. If the proviso (a) is read in proper perspective the proceeding was squarely time-barred. In the case at hand, as has been reflected in the order passed by the Appellate Court services of the workman were put to an end to on 30-4-1992 whereas he approached the Labour Court on 30-11-1994 which is beyond the prescribed period. If the proviso (a) is read in proper perspective the proceeding was squarely time-barred. If the provisions are read conjointly it would become graphically clear that an employee who seeks to challenge the validity of the order he has to approach the Labour Court within the prescribed period of limitation. After the statutory time limit expires Labour Court cannot give declaration sought for. 8. In view of the aforesaid enunciation of law, there remains no iota of doubt that a proceeding before the Labour Court cannot be instituted after the period of limitation as prescribed is over. 9. At this juncture, I may proceed to state that in the case of Vijay Kumar Sharma (supra) this Court expressed the opinion that the Labour Court is not a Court as the meaning of the Court is understood in the eye of law. The said observation was made in the context that a Labour Court functions within the confines of the special statute called the M.P. Industrial Relations Act, 1960 and the said statute-does not confer any power to condone the delay. This Court referred to the decision rendered in the case of Officer on Special Duty (Land Acquisition) and Anr. v. Shah Manilal Chandulal etc., AIR 1996 SCW 941 , wherein the Apex Court was dealing with the powers of the Land Acquisition Officer. It is worth mentioning here that in the case of Vijay Kumar Sharma (supra) this Court had held that the Labour Court is not a Court. At that juncture the decision rendered in the case of Labour Law Practitioners Association (supra) was not brought to the notice of this Court. In paragraphs No. 4 and 5 of the said decision the Apex Court has held as under: 4. u/s 6 of the Maharashtra Recognition of Trade Unions and Prevention of Unfair Labour Practices Act, 1971, (he State Government is entitled to constitute one or more Labour Courts and appoint persons having prescribed qualifications as judges of these Courts. In paragraphs No. 4 and 5 of the said decision the Apex Court has held as under: 4. u/s 6 of the Maharashtra Recognition of Trade Unions and Prevention of Unfair Labour Practices Act, 1971, (he State Government is entitled to constitute one or more Labour Courts and appoint persons having prescribed qualifications as judges of these Courts. The proviso to Section 6 lays down that no person shall be appointed unless he possesses the qualification other than the qualification of age, prescribed under Article 234 of the Constitution for being eligible to enter the judicial service in the State of Maharashtra and is not more than 60 years of age. This provision remains unamended. However, in view of the amendments carried out in the Industrial Disputes Act and the Bombay Industrial Relations Act, the State Government felt that it was open to the State Government to appoint Assistant Commissioners of Labour working under the State Government for a period of not less than five years and holding a law degree, to the office of the presiding officer of Labour Courts. The impugned notification of 8-3-1979, therefore was issued appointing two such persons as presiding officers of Labour Courts at Sholapur and Pune which has been challenged in these proceedings. According to the first Respondent-Association, appointments as presiding officers of Labour Courts are appointments to the judicial services of the State and are, therefore, governed by Article 234 of the Constitution. 5. There is not much difficulty in holding that the Labour Court performs judicial functions and is a Court. The Labour Court adjudicates upon disputes that, had it not been for the Industrial Disputes Act, the Bombay Industrial Relations Act and the Maharashtra Recognition of Trade Unions and Prevention of Unfair Labour Practices Act, would have been within the jurisdiction of the Ordinary Civil Courts to decide, although the Ordinary Civil Courts may not be able to grant all the relief's that are contemplated by these Acts. The Labour Courts are, therefore, Courts and decide disputes that are civil in nature. 10. I may with all humility say that the observation made in the case of Vijay Kumar Sharma (supra) with regard to the aspect that the Labour Court is not a Court was so stated without taking note of the law laid down by the Apex Court in the case of Labour Law Practitioners Association (supra). 11. 10. I may with all humility say that the observation made in the case of Vijay Kumar Sharma (supra) with regard to the aspect that the Labour Court is not a Court was so stated without taking note of the law laid down by the Apex Court in the case of Labour Law Practitioners Association (supra). 11. In view of the aforesaid pronouncement of law by the Apex Court the Labour Court is a Court and the observation made in the Court of Vijay Kumar Sharma (supra) is indubitably per incuriam. However, I may proceed to state except so stating nothing more is expressed in this regard. 12. I may, now go back to the first limb of the submission of Mr. Kale, learned Senior Counsel for the Petitioner. It is put forth by him that the Labour Court had not addressed itself with regard to the issue of limitation. The said aspect is not disputed by Mr. Menon. In view of the aforesaid, I am inclined to set aside the order passed by as by the Industrial Court as far as it relates to the final disposal of the case and also the order passed by the Labour Court and direct that the matter be dealt with by the Labour Court afresh. It would be open to the Petitioner to put forth all his contention in regard to the aspect that the application filed by him was not barred by limitation. The said issue shall be adverted to by the Labour Court in accordance with law. 13. The writ petition is allowed to the extend indicated above. However, there shall be no order as to costs. Final Result : Allowed