P.G. AGARWAL, J. — Heard Mr. B.R. Dey and Mr. Dilip Hazarika, learned counsel for the petitioner and Mr. A.K. Phukan, learned Advocate General, Assam, Mr. J.M. Choudhury, Mr. J. Roy, Mr. TJ. Mahanta and Mr. D.P. Chaliha, learned counsel for the respondent. 2. This common order disposes of Misc. Case Nos. 1587/2001, 1588/2001, 1589/2001, 1590/2001 arising out of W.P.(C) No. 8142/2001. 3. The above Misc. Cases have been filed by the respondent No. 8, respondent No. 7, respondent No. 5 and respondent No. 3 for vacating or modifying the interim order passed by this Court on 28.11.2001 in W.P.(C) No. 8142/2001. 4. The matter relates to supply of clothing article for the Assam Police for the year 2001-2002 for which the DIG of Police (A) invited tenders by Notification dated 11.6.2001 in respect of as many as 160 items. The petitioner Mrs. Bibha Hazarika in this writ petition has challenged the acceptance of tender of respondent Nos. 4, 5, 6, 7 and 8 in respect of certain items and at the time of issuing of notice vide order dated 28.11.2001, this Court directed: "In the meantime no formal order shall be passed as regards to the supply order in respect of Item No. 9, 12, 13, 15, 20, 22 and 30 in pursuance to Notice Inviting Tender dated 11.6.2001 (Annexure-I). Since the interim order has Been passed exparte liberty is granted to the private-respondent to move this Court for modification, alteration or cancellation if so advised." Hence the present Misc. Cases. 5. Learned counsel for the respondent has submitted that the petitioner had participated in the same tender process and she was also beneficiary of the said tender notice in the sense that the tender paper of the petitioner was accepted in respect of certain items and she was allotted the work/ supply and this fact was not disclosed by the petitioner in the writ petition. 6. Mr. A.K. Phukan, learned Advocate General, Assam on the other hand submits that some of the items for which tenders were invited are meant for winter clothes of the police forces of the State of Assam and we are in the midst of winter session and as such the restrain order has affected the police personnel at large. Hence, the matter needs to be disposed of. Mr. Hence, the matter needs to be disposed of. Mr. Phukan submits that there may be certain variations here and there, which do not affect the decision making process. It is submitted that there is no such norms or printed form and the applications were invited in plain papers only and as such this Court while disposing of the main writ petition may lay down guidelines for future guidance to make the system full-proof. Learned Advocate General has produced the records as directed by this Court. 7. In respect of Item No. 9 (Khaki Terry Cotton Cloth) supply order was placed with respondent No. 4 (M/s. M.P. Laghu Udyog Nigam Limited, Kolkata). The allegation made in para-6 of the writ petition as regards item No. 9 and 15 reads as follows : "That the respondent No. 4 also submitted tender for item No. 9 and 15 but without mentioning manufacturing trade mark, mills name Brand name and quality and has not furnished Test Certificate Authority letter, and has not pledged the NSC/KVP in favour of the respondent No. 3 as required under clauses 4, 4(a) and 5 of the Notice Inviting Tender herein after mentioned as N.I.T." The original documents have been produced and I find that the Test Certificate has been enclosed and available and even the NSC/KVP has been enclosed with the tender and there is an endorsement by the Sub Post Master of the GPO transferred the security to the Government of Assam. So far the samples are concerned, the sample was produced as seen from the record and the sample was found by the Board as suitable. Therefore, there is no force in the allegations levelled against the respondent No. 4. 8. As regards the item No. 13 (Khaki drill cloth) the proceeding of the Board shows that 15 tenderers submitted their tender and the Board examined the samples and accepted the tender of respondent No. 5 (M/s. M.R. Enterprise). The allegation made in para-7 of the writ petition reads as follows : "But the official respondents accepted the tender of respondent No. 5 at Rs.33.75 per meter although the brand name and quality E.G. 300 of Elgin Mill Limited Kamrup have been mentioned the said Mill is no longer in operation of production for last several years. The allegation made in para-7 of the writ petition reads as follows : "But the official respondents accepted the tender of respondent No. 5 at Rs.33.75 per meter although the brand name and quality E.G. 300 of Elgin Mill Limited Kamrup have been mentioned the said Mill is no longer in operation of production for last several years. The respondent No. 5 has specifically mentioned in the tender that I.T.C.C. and S.T.C.C. and for Trade Licence it has applied for and Test Certificate of the Elgin Mills have not been furnished as required under clauses 4 of N.I.T." So far the tender for khaki drill cloth manufactured by Elgin Mill, Kamrup it seems that the writ petitioner was in hurry and could not make any difference of Elgin Mill Limited, Kanpur and has stated that Elgin Mill, Kamrup is no longer in operation. It may be mentioned that there is no Mill in the name of Elgin Mill, Kamrup, Assam. As regards the Income Tax Clearance Certificate and Sales Tax Clearance Certificate, the allegation made in the writ petition is unfounded as the same are available with the record alongwith the copy of the Trade Licence/ certificate in the name of M.R. Enterprise, Tezpur issued by the Tezpur Municipal Board. Hence, the allegations as quoted above and contained in para-7 of the writ petition are baseless and unfounded. 9. So far the item No. 20 (Khaki Great Coat Cloth) is concerned, 14 firms submitted their tenders and the Board accepted the sample furnished by the respondent No. 6 (M/s. H.I. Textiles, Guwahati). The allegation of the petitioner is that Modilla Mills, whose products were tendered by respondent No. 6 is no longer in existence. There is no supporting document to show that the said Mill is no longer in existence. 10. So far item No. 22 (khaki woollen serge cloth) the Board accepted the tender of M/s. Talukdar Supplier & Construction, Guwahati (respondent No. 7) holding that the quality of the sample given by the other firms having offered lowest rate were not found suitable. The allegation of the petitioner is that sample offered by respondent No. 7 was of Radium Woollen Mills which is not in operation. There is no supporting document to the said allegation. 11. The allegation of the petitioner is that sample offered by respondent No. 7 was of Radium Woollen Mills which is not in operation. There is no supporting document to the said allegation. 11. So far item No. 30 (Woollen Blanket) 16 firms had submitted their tenders and the Board accepted the sample of M/s. M.R. Enterprise, Tezpur as the quality was found to be suitable. The allegation of the petitioner is that the tender was submitted without mentioning specific weight of Oswal Brand and that of Raymond Brand but the samples mentioned weight 1800 to 2000 gross. The relevant portion of tender submitted by M/ s. M.R. Enterprise in respect of item No. 30 reads as follows : Name of Item Quantity Unit cost Total cost quoted quoted Woollen Blanket 20,054 Rs.185.00 Rs.37,09,990/- of superior Nos. per piece. (Rs.thirty- quality. (Rs. one seven lacs Siz : 60"x90" hundred nine thousand Weight: 1800 gms. eighty nine hundred 2100gms. five only) ninety only) (approx.) RAYMOND, All Wool Blanket of OSWAL. (1. SamplerGrey 1. Sample : Navy Blue) From the above, it is seen that the rates were offered by the two Brand names of Oswal and Raymond by the respondent No. 5 who mention the rate and Brand name of Oswal and Raymond manufactured by Oswal Group, in the weight ranging from 1800 to 2100 gms. As stated above the Income Tax Clearance Certificate and Sales Tax Clearance Certificate were enclosed alongwith the tender form and these are available with the record. 12. As regards item No. 12 (Grey Terry Cotton Cloth) the tender submitted by respondent No. 8 (M/s. Uncles Shop, Silpukhuri, Guwahati) was accepted by the Board. The Purchase Board accepted the offer of APOL Product at the rate of Rs.l 17/- per meter. There is no dispute at the Bar that M/s. APOL is an Assam based Co-Operative Society engaged in the business of manufacturing clothes. The allegation of the petitioner is that the APOL does not manufacture Polyester Cotton and the price of the APOL product is not more than Rs.75/- per meter and the respondent submitted the letter issued by the Chairman Cum Managing Director of APOL wherein it is stated : "You will be happy to learn that lately we have started producing polyester cotton cloth for supplying to Govt. Deptt. Deptt. as and when required." In view of the above, I find no force in the submission that APOL does not manufacture polyester cotton cloth. As regards the rate, the respondent had produced a copy of letter issued by the Deputy Manager, Marketing, APOL, certifying that the price of APOL suiting 06080 is Rs. 117/- per linear meter. 13. Learned counsel for the writ petitioner submits that the samples have not been produced before the Court. Mr. A.C. Buragohain, learned Govt. Advocate submits that the samples are available in the gUnny bag lying with him. I do not propose to examine the sample to come to the finding about the quality of the sample. As the matter was considered and examined by the expert body, this Court may not be giving finding as regards the quality of the clothes offered by various suppliers. 14. Learned counsel for the petitioner has placed reliance on a decision of this Court in the case of Purbottar Trade & Marketing Co-Operative Society Ltd. & Ors. Vs. State of Assam & Ors., reported in 2000 (2) GLT145 wherein this Court had the occasion to examine the matter of supply of contract awarded by the public authority. This Court in para-32 observed: "32. The power of the Court to interfere in the field of contract by Government or instrumentality of State has crystalised. The Court does not act as a Court of appeal but merely reviews the manner in which the decision was made, particularly as the Court does not have the expertise to correct the administrative decision. If a review of the administrative action is permitted, it will be substituting its own decision which itself may be fallible. The duty of the Court is to confine itself to the question of legality. Its concern should be - (i) whether the decision making authority exceeded its powers (ii) committed an error of law in decision making process (iii) committed a breach of the rules of natural justice (iv) reached a decision which no reasonable man could not have reached (v) abused its powers (see Mausukhbal -Vs- State ofGujarat: 1997 (7) SCC 622 ). In Wcdncsbury case it was pointed out that the decision could be one of many choice open to the authority, but it was for that authority to decide upon the choice and not for the Court to substitute its view. In Wcdncsbury case it was pointed out that the decision could be one of many choice open to the authority, but it was for that authority to decide upon the choice and not for the Court to substitute its view. To characterise on administrative decision as irrational the Court has to hold on materials, that it is a decision so outiagcous as to be in total defiance of logic or moral standards. The Supreme Court in 1997 (7) SCC 463 (Union of India-Vs-G., Anunyatham) pointed out that in India the position of administrative law where no fundamental right is involved is that Courts will only play a secondary role while the primary judgment as to reasonableness will remain with the executive or administrative authority. The secondary judgment of the Court is to be based on Wednesbury and C.C.S.U. principles as stated by Lord Diplock (reported in para 13 of the judgment) respectively to find if the executive or administrative authority has reasonably arrived at its decision as the primary authority. The Supreme Court in 1997 (1) SCC 738 (Asia Foundation - Vs- Trafalgar House) lays down that though the principle of judicial review cannot be denied so far as exercise of contractual powers of Government bodies are concerned. But it is intended to prevent arbitrariness or favouritism and it is exercised in the larger public interest or if it is brought to the notice of the Court that in the matter of award of a contract power has been exercised for collateral purpose. It is not within the permissible limits of the Court of law, particularly when there has been no allegation of malice or ulterior motive and particularly when Court has not found any malafide or favouritism in the grant of contract in favour of a successful bidder." The Court further observed in para-35 : "35. It is further the law to establish malafide exercise of power it must be shown by the petitioner that the power was exercised with an ulterior motive and with an object of to defeat the claim of the person interested. But when valid reason/ground can be discerned in the action of the authority from the materials it shall not be malafide exercise. A decision must not be the rules of thumb. But when valid reason/ground can be discerned in the action of the authority from the materials it shall not be malafide exercise. A decision must not be the rules of thumb. If it can be gathered or demonstrated that the foundation of the decision is for wrong motives or on irrelevant grounds or arbitrary or unreasonable the Court may exercise the power. Regarding reasons to be recorded/stated I quote below a passage from Administrative Law by Wade 7th Edn. page 402 "Reasonableness does not require reasons to be stated. The Only significance of withholding reasons is that if the facts point overwhelmingly to one conclusion, the decision maker cannot complain if he is held to have had no rational reason for deciding differently and in the absence of reason he is in danger of being held to have acted arbitrarily". The writ Court must guard and give protection to a citizen against transgression made by the executive. But the Court must be prudently cautious in such a matter, in the gurb of affording such protection, the Court must not take the virtual control of the administration. For each and every infraction the Court must not step into set at naught an administrative action arrived at by due deliberation and proper application of mind, such a decision though may not be perfect yet it does not call for interference if otherwise it is not arbitrary and absurd. It is that yardstick/measuring rod which I have applied in the matters and I find that the decision making process does not suffer from a vice which call for interference at the hand of the Court. In this connection, I quote a passage from the Book Freedom under the Law by Lord Denning (page 102) "One of the most important tasks of the Courts is to see that the powers of the executive are properly used, that is used honestly and reasonably for the purposes authorised by Parliament and not for any ulterior motive" in the case in hand the Purchase Board had to select a larger numbers of items for its Police Fora and it did so by looking at the samples submitted with the tender according to quality and durability. The exercise was honest and reasonable. The exercise was honest and reasonable. A person not given/bestowed a benefit by the authority may always approach a forum and advance hair splitting arguments to establish/demonstrate some mistake/deviation in the decision making process, but that itself is not adequate/sufficient to strike down the process, there must be something more, it must lead to injustice in general. A malafide exercise of power does not necessarily imply any moral turpitude as a matter of law. It only means that the power is exercised for purposes foreign to those for which it is intended/vested. In other words the power vested has been utilised/used for some indirect purpose not connected with the purpose or object. It must be such exercise from which law will imply evil intent. The exercise of power must be without just cause or excuse or for want of reasonable or probable cause. The Courts may declare administrative acts to be invalid for manifest unreasonableness." 15. In the present case from what has been stated above, I find that this not a public interest litigation but litigation by an unsuccessful tenderers who was not favoured with the supply order in respect of the items mentioned above. There is no malafide in the action of the Purchase Board and hence, relying on the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Raunaq International Ltd. -Vs-I.V.R. Construction Ltd. and others, reported in AIR 1999 SC 393 , no case for suspending the supply order is made out. As stated above, the articles are urgently required for the Police personnel and it will not be in the public interest to restrain the respondents from issuing the work order. Learned Advocate General submits that in respect of the said tender, contract has already been executed and the supply order has been issued. 16. In the result, the interim order passed on 28.11.2001 stands vacated. The Misc. Cases stand disposed of.