Judgment Tarun Chatterjee, J. A demarcated northern portion of premises No. 143/1/1, Cotton Street, Calcutta (hereinafter referred to as the said premises) was purchased in the name of Sri Sri Madan Gopal Jew the applicant No.1 a Hindu deity, by a conveyance dated 13th March, 1942. Thereafter on the 3rd May, 1944 one Ajit Kishore Maitra the then shebait of the deity executed a Deed of lease demising the said portion of the said premises in favour of Bhagwan Das Kalla, Goverdhandas Kalla and Bulakidas Kalla for a period of 90 years on and from the 21st of Baishakh, 1351 Bengali year. Under the terms and conditions of the lease, the lessees were entitled to assign the said lease in whole of in part or sublet the said permises. On 26th June, 1947, Bhagwandas, Goverdhandas and Bulakidas, the lessees, executed a conveyance whereby their right, title and interest in the said portion of the said premises under the lease were conveyed to one Kalla Properties and Industrial Corporation Ltd. On the 11th May, 1953, the said Kalla Properties and Industrial Corporation Limited executed a deed demising by way of sub-lease the said portion of the said premises to one Dhanraj Purohit for a period of three years. It was a term or condition of the said sub-lease that the sub-lease namely. Dhanraj Purohit would not transfer, assign or convey his right, title and interest in the demised premises or any part thereof without the consent of the lesser namely, Kalla Properties and Industrial Corporation Ltd. On or about 11th February, 1954 the said Dhanraj Purohit inducted one Gulab Devi Nauhal, wife of Goverdhan Das Vaidya, the respondent No.2 in the application for execution as a tenant in the said room in the first floor of the said portion of the said premises at a rent of Rs.105/- per month. On or about 8th of June, 1954 Dhanraj Purohit assigned the said sub-lease in his favour or granted a further sub-lease of the said Portion of the said premises in favour of one Asharam Swami. By a notice dated 4th December, 1954, Gulab Devi Nauhal was directed to attorn tenancy to Asharam Swami. The grant in favour of Asharam Swami, expired on 24th October, 1955 in spite whereof he continued to hold the said demised premises on the same terms and conditions till the time as noted in this judgment hereafter. By a notice dated 4th December, 1954, Gulab Devi Nauhal was directed to attorn tenancy to Asharam Swami. The grant in favour of Asharam Swami, expired on 24th October, 1955 in spite whereof he continued to hold the said demised premises on the same terms and conditions till the time as noted in this judgment hereafter. On the 8th of August, 1957, the said Asharam Swami executed a deed whereby he assigned his .right, title and interest in the said portion of the said premises in favour of one Bholalal with effect from 4th of August, 1957. The said Bholalal on 30th of December, 1957 executed a Deed by which he had assigned his right, title and interest in the said portion of the said premises in favour of Sri Latiyal Agricultural and Industrial (P) Ltd. On or about the 16th of July, 1959 Sri Sri Madan Gopal Jew the said deity instituted a suit in the Original Side of this Court against the said Ajit Kishore Maitra, the executor to the will and the legal heirs and representatives of Bhagwandas Kalla since deceased, Goverdhandas Kalla, Bulakidas Kalla, Kalla Properties and Industrial Corporation, Dhanraj Purohit, Asharam Swami, Bholalal and Sri Latiyal Agricultural and Industrial Private Ltd. claiming, inter alia declarations that the lease dated the 3rd May, 1944 executed by the said Ajit Kishore Maitra in favour of Bhagwandas Kalla and others, the said conveyance dated the 28th of June, 1947 executed by Bhagwandas Kalla and others in favour of Kalla Properties and Industrial Corporation Ltd. the agreement of sub-lease dated the 11th May, 1953 executed by Kalla Properties and Industrial Corporation Ltd. in favour of Dhanraj Purohit in the said sub-lease granted by Dhanraj Purohit in favour of Ashram Swami and the grant of the Ashram Swami in favour of Bholalal and the subsequent grant by the said Bholalal in favour of Sri Sri Latiyal Agricultural and Industrial Pvt. Ltd. were all invalid and inoperative, not binding and the same did not pass any title to the respective lessees, sub-lessees or grantees, restoration of possession of the said portion of the said premises to the deity and cancellation of the said lease and the subsequent sub-leases or deeds of assignments were also claimed. By an order passed in the said suit on 14th of September, 1959 a learned Advocate of this Court was appointed as a Receiver who took possession of the said portion of the said premises on the 8th June, 1963. By an order passed in the above company Petition No. 162 of 1965 on the 24th of April, 1966. Sri Latiyal Agricultural and Industrial Ltd., was directed to be wound up and the official liquidator was appointed the liquidator of the said company. On 6th of July, 1971 a decree was passed by consent of parties in the said suit No. 961 of 1959 providing, inter alia, as follows: "a) It was declared that the lease dated the 3rd May, 1944 granted by the said Ajit Kishore Maitra in favour of Bhagwandas Kalla, since deceased Goverdhandas Kalla and Bulakidas Kalla in respect of the said portion of the said premises stood cancelled with effect from June, 1965. b) It was declared inter alia, that the executor and the legal heirs and representatives of Bhagwandas Kalla, since deceased, Govardhandas Kalla, Bulakidas Kalla, Kalla Properties and Industrial Corporation Limited, Dhanraj Purohit, Asharam Swami, Bholalal and Sri Latiyal Agricultural and Industrial Pvt. Ltd. (in liquidation) have no right, title and interest in the said portion of the said premises. c) The Receiver appointed in the suit was directed to make over possession forthwith of the said portion of the said premises to Sabita Moitra, the appellant No.2 and upon making over such possession and upon payment of the amount as directed the Receiver was directed to stand discharged. d) No party would have any other claim against others on any account whatsoever." 2. It was further recorded in the said decree passed on the aforesaid terms that the suit as against the defendants, inter alia, Goverdhan Das Kalla, Asharam Swami and Bholalal be dismissed. It is not in dispute that Sri Latiyal Agricultural and Industrial Pvt. Ltd. which was then in liquidation was a party to the said consent decree and was represented by the official liquidator. 3. It is not in dispute that Sri Latiyal Agricultural and Industrial Pvt. Ltd. which was then in liquidation was a party to the said consent decree and was represented by the official liquidator. 3. An application was filed on 5th of July, 1983 by the said deity thorough its shebait Smt. Sabita Moitra in which the following reliefs were prayed for: "a) The alleged right, title and interest with regard to the said portion of the said premises be determined and the said respondent No.2 Govardhandas Vaidya be declared a trespasser in the said room in the said portion of the said premises. b) The occupation of the respondent No. 2 be declared illegal, null and void and direction be given to the respondent No.2 to vacate the said premises within a period of four weeks from the date of the under to be passed and to deliver vacant possession of the said room in the said portion of the said premises to the Official Liquidator to enable the latter to make over vacant possession of the said room to the applicants. c) Directions be given on the Official Liquidator to make over possession of the said room to the applicants. d) Injunction restraining the respondent No.2 from encumbering or subletting or inducting anybody in the said room during the pendency of the application. e) The respondent No.2 may be directed to pay the mesne profits for the period of his wrongful occupation of the said room at the rent of Rs.400 per month." 4. In the affidavit of Sabita Moitra, the applicant No.2, it was alleged that Goverdhandas Kalla, the respondent No.2, occupied the said room under Latiyal Agricultural and Industrial Pvt. Ltd. and used to pay a sum of Rs.105/- per month on account of occupational charges. It was further alleged in the application that after Receiver was appointed in Suit No. 961 of 1959 he used to collect charges from all occupiers of the said premises without prejudice to the rights and contentions of the parties. The word 'without prejudice' was endorsed on every receipt granted by the said receiver. It was further alleged that the respondent No.2 was inducted illegally in the said room and therefore, his possession in the said room was illegal and unauthorised. The word 'without prejudice' was endorsed on every receipt granted by the said receiver. It was further alleged that the respondent No.2 was inducted illegally in the said room and therefore, his possession in the said room was illegal and unauthorised. It was further alleged that the respondent No.2 was claiming tenancy or sub-lease through Shri Latiyal Agricultural and Industrial Private Ltd. but in a decree passed on 15th of September, 1979 in a suit filed by Kalla Properties and Industrial Corporation Ltd., against Shri Latiyal Agricultural and Industrial Pvt. Ltd. and others, in suit No. 1772 of 1964 it was recorded by the Official Liquidator that the occupation by Shri Latiyal Agricultural and Industrial Pvt. Ltd. of both the northern and southern portion of the said premises was illegal and void. In the said suit Shri Latiyal Agricultural & Industrial Pvt. Ltd disclaimed its right, title and interest in the said premises and contended in the suit that possession thereof should be delivered to the respective owners. It was further alleged that there was no bar on this Court to decide the nature of title and interest of the respondent No.2 in respect of the said room under the company in liquidation. It was further alleged that the respondent No.2 had taken possession of the said room by a clever contrivance while Shri Latiyal Agricultural and Industrial Pvt. Ltd. was in liquidation and, the Official Liquidator had acted in contravention of law in allowing the respondent No.2 to continue in such possession. Therefore, it was alleged in the said application that the applicants were vitally interested in the said room as owners and the right, title and interest of the company in liquidation having been declared null and void by the decree passed in suit No. 961 of 1951, the Official Liquidator should be directed to hand over possession of the said room of the said premises occupied by the respondent No.2 who was wrongfully inducted therein during the pendency of the liquidation proceedings. It was further alleged in the application that the Official Liquidator had failed and neglected to deliver vacant possession of the said room to the applicants in spite of demands. It was further alleged in the application that the Official Liquidator had failed and neglected to deliver vacant possession of the said room to the applicants in spite of demands. Against this application the Official Liquidator had affirmed in affidavit in which it was inter alia alleged that after Shri Latiyal Agricultural and Industrial Pvt. Ltd. was directed to be wound up, the Official Liquidator took possession of the southern portion of the said premises but not the demarcated northern portion in which the said room was situated. It was alleged that the Official Liquidator never collected any rent from any of the tenants in the northern portion of the said premises and that the decree dated 18th September, 1979 passed in suit No. 1772 of 1964 was only in respect of the southern portion of the said premises. The respondent No.2 also filed an affidavit, which was also filed in opposition to the affidavit of Sabita Moitra, the applicant No.2 in which it was inter alia alleged that the room in dispute was let out by Dhanraj Purohit to Gulab Devi Nauhal in February, 1954 at a rent of Rs.105/- per month. It was further alleged that after Dhanraj Purohit transferred his right, title and interest in the said premises to Asharam Swami the said Gulab Devi Nauhal initiated proceedings before the Rent Controller for determination of the fair rent of the said room against Dhanraj Purohit and Asharam Swami. When Bholalal assigned his title, right and interest in the said portion of the said premises in favour of Latiyal Agricultural and Industrial Pvt. Ltd., Gulab Devi Nauhal attorned tenancy to the company and paid rent from March, 1960 up to the 19th August, 1961. In the said affidavit it was alleged that on 11th of September, 1961 the Rent Controller fixed the fair rent for the said room at Rs.35/- per month with effect from 1st of July, 1956. On and from 1960, Gulab Devi Nauhal, it was alleged, paid such rent to the Receiver. On the 21st of December, 1979, Gulab Devi Nauhal died leaving behind-her husband, the respondent No.2, one son and four daughters as her legal heirs and representatives. A decree was passed the said Gulab Devi Nauhal tendered rent in respect of the said room to the applicant No.2, Sabita Moitra who refused to accept the same. On the 21st of December, 1979, Gulab Devi Nauhal died leaving behind-her husband, the respondent No.2, one son and four daughters as her legal heirs and representatives. A decree was passed the said Gulab Devi Nauhal tendered rent in respect of the said room to the applicant No.2, Sabita Moitra who refused to accept the same. Since then the said rent was deposited with the Rent Controller. In respect of the said decree, the decree holders initiated proceedings in execution and sought to evict Gulab Devi Nauhal from the said room. By an order passed on the 18th of May, 1977 the said application of the decree holders was dismissed. An appeal preferred by the decree holders from the said orders dated 18th May, 1977 was dismissed or withdrawn on 19th August, 1983. A learned Judge of this Court by a final order dated 9th of January, 1987 rejected the application filed by the appellants against which the present appeal has been preferred by the appellants. 5. We have heard Mr. Moloy Ghosh appearing on behalf of the decree holders/appellants and Mr. Tibrewal the senior learned counsel appearing for the respondents. 6. From the perusal of the judgment under appeal it appears to us that the learned Judge held that the Company Court could not he invited to hold that the Official Liquidator continued to be entitled to or responsible for any further dispossession of the room in question. By reason of the decree passed in suit No. 961 of 1950 the right, title and interest of the company in liquidation in respect of the room in question if there was any, had ceased to exist and could not be treated as part of the assets of the company in liquidation. Therefore, the learned Judge held that the Official Liquidator could not be directed now to take back possession of the room in question and thereafter to make over the same to the decree holders/applicants. According to the learned Judge, the questions, which were sought to be raised in the application, were not the questions, which would arise in the course of winding up of the company in liquidation and therefore, could not be adjudicated by the Company Court. For the reasons aforesaid the learned Trial Judge had rejected the application filed by the appellants. 7. Mr. For the reasons aforesaid the learned Trial Judge had rejected the application filed by the appellants. 7. Mr. Ghosh appearing on behalf of the appellants however had drawn our attention to a Division Bench decision of this court in the case of Vidyadhar Upadhyay vs. Shree Shree Madan Gopal Jew and Ors., 67 Company Cases 394 and relying on the said decision of the Division Bench argued before us that the Official Liquidator must be deemed to be in possession under section 454 of the Companies Act. This submission of Mr. Ghosh was disputed by Mr. Tibrewal, the learned senior Counsel appearing for the respondent before us. Whether the application made before the Company Court was maintainable or not was dealt with by the aforesaid Division Bench decision of this Court. The observations made by the Division Bench at page 403 of the said decision, which in our opinion, would be necessary for us to decide this appeal must be referred to by us. Accordingly the said observations of the Division Bench made in page 403 in the said decision are quoted which are as follows: "The next question is whether this application made before the Company Court was maintainable or not. Before we deal with the same we shall refer to the Division Bench judgment of this Court in the case of Indramoni vs. Shriram Jute Mills P. Ltd. (Appeal No. 154 of 1976 dated December 6, 1976). In that case, the Clive Mills Co. Ltd. went into Liquidation and the Official Liquidator was appointed as the liquidator and the Official Liquidator was appointed as the Liquidator of the said company in liquidation. Pursuant to the order of the learned company Judge, the Official Liquidator was directed to accept the offer for sale of the assets of the company. Delivery of possession was given to the purchaser. It appeared that certain persons were residing at certain quarters situated within the area of the same mills and they were claiming to be the tenants in respect of the said quarters. Under these circumstances, a Judge's summons was taken out for an order directing the Superintendent of Police and other Police Officers to remove all trespassers as shown in the annexure to the said application who were in wrongful occupation of the premises in question. Under these circumstances, a Judge's summons was taken out for an order directing the Superintendent of Police and other Police Officers to remove all trespassers as shown in the annexure to the said application who were in wrongful occupation of the premises in question. Some of the occupiers contended that they had their tenancy title to the quarters occupied by them. Thereafter, the learned Judge passed an order and three persons who were found to be trespassers preferred an appeal. One of them was Indramoni who was claiming to have been in possession of one such quarters. It was contended on behalf of the appellant that no such application could be made or order be passed on the basis of section 446(2) of the said Act. In this connection, the Division Bench held as follows: In our opinion, the language of sub-section (2) is clear, it was the intention of learned Judge that all questions which come within the scope of subsection (2) of the said section should be dealt with by the company court in order to avoid unnecessary delay and multiplicity of proceedings. In an application being made to that effect, leave is given to the liquidator or appropriate party to institute or continue such proceedings in any other court or Tribunal. In this case, there was an application under section 446(2). It comes under clause (b) which relates to any claim made by or against the company and in any event it is certainly covered by clause (d) which includes any question whatsoever whether of law or fact which may relate to or arise in the course of the winding up of the company. In the present case, admittedly, the winding-up proceedings have not come to an end. The company was not yet dissolved. It was still in the course of winding-up. Further in our opinion, it was certainly a question relating to or arising in the course of such winding-up. In the course of the winding-up, the Official Liquidator was directed to sell the mill premises to the purchaser who was the applicant before the learned company Judge. This provided for handing over possession of the immovable properties to the purchaser. The order specifically directed the police authorities referred to therein to render police help in evicting the trespassers. A list of tenants and licensees was prepared. The others in occupation were the trespassers. This provided for handing over possession of the immovable properties to the purchaser. The order specifically directed the police authorities referred to therein to render police help in evicting the trespassers. A list of tenants and licensees was prepared. The others in occupation were the trespassers. The liquidator prepared a list showing whether the tenants are licensees or trespassers. This was challenged by the appellants on the ground that the liquidator did not give them any opportunity. On that basis, they were given further liberty to file supplementary affidavits, which they did. Now the question was whether these appellants were trespassers or not within the meaning of the order passed on August 8, 1972. In our opinion, it was certainly a claim or question coming within clause (b) and certainly within clause (d) of sub-section (2) of section 446 of the said Act. Accordingly, in our opinion, the learned Judge was entitled to entertain this application owing to such a question in such a proceeding. Accordingly, we reject this contention of Dutta. The interpretation of the said section has been given by the said Division Bench judgment. Applying the principles laid down therein, we are of the opinion that this application is certainly maintainable and the questions raised in this application come within the scope of section 446(2) of the Companies Act." 8. In our opinion, the aforesaid Division Bench decision of this Court in the case of Vidyadhar Upadhyay vs. Sree Sree Madan Gopal Jew and Ors. (supra) which had relied on an earlier Division Bench decision of this Court is clearly applicable to the facts of this case. The law settled by the Division Bench in the 80s has not been disturbed either by the Supreme Court or by this Court on the question of maintainability of an application under section 446(2) of the Companies Act. In our view, since this law, which has been settled in the 80s, is still controlling the field, it would be improper for us at this stage to hold otherwise. That apart, it is evident that the aforesaid Division Bench decision of this Court was delivered in respect of the same property in which the lessor and the lessees were practically same. That apart, it is evident that the aforesaid Division Bench decision of this Court was delivered in respect of the same property in which the lessor and the lessees were practically same. Such being the position, we feel it proper to apply the principles laid down in the aforesaid Division Bench of this Court in the present case and hold that the learned Company Judge was not justified in rejecting the application filed under section 446(2) of the Companies Act. That apart, in this case of Dhirendra Chandra Pal vs. Bank of Tripura Ltd., AIR 1955 SC 213 , the Supreme Court held that where the liquidator had to approach the Court under section 45(B) of the Banking Companies Act, 1945 (provisions para materia of section 446(2) of the Companies Act) for relief in respect of the matters legitimately falling within the scope thereof, elaborate proceedings by way of his suit involving time and expense to the department of ultimate interest of the company under liquidation, were not contemplated. 9. However, Mr. Tibrewal appearing on behalf of the respondent had strongly relied on a Division Bench decision of the Bombay High Court in the case of M/s. D. Vasantrai & Co. vs. The Official Assignee, High Court of Judicature at Bombay and Ors., AIR 1985 Bombay 1, and contended that the direction to the appellant to hand over possession of the premises in question in a proceeding 446(2) of the Companies Act could not arise at all. In view of the earlier Division Bench decision of this Court in respect of the same subject matter and in view of the fact that the Bombay High Court decision was not based on the power of the Company Court under section 446(2) of the Companies Act which was not at issue before the Bombay High Court we are unable to rely on the Division Bench decision of the Bombay High Court the Division Bench of that Court clearly observed as follows:- "In this case the agreement of sub-tenancy of the premises between the insolvents and the appellants clearly shows that it created only the sub-tenancy of the premises and nothing more. The report of the Official Assignee also proceeded on that basis. In that event the insolvency determines the question of title in respect of the said tenancy which could not vest in the Official Assignee." 10. The report of the Official Assignee also proceeded on that basis. In that event the insolvency determines the question of title in respect of the said tenancy which could not vest in the Official Assignee." 10. It is true that in the said decision, the Bombay High Court observed that direction of the Insolvency Court to the appellant to hand over possession of the premises in question to the Official Assignee on the basis that the tenancy of the premises in favour of the insolvent had vested in the Official Assignee and that as against the insolvent the appellants had title to the said premises, cannot be sustained. But we are unable to apply the aforesaid principles laid down by the Division Bench of the Bombay High Court in the facts and circumstances of this case. More precisely in that Bombay High Court decision, the Bombay High Court was not considering the provisions of the Companies Act and the power of the Company Court. Power of the Company Court to direct delivery of possession on an application under section 446(2) of the Companies Act was not at all an issue because that decision was based on the interpretation of the Presidency-Town Insolvency Act. Therefore, we are unable to find any reason to rely on the decision of the Bombay High Court in the case of M/s. D. Vasantrai & Co. vs. The Official Assignee, High Court of Judicature at Bombay and Ors. (supra). Mr. Tibrewal however submitted before us that the earlier Division Bench decision in respect of the same subject matter reported in the case of Vidyadhar Upadhyay vs. Sree Sree Madan Gopal Jew and Ors. (supra) cannot be relied on by us as the principles laid down in the said decision cannot be construed to be a precedent as the said question was neither raised nor argued before the earlier Division Bench where the same subject matter was involved and the discussions by the Court after pondering over the possession in depth could not be a binding precedent. There is no dispute about these principles. But in the case of Vidyadhar Upadhyay vs. Sree Sree Madan Gopal Jew and Ors. (supra) the question that was an issue was whether the application made before the Company Court under section 446(2) of the Companies Act was maintainable or not. There is no dispute about these principles. But in the case of Vidyadhar Upadhyay vs. Sree Sree Madan Gopal Jew and Ors. (supra) the question that was an issue was whether the application made before the Company Court under section 446(2) of the Companies Act was maintainable or not. While considering the question of maintainability, the Division Bench went into this issue and decided such issue in the manner indicated herein-earlier by relying on an earlier Division Bench judgment of this Court in the case of Indramoni vs. Shriram Jute Mills (P) Ltd. (Appeal No. 154 of 1976 dated 6th December, 1976). 11. Accordingly, we are unable to agree with Mr. Tibrewal, the learned senior Counsel appearing for the respondent that the application field by the decree holders/appellants for delivery of possession was not maintainable in law as we are of the view that the decision of the Bombay High Court in the case of M/s. D. Vasantrai & Co. vs. The Official Assignee, AIR 1985 Bombay 1, cannot be applied to the facts and circumstances of the case as that was not a decision rendered on the provisions of the Companies Act and that the earlier two Division Bench decisions had already held in favour of the appellants. That being the position now, the principles, laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of Rajpur Ruda Meha & Ors. vs. State of Gujarat, AIR 1980 SC 1707 , as was relied on by Mr. Tibrewal, the learned senior Counsel appearing for the respondent cannot be applied to the facts of this case. Lastly Mr. Tibrewal urged before us that section 446(2) of the Companies Act cannot be applied in an eviction suit as eviction suit cannot come within the scope of section 446(2) of the Companies Act. This principle is well settled, but in a situation like in the case of Vidyadhar Upadhyay vs. Sree Sree Madan Gopal Jew and Ors. (supra) the Division Bench of this Court in fact followed an earlier Division Bench of this Court, as noted herein earlier and held that the language of sub-section (2) was very clear and all questions which come within the scope of sub-section (2) of section 446 of the Companies Act should be dealt with by the Company Court in order to avoid unnecessary delay and multiplicity of proceedings. At page 403 of the aforesaid decision, the Division Bench of this Court which concerned with the same property relied oil an earlier Division Bench of this Court in the case of Indramoni vs. Shriram Jute Mills P. Ltd. (Appeal No. 154 of 1976 dated 6th December, 1976) and came to a conclusion that the earlier Division Bench of this Court which interpreted the scope of section 446(2) of the Companies Act was rightly interpreted. The Division Bench in the case of Vidyadhar Upadhyay vs. Sree Sree Madan Gopal Jew and Ors. (supra) held that the application filed by the decree holders/appellants for recovery of possession was certainly maintainable and the questions raised in the application must come within the purview of section 446(2) of the Companies Act. Accordingly, we are unable to agree with Mr. Tibrewal that under section 446(2) of the Companies Act, the respondents could not be directed to deliver possession of the said premises, as any person cannot be evicted under this process without taking other recourse to law. That apart, in this case we are not concerned with an eviction suit filed under section 446(2) of the Companies Act. 12. Before we conclude, one more aspect of the matter should be dealt with. An earlier unreported Division Bench decision of this Court in which two cases were disposed of by one judgment viz., Ghanashyam Choubey vs. Shree Shree Madan Gopal Jew & Ors., Appeal No. 206 of 1979, and Ram Kumar Bhiwaniwalla vs. Sree Sree Madan Gopal Jew & Ors., Appeal No. 207 of 1979, which was disposed of on 11th February, 1981, was placed strong reliance by Mr. Tibrewal the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the respondent. It is true that in the said decision a Division Bench of this Court held that the executing Court cannot go behind the decree and make an order for delivery of possession. This unreported judgment of the Division Bench of this Court in respect of the same property was taken into consideration by the earlier Division Bench of this Court in the case of Vidyadhar Upadhyay vs. Sree Sree Madan Gopal Jew & Ors. (supra). This unreported judgment of the Division Bench of this Court in respect of the same property was taken into consideration by the earlier Division Bench of this Court in the case of Vidyadhar Upadhyay vs. Sree Sree Madan Gopal Jew & Ors. (supra). At page 400 the Division Bench considered this aspect and held as follows: "Next he relied on the fact that in the execution application an order was passed again the appellant which was set-aside in appeal preferred by the appellant and accordingly it was submitted that no such relief could be given. The next submission was that his client is in possession and no person could be evicted without due process of law and the present proceedings cannot be said to be the due process of law. (Emphasis Supplied) 13. Therefore, we cannot say that while deciding the case reported in 67 Company Cases 394 (supra) the Division Bench had not considered the aforesaid unreported decision of this Court. Such being the position we are unable to accept the contentions of Mr. Tibrewal that the application filed by the decree holders was not maintainable in law. 14. For the reasons aforesaid the appeal is allowed. The impugned judgment of the Trial Court is hereby set aside. The application filed by the decree holders/appellants stands allowed. The appellants would be at liberty to take possession of the property in question in accordance with law. 15. No other submission was made on behalf of the appellants. 16. However, there will be no order as to costs. Later: Learned Counsel appearing for the respondents asks for stay of operation of this judgment for some time. Considering the facts and circumstances of the case and the law decided, we do not find any reason to grant any stay in this matter. Accordingly, prayer for stay is refused. Asit Kumar Bisi, J.: I agree. Appeal allowed and application filed by the decree holders/appellants stands allowed.