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2002 DIGILAW 236 (HP)

BARIAM SINGH v. AGYA RAM

2002-08-26

M.R.VERMA

body2002
JUDGMENT M.R. Verma, J.—The applicant has moved this application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act for condonation of delay in filing a revision petition under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure against the order dated 4.6.1999 passed by the learned Sub Judge, Dehra, District Kangra, in execution petition No. 14 of 1997. 2. Brief facts leading to the presentation of this application are that in Civil Suit No. 127/90, learned Sub Judge, Dehra passed a decree for joint possession of land in favour of the applicant. The applicant filed execution petition dated 19.3.1997 wherein a warrant of possession as per the decree was issued and was duly executed as per report Annexure PL3, therefore, the executing Court dismissed the execution petition as fully satisfied vide order dated 4.6.1999 which is sought to be impugned by the DH himself. Since the revision petition against said order, by virtue of lapse of time has become hopelessly time barred, therefore, the present application has been moved by the applicant for condonation of delay on the grounds that under the mistaken belief that remedy in respect of possession would lie before the Director of Consolidation, he approached the Director of Consolidation but his petition was returned by the said Director on 19.2.2001 .Being a rustic villager and illiterate person, the applicant did not know as to which Court could provide him remedy. It is in these circumstances that delay occurred in presenting the revision petition and that such delay is not wilful but occurred in the circumstances beyond the control of the applicant. 3. The respondents contested the application and in the reply claimed that the application was not maintainable as no sufficient cause for condonation of delay has been shown. 4. I have heard the learned Counsel for the parties and have also gone through the records. 5. Be it stated that if any cause of action has accrued to the applicant to prefer a revision petition against the order dated 4.6.1999 the same had accrued on the date of such order. He did not take any steps to seek redressal in the matter in accordance with law though the order dated 4.6.1999 was passed in the presence of his counsel. He did not take any steps to seek redressal in the matter in accordance with law though the order dated 4.6.1999 was passed in the presence of his counsel. It is not his case that after having come to know that the order dated 4.6.1999 is illegal, as alleged, he had taken recourse to the lawful remedy before a wrong Court of law under bona fide belief. On the contrary, his case is that he sought redressal from the Director of Consolidation which remedy apparently was not legally available to him for the simple reason that the order passed by the Civil Court could not be called in question before an executive authority i.e. Director of Consolidation. It is not the case of the applicant that he approached the said Director pursuant to such legal advice given to him. Admittedly, the Director of Consolidation had returned his papers on 19.2.2001. Still he did not file the revision petition till 18.1.2002 i.e. for a period of 11 months. It is claimed that the failure to do so was because the applicant being rustic villager and illiterate person did not know as to what remedy was available to him. However, it is not his case that he consulted any lawyer in this regard immediately after 19.2.2001 to find out as to what further remedy was available to him nor it is averred in the application as to who advised him and when to file the revision petition. 6. It was contended by the learned Counsel for the applicant that to be a rustic villager and illiterate person in itself constitute a sufficient cause for condonation of delay in filing the revision petition. It was urged by the learned Counsel that there is no presumption that everyone knows the law, therefore, where the state of law as to the rights of the applicant was ambiguous and he was not sure as to what remedy is available to him against the order sought to be impugned, he could not seek the appropriate remedy in time, therefore, delay in riling the revision petition was not intentional. To substantiate his contention, the learned Counsel relied on M/s. Motilal Padampat Sugar Mills v. State of Uttar Pradesh and others, (1979) 2 SCC 409, wherein the Honble Supreme Court held as under: ".....Moreover, it must be remembered that there is no presumption that every person knows the law. To substantiate his contention, the learned Counsel relied on M/s. Motilal Padampat Sugar Mills v. State of Uttar Pradesh and others, (1979) 2 SCC 409, wherein the Honble Supreme Court held as under: ".....Moreover, it must be remembered that there is no presumption that every person knows the law. It is often said that everyone is presumed to know the law, but that is not a correct statement-there is no such maxim known to the law. Over a hundred and thirty years ago, Maule, J., pointed out in Martindale v. Falkner: There is no presumption in this country that every person knows the law; it would be contrary to common sense and reason if it were so. Scrutton, L.J., also once said: It is impossible to know all the statutory law, and not very possible to know all the common law. But it was Lord Atkin who, as in so many other spheres, put the point in its proper context when he said in Evans v. Bartlam: .......the fact is that there is not and never has been a presumption that every one knows the law. There is the rule that ignorance of the law does not excuse, a maxim of very different scope and application.........." 7. In my view, however, the proposition, as relied upon by the learned Counsel for the applicant is of no help to the applicant. May be that the applicant is ignorant of law but this by itself is no reason for condonation of delay for the reason that a person may be ignorant of law but ignorance of law is no excuse to circumvent the law of limitation which is based on public policy. 8. In Sant Ram and others v. Puran Chand and others (Latest HLJ 2001 (HP) 1047), this Court held as under: "7. It may be pointed out at the very outset that the delay in filing any application or appeal can be condoned only on sufficient cause made out for such condonation. The period of limitation cannot be extended nor the delay can be condoned on the principles of natural justice, equity and fair play. Law of limitation though may some time harshly affect a party, but nevertheless it has to be applied with all its rigours. Therefore, the delay in this case can be condoned only if sufficient cause is shown by the appellants/applicants for such condonation." 9. Law of limitation though may some time harshly affect a party, but nevertheless it has to be applied with all its rigours. Therefore, the delay in this case can be condoned only if sufficient cause is shown by the appellants/applicants for such condonation." 9. In Inderjit Singh and another v. Onkar Singh, 2002 (1) SLJ 90, this Court held as under: "8. In view of the provisions of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, delay in filing an appeal can be condoned if the appellant shows sufficient cause for such condonation. The expression sufficient cause has not been defined in the Act and thus, in the ordinary course, it must mean a cause which is beyond the control of the party seeking to invoke the aid of Section 5 of the Limitation Act. In other words, to constitute sufficient cause7 it must be established that some event(s) or circumstance(s) prevented the party seeking condonation of delay from filing the appeal within the prescribed period of limitation. 9. In N. Balakrishnans case (supra), the Honble Supreme Court has held that the rules of limitation are not meant to destroy the rights of the parties. They are meant to see that parties do not resort to dilatory tactics, but seek their remedy promptly The object of proving a legal remedy is to repair the damage caused by reason of legal injury The law of limitation fixes a lifespan for such legal remedy for the redressal of the legal injury so suffered and that the refusal to condone the delay would result in foreclosing the suit or from putting forth his cause. There is no presumption that delay in approaching the Court is always deliberate. Therefore, the expression sufficient cause under Section 5 of the Limitation Act must be construed liberally so as to advance substantial justice. If the explanation offered for condonation of delay does not smack of mala fides or is not put forth as part of a dilatory strategy, the Court must show utmost consideration to the suitor. However, it has further been held that time is precious and wasted time would never revisit. During the efflux of time, newer causes would sprout up necessitating newer persons to seek legal remedy by approaching the Courts. So a lifespan must be fixed for each remedy. However, it has further been held that time is precious and wasted time would never revisit. During the efflux of time, newer causes would sprout up necessitating newer persons to seek legal remedy by approaching the Courts. So a lifespan must be fixed for each remedy. Unending period for launching the remedy may lead to unending uncertainty and consequential anarchy, the law of limitation is thus founded on public policy 10. In P.K. Ramachandrans case (supra), it has been held that the law of limitation may harshly affect a particular party but it has to be applied with all its rigour when the statute as prescribes and the courts have no power to extend the period of limitation on equitable grounds. Similar view has been taken by the Honble Supreme Court in the case Lachhman Dass Arora v. Ganeshi Lai and others, (1999) 8 SCC 532. 11. In Balak Ram and others v. Chet Ram and others, 2000 (2) Shim. L.C. 167 (supra), this Court held as under: "10. The crux of the aforesaid is that once the court accepts the explanation for the delay as given by the concerned party, it must condone the delay However, the sufficiency of the explanation given by a party for condonation of delay will depend on the facts and circumstances of each case. Decidedly, the word "sufficient cause" has to be construed liberally but the extent of the liberal construction should not be such that it may totally ignore the public policy on which the law of limitation is founded and thereby defeat the very purpose of the law of limitation. Thus, the court must at least be satisfied that the party has shown the existence of certain facts and circumstances which constitute a cause which can liberally be held to be the sufficient cause for condoning the delay" 12. It was thus clear that the expression "sufficient cause" must be construed liberally so as to advance the cause of justice on merits but at the same time it has to be borne in mind that "liberal construction" should not be such that it may totally ignore the public policy on which the law of limitation is founded and thereby defeat the very purpose of the law of limitation. It follows that a truthful cause which may warrant condonation of delay, has to be shown to the satisfaction of the Court before the delay in filing any application or appeal is condoned under Section 5 of the Limitation Act." 10. In view of the above position in law and the maxim that ignorance of law is no excuse and this being not a case where any wrong legal advice might have been given to the applicant, the mere plea, as averred in the application that the applicant is a rustic and illiterate person does not constitute sufficient cause for condonation of colossal delay of 2 years 3 months and 3 days in filing the revision petition. 11. As a result, this application merits dismissal and is accordingly dismissed.