JUDGMENT 1. - Heard learned Counsel for the parties.FACTS ABOUT CIVIL SECOND APPEAL NO. 91/2001 1. This appeal is directed against the judgment and decree passed by the Additional District Judge No. 3, Jodhpur in Civil Appeal No. 39/95 dated 5.12.2000. 2. The first appeal filed by the present appellant UIT, Jodhpur was dismissed by the Additional District Judge, Jodhpur who affirmed the decree and judgment passed by the trial Court namely the Additional Civil Judge (Junior Division) and Judicial Magistrate No. 6, Jodhpur dated 7.3.1995. 3. A civil suit was filed by the plaintiffs-respondents No. 1 to 6 somewhere in 1990 for restraining the UIT, Jodhpur from interfering with the land comprised in Khasra No. 771 measuring 54.4 bighas. According to the claim of the plaintiffs, the land in question was sold by Dhula Parihar on 4.7.1966 to one Ved Prakash. The said Ved Prakash transferred that land in favour of Late Patric Viscent and the plaintiffs-respondents No. 1 and 2 on 27.9.1966 by a registered sale-deed and the purchasers were put in possession of the land on the same date. The said Patric Viscent died on 30.8.1989. Plaintiffs No. 3 to 6 are heirs and legal representatives of said Patric Viscent. It was also alleged that after purchasing the agricultural land, an application was made by the original purchaser Patric Viscent and plaintiffs No. 1 and 2 for conversion of the land for non-agricultural use, which conversion application was allowed and the land was converted into residential purposes. Separate Pattas were issued in the names of holders on 24.4.1989. The order dated 24.4.1989 was appealed before the learned Revenue Appellate Authority by the State through the Tehsildar, which appeal was rejected on 4.10.1989. Thereafter, on receipt of a notice from the UIT on 28.7.1990 by treating the possession of the plaintiffs to be as trespassers required them to remove their encroachment, the notice was replied to and they produced the relevant documents before the Officer of the Urban Improvement Trust. However, seeing that the Urban Improvement Trust is not responding to their claim, they filed the present suit. 4. No written statement was filed by the defendants-appellants even after several opportunities and the right to file the written statement was ultimately closed by the trial Court. In response to the evidence led by the plaintiffs, no evidence in rebuttal was led by the defendants. 4. No written statement was filed by the defendants-appellants even after several opportunities and the right to file the written statement was ultimately closed by the trial Court. In response to the evidence led by the plaintiffs, no evidence in rebuttal was led by the defendants. In the trial Court it was argued that the land in question was not entered in the name of Dhula Ram or any other name in the land records and, therefore, they could not have created any rights in plaintiffs by transfers, and plaintiffs did not acquire any rights in the property. It was also claimed that after the alleged transfers, on 19.4.1978 the land in question was placed at the disposal of UIT by the State and it was mutated in the name of UIT. However, such pleas were not supported by any evidence. The trial Court in the absence of any contrary material has decreed the suit in toto. 5. On appeal it was contended by the appellant-defendant before the First Appellate Court that the land in question was not recorded in the name of Dhula Ram and therefore, the plaintiffs did not acquire any right through the deed of transfer and that an earlier attempt to convert the land for non-agricultural use was proved abortive, which fact has not been disclosed by the plaintiffs in the subsequent proceedings for conversion which terminated in favour of the plaintiffs. 6. The learned appellate Judge also found that no evidence, oral or documentary, is available on record to support their contentions and in view of the existing material on the record of the case, the appeal was dismissed and the decree passed by the trial Court was affirmed. 7. Hence, this second appeal. Before admission of the case, it was brought to the notice of the Court by learned Counsel for the appellant that the plaintiffs have transferred the entire land in question to the different persons and lease deeds/allotment letters have been issued to all those transferees. This appeal was ordered to be Listed before the Division Bench alongwith D.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 3736/2000. This is how, this second appeal is before us. This appeal has been heard alongwith D.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 3736/2000. FACTS ABOUT D.B. CIVIL WRIT NO. 3736/2000 8. This appeal was ordered to be Listed before the Division Bench alongwith D.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 3736/2000. This is how, this second appeal is before us. This appeal has been heard alongwith D.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 3736/2000. FACTS ABOUT D.B. CIVIL WRIT NO. 3736/2000 8. The writ petition is alleged to be a public interest litigation by a public minded citizen for restraining the UIT from parting with the lands placed at its disposal by the State Government in pursuance of Annexure-2, resolution No. 8 dated 9.1.1996 and Annexure-3 resolution No. 13(12) dated 9.1.1997 and the Press Note, Annexure-4 for giving effect to the aforesaid resolution. The contention of the learned Counsel for the petitioner is that UIT has no authority to pass the resolutions in questions for fixing the price of the land which has been placed at its disposal in 1978. In doing so, it is not discharging its functions of developing the land in accordance with the provisions and objects of Urban Improvement Trust Act, 1959. 9. On the other hand learned Counsel for the respondent UIT has urged that the resolution No. 8 of 1996 related to specific land in respect of which number of disputes are/were on going at different levels and forums and the resolution was to make a settlement of said litigations in respect of land subject matter of disputes with Pololink Housing Cooperative Society. Such settlement is permissible Under Section 96 of the Urban Improvement Act, 1959. No question of public interests is involved in that regard. The resolution No. 8 of 1996 further authorised the Chairman to settle other disputes regarding 46 Khasara by entering into dialogue with claimants. Resolution No. 13(12) of 1997 lays down the guidelines for entering into a compromise in respect of lands comprised in said 46 Khasras where the dispute exists about the title of the property and most part of which was under construction and possession of others, after examining the claims put forward by each of the person claiming title adverse to the UIT/State. Section 96 of the Act of 1959 authorities the UIT to settle any dispute which is pending in the judicial proceedings or otherwise. Section 96 of the Act of 1959 authorities the UIT to settle any dispute which is pending in the judicial proceedings or otherwise. The object in passing the resolution was to minimise the litigation after examining the existence of the claimants' title and satisfying about plausibility of such claim prima facie and to prevent likely litigation in respect of which claim to title has been raised by occupants. Settling the dispute of the nature where prima facie plausible dispute as to title exist falls within the ambit of powers of UIT and in discharge of that obligation UIT has acted in the best public interest. The petitioner cannot be said to have any litigating interest. 10. He has also cited the case which is subject matter of second appeal referred to above in this judgment as an illustration. The land which is subject matter of dispute in the said second appeal is covered by one of the Khasaras, to which the resolution No. 13(12) of 1997 relates. It was also informed by the parties to said suit that in pursuance of above impugned resolution the plaintiffs-respondents in appeal have surrendered the disputed land in favour of UIT and in return the UIT has made an allotment in favour of plaintiffs at the rate mentioned in the said impugned resolution. Thus dispute in which litigation was pending and UIT has lost at two stage, stood settled, with perfection of title of UIT and reducing the plaintiff from an owner of free hold to a lessee from UIT. 11. Having examined the contentions raised before us and perusing the resolutions, we are of the opinion that it is apparently an attempt by the UIT, Jodhpur to minimise the litigation and to settle the disputes raised by the persons claiming to be in possession of the land on the basis of their title by requiring them to surrender the land to the UIT resulting in perfecting the title of UIT and subjecting the occupants to the title of UIT and in view of settling such disputes without litigation, the claimants who surrendered such land to UIT, were to be allotted the same land at a price determined under the resolution. Thus the resolution in term settles the dispute about the title of the UIT in lieu of allotting the land to the persons surrendering the claim to title to the UIT and obtaining right continued possession and is or under a title from UIT on payment of a price fixed under the resolution. In that light press note has been issued that those persons who are in possession of land and claim their possession on the basis of title to such land, they must present their documentary proof before the authority concerned (UIT) for its examination. On examination of such proof if the UIT finds to be a prima facie claim to title which can possibly be litigated with fair amount of chances of success the surrender of land could be accepted and the land to be allotted at a price determined as per resolution dated 9.1.1996 and 9.1.1997 referred to above. The settlement is two way process. Neither party is bound to accept settlement in all cases, where claim has been raised against UIT, the Trust may under the resolution in respect of land governed by resolutions in question, can agree to settle only if is satisfied about the bonafide of claim raised before it, and possibility of a litigation which is fairly arguable on behalf of the claimants, but not otherwise. In case UIT does not decide to settle any claim, the parties' rights to have their rights determined through appropriate forums is not affected. Likewise if a person claiming title in any land does not wish to agree to term of settlement envisaged under the Resolutions in question, cannot be compelled to act in terms of said Resolutions. His denial to come within the terms of settlement does not in any way affect the parties right to have recourse to law for determination of such rights through remedial measures provided in law. 12. It has further been stated that the resolution fixing the price for settlement of dispute has since been approved by the Government. 13. The perusal of Section 96 of the Urban Improvement Act also leaves no room of doubt that it is not a pre-condition for settling a dispute that it must be pending before any court. 12. It has further been stated that the resolution fixing the price for settlement of dispute has since been approved by the Government. 13. The perusal of Section 96 of the Urban Improvement Act also leaves no room of doubt that it is not a pre-condition for settling a dispute that it must be pending before any court. As was suggested by learned Counsel for the petitioner it is enough if there is a bona fide debatable claim, raised by a claimant to the land in question. In such event the Urban Improvement Trust has necessary authority to settle such disputes to prevent litigation by securing its own title perfected by surrender of the land in its favour and in lieu thereof to allot the land, which is not falling within the zone of specific purpose excluded from Resolution, by the, UIT on its own terms. 14. To this goal, a general guideline can also be issued where In respect of specific area, large number of disputes have arisen on account of existing constructions which are claimed to have been raised under existing title and litigation is either pending or is likely to ensue. Settlement envisaged Under Section 96 is of dispute and not of litigation. A dispute is a dispute whether it has been subjected to litigation or can germinate into a litigation if not attended to properly. Any party having a dispute has always an option to settle it before going to court. In fact there is already much emphasis laid on alternative dispute resolution by methods otherwise than going to courts, whenever it is possible. 15. In these circumstances, we do not see that any question of public interest is involved in adopting the procedure countenanced by statutory provision. We do not find reference made to any particular instance of entertaining bogus claims under the guise of existing title in abuse of its authority conferred through resolutions in questions. If specific instances of abuse of power is brought to notice the same can be examined but no exercise of groping in dark can be made. The court will not ordinarily be entertaining petition on vague allegations that such and such resolutions are contrary to the limits of authority conferred on the UIT. If specific instances of abuse of power is brought to notice the same can be examined but no exercise of groping in dark can be made. The court will not ordinarily be entertaining petition on vague allegations that such and such resolutions are contrary to the limits of authority conferred on the UIT. In reply to the petition it has been clearly stated by the respondent UIT that particularly one of the case which we have referred to above, speaks for itself about the nature of dispute which was pending litigation and which has been included in the press-note. Moreover it is the case of the respondents and those facts have not been denied that most parcels of the land under the press note are prone to litigation on account of the long possession held by different persons claiming title in the land and constructions have come existence for long time, on such land. 16. As a result we do not find any merit in this writ petition and the same is hereby rejected. 17. So far as the second appeal is concerned we have noticed above as stated by learned counsel for the parties that in view of the resolution, the respondents-claimants have availed the opportunity and the land in dispute being subject matter of the suit has been surrendered in favour of UIT and allotment of the said land to the claimants have also been made on payment of price, and no dispute now survives. 18. In this view of the matter, this second appeal does not survive as it has becomes infructuous. The same is also therefore, dismissed as having become infructuous. However this dismissal shall not affect the validity of the act of parties in setting their dispute in terms of the Resolution referred to above. 19. No orders as to costs in both the cases.(1) Writ Petition Dismissed as Involving Public Interest. (2) Second Appeal Dismissed as Having become infructuous. *******