Judgment :- K. Padmanabhan Nair, J. These four Civil Revision Petitions arise from the common order passed by the Appellate authority (Land Reforms), Thrissur disposing four appeals as A.A. Nos. 26 of 1987, 23 of 1987, 25 of 1987 and 24 of 1987, which in turn arise from the common order passed by the Land Tribunal, Thrissur dismissing O.A. Nos. 2178 of 1976, 2179 of 1976, 2180 of 1976 and 2177 of 1976. All the four Original Applications were filed under Section 80-B of the Kerala Land Reforms Act ('Act for short) for purchase of the alleged kudikidappu right over the petition scheduled buildings. 2. The proceedings have got a chequered career. The properties comprised in Survey Nos. 219and 222 originally belonged to Sri. Appan Thampuran. The properties were purchased by the revision petitioners under Exhibits B1 and B2 sale deeds. The contesting respondents in these original Applications and others who were residing in buildings situated in the property, filed seven original Applications as O.A. Nos. 2176 of 1976 to 2182 of 1976 for purchase of kudikidappu on identical grounds. The revision petitioners entered appearance and raised identical objections in all the seven Original Applications. The Land Tribunal deputed an Authorised Officer (Revenue Inspector) to conduct a local inspection and file reports. The Authorised Officer filed reports in all the seven cases whhich were marked as exhibit C1 in all the cases. The applicants in all the seven original Applications filed identical objections to Exhibit C1 report filed in all the cases. The revision petitions also filed identical objections. In all cases, on the side of the petitioners the petitioners were examined as PW1. In O.A. 2176 of 1976 and independent witness was also examined as P.W.2 . The respondent gave evidence in all the seven Original Applications as R.W.1. Thereafter a note of argument was submitted by the revision petitioners in all the seven cases raising identical contentions. The Land Tribunal after considering the pleadings and evidence found that the applicants in all the seven cases does not come under the definition of Section 2(25)(a) of the Act. It was found that their common case that their predecessors in interest obtained land from Appan Thampuran for constructing homestead about forty years back, in which they had constructed homesteads and they are residing there was not proved. It was found that their common case that their predecessors in interest obtained land from Appan Thampuran for constructing homestead about forty years back, in which they had constructed homesteads and they are residing there was not proved. After analysing the evidence, the Tribunal found that the applicants in all the seven cases does not satisfy the definition of "kudikidappukaran" contained in Section 2(25) (a) of the Act and dismissed all the Original Applications. 3. The petitioners in O.A. 2176 of 1976 and 2182 of 1976 did not file any appeal before the Appellate Authority. The petitioners in the other original Applications filed A.A. Nos. 72 of 1978, 176 of 1978, 177 of 1978, 224 of 1978 and 643 of 1978. All these five appeals were heard together. The Appellate Authority found that "the Land Tribunal based its decision mainly on the report of the Revenue Inspector and the purchase deed of the respondents". It was further found that there was "no detailed examination as to who constructed the house, what were their cost of construction at the time of their construction and what would be the probable rent the building would fetch, have not been properly examined". It was also found that "the evidence relied on were not adequate to come to a correct conclusion" and that "the decision of the Land Tribunal not sound". So, the Appellate Authority held that "further enquiry as to whether the building will come under the definition of "hut" under K.L.R. Act has to be examined on the basis of the detailed enquiry and lead further evidence, if necessary, by deputing an Advocate Commissioner to assess the value at the time of construction". All the five appeals were allowed and the Original Applications were remanded. 4. After remand, and Advocate Commissioner was deputed, who filed Exhibit C2 report in all the five cases. In O.A. 2176 OF 1976, the son of the original applicant was again examined as P.W.1 and in all the four other Original Applications the very same applicants who were examined as P.W. 1 were again examined as P.W. 1. The Land Tribunal again found that the Original Applicants have no definite case and have miserably failed to prove their case and dismissed all the five Original Applications. The applicants in the four Original Applications filed four appeals before the Appellate Authority as A.A. Nos. The Land Tribunal again found that the Original Applicants have no definite case and have miserably failed to prove their case and dismissed all the five Original Applications. The applicants in the four Original Applications filed four appeals before the Appellate Authority as A.A. Nos. 23 of 1987 to 26 of 1987. Applicant in O.A. 2182 of 1976 did not file any appeal. The Appellate Authority, after considering the case of the applicants, found that the Land Tribunal failed to assess the value of the disputed buildings at the time of its construction and its probable rent that it would have fetched had those buildings been let out at the time of construction. It was found that all the buildings in question satisfy the definition of "hut" and hence they are kudilidappukarars and entitled to purchase the land owners right in respect of 10 cents each. The Appellate Authority found that the land owners were able to obtain orders in their favour obviously with the connivance of the Land Tribunal and its officials and there was failure on the part of the revision petitioners to file a statement as provided in sub-rule (3) of Rule 80 of the Tenancy Rules and their defence, if any, to be struck off and the cases have to be proceeded as if the revision petitioners had not defended their case. The Appellate Authority directed the Tribunal to assign the kudikidappu within thirty days from the date of receipt of the order. The respondents in those four appeals have filed these four revisions challenging the common order passed by the Appellate Authority in the four appeals. 5. The learned counsel appearing for the revision petitioners has argued that the Appellate Authority committed grave illegality and has failed to decide the question of law arising in these four cases. It is argued that in all these cases the definite contention put forward by the applicants were that they were kudikidappukars in view of the definition contained in Section 2(25)(a) of the Act and not on the ground that the buildings occupied by them are huts falling under Section 2(25)(b) of the Act. It is argued that it is very specifically contended that the predecessors in interest of the applicants obtained land from the land owner and constructed a homestead about 40-50 years of the filing of the applications and all the buildings are not huts. It is argued that it is very specifically contended that the predecessors in interest of the applicants obtained land from the land owner and constructed a homestead about 40-50 years of the filing of the applications and all the buildings are not huts. It is argued that the pleadings and the evidence before the Land Tribunal prior to the remand was only to the effect that either the applicants or their predecessors in interest constructed homesteads in the land obtained from the land owner and hence they will come under the definition of Section 2(25)(a) of the Act. It is argued that eventhough none of the applicants have got a case that they were residing in a hut belonging to the land owner, the Appellate Authority at the first time illegally set aside that orders passed by the land Tribunal and remanded the cases. It is submitted that in view of the legal position laid down by this Court in Joseph v. Velayudhan Pillai (1976 KLT 870) that no revision was maintainable from the order passed by the Appellate authority remanding a case the revision petitioners were not able to challenge the orders of remand. It is pointed out that as the Appellate Authority did not enter into any finding on any issues and it was an open remand only with a direction to consider whether the disputed structures are huts or not. It is also argued that on the second occasion the Appellate Authority refused to consider the contention raised by the revision petitioners on the ground that in view of the provisions contained in Rule 80(3) of the Tenancy Rules the defence have to be struck off and case has to be decided as if they have not defended the Original Applications. It is also argued that the comments made by the Appellate Authority regarding the Land Tribunal and its officers are not based on any material whatsoever and such comments could have been made only on extraneous considerations. 6. It is also argued that the comments made by the Appellate Authority regarding the Land Tribunal and its officers are not based on any material whatsoever and such comments could have been made only on extraneous considerations. 6. The learned counsel appearing for the respondents have argued that originally the finding of the Land Tribunal was that the applicants are not kudikidappukars coming within the purview of Section 2(25)(a) of the Act, but that finding was set aside by the Appellate authority and directed the Land Tribunal to consider whether the building in question are huts, thereby there is a specific finding to the effect that the case of the respondents is one falling under Section 2(25)(b) of the Act and not under Section 2(25)(a) of the act and so the only question arising for consideration after the first order of remand is whether the building is a hut or not. It is argued that the revision petitioners did not file any revision against the earlier order of remand. Hence, the same become final and conclusive. 7. It is true that originally the Tribunal found that the applicants are not kudikidappukars falling within the definition of Section 2(25)(a) of the Act and that finding was set aside by the Appellate authority and remanded the original Applications to the Land Tribunal for fresh consideration. The revision petitioners did not challenge those orders by filing a revision or Original Petition under Article 227 of constitution of India before this Court. In Baby v. Travanacore Devaswom Board (199(1) KLT SN 1 (Case Bo. 1)) it was held by the Supreme Court that even if a revision is maintainable the order can be challenged by filing and Original Petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. In Mammu v. Hari Mohan (2000 (1) KLT 835 (SC)), the apex court considered the Section 103 of the Act and found that the order of remand passed by the Appellate Authority to the Land Tribunal for disposal in accordance with law cannot be said to be an interlocutory order. It was held as follows :- "An order of remand in which the matter is remanded to the Land Tribunal for disposal in accordance with law cannot be said to be an interlocutory order for the simple reason that the appeal filed before the Appellate Authority stands disposed of by such order. It was held as follows :- "An order of remand in which the matter is remanded to the Land Tribunal for disposal in accordance with law cannot be said to be an interlocutory order for the simple reason that the appeal filed before the Appellate Authority stands disposed of by such order. In a case where the Appellate Authority keeps the proceedings pending and calls for a finding on a specific issue or point formulated by it from the Land Tribunal or any other Authority, then such an order cannot be said to be a final order against which a revision can be filed before the High Court". But, in paragraph 5 of the decision, the apex court noted various decisions of this court in this point, reported in Joseph v. Velayudhan Pillai (1976 KLT 870), Mahadevan Iyer v. Bhagavathy Ammal (1979 KLT 910) and Bhaskara Menon v. Gangadharan (1983 KLT 435). In Joseph's case (1976 KLT 870) and in Bhaskara Menon'c case (1983 KLT 435), this court found that an order of remand is not revisable and a revision against those orders are not maintainable in view of the provisions of Section 103 of the Act. The apex court approved the decision rendered by this Court in Mahadevan Iyer's case (1979 KLT 910) and overruled the principle laid down in 1976 KLT 870 and 1983 KLT 435). So, the legal position is that even against an order of remand, a revision is maintainable. But at the same time, the Supreme court has categorically held that the decision rendered in Mammu's case (2000(1) KLT 835) can only prospective effect. It held as follows :- "We make it clear that our decision to reverse the finding on the maintainability of the revision petition and overruling the contra view taken by the Kerala High Court for the reasons set forth in this judgment, will have only prospective effect. Any proceeding under the Act which has been concluded and finally disposed of by the Tribunal, High Court or any other competent authority relying on the decisions of the Kerala High Court on the point will not be re-opened on the basis of the decision rendered by us". Any proceeding under the Act which has been concluded and finally disposed of by the Tribunal, High Court or any other competent authority relying on the decisions of the Kerala High Court on the point will not be re-opened on the basis of the decision rendered by us". So, on the date of which the Appellate Authority passed the order of remand, in view of the decisions of this Court in Joseph's case (supra) and Bhaskara Menon's case (supra) even if the revision petitioners filed a revision, the same would have been dismissed as not maintainable. 8. Even accepting for the sake of argument that the order passed by the Appellate Authority has become final, the next question that arises for consideration is whether there was any finding or any point formulated by the Appellate Authority for the Land Tribunal to consider. The relevant portion of the order of the Appellate Authority reads as follows :- "No detailed examination as to who constructed the house, what were their cost of construction at the time of their construction and what would be the probable rent the buildings would fetch, have no been properly examined. The evidence relied upon is not adequate to come to a correct conclusion. So I find the decision of the Land Tribunal not sound. Further enquiry as to whether the buildings will come within the definition of hut under the K.L.R. Act has to be examined on the basis of detailed enquiry and further evidence". What the Appellate Authority found was that there is no detailed examination by the Land Tribunal as to who constructed the house. There is no finding entered into by the appellate Authority that the claim of the respondents are one falling under sub-section (8) of Sec. 2(25) of the Act. So, it is evidently clear that the Appellate Authority while setting aside the binding of the Tribunal that the respondents failed to establish that their predecessors in interest constructed the homestead after obtaining land from the land owner directed the tribunal to consider the whole case. There was no adverse finding against the revision petitioners so as to estop them from contending than since the applicants failed to establish that they had obtained land from the land owners and constructed the building they are not kudikidappukars. There was no adverse finding against the revision petitioners so as to estop them from contending than since the applicants failed to establish that they had obtained land from the land owners and constructed the building they are not kudikidappukars. So, a reading of the order of the Appellate Authority shows that it is an open remand, whereby the Land Tribunal was directed to consider the whole matter afresh. In this connection, it is very pertinent to note that in Mammu's case (2000 (1) KLT 835) the Land Tribunal dismissed the application holding that the applicant was not a kudikidappukaran. But in the appeal, the Appellate Authority entered into a finding that the applicant was a kudikidappukaran and remanded the case only for the limited purpose of granting kudikidappu right to the applicant in the light of the directions given in that order. The land tribunal assigned the kudikidappu right to the applicant. The appeal filed by the land owner was dismissed in view of the finding of the Appellate Authority in the earlier remand order. In the present order the Land Tribunal was directed to reconsider the whole case afresh, if necessary by deputing an Advocate Commissioner. So, there is absolutely no merit in the contention raised by the respondents that in view of the finding of the Appellate Authority in the earlier remand order the matter is concluded and the only question to be considered is whether the buildings occupied by applicants are huts. 9. It is true that there was no specific finding entered into by the Appellate Authority that the defence put forward by the revision petitioners in all the four Original Applications has struck off. But, the fact remains that the Appellate Authority did not consider any of the contentions put forward by the revision petitioners. The relevant portion of the order is as follows :- Therefore the failure of the respondent landlord does attract invoking of sub-rule 3 to Rule 80 of the Tenancy Rules, according to which any person fails to file a statement under sub rule (1) or fails to disclose particulars when examined under that sub rule, be liable , without prejudice to any other penalties to which he may be liable, to have his defence, if any, struck out and to be placed in the same position as if he had not defended the application". So, it is clear that the Appellate Authority struck off the defence of the land owner. Rule 80 of the Rules reads as follows:- "80. Person in possession to disclose certain information. - (1) The person in possession of the land in which a kudikidappu is situate shall, where he appears before the Land Tribunal in pursuance of a notice under sub-rule (2) of rule 79, or when required by the Land Tribunal, file a written statement of his defence, if any, to the application, accompanied by a statement certified by him to be correct setting forth.- (a) the extent of lands [as specified in sub-section (12) of Section 80A] held by him; (b) the taluk and village in which, and the local authority within whose jurisdiction, each item of such lands is situate ; (c) the survey number and sub-division number, or a sufficient description of each item of such lands; (d) the extent of each item of such lands; (e) whether there are kudikidappukars in any item of such lands; (f) the number of kudikidappukara, if any, in each item of land with the names and addresses of such kudikidappukars; (g) whether to his knowledge any application for purchase of kudikidappu and lands adjoining thereto in respect of any land held by him has been filed by any person and if so the details of such application : Provided that where the extent of lands {as specified in sub-section (12) of sec. 80A} held by a person is five acres or more, it shall not be necessary for him to furnish the particulars referred to in clauses (b) to (g) of this sub-rule. (2) The Land Tribunal may, where it thinks it necessary so to do summon and examine an oath the person in possession of the land in which the kudikidappu is situate to ascertain any particulars necessary for the disposal of the application for the purchase of that kudikidappu. (3) Where any person fails to file statement under sub-rule (1) or to appear when summoned under sub-rule (2) or fails to disclose particulars when examined under that sub-rule he shall be liable , without prejudice to any other penalties to which he may be liable, to have his defence, if any struck out and to be placed in the same position as if he had not defended the application". Sub-rule (1) of Rule 80 provides that the person in possession of the property in which the kudikidappu is situate shall file his written statement of defence, if any, to the application, accompanied by a statement certified by him to be correct. They had filed written statements in the cases. The respondents have no case that any order was passed by the Land Tribunal directing the revision petitioners to file a statement as contemplated under sub-rule(1) of Rule 80. The revision petitioners were not summoned by the Land Tribunal to be examined them on oath to ascertain the particulars. So it is not a case covered by sub-rule (2) of Rule 80 also. In the application in Column No. 6 in all applications, the Applicants had stated that in addition to the applicant in that particular case there were nine other kudikidappukars residing in the property whereby it was admitted that there were ten kudikidappukars in the property. The details regarding Taluk, village, survey number, sub division number etc. are stated in column No. 2 of the application itself. In column No.9 it is stated that the revision petitioners own more than five acres of land. The names of other alleged kudikidappukars are also given in the application itself. In paragraph 8 of the written statement filed by the revision petitioners, it is specifically averred that the contention of the applicants that the land owners own more than five acres of land is not correct and they are in possession of the property in which the alleged kudikidappus are situated only. They have produced the title deeds in respect of that property also. So, all the necessary details which are required to be furnished under sub-rule (1) of Rule 80 were available before the Tribunal. So, there was substantial compliance of provisions of Rule 80(1) of the Rules. The applicants have no such case that the defence put forward by the land owners should be struck off in view of the failure on their part to file a statement under Rule 80(1) of the Rules. The counsel appearing for the land owners pointed out that no such contention was raised before the Land Tribunal and in the appeal memos filed on both occasions and only at the time of final hearing of the present appeals such a contention was put forward by the counsel appearing for the applicant. The counsel appearing for the land owners pointed out that no such contention was raised before the Land Tribunal and in the appeal memos filed on both occasions and only at the time of final hearing of the present appeals such a contention was put forward by the counsel appearing for the applicant. It is argued that without giving sufficient opportunity to the revision petitioners to answer that contention, the Appellate Authority struck off the defence. It is argued that the attitude of the Appellate Authority in appreciating the contentions raised by the parties is clear by the uncharitable comments made against the Land Tribunal and its officers. The very purpose of incorporating sub-rule(1) to Section 80 is to provide necessary details to the Land Tribunal to enter into a just and proper decision in an application filed by the kudikidappukars for the purchase of the kudikidappu. None of the applicants have got a case before the Land Tribunal that in view of the failure of the revision petitioners to file a separate statement as contemplated by Rule 80(8) of the Rules any prejudice was caused to them. So, the Appellate Authority acted illegally in striking off the defence and that the revision petitioners on a ground that the applicants had never put forward before the Land Tribunal before or after the remand or before the Appellate Authority on the earlier occasion. 10. Now I shall consider how far the finding of the Appellate Authority that the respondents are kudikidappukars is legal. In the application in answer to column No. 3 it is very specifically stated that the building is constructed by the applicants. What is stated is :- In answer to column No. 4 it is specifically averred that the disputed structures are not huts and they are homesteads constructed by the applicant. This is what is stated :- In Column No. 5, it is averred that about 40 years prior to the date of filing of the applications the predecessors in interest of the applicants obtained the land from Appan Thampuran and constructed homesteads and are residing there. In all the four cases the averments are identical. It is veryn specially averred that the land originally belonged to Appan Thampuran and predecessors in interest of the applicants obtained the land and in that land they constructed a homestead and the structures are not huts. In all the four cases the averments are identical. It is veryn specially averred that the land originally belonged to Appan Thampuran and predecessors in interest of the applicants obtained the land and in that land they constructed a homestead and the structures are not huts. In paragraph 3 of the written statement filed by the revision petitioners, it is very specifically stated that since the contention of the applicants that the disputed structures are not huts, the applications are only to be rejected. It is also averred that there are altogether 15 buildings in the property and all those buildings were rented out. It was also contended that after the purchase the tenants were evicted and the buildings were reconstructed and the reconstructed buildings were let out to the present applicants and they are occupying the buildings as tenants of the building. The averment that permission was granted to occupy the land was specifically denied. The Authorised Officer appointed in all these cases, after inspecting the buildings, filed reports. In paragraph 3 of the objection filed by the applicants in all these four cases it was very specifically contended that since the disputed structures are homesteads, it is not necessary to ascertain the value of the buildings at the time of construction. The witnesses examined in all these cases prior to remand also stated that the disputed structures are not huts; they are homesteads which were constructed by their predecessors in interest after obtaining land from Appan Thampuran. In O.A. 2179 of 1976 prior to the remand the applicant deposed that his father obtained the land and father constructed the building and was residing there and after his marriage, he had constructed the building about 19 years prior to the date of his filing the application. In O.A. 2179 of 1976 prior to the remand the applicant deposed that his father obtained the land and father constructed the building and was residing there and after his marriage, he had constructed the building about 19 years prior to the date of his filing the application. Section 2(25)(a) of the Act reads as follows :- "(25) "Kudikidappukaran" means a person who has neither a homestead nor any land exceeding in extent three cents in any city or major municipality or five cents in any other municipality or ten cents in any panchayat area or township, in possession either as owner or as tenant, on which he could erect a homestead and - (a) Who has been permitted with or without an obligation to pay rent by a person in lawful possession of any land to have the use and occupation of a portion of such land for the purpose of erecting a homestead; or (b) who has been permitted by a person in lawful possession or any land to occupy, with or without an obligation to pay rent, a hut belonging to such person and situate in the said land; and "kudikidappu" means he land and the homestead or the hut so permitted to be erected or occupied together with the easements attached thereto". So, the specific contention put forward by the applicants in the pleadings as well as at the time of evidence adduced before the first order of remand by the Appellate Authority that their predecessors in interest were permitted to have the use and occupation of the land and after obtaining such permission, homesteads were constructed. The learned counsel relying on Explanation II(b) to Section 2(25) argued that once in an application for purchase of kuikidappu the applicant is able to establish that the disputed structure is a hut, he is entitled to get assignment of kudikidappu even if he fails to prove the permission to have the use and occupation of the land. Explanation II reads as follows :- "Explanation II.- For the purposes of this clause. Explanation II reads as follows :- "Explanation II.- For the purposes of this clause. - (a) "hut" means any dwelling house constructed by a person other than the person permitted to occupy it - (i) at a cost, at the time of construction, not exceeding seven hundred and fifty rupees; or (ii) which could have at the time of construction , yielded a monthly rent not exceeding five rupees, and includes any such dwelling house reconstructed by the kudikidappukaran in accordance with the provisions of section 79; and (b) "homestead" means, unless the context otherwise require, any dwelling house erected by the person permitted to have the use and occupation of any land for the purpose of such erection, and includes any such dwelling house reconstructed by the kudikidappukaran. In accordance with the provisions of Section 79". Counsel has placed reliance on Sec. 79 of the Act. Explanation II(b) only definite the words "homestead" and "hut". It states that the words "homestead" means and dwelling house erected by the person permitted to have the use and occupation of the building. In other words, when the claim is that it is a homestead, the value of the building is immaterial . The Land Tribunal need not consider whether it is a hut or a substantial building. What is important is, whether it was erected by the person permitted to have the use and occupation of the land. It is further provided that even, if there was reconstruction of building it will still come within the definition of homestead. It is clarified that even if the homestead is reconstructed by the kudikidappukaran in accordance with Sec. 79, he is entitled to get the benefit. Section 79 does not create or confer any new right. It only deals with the right and the privileges of kudikidappukaran to maintain and repair homestead or hut. It reads as follows :- "79. Right of kudikidappukaran to maintain, repair etc; homestead or hut :- The kudikidappukaran shall have the right to maintain, repair and reconstruct with the same or different materials, but without increasing the plinth area at the commencement of the Kerala Land Reforms (Amendment) Act, 1969 by more than fifty percent, the hut belonging to the person who permitted occupation by the kudikidappukaran, or the homestead, at his own cost". A reading of Sec. 2(25) Explanation II to that Section and Sec. 79 of the Act makes it abundantly clear that the legislature had classified the building into two types, one as 'hut' and another as 'homestead'. When a person who obtained permission to have use and occupation of a land constructs a building, the value of the building is immaterial. If the permission was given for occupation of the building, then the building must come within the definition of 'hut' as defined in Explanation II (a). So, there is absolutely no merit in the contention raised by the learned counsel for the applicants that once it is shown that the buildings in question are huts, the applicants are entitled to purchase the same. 11. Another question arising for consideration is whether the applicants are entitled to adduce any evidence to prove the fact that the disputed structures are huts as defined under the Act. The specific case put forward in the application was that buildings in question are not a hut, but a homestead constructed by the applicants. That fact is not disputed by the revision petitioners. On the other hand, their contentions were that since the disputed structures are not huts, the applications are liable to be dismissed. Since there was no dispute regarding the nature of the buildings, the parties were not entitled to adduce any evidence on that point and evidence need be adduced only to prove a disputed fact and not to disprove an admitted fact. Since the applicants had admitted that the buildings in question were not huts they are not entitled to adduce any evidence to prove otherwise. So, even assuming that the applicants are claiming kudikidappu under sec. 2(25)(b) of the Act, their claims have to fail in view of their admission. 12. The evidence discussed above clearly shows that the only case put forward by the applicants in all the four applications is that their predecessors in interest obtained permission from the land owner to have use and occupation of a land and in that land either their predecessors in interest or the applicant had constructed homestead and are residing there. 12. The evidence discussed above clearly shows that the only case put forward by the applicants in all the four applications is that their predecessors in interest obtained permission from the land owner to have use and occupation of a land and in that land either their predecessors in interest or the applicant had constructed homestead and are residing there. The case of the land owner is that no such permission was granted by the former land owner to the predecessors in interest of the respondents to have the use and occupation of the land and these buildings were constructed by their predecessor in interest and after the purchase under Exhibits B1 and B2, they reconstructed the same and they made additions or alternations and thereafter those buildings were let out to the present occupants. In the order dated 30.9.1976, the land Tribunal accepted the case of the land owners and found that the applicants failed to prove that they got permission from the land owner for use and occupation of any land and they have constructed any homestead in it. That finding was set aside by the Appellate Authority as per order dated 30.6.1983 and remanded the case for fresh consideration with a direction to conduct further enquiry as to whether the buildings will come within the definition of "hut" under the Act. The Land Tribunal again, by order dated 29.4.1989, found that the applicants are not kudikidappukars and dismissed the applications. The Land Tribunal discussed the evidence in detail and came to the conclusion that the buildings in question are not huts as defined under the Act. It was also found that before remand the specific case put forward by the applicants were that the buildings were homesteads and not huts. The relevant portion reads as follows :- "Hence their definite case was that the property was homestead. Hence it is clear that after seeing Exts. B1 and B2 they changed their contention that the petition schedule property is a hut. Hence the deposition of the petitioners were contradictory and inconsistent. At the same time, RW1 has stated whatever stated in 1975 is correct. Further according to Sec. 79 of the plinth area of the original house cannot be increased". Based on that finding, the Tribunal found that the applicants are not kudikidappukars and dismissed all the five original Applications. Hence the deposition of the petitioners were contradictory and inconsistent. At the same time, RW1 has stated whatever stated in 1975 is correct. Further according to Sec. 79 of the plinth area of the original house cannot be increased". Based on that finding, the Tribunal found that the applicants are not kudikidappukars and dismissed all the five original Applications. The appellate Authority, in the impugned order, did not consider the pleading or evidence and the contentions raised by the revision petitioners on the ground that failure of the respondent landlord does attract invoking of Sub Rule 3 to Rule 80 of the Tenancy Rules". The Appellate Authority came to a conclusion that the disputed structures are huts solely based on the report filed by the Advocate commissioner. He discarded Exhibit C1 report filed by the Authorised Officer. The Appellate Authority did not consider what exactly is the claim put forward by the applicants in the Original Applications. There is no finding whether they are kudikidappukars falling under sub-section (a) or (b) of Section 2(25) of the Act. He also did not consider whether a person can approbate and reprobate, because in the original applications, objections filed to the report of the Authorised Officer and at the time of examination before remand the specific case put forward by the applicants were that their predecessors in interest constructed the homestead after obtaining permission to have use and occupation of the land and hence the value of the structures are immaterial. He also did not consider how far their oral evidence adduced after remand, to the effect that the buildings are hut, help them to get an order in their favour. It is evidently clear that the Appellate Authority has not considered any material points arising for consideration in the appeals and illegally struck off the defence of the land owners. In fact, in the original order passed by the Land Tribunal in 1976 alone the Land Tribunal considered whether the building was constructed by the predecessors in interest of the applicants as alleged by them. The Appellate Authority did not consider the pleadings and evidence adduced by the parties on both occasion. The Land Tribunal after remand did not consider this aspect. The Appellate Authority did not consider the pleadings and evidence adduced by the parties on both occasion. The Land Tribunal after remand did not consider this aspect. So, eventhough it is a litigation which has celebrated its silver jubilee, I have no other option but to set aside the orders passed by the Appellate Authority and remand the same to the Appellate Authority to consider the whole matter afresh and decide the same in accordance with law with the pleadings and evidence already on record. For that purpose, all the four appeals are to be remanded to the Appellate Authority. Since the Appellate Authority had already given an opportunity to both sides to adduce further evidence in the previous occasion, it is not necessary to give an opportunity either to amend the pleadings or adduce further evidence. In the result, all the four Civil Revision Petitions are allowed. The orders passed by the Appellate Authority in A.A.Nos. 26 of 1987, 23 of 1987, 25 of 1987 and 24 of 1987 are hereby set aside. The appeals are remanded to the Appellate Authority with a direction to dispose of all the four appeals afresh in accordance with law with the pleadings and evidence already on record. Since the matters are pending for more than two and a half decades, the Appellate Authority shall dispose of the matter as expeditiously as possible, at any rate, within four months from the date of appearance of parties. Office is directed to forward a copy of this order with the records, if any, received to the Appellate Authority forthwith. The parties shall appear before the Appellate Authority on 6.5.2002.