JUDGMENT Arun Kumar Goel, J.—Petitioners have challenged the decision of the Himachal Pradesh State Administrative Tribunal, dated 11th November, 2001 in O.A. No. 140 of 2001 on a number of grounds. 2. Admitted facts of this case are that respondent was working as a conductor in H.R.T.C., i.e. petitioner No. 1 under petitioner No.2 at the relevant point of time. Certain alleged acts of misconduct were committed by him therefore, action was taken against him because he admitted such misconduct. On the basis of such admission, minor punishment was imposed on the petitioner. However, Appellate Authority since intended to enhance the minor punishment to major one i.e. removal from service, show cause notice was issued to him on 23.4.1997. Thereafter vide order dated 12.9.1997 order of removal of the petitioner from service was passed. Since no inquiry was admittedly conducted at any stage of the case, therefore, petitioner challenged the said order before the H.P. State Administrative Tribunal, in O.A. No. 1811 of 1997 on 13th November, 1997. This application was allowed and order of removal was set aside. Respondents were left free to conduct inquiry under the rules in case they consider it. 3. Thereafter inquiry was conducted by the petitioners against the respondent on the following charges, after having served charge sheet on him: 1. Allegation regarding misappropriation of an amount of Rs. 79/ on 21.10.1996 by not issuing tickets to 17 passengers. 2. Violation of CCS. (Conduct) Rules, 1964 by consuming liquor in duty hours and caused a loss of Rs. 2,625/- to the Corporation and tarnished the image of the Corporation. 3. Allegation of not being obedient to his duties. 4. Having a shappy service record. Inquiry Officer submitted his report dated 12.10.1999. Findings of the Inquiry Officer on the aforesaid charges were as under: 1. Charge No. 1 is partially proved to the extent of Rs. 28/- only. 2. Charge No. 2 is not proved. 3. Charge No. 3 being related to Charge Nos. 1 and 2 is also partially proved. 4. Charge No. 4 is proved to the extent of Charge Nos. 1 and 3. 4. In the aforesaid background, disciplinary authority not agreeing with the findings of the Inquiry Officer was of the view that all the charges framed against the petitioner have been fully proved. 1 and 2 is also partially proved. 4. Charge No. 4 is proved to the extent of Charge Nos. 1 and 3. 4. In the aforesaid background, disciplinary authority not agreeing with the findings of the Inquiry Officer was of the view that all the charges framed against the petitioner have been fully proved. As such major penalty was intended to be imposed upon him in view of the gravity of the charges. As such vide Memorandum dated 30.12.1999, show-cause notice was issued to the petitioner, copy whereof is attached with O.A. as Annexure P-5 and is at page 45 of this writ petition. Reply was submitted by the petitioner vide Annexure A-6, its copy is at pages 49 to 57 of the writ petition. Being dissatisfied with the same, petitioner was removed from service vide Order dated 18.4.2002. When petitioner challenged his removal before the Appellate Authority, the same was upheld by the Managing Director of petitioner No. 1 Corporation. 5. In the aforesaid background O.A. No. 140 of 2001 was filed by respondent before the H.P. State Administrative Tribunal. It was allowed in the following terms:— "14. Keeping in view all the facts and circumstances of the case and also the observations of the Honble Apex Court in (1998) 7 SCC 84 and (1999) 7 SCC 739 (supra), I am of the view that no reasonable opportunity was given to the delinquent official before differing with the enquiry report. The disciplinary authority, before the conclusion of its findings has to communicate to the charged employee its tentative reasons for dis-agreeing with the findings of the enquiry officer. The memo Annexure A-5, issued in the present case to the applicant with regard to the proposed punishment does not meet the requirement of law because the final decision to disagree with the Enquiry Officer has already been taken. The post decisional hearing is of no avail in the facts and circumstances of the present case. The post decisional opportunity of making representation is not the substitute for pre-decisional hearing. Accordingly, the original application is allowed and the impugned orders dated 30.12.199,9 (Annexure A-5), Annexure dated 18.4.2000 (A-7) and order dated 20.9.2000 (Annexure A-9) are quashed and set aside and the respondents are directed to release all the consequential benefits including the continuity of service and further promotion.” In these circumstances present writ petition has been filed. 6. Accordingly, the original application is allowed and the impugned orders dated 30.12.199,9 (Annexure A-5), Annexure dated 18.4.2000 (A-7) and order dated 20.9.2000 (Annexure A-9) are quashed and set aside and the respondents are directed to release all the consequential benefits including the continuity of service and further promotion.” In these circumstances present writ petition has been filed. 6. Learned counsel for the petitioners submitted that the learned Tribunal below had fallen into error while allowing O.A. as no case was made out for setting aside the order of termination of the petitioner looking to the facts and circumstances of the case that was upheld in appeal. According to him so far misappropriation by not issuing tickets to the extent of Rs. 28/- under Charge No. 1 and on its basis Charges Nos. 3 and 4 having partly proved, impugned order cannot be sustained. 7. All these pleas have been controverted by Mr. Rajnish Maniktala, Advocate, learned counsel for the respondent, who submitted that there is nothing wrong with the decision of the learned Tribunal below. According to him admittedly minor penalty was imposed upon his client. He was satisfied with that In case disciplinary authority did not agree with it, it ought have assigned its reasons. This was the minimum requirement of not only Rule 15 of CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965 but also of fairplay and good conscious. Without assigning reasons as to why the Disciplinary Authority did not agree with the report of Enquiry Officer, we are unable to accept the plea urged on behalf of the petitioners that no wrong has been committed by the said authority. 8. This illegality as well as mistake has in our view, been perpetuated by the Appellate Authority while upholding the order of the Disciplinary Authority. Both these Authorities, i.e. Disciplinary as well as Appellate failed to appreciate that their orders are going to affect the civil rights of a person like respondent. As such even in the absence of decisions relied upon by the Tribunal while passing the impugned judgment, least that was expected of them (Disciplinary & Appellate Authorities), was that they ought to have applied their mind and then passed reasoned orders. This admittedly has not been done. Fair play required that application of mind should be reflected by process of reasoning as in the present case when report of the Enquiry Officer was not accepted. 9. Mr. This admittedly has not been done. Fair play required that application of mind should be reflected by process of reasoning as in the present case when report of the Enquiry Officer was not accepted. 9. Mr. Sharma, learned counsel for the petitioners, urged that instead of sending back the case to the disciplinary authority for re-consideration, respondent may be given post decisional hearing by this court. In our view it is not a substitute for principles of natural justice because respondent had a right to pre-decisional hearing before the Disciplinary Authority who chose not to agree with the findings recorded by the Enquiry Officer. For taking this view reference can be made to the decisions reported in H.LTrehan and others v. Union of India and others, (1989) 1 SCC 764; K.L Shephard and others v. Union of India and others, (1987) 4 SCC 431 and Swadeshi Cotton Mills v. Union of India and two other connected cases, (1981) 1 SCC 664. 10. To this limited extent we find that the decision of the State Administrative Tribunal is in accordance with law and is upheld. The question that needs to be further looked into is as to how the Tribunal ought to have proceeded further in the matter. In our considered view after having quashed the order of compulsory retirement dated 18.4.2002 and appellate order dated 20.9.2000, it ought to have directed the Disciplinary Authority to re-examine the matter and in case it chose to disagree with the decision of the Enquiry Officer, it could have proceeded further in the matter by recording reasons for such disagreement as well as to keep in view the decisions of the Honble Supreme Court of India reported in Yoginath D. Bagde v. State of Maharashtra and another, (1999) 7 SCC 739; Colour Chem Ltd. v. A.L. Alaspurkar and others, (1998) 3 SCC 192; S.B.L and others v. Arvind K. Shukla, AIR 2001 SC 2398; Bihar State Electricity Board v. Bra] Kishore Singh and others, 2001 LIC 1627. 11. To be fair to Mr. 11. To be fair to Mr. Sharma, we may notice that he placed reliance on a decision of Supreme Court reported in High Court of Judicature at Bombay through its Registrar v. Shashikant S. Patil and another, (2000) 1 SCC 416, and submitted that no illegality muchless impropriety has been committed by the Disciplinary Authority as well as the Appellate Authority, in passing the impugned order of punishment and dismissal of the appeal respectively. Thus, he has prayed for upholding the same by allowing this petition. We find that this plea has been raised simply to be rejected in the light of what has been discussed hereinabove. 12. No other point is urged. 13. As a result of the aforesaid discussion while upholding the decision of the H.P. State Administrative Tribunal so far it quashes and sets-aside the two orders, i.e. of the Disciplinary Authority dated 18.4.2000 and of appellate authority dated 20.9.2000, it is ordered that parties are relegated back to the position after receipt of inquiry report by the Disciplinary Authority. Said authority is now directed to re-examine the case of the respondent in the light of the inquiry report and proceed further as per law. In case it decides not to agree with the said report, in such a situation it will assign its reasons of such disagreement and then proceed further as envisaged under law. It is made clear that in case on the basis of the order of compulsory retirement (which was upheld in appeal), respondent had derived any retiral benefits, the same shall be restored back before he is heard further in the matter. Keeping in view the chequered history of this case, we feel that matter needs to be decided by the authorities concerned with utmost expedition and dispatch and it is ordered accordingly.-